President-Elect of Iran Says He Will Engage With the West--New York Times

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/world/middleeast/president-elect-of-iran-says-he-will-engage-with-the-west.html?hp

President-Elect of Iran Says He Will Engage With the West

By THOMAS ERDBRINK

Published: June 29, 2013

TEHRAN — Iran's president-elect, Hassan Rouhani, said Saturday that he would engage with the West and fulfill his electoral promises to allow more freedom for the Iranian people

Mr. Rouhani, who calls himself a moderate, won the June 14 presidential election by a large margin, surprising many who expected Iran's governing establishment to block any candidate calling for change. Hinting at the revolutions that have ousted several leaders in the Middle East, Mr. Rouhani emphasized that it was important to listen to the "majority of Iranians."

"In our region, there were some countries who miscalculated their positions, and you have witnessed what happened to them," he said during a live broadcast of a conference organized by Voice and Vision, Iran's state television and radio organization.

"The world is in a transitional mood, and a new order has yet to be established," he said. "If we miscalculate our national situation, it will be detrimental for us."

He also said Iran should not hesitate to criticize the Syrian government for some of its actions in its war against rebels seeking to oust it. While Iranian officials have staunchly defended Iran's support for President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, Mr. Rouhani warned against a double standard in international affairs.

"We should not describe as oppressive brutal actions in an enemy country while refraining from calling the same actions oppressive if they take place in a friendly country," he said. "Brutality must be called brutality."

Mr. Rouhani appealed for more moderation in foreign and domestic policies and praised the police for tolerating recent street celebrations over his election victory and for Iran's soccer team.

He also hinted that he would consider loosening some of the restrictions imposed by the much-loathed morality police, who arrest people for wearing "improper clothing" or not observing Islamic codes strictly. "Happiness is our people's right," he said. "We should not be strict toward the people. People follow the morality codes by themselves and are careful about them."

Mr. Rouhani, who will be sworn in on Aug. 3, reminded those opposing change in Iran that the election was also a referendum on the country's future.

"The majority of Iranian people voted for moderation, collective wisdom, insight and consultation," he said. "Everybody should accept the people's vote — the government should accept the people's vote. The people have chosen a new path."

Many Iranians are carefully optimistic about Mr. Rouhani. Last week, Iran's currency gained strength against the dollar. Business owners said they were hopeful that he would address domestic economic problems and possibly find a way to ease the international sanctions over Iran's nuclear program.

Mr. Rouhani also appealed for a more open state news media. "The age of monologue media is over; media should be interactive," he said. In Iran, millions of Web sites are blocked, and the state news media has a monopoly, while the authorities use radio waves to block satellite transmissions from abroad. "In a country whose legitimacy is rooted in its people, then there is no fear from free media," he said.

--

William O. Beeman 

Professor and Chair 

Department of Anthropology 

University of Minnesota 

395 HHH Center 

301 19th Avenue S.  

Minneapolis, MN 55455 

(612) 625-3400 

wbeeman@umn.edu

Twin Cities-Best Arts and Culture in the Nation

Rash Report: Twin Cities creative ecology is interdependent, healthy: http://www.startribune.com/opinion/commentaries/213594171.html

Thoughts on the invalidation of DOMA

Thoughts on the invalidation of DOMA

I wish I could be sanguine about the future of marriage equality, but judging from the angry pronouncements from the right it looks like hatred and bigotry, like the last lurch of a dying monster in a B-movie will not die.

The opposition to same-sex marriage purports to be about a lot of things: religious freedom (the freedom to hate and discriminate in name of religion), family values (despite rampant divorce, spousal abuse and child abuse among heterosexual couples) and even economic costs in insuring same sex spouses and losing tax revenue if people file as a married couple (as if Republicans really cared about tax revenue!)

What is really at issue is discrimination. The opponents of same-sex marriage want to do anything they can to avoid having to acknowledge that homosexuals are in any way "like them." They want to exclude gay citizens in any way they can from normal citizenship--even normal humanity.

This is why the issue of same-sex marriage is on a par with racial equality. It is an exercise that forces Americans to stop "othering" gay people, and in their own crude parlance, legalization of same-sex marriage is being "crammed down their throats." They prefer to exclude, hate and discriminate, and this is more important to them than any American ideal of equality, protection under the law or human rights.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/opinion/the-long-road-to-marriage-equality.html?comments#permid=27


--

William O. Beeman 

Professor and Chair 

Department of Anthropology 

University of Minnesota 

395 HHH Center 

301 19th Avenue S.  

