Iran Charges 3 American Hikers With Espionage
By JACK HEALY and NAZILA FATHI
Published: November 9, 2009
Note by William O. Beeman: There is a danger in being too sanguine about the situation of the three hikers (including photojournalist Shane Bauer) who transgressed the Iranian border and were today charged with spying in Iran. However, this follows the same pattern that has been seen now six or seven times. Someone is involved with a minor infraction, or just heightened suspicion. The Iranian government charges them with spying to squeeze the greatest possible propaganda value from the situation. The alleged spies are generally treated humanely and undergo a show trial, and are usually released, or allowed to depart after having posted bail as a sign of Iranian humanitarian generosity. If past experience is any predictor, this is how this situation will play out as well.
The spying charges become believable to a domestic Iranian audience because of the consistent pattern of past interference by the United States in Iranian affairs, and George W. Bush's flat statement that we have agents operating in Iran--something the Iranians absolutely know to be true. Iran is of course trying to make a point to the external world as well--stop spying on us!
We have two new stars at the State Department in Washington--John Limbert (Iran) and Tamara Wittes (Near East), both of whom have superb credentials on Iran. They will have to deal with this. The situation is also variable due to the ongoing nuclear negotiations. One can bet that these three detainees are being presented as chips in the negotiations--or possible signs of "good faith." The three hikers were caught in Iranian territory without visas or documentation. The United States treats similar infractions with utmost harshness, so we have very little to say on this matter from a legal standpoint. Asking for clemency is really the proper way to go, though it is going to stick in the craw of many right-wingers. Certainly condemning the Iranian government is foolish. The United States doesn't have a leg to stand on here.
The case of Iranian-American Kian Tajbakhsh, also charged with spying in Iran, is linked with this case as well.
Three American hikers who were arrested in Iran this summer after straying across its border with Iraq have been charged with spying, an Iranian state news agency reported on Monday.
The Tehran prosecutor told Iran’s official IRNA news agency that Iranian officials were pursuing espionage charges against the Americans, who were detained in late July after trekking through the Kurdistan region of Iraq and toward the Iranian border.
News of the charges drew a quick rebuke from Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, who reiterated calls for the Iranians to release the hikers, Shane M. Bauer of Emeryville, Calif.; Joshua F. Fattal of Cottage Grove, Ore.; and Sarah E. Shourd of Oakland, Calif.
“We believe strongly that there is no evidence to support any charge whatsoever,” she told reporters in Berlin, according to The Associated Press. “And we would renew our request on behalf of these three young people and their families that the Iranian government exercise compassion and release them so they can return home.”
The spectacle of three American tourists on trial in Iran could add more strain to relations between Iran the United States at a time when the countries are engaged in fraught negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. The United States has been pursuing the release of the hikers through Swiss diplomats who represent American interests in Tehran. The United States severed diplomatic ties with Iran after the 1979 takeover of its embassy in Tehran.
There was no immediate comment from family members or friends of the Americans.
Statements from family members and Kurdish authorities have said that the three travelers, all graduates of the University of California, Berkeley, had crossed from Turkey into Kurdistan, where they stayed at a hostel and camped as they headed toward Ahmed Awa, a resort area of caves and waterfalls on the border.
A statement on a Web site set up for the hikers, freethehikers.org, makes a plea for their release: “We hope the Iranian authorities understand that if our children and friends did happen to enter Iran, there can only be one reason: because they made a regrettable mistake and got lost.”
Jack Healy reported from New York, and Nazila Fathi from Toronto.
Monday, November 09, 2009
Sunday, November 08, 2009
William O. Beeman--IAEA Found Nothing Serious at Iran Site
IAEA Found Nothing Serious at Iran Site
Posted on Nov 07, 2009 02:56:00 PM by Andrew Lam
[ filed under: foreign-policy middle-east ]
by William O. Beeman
When a “secret nuclear site” in Qom (Qum), Iran was voluntarily disclosed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by Iran on September 21, 2009, President Obama claimed that the United States forced the disclosure. Indeed, the United States had known about the site for at least three years.
The Qom site was reportedly a second uranium enrichment site, matching the one already in operation at the town of Natanz. However, even at the time of disclosure it appeared to be less than had been reported by President Obama. It had 3000 antiquated centrifuges purchased from Pakistan that had not been even set up for use. It had no nuclear fissile material in it, In short, the site was was not operational in any way.
