We Killed Osama bin Laden, Now Let’s Kill the Myth - New America Media
             The United States is jubilant over the killing of Osama bin  Laden in Pakistan. However, it will be some time before history catches  up with the mythology that arose around him and the al-Qaeda  organization in the past 10 years. Osama bin Laden at the end was far  from the looming powerful figure he was made out to be. He had outlived  his usefulness both as a bogeyman for the West, and as an Islamic  responder to the neo-colonialist forces his organization purported to  confront.
The principal myth surrounding bin Laden was that his  brand of religion represented a mainstream streak of something  identified variously as “jihadism” or, in more genteel rhetoric,  “political Islam.” This was far from the truth. No doubt, bin Laden  justified his actions with questionable theology and bogus fatwas, but  his organization’s actions represented an extremist view of religiously  justified political action that was embraced by only a fraction of the  Islamic world.
Second, bin Laden was seen as promulgating the  United States as al-Qaeda’s principal target—a mythology that was  certainly reinforced by the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.  Actually, the target of bin Laden and the al-Qaeda forces for which he  served as leader was the Saudi Arabian Royal Family. He turned to this  mission after the Soviet Union was expelled from Afghanistan. Bin Laden  viewed the Saudi Royal Family as having defiled the Arabian  Peninsula—the Holy Land where the major religious shrines of Islam are  located. Not only were the lives of the Saudi rulers seen as venal, they  allowed the United States and other nations to establish military  operations on Saudi soil. The United States became the target of  al-Qaeda when they set up operations to protect and support the Saudi  Royal Family.
Third, bin Laden was promoted by the Bush  administration as the mastermind of a gigantic apocalyptic global  organization under his control. They built the search for him into the  Global War on Terror—for which they actually issued GWOT medals. This  was a gigantic exaggeration that was largely accepted by the American  public without question.
Fourth, exaggerating bin Laden’s powers  also served disparate dissident groups in the Islamic world. After the  attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, bin Laden’s organization had enormous cachet  among political resistance groups—many of whom predated the rise of bin  Laden and al-Qaeda by decades. These smaller groups, with their own  local grievances against repressive rulers, quickly “branded” themselves  with the epithet “al-Qaeda.” It was a franchise operation that gave  many small groups from the Philippines to Morocco instant attention and  credibility. In fact, bin Laden never had direct control over these  groups. They would occasionally come to him directly or indirectly for  blessings of their actions, and he would routinely “approve.” This  served everyone’s purpose—making bin Laden’s al-Qaeda seem more powerful  than it was, and giving the local groups credibility. We now know that  over 10 years, bin Laden’s organization had dwindled precipitously. In  fact, its numbers were in the low hundreds in the Afghan-Pakistan  theater in the end.
Fifth, bin Laden was presented by the United  States—particularly the Bush administration—as impossibly clever, wily  and able to evade U.S. military operations. This mythology was  promulgated by Pakistan as well. In fact, bin Laden was an incredibly  useful symbolic bogeyman. His mere existence justified the United  States’ presence in Afghanistan, as well as billions of dollars spent  supporting the Pakistan military regime without complaint from the  American public. It is already apparent that the Pakistanis—and likely  some Americans—knew very well where he was. He was not hiding out in a  cave somewhere; he was 35 miles from Islamabad in a stable compound in a  luxury neighborhood.
Finally, bin Laden has been portrayed with the  power to reach beyond the grave. Virtually, the instant that his death  was announced, global speculation about “sleeper cells” and attacks by  “bin Laden’s followers” filled the airwaves. In fact, no one has ever  identified these organizations. This is part of the continued mythology  of a unified Islamic global movement organized to confront Western  civilization. Such a movement never existed, though there are certainly  individuals in both the West and the Islamic world who find it  politically useful to promulgate such a fabrication.
As we have  seen in the past few months, the dominant focus for political action in  the Middle East and elsewhere is not religious-based. Movements in  Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain and even Jordan are based in the  principle of secular representative government free of Western political  and economic control, channeled through repressive rulers. Even in  Iran, dissidents seek to lessen the influence of religious doctrinaire  control as their political system moves inexorably toward secular rule.
The  mythic ideology of Islamic confrontation with the West, inherent in the  bin Laden myth, should die with him. Americans, rather than celebrating  a triumph over Islam, should instead be looking forward to a new era of  cooperation with the progressive peoples throughout the region, who,  with bin Laden’s death, have now begun to have the false accusation of  Islamic extremism lifted from their shoulders.
William O.  Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology,  University of Minnesota, Minn. He has lived and worked in the Middle  East for more than 30 years, and is past president of the Middle East  Section of the American Anthropological Association. 
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