Minneapolis, MN 55455 

(612) 625-3400 

wbeeman@umn.edu

Dennis Ross insults the Iranian people

In the New York Times today (June 26) former Middle East Negotiator Dennis Ross delivers a slap at the Iranian people. He writes

Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, allowed Mr. Rowhani to win the election recognizing that he had run against current Iranian policies that have isolated the country and invited economically disastrous sanctions. But it isn't clear why Mr. Khamenei allowed such an outcome, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/opinion/talk-to-irans-new-president-warily.html?hp&_r=0

In this statement, Mr. Ross, who urged support of the Green movement in 2009 effectively ignores the reform movement in Iran, a movement that has been ongoing for more than 15 years. He also insults the Iranian people by implying that they have no agency in their own elections. 

Mr. Ross is a neoconservative connected with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) a well known anti-Iran think tank, still influential with conservative legislators and supported by AIPAC.

One uncharacteristic point in Mr. Ross' op-ed was his de-facto call for recognition of Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy development. 

The answer should be that we can accept Iran's having civil nuclear power but with restrictions that would make the steps to producing nuclear weapons difficult, as well as quickly detectable.

Since Mr. Ross has been a hard-liner on this issue, calling for denying Iran any of its rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, this may signal that the extreme right, of which he is a member, is finally beginning to see after 10 years that this position has no currency. 

--

William O. Beeman 

Professor and Chair 

Department of Anthropology 

University of Minnesota 

395 HHH Center 

301 19th Avenue S.  

Minneapolis, MN 55455 

(612) 625-3400 

wbeeman@umn.edu

Marsha Cohen--Diamonds for Peanuts and the Double Standard on Iran (Beeman)

http://www.lobelog.com/diamonds-for-peanuts-and-the-double-standard/

"Diamonds for Peanuts" and the Double Standard

by Marsha B. Cohen

The New York Times' op-ed page headlined "Hopes for Iran", which offers half a dozen cautious to negative views on Iran's president-elect Hassan Rouhani, unexpectedly links to a "Related Story" published last year: Should Israel Accept a Nuclear Ban? Linking the online discussion — intentionally or not — to a debate over Israel's own nuclear program and policies may be more remarkable than any of the op-eds' arguments.

One of the most overlooked and under-discussed aspects of the Iranian nuclear program, at least from an Iranian point of view, is the double standard that's applied to it: while Israel has an estimated 100-200 nuclear weapons that it has concealed for decades, Iran is treated like the nuclear threat — and Iran doesn't possess a single nuclear weapon. Adding insult to injury, Israel is usually the first, loudest and shrillest voice condemning Iran and demanding "crippling sanctions" while deflecting attention away from its own record.

"Iran has consistently used the West's willingness to engage as a delaying tactic, a smoke screen behind which Iran's nuclear program has continued undeterred and, in many cases, undetected," complained former Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Dore Gold (also president of the hawkish Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) in a 2009 LA Times op-ed entitled "Iran's Nuclear Aspirations Threaten the World":

Back in 2005, Hassan Rowhani, the former chief nuclear negotiator of Iran during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, made a stunning confession in an internal briefing in Tehran, just as he was leaving his post. He explained that in the period during which he sat across from European negotiators discussing Iran's uranium enrichment ambitions, Tehran quietly managed to complete the critical second stage of uranium fuel production: its uranium conversion plant in Isfahan. He boasted that the day Iran started its negotiations in 2003 "there was no such thing as the Isfahan project." Now, he said, it was complete.

Yet half a century ago, Israel's Deputy Minister of Defense, Shimon Peres — the political architect of Israel's nuclear weapons program — looked President John F. Kennedy in the eye and solemnly intoned what would become Israel's "catechism", according to Avner Cohen: "I can tell you most clearly that we will not introduce nuclear weapons to the region, and certainly we will not be the first." Fifty years and at least 100 nuclear weapons later, Peres is awarded the U.S. Medal of Freedom, with no mention of his misrepresentation of Israel's nuclear progress.