Iran claimed that under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) they were not required to report such sites until 180 days prior to the introduction of fissile material. The U.S. and other nations claimed that Iran was bound by an “additional protocol” to the NPT that required them to disclose planned sites even before they were built. Iran never properly ratified the additional protocol, but observed it voluntarily as a goodwill gesture from 2004 to 2007, formally notifying the IAEA in 2007 that they were suspending this observance. The conversion of the Qum site did not begin until 2008.
The brouhaha over the “discovery” of the Qum site was epic. Israel and numerous American politicians claimed that it “proved” that Iran was building a bomb. Iran immediately invited IAEA inspectors to the site, though they claimed they were not required to do so.
Last Thursday Reuters and the New York Times reported that the IAEA inspectors had visited the Qom site. As can be seen from
the Reuters article, the whole matter proved to be a tempest in a teapot.
According to IAEA Chief, Mohammad al-Baradei, the Qom site contained nothing of any importance, was not operational, and was in effect a bunker—a hole in the ground. The flap over this silly incident demonstrates the extraordinary lengths politicians in Israel and the West will go to demonize Iran’s nuclear energy program.
There is still no proof whatever that Iran has a nuclear weapons program.
Posted on Nov 07, 2009 02:56:00 PM by Andrew Lam
[ filed under: foreign-policy middle-east ]
by William O. Beeman
When a “secret nuclear site” in Qom (Qum), Iran was voluntarily disclosed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by Iran on September 21, 2009, President Obama claimed that the United States forced the disclosure. Indeed, the United States had known about the site for at least three years.
The Qom site was reportedly a second uranium enrichment site, matching the one already in operation at the town of Natanz. However, even at the time of disclosure it appeared to be less than had been reported by President Obama. It had 3000 antiquated centrifuges purchased from Pakistan that had not been even set up for use. It had no nuclear fissile material in it, In short, the site was was not operational in any way.
Iran claimed that under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) they were not required to report such sites until 180 days prior to the introduction of fissile material. The U.S. and other nations claimed that Iran was bound by an “additional protocol” to the NPT that required them to disclose planned sites even before they were built. Iran never properly ratified the additional protocol, but observed it voluntarily as a goodwill gesture from 2004 to 2007, formally notifying the IAEA in 2007 that they were suspending this observance. The conversion of the Qum site did not begin until 2008.
The brouhaha over the “discovery” of the Qum site was epic. Israel and numerous American politicians claimed that it “proved” that Iran was building a bomb. Iran immediately invited IAEA inspectors to the site, though they claimed they were not required to do so.
Last Thursday Reuters and the New York Times reported that the IAEA inspectors had visited the Qom site. As can be seen from
the Reuters article, the whole matter proved to be a tempest in a teapot.
According to IAEA Chief, Mohammad al-Baradei, the Qom site contained nothing of any importance, was not operational, and was in effect a bunker—a hole in the ground. The flap over this silly incident demonstrates the extraordinary lengths politicians in Israel and the West will go to demonize Iran’s nuclear energy program.
There is still no proof whatever that Iran has a nuclear weapons program.
Saturday, November 07, 2009
Reuters: IAEA Found Nothing Serious at Iran Site
Reuters News Service
IAEA found nothing serious at Iran site: ElBaradei
Thu Nov 5, 2009 4:26pm EST
Note from William O. Beeman: When the "secret nuclear site" in Qum, Iran was disclosed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)voluntarily by Iran in September 2009, President Obama claimed that the United States forced the disclosure. The site had no nuclear fissile material in it, and was not operational. Iran claimed that under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) they were not required to report such sites until 180 days prior to the introduction of such material. The U.S. and other nations claimed that Iran was bound by an "additional protocol" to the NPT that required them to disclose planned sites even before they were built. Iran never properly ratified the additional protocol, but observed it voluntarily as a goodwill gesture from 2004 to 2007, formally notifying the IAEA that they were suspending this observance. The conversion of the Qum site did not begin until 2008. The brouhaha over the "discovery" of the Qum site was epic. Israel claimed that it "proved" that Iran was building a bomb. Iran immediately invited IAEA inspectors to the site, though they claimed they were not required to do so. As can be seen from the article below, this was a tempest in a teapot. The Qum site contained nothing of any importance, was not operational, and was in effect a bunker--a hole in the ground. The flap over this silly incident demonstrates the extraordinary lengths politicians in Israel and the West will go to demonize Iran's nuclear energy program. There is still no proof whatever that Iran has a nuclear weapons program.