According to declassified documents, Yitzhak Rabin, another future Israeli prime minister (who would be awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1994) also invoked the nuclear catechism to nuclear negotiator Paul Warnke in 1968, arguing that no product could be considered a deployable nuclear weapons-system unless it had been tested (Israel, of course, had not tested a nuclear weapon). Warnke was unswayed by Rabin's talmudic logic but came away convinced that pressuring Israel would be futile since it was already a nuclear weapons state.

In a BBC Radio June 14 debate between Gold and former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw about the prospects for improving relations with Iran after Rouhani's election, Straw pointed out that Israel has a "very extensive nuclear weapons program, and along with India and Pakistan are the three countries in the world, plus North Korea more recently, which have refused any kind of international supervision…":

JOHN HUMPHRYS (Host): Well let me put that to Dr Gold; you can't argue with that, Dr Gold?

DORE GOLD: Well, we can have a whole debate on Israel in a separate program.

JOHN HUMPHRYS: Well, it's entirely relevant isn't it? The fact is you're saying they want nuclear weapons; the fact is you have nuclear weapons.

DORE GOLD: Look, Israel has made statements in the past. Israeli ambassadors to the UN like myself have said that Israel won't be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.

JACK STRAW: You've got nuclear weapons.

JOHN HUMPHRYS: You've got them.

JACK STRAW: You've got them. Everyone knows that.

DORE GOLD: We have a very clear stand, but we're not the issue.

JACK STRAW: No, no, come on, you have nuclear weapons, let's be clear about this.

National security expert Bruce Riedel is among those who have observed Washington's "double standard when it comes to Israel's bomb: the NPT applies to all but Israel. Indeed, every Israeli prime minister since David Ben-Gurion has deliberately taken an evasive posture on the issue because they do not want to admit what everyone knows." Three years ago, Riedel suggested that the era of Israeli ambiguity about its nuclear program "may be coming to an end, raising fundamental questions about Israel's strategic situation in the region." Thus far that hasn't happened. Instead, Israeli leaders and the pro-Israel lobby use every opportunity (including Peres' Medal of Freedom acceptance speech) to deflect attention from Israel's defiant prevarication about its own nuclear status and directing it toward Iran.

This past April, Anthony Cordesman authored a paper for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) arguing that Israel posed more of an existential threat to Iran than the other way around. "It seems likely that Israel can already deliver an 'existential' nuclear strike on Iran, and will have far more capability to damage Iran than Iran is likely to have against Israel for the next decade," Cordesman wrote. (The paper has since been removed from the CSIS website, but references to it persist in numerous articles.)

This double standard, and refusal to recognize Iranian security concerns, is not news to Iranians. Ali Larijani, Speaker of the Iranian Majlis (Parliament), assured the Financial Times last September that talks between the U.S. and Iran "can be successful and help create more security in the region. But if they try to dissuade Iran from its rights to have peaceful nuclear technology, then they will not go anywhere — before or after the US elections." Larijani, who was Iran's nuclear negotiator between 2005-2007, proposed that declarations by U.S. political leaders that Iran has a right to "peaceful nuclear technology" be committed to in writing.

"Many times the US president or secretary of state have said they recognise Iran's right to nuclear energy," Larjani said. "So, if [they] accept this, write it down and then we use it as a basis to push forward the talks…What they say during the talks is different from what they say outside the talks. This is a problem." Larijani also denied that Iranian leaders were discussing withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) even though the benefits of Iran remaining a signatory — in the face of mounting international pressure campaigned for by Israel while Israel itself faced little to no criticism — seemed unclear. "The Israelis did not join the NPT and they do not recognize the IAEA," he said. "They are doing what they want — producing nuclear bombs, and no one questions it."

This past weekend, CNN's Christiane Amanpour bluntly suggested that up until now, the U.S. has offered Iran few incentives to comply with the international community's demands regarding Iran's nuclear program: "Let's just call a spade a spade. I've spoken to Iranian officials, former negotiators, actually people who worked for Dr. Rouhani earlier, and they said that so far the American incentives to Iran in these nuclear negotiations amounts to demanding diamonds for peanuts."

Ben Caspit, writing in al-Monitor last week week, notes that as soon as the Russians hinted Iran would be willing to suspend uranium enrichment and keep it at the 20% level, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blew off the suggestion as merely cosmetic. The Israeli demand will continue to be  uncompromising, Caspit says, insistent that "…nothing short of complete cessation of uranium enrichment, removal of all enriched uranium out of Iran; termination of nuclear facility activities and welcoming the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would provide sufficient guarantee of Iran's willingness to abandon the nuclear program. Needless to say this will never happen."

As Jim Lobe pointed out the other day, Rouhani outlined an 8-point blueprint for resolving the nuclear standoff between the U.S. and Iran in a letter to TIME in 2006. Rouhani stated:

In my personal judgment, a negotiated solution can be found in the context of the following steps, if and when creatively intertwined and negotiated in good faith by concerned officials…Iran is prepared to work with the IAEA and all states concerned about promoting confidence in its fuel cycle program. But Iran cannot be expected to give in to United States' bullying and non-proliferation double standards.

--

William O. Beeman 

Professor and Chair 

Department of Anthropology 

University of Minnesota 

395 HHH Center 

301 19th Avenue S.  

Minneapolis, MN 55455 

(612) 625-3400 

wbeeman@umn.edu

Neoconservative Reuel Marc Gerecht insults Dr. Hassan Rowhani in the New York Times

Self-avowed neoconservative Reuel Marc Gerecht in the New York Times on Sunday chose to insult Dr. Hassan Rowhani's educational credentials by stating that he "supposedly has a Ph.D. in constitutional law from some university in Scotland (exactly where isn't clear)"

<http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/06/17/hopes-for-change-in-iran/rowhani-is-a-tool-of-irans-rulers>

Here are the details from Glasgow Caledonian University where he received his higher degrees

Here are the details from Glasgow Caledonian University, where he received his Ph.D:

"Dr Rouhani, who was a clear winner of the Iranian Presidential election capturing more than 50% of the vote, studied at GCU in the 1990s under his family name of Hassan Feridon. He was awarded an MPhil in 1995. His thesis was entitled The Islamic Legislative Power with reference to the Iranian experience. In 1999, Dr Rouhani gained a PhD with his thesis, The Flexibility of Shariah (Islamic Law), with reference to the Iranian experience.

Dr Rouhani's election campaign videos featured pictures of Glasgow Caledonian University and the former GCU student spoke warmly of his time in the city. On Tuesday, June 18, the Glasgow-based Herald newspaper reported on Dr Rouhani's first news conference in Tehran, quoting him as saying he would "follow the path of moderation and justice, not extremism".

more can be seen at 

http://www.gcu.ac.uk/newsevents/news/article.php?id=59642

--

William O. Beeman 

Professor and Chair 

Department of Anthropology 

University of Minnesota 

395 HHH Center 

301 19th Avenue S.  

Minneapolis, MN 55455 

(612) 625-3400 

wbeeman@umn.edu

Oped-New York Times: How to End the Stalemate With Iran (Mousavian and Shabani)

How to End the Stalemate With Iran

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/opinion/how-to-end-the-stalemate-with-iran.html?_r=0

By SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN and MOHAMMAD ALI SHABANI

Published: June 18, 2013

THE stunning election of a pragmatic former Iranian nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, has offered the Obama administration a once-in-a-lifetime chance to end the atomic stalemate with Iran.

In the West, Mr. Rowhani is widely seen as a turbaned politico from inside the establishment. One of us has worked for him directly, as his deputy in nuclear talks. The other has conducted research at the think tank he runs. We can attest that he is wary of a purely ideological approach to foreign policy and is driven by more than simple expediency in pursuit of the national interest. After seeing the nuclear deal he was attempting to negotiate with the European Union fall apart in 2005, Mr. Rowhani is now seeking to resolve the nuclear issue once and for all, and also to redeem himself politically.

Mr. Rowhani's victory demonstrates that there is now real momentum toward the initiation of direct talks between Iran and the United States. Despite remarks he has made to appease hard-liners since his victory, Mr. Rowhani's campaign rhetoric made clear his desire to change the hostile relationship with America. In recent months, even Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has given permission for direct negotiation — although he has not expressed optimism about its prospects.

 

The single biggest threat to this unique window for dialogue is misguided perceptions of each side's respective strengths and weaknesses. To avoid squandering this opportunity, President Obama and President-elect Rowhani, who takes office in August, must resist and debunk the false impressions that have been promoted by extremists on both sides.