VIENNA (Reuters) - U.N. inspectors found "nothing to be worried about" in a first look at a previously secret uranium enrichment site in Iran last month, the International Atomic Energy chief said in remarks published Thursday.
Mohamed ElBaradei also told the New York Times that he was examining possible compromises to unblock a draft nuclear cooperation deal between Iran and three major powers that has foundered over Iranian objections.
The nuclear site, which Iran revealed in September three years after diplomats said Western spies first detected it, added to Western fears of covert Iranian efforts to develop atom bombs. Iran says it is enriching uranium only for electricity.
ElBaradei was quoted in a New York Times interview as saying his inspectors' initial findings at the fortified site beneath a desert mountain near the Shi'ite holy city of Qom were "nothing to be worried about."
"The idea was to use it as a bunker under the mountain to protect things," ElBaradei, alluding to Tehran's references to the site as a fallback for its nuclear program in case its larger Natanz enrichment plant were bombed by a foe like Israel.
"It's a hole in a mountain," he said.
The IAEA has declined to comment on whether the inspectors came across anything surprising or were able to obtain all the documentation and on-site access they had wanted at the remote spot about 160 km (100 miles) south of Tehran.
Details are expected to be included in the next IAEA report on Iran's disputed nuclear activity due in mid-November.
The inspectors' goal was to compare engineering designs to be provided by Iran with the actual look of the facility, interview scientists and other employees, and take soil samples to check for any traces of activity oriented to making bombs.
SUSPICIONS
Western diplomats and analysts say the site's capacity appears too small to fuel a nuclear power station but enough to yield fissile material for one or two nuclear warheads a year.
The Islamic Republic revealed the plant's existence to the Vienna-based U.N. nuclear watchdog on September 21. It said the site, which remains under construction, would enrich uranium only to the low 5 percent purity suitable for power plant fuel.
Enrichment to the 90 percent threshold provides the fissile material that detonates nuclear weapons.
After talks with Iran and three world powers, ElBaradei drafted a plan for Iran to transfer most of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia and France to turn it into fuel for a Tehran reactor that makes isotopes for cancer treatment.
Russia, France and the United States, which would help modernize the reactor's safety equipment and instrumentation under the deal, see it as a way to reduce Iran's LEU stockpile below the threshold needed to produce material for a bomb.
But since the October 19-21 talks, Iran has made clear it is loath to ship its own LEU abroad because of its strategic value, and would prefer buying the reactor fuel it needs from foreign suppliers. Iran has called for more talks.
Western diplomats say the three powers do not want more talks and that Iran's demands are a non-starter as they would do nothing to remove the risk of nuclear proliferation in Iran.
ElBaradei was quoted by the New York Times as saying the problem boiled down to "total distrust on the part of Iran ...
"The issue is timing, whether the uranium goes out and then some time later they get the fuel, as we agreed (tentatively) in Geneva, or whether it only goes at the same time as the fuel is delivered," he said.
"There are a lot of ideas. One is to send (Iran's uranium) to a third country, which could be a friendly country to Iran, and it stays there. Park it in another state ... (for) something like a year..., then ... bring in the fuel. The issue is to get it out, and so create the time and space to start building trust."
(Writing by Mark Heinrich; Editing by Richard Williams)
William O. Beeman--Commensality--Table Fellowship (interview)
http://www.startribune.com/lifestyle/taste/69079902.html?elr=KArksUUUoDEy3LGDiO7aiU
Commensality: Table fellowship
Mind your manners, and all is well at the table.
By LEE SVITAK DEAN, Star Tribune
Last update: November 4, 2009 - 2:33 PM
Eating with others at a shared table is one of the most important human activities, says William Beeman, professor of anthropology at the University of Minnesota. There's even a word for it: commensality.
"There's not a society on Earth where human beings don't engage in eating together as a really important activity," he said. "The process of eating together actually takes on the quality of a kind of social ritual."