 

In Washington, some have started portraying Mr. Rowhani's election as proof that America's current approach, which relies on tough sanctions, is working. The perception is that the Iranians are willing to budge on their nuclear rights, and that the centrist president-elect — who once agreed to temporarily and voluntarily suspend uranium enrichment — will make unreciprocated concessions. According to this theory, a weakened Iran, hungry for an imminent end to hard-hitting sanctions, will take what it can get. This view implicitly promotes the dangerous idea that the United States should retain or even stiffen its rigid nuclear posture.

 

In Tehran, there is a sense of optimism about the nuclear issue that derives from a tenuous narrative of Iranian resurgence. For years, there has been a systemic reluctance to engage in substantive negotiations, unless Iran is operating from a position of strength. Now a new president has won a clear popular mandate after eight years of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's divisive rule. As a result, there is a growing perception that Iran has the long-sought upper hand.

 

Indeed, many view Mr. Rowhani's background as the supreme leader's longtime personal representative to the Supreme National Security Council as evidence of a new era of national cohesion. This perception of strength could spur Iran to seriously enter nuclear negotiations. But overconfidence could also lead Iran's rulers to avoid making the concessions necessary to break the stalemate.

 

When two rivals walk into a room, each convinced that he has the upper hand, it can end only in disaster. These diametrically opposed perceptions of the meaning of Mr. Rowhani's election have the potential to torpedo this unique opportunity for a deal.

 

Worryingly, the West has a history of squandering chances to strike a deal with Mr. Rowhani. He has publicly suggested that one route out of the nuclear stalemate is the torpedoed 2005 proposal he negotiated with Jacques Chirac, France's president at the time. Under that plan, Western powers would recognize Iran's legitimate rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, including uranium enrichment for civilian purposes like nuclear energy and medical research.

 

In exchange, Iran would accept the International Atomic Energy Agency's definition of "objective guarantees" that the Iranian nuclear program will remain peaceful and not be diverted toward weaponization in the future. That proposal fell apart because of pressure from the George W. Bush administration, which insisted on no enrichment at all.

 

Eight years after the collapse of dialogue with the European Union, the dominant discourse in Tehran still portrays Mr. Rowhani's recommendation to suspend enrichment on a voluntary, temporary basis as a failure because it resulted only in humiliating calls for an indefinite suspension of all enrichment.

 

But Iran's relinquishing of its legitimate rights under the N.P.T., including enrichment, isn't, and has never been, on the table. However, Iranian leaders are open to new measures that would permanently allay Western concerns about Iran's nuclear program.

Indeed, the contours of a final nuclear deal are clear. Iran will have to agree to the highest level of transparency and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and assure world powers that its nuclear program will never be diverted toward weaponization.

 

In exchange, the West will have to recognize Iran's right to peaceful nuclear technology, including enrichment, and gradually lift sanctions.

 

Sooner rather than later, Iran and the United States will engage with each other. The main obstacle to a final deal is no longer its terms, but the path to reaching such an accord. Mr. Rowhani and Mr. Obama must stick to pragmatism and fend off extremism. They must combine prudence with courage and take reciprocal, rationally sequenced steps, and then follow through with hard sells at home. And most of all, they must avoid embracing the misperceptions of strength and weakness that have brought us to the brink.

After decades of fruitless confrontation, both the United States and Iran need cooperation.

 

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former spokesman for Iran's nuclear negotiators, is a research scholar at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton and the author of "The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir." Mohammad Ali Shabani, a contributing editor at the Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, is a doctoral candidate at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

 

_________________________________________

Seyed Hossein Mousavian

Associate Research Scholar atWoodrow Wilson School Princeton University

Phone +1 609 258 9873 | Fax +1 6092563661 - smousavi@princeton.edu  

 http://www.princeton.edu/sgs/faculty-staff/seyed-hossein-mousavian/

 

---

June 18, 2013

How to End the Stalemate With Iran

By SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN and MOHAMMAD ALI SHABANI-- 

6/18/13 How to End the Stalemate With Iran - NYTimes.com

www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/opinion/how-to-end-the-stalemate-with-iran.html?hp&_r=0&pagewanted=print 1/3

June 18, 2013

How to End the Stalemate With Iran

By SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN and MOHAMMAD ALI SHABANI

THE stunning election of a pragmatic former Iranian nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, has

offered the Obama administration a once-in-a-lifetime chance to end the atomic stalemate with

Iran.

In the West, Mr. Rowhani is widely seen as a turbaned politico from inside the establishment.

One of us has worked for him directly, as his deputy in nuclear talks. The other has conducted

research at the think tank he runs. We can attest that he is wary of a purely ideological

approach to foreign policy and is driven by more than simple expediency in pursuit of the

national interest. After seeing the nuclear deal he was attempting to negotiate with the

European Union fall apart in 2005, Mr. Rowhani is now seeking to resolve the nuclear issue

once and for all, and also to redeem himself politically.

Mr. Rowhani's victory demonstrates that there is now real momentum toward the initiation of

direct talks between Iran and the United States. Despite remarks he has made to appease

hard-liners since his victory, Mr. Rowhani's campaign rhetoric made clear his desire to change

the hostile relationship with America. In recent months, even Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah

Ali Khamenei, has given permission for direct negotiation — although he has not expressed

optimism about its prospects.

The single biggest threat to this unique window for dialogue is misguided perceptions of each

side's respective strengths and weaknesses. To avoid squandering this opportunity, President

Obama and President-elect Rowhani, who takes office in August, must resist and debunk the

false impressions that have been promoted by extremists on both sides.

In Washington, some have started portraying Mr. Rowhani's election as proof that America's

current approach, which relies on tough sanctions, is working. The perception is that the

Iranians are willing to budge on their nuclear rights, and that the centrist president-elect —

who once agreed to temporarily and voluntarily suspend uranium enrichment — will make

unreciprocated concessions. According to this theory, a weakened Iran, hungry for an imminent

end to hard-hitting sanctions, will take what it can get. This view implicitly promotes the

dangerous idea that the United States should retain or even stiffen its rigid nuclear posture.

In Tehran, there is a sense of optimism about the nuclear issue that derives from a tenuous

MORE IN OPINION

Editorial: Details Not More Assurances

Read More »

6/18/13 How to End the Stalemate With Iran - NYTimes.com

www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/opinion/how-to-end-the-stalemate-with-iran.html?hp&_r=0&pagewanted=print 2/3

narrative of Iranian resurgence. For years, there has been a systemic reluctance to engage in

substantive negotiations, unless Iran is operating from a position of strength. Now a new

president has won a clear popular mandate after eight years of President Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad's divisive rule. As a result, there is a growing perception that Iran has the longsought

upper hand.

Indeed, many view Mr. Rowhani's background as the supreme leader's longtime personal

representative to the Supreme National Security Council as evidence of a new era of national

cohesion. This perception of strength could spur Iran to seriously enter nuclear negotiations.

But overconfidence could also lead Iran's rulers to avoid making the concessions necessary to

break the stalemate.

When two rivals walk into a room, each convinced that he has the upper hand, it can end only in

disaster. These diametrically opposed perceptions of the meaning of Mr. Rowhani's election

have the potential to torpedo this unique opportunity for a deal.

Worryingly, the West has a history of squandering chances to strike a deal with Mr. Rowhani.

He has publicly suggested that one route out of the nuclear stalemate is the torpedoed 2005

proposal he negotiated with Jacques Chirac, France's president at the time. Under that plan,

Western powers would recognize Iran's legitimate rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty, including uranium enrichment for civilian purposes like nuclear energy and medical

research.

In exchange, Iran would accept the International Atomic Energy Agency's definition of

"objective guarantees" that the Iranian nuclear program will remain peaceful and not be

diverted toward weaponization in the future. That proposal fell apart because of pressure from

the George W. Bush administration, which insisted on no enrichment at all.

Eight years after the collapse of dialogue with the European Union, the dominant discourse in

Tehran still portrays Mr. Rowhani's recommendation to suspend enrichment on a voluntary,

temporary basis as a failure because it resulted only in humiliating calls for an indefinite

suspension of all enrichment.

But Iran's relinquishing of its legitimate rights under the N.P.T., including enrichment, isn't, and

has never been, on the table. However, Iranian leaders are open to new measures that would

permanently allay Western concerns about Iran's nuclear program.

Indeed, the contours of a final nuclear deal are clear. Iran will have to agree to the highest level

of transparency and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and assure

world powers that its nuclear program will never be diverted toward weaponization. In

6/18/13 How to End the Stalemate With Iran - NYTimes.com

www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/opinion/how-to-end-the-stalemate-with-iran.html?hp&_r=0&pagewanted=print 3/3

exchange, the West will have to recognize Iran's right to peaceful nuclear technology, including

enrichment, and gradually lift sanctions.

Sooner rather than later, Iran and the United States will engage with each other. The main

obstacle to a final deal is no longer its terms, but the path to reaching such an accord. Mr.

Rowhani and Mr. Obama must stick to pragmatism and fend off extremism. They must

combine prudence with courage and take reciprocal, rationally sequenced steps, and then follow

through with hard sells at home. And most of all, they must avoid embracing the

misperceptions of strength and weakness that have brought us to the brink.

After decades of fruitless confrontation, both the United States and Iran need cooperation.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former spokesman for Iran's nuclear negotiators, is a research scholar

at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton and the author of

"The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir." Mohammad Ali Shabani, a contributing editor at the

Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, is a doctoral candidate at the School of Oriental and African

Studies, University of London.

William O. Beeman 

Professor and Chair 

Department of Anthropology 

University of Minnesota 

395 HHH Center 

301 19th Avenue S.  

Minneapolis, MN 55455 

(612) 625-3400 

wbeeman@umn.edu

Iranian and American Elections Have Similarities--William O. Beeman (New America Media)

http://newamericamedia.org/2013/06/iranian-and-american-elections-have-similarities.php

Iranian and American Elections Have Similarities

New America Media, News Analysis, William O. Beeman, Posted: Jun 16, 2013

Much of what transpired in Iran during the presidential election on Friday, June 14 (Flag Day in the U.S.), won by Hassan Rowhani should be familiar to American citizens: A candidate replacing a term-limited president contrasting himself with a former conservative government, campaigning on social and human rights issues along with a promise for an improved economy, combined with a split vote for his opposition that assured his victory by less than a one per-cent margin. Echoes of the American election in 2012 and many earlier elections are clearly present in Iran in 2013. Apparently Iranian and American voters are more alike than either group realizes.

And like American elections often are, the Iranian presidential elections did not turn out as expected—happily for many Iranians, and not so happily for Western critics of Iranian society. The victorious Mr. Rowhani, seen as the most moderate of all the six candidates, was not predicted to win by Western pundits, who followed their own superficial ideological bias, predicting that the election would be rigged by ultra-conservative mullahs and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to favor the most conservative contender. As Iranians turned out in huge numbers—more than 80 percent of eligible voters by the most recent estimates—they gave the lie to this superficial Western view.

Mr. Rowhani’s election was engineered with adept politicking worthy of Democratic mastermind David Axelrod. Mr. Rowhani was somewhat of a dark horse at the beginning of Iran’s short campaign period. Sharp, well-articulated political speeches, including criticism of the current government, garnered him immediate attention as a politician differentiated from the pack of conservatives favored by Iran’s leaders. His endorsement by former Presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani, both seen as relatively moderate, gave him a large boost. Finally, the strategic withdrawal of the other moderate candidate, Mohammad Reza Aref in favor of Mr. Rowhani, sealed the victory.

A friend who works for Press TV, a major Iranian news station, confirmed this dynamic: “After the withdrawal of Mr. Aref, the people saw that Mr. Rowhani had a chance of winning. Many who had planned to boycott the election then decided to vote.” The surge occurred in the two days before the election. As a result, the three conservative candidates split the conservative vote, and Mr. Rowhani as the only moderate surged in the polls and in the vote.

Mr. Rowhani’s victory was decisive. He emerged on Saturday garnering three times the votes of his nearest rival for office, and thus avoiding a runoff election. The results have been met with delight in Iran. Speaking to a journalist friend in Tehran, he reported that the people were celebrating Mr. Rowhani’s victory in the streets in huge numbers. “They are very, very happy,” he exclaimed.

Mr. Rowhani‘s social issues agenda was devoured by the voters, hungry for change. He vowed to increase freedom of expression, free political prisoners, establish greater roles for women and encourage support of the arts, as well as the most important issue for Iranians, to support the Iranian economy, which has been hit hard by U.S. and European sanctions. This makes the election similar to those elections everywhere, where social and pocketbook issues are the main concerns of the electorate.

From the myopic perspective of Washington, London and other Western capitals, however, the only issue worth talking about was Iran’s nuclear program. From the perspective of the Iranian citizenry, this was a minor issue, if it was mentioned at all. At best, the nuclear question was seen as an unfair characterization by the U.S. and its allies of a program in which Iranians take great pride, because of its demonstration of Iranian technological progress and knowledge. Concomitantly, U.S. sanctions designed to force Iran to stop enriching uranium were met with anger and defiance by the everyday voter.

Even with the Iranian public downplaying the nuclear issue, there is active speculation that the election of Mr. Rowhani may open a new chapter in Western-Iranian relations. Mr. Rowhani was the Iranian nuclear negotiator from 2003-2005. In 2004 on his watch Iran voluntarily suspended uranium enrichment as a confidence building measure in hoped-for negotiations with the West. The United States and other Western powers pointedly ignored this gesture, and imposed further sanctions. After the election of President Ahmadinejad in 2005, uranium enrichment was resumed.

It is important to note that despite the obvious delight of Iranian voters at Mr. Rowhani’s victory, his election is somewhat symbolic. His moderate views may be difficult to implement, given the relative weakness of the Iranian presidency compared to the nation’s Spiritual Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i , who occupies the principal seat of power in the Iranian government. Even outgoing President Ahmadinejad, seen as a conservative, frequently ran afoul of Ayatollah Khamene’i, with detrimental effects on his ability to lead.

Even so, this election will go far in mitigating the public feeling that the last election, in 2009, had been stolen by the government to give President Ahmadinejad a second term, rather than electing the more moderate Mir-Hossein Mousavi. This perception led to riots and demonstrations in Tehran that lasted for months.

The current election celebrations in Iran are reminiscent of those greeting President Obama in his victories of 2008 and 2012. As Americans know, a candidate’s promises are often more celebrated than the reality of governance. This may be Mr. Rowhani’s fate, but for the time being his election is a bright spot in a dismal region of the world.

William O. Beeman is Department Chair of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, a veteran commentator on Iran politics, and a longtime editorial contributor for New America Media.

Iran implicated in "Cyberattacks" with no evidence, and no attribution--New York Times and Vanity Fair

Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger have found a way to implicate Iran in the current discussion on cyber-surveillance. In the New York Times yesterday ("U.S. Helps Allies Trying to Battle Iranian Hacker" June 8, 2013), in the series of Sanger attacks on Iran appearing virtually every Saturday--perhaps to avoid close scrutiny.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/world/middleeast/us-helps-allies-trying-to-battle-iranian-hackers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

Shanker and Sanger attribute an attack on Aramco facilities to Iran using unattributed soures:

"But deterring cyberattacks is a far more complex problem, and American officials concede that this effort, which will include providing computer hardware and software and training to allies, is an experiment. It has been propelled by two high-profile attacks in the past year. One was against Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s largest, state-run oil producer, and according to American officials it was carried out by Iran. That attack crippled 30,000 computers but did not succeed in halting production." [the other was purportedly launched by North Korea--shades of the Axis of Evil]

A more nuanced, but still inaccurate picture arises in Michael Joseph Gross' article "Silent War" in the July 2013 issue of Vanity Fair
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2013/07/new-cyberwar-victims-american-business#livefyre

Gross writes:

"The data on three-quarters of the machines on the main computer network of Saudi Aramco had been destroyed. Hackers who identified themselves as Islamic and called themselves the Cutting Sword of Justice executed a full wipe of the hard drives of 30,000 Aramco personal computers. . . .

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, as forensic analysts began work in Dhahran, U.S. officials half a world away gathered in the White House Situation Room, where heads of agencies speculated about who had attacked Aramco and why, and what the attackers might do next. Cutting Sword claimed that it acted in revenge for the Saudi government’s support of “crimes and atrocities” in countries such as Bahrain and Syria. But officials gathered at the White House could not help wondering if the attack was payback from Iran, using America’s Saudi ally as a proxy, for the ongoing program of cyber-warfare waged by the U.S. and Israel, and probably other Western governments, against the Iranian nuclear program."

So we see from Gross' account that the perpetrators of this attack did not identify themselves as Iranian, but the United States "officials" were ready to be "wondering" if Iran had some kind of "proxy" to carry out the attack.

Both articles continue to imply that Iran has done things for which no one has any evidence or proof. It is Claude Rains in Cassablanca--"round up the usual suspects," and Iran is ALWAYS the usual suspect.