Consider how people, gathered around a table, generally don't start eating until everyone has food. "That little principle of starting at the same time is widespread on the planet and almost universally observed," said Beeman, who will speak Nov. 5 on global table manners and etiquette at the Bell Museum, as part of the "Hungry Planet" exhibit.
Meals often have a ritual that reflects the beginning of the event, be it a toast or invocation as simple as "bon appétit!"
Most table manners reflect a transition between the act of eating and other kinds of social life. In many societies, there may be a kind of hierarchical movement to the table, with the most prominent people first and then others following.
Think rank doesn't matter in this country? At the White House, there is a chief of protocol who makes certain that people are placed at the dinner table in the right order. "The person who sits next to the First Lady gets the real place of honor and you might be insulted if you don't get that place," said Beeman.
The act of eating is not particularly pleasant to watch, regardless of culture. Beeman noted that the physical body is an important boundary everywhere, and rituals are set so we make sure there's a clear transition between inside and outside (such as ingesting).
Societies try to make eating as gracious as possible. In cultures where food is to be eaten with fingers, for example, hands are washed in public, as a courtesy to others.
Generally, table manners are intended to facilitate the social event, whether it's a dinner party or a family sitting together at the table.
"The goal is for the meal to go along well for everyone," Beeman said.
Commensality: Table fellowship
Mind your manners, and all is well at the table.
By LEE SVITAK DEAN, Star Tribune
Last update: November 4, 2009 - 2:33 PM
Eating with others at a shared table is one of the most important human activities, says William Beeman, professor of anthropology at the University of Minnesota. There's even a word for it: commensality.
"There's not a society on Earth where human beings don't engage in eating together as a really important activity," he said. "The process of eating together actually takes on the quality of a kind of social ritual."
Consider how people, gathered around a table, generally don't start eating until everyone has food. "That little principle of starting at the same time is widespread on the planet and almost universally observed," said Beeman, who will speak Nov. 5 on global table manners and etiquette at the Bell Museum, as part of the "Hungry Planet" exhibit.
Meals often have a ritual that reflects the beginning of the event, be it a toast or invocation as simple as "bon appétit!"
Most table manners reflect a transition between the act of eating and other kinds of social life. In many societies, there may be a kind of hierarchical movement to the table, with the most prominent people first and then others following.
Think rank doesn't matter in this country? At the White House, there is a chief of protocol who makes certain that people are placed at the dinner table in the right order. "The person who sits next to the First Lady gets the real place of honor and you might be insulted if you don't get that place," said Beeman.
The act of eating is not particularly pleasant to watch, regardless of culture. Beeman noted that the physical body is an important boundary everywhere, and rituals are set so we make sure there's a clear transition between inside and outside (such as ingesting).
Societies try to make eating as gracious as possible. In cultures where food is to be eaten with fingers, for example, hands are washed in public, as a courtesy to others.
Generally, table manners are intended to facilitate the social event, whether it's a dinner party or a family sitting together at the table.
"The goal is for the meal to go along well for everyone," Beeman said.
Wednesday, October 14, 2009
William O. Beeman--Commentary on Afghanistan--KARE 11 Television, Minneapolis
Two Minnesota families are mourning the loss of two men killed last week fighting for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
"It took so long to sink in, I don't think it has really," Kyle Taylor said in Two Harbors Tuesday morning. Marine Staff Sgt. Aaron Taylor, Kyle's older brother, was killed Friday while on foot patrol in Afghanistan. "He was a great man, he died doing what he loved to do and I only wish I could be like him some day," Kyle Taylor said.
A day later, 24 year old National Guard Specialist George Cauley of Walker died in Afghanistan. He was injured a few days earlier by an insurgent bomb, also in Helmand Province.
The two soldiers were killed as President Obama considered a request for 40,000 extra troops for the war in Afghanistan. General Stanley McChrystal, the military commander in the country, made a very public plea for more soldiers on the grounds a few weeks ago.
"It certainly will intensify. As we escalate, so will the other side," U of M Anthropology Chair William Beeman said. Beeman is an internationally known expert on the Middle East. He believes even with more US troops, the war will become even more difficult in the coming weeks. Beeman said Afghanistan is so divided that it could be tough to figure out who is loyal to Al Qaeda and who will be willing to help US soldiers.
"The country's always been split up in small territories that were more or less governed by local political figures. Nobody has a tattoo on their forehead that says Taliban or Al Qaeda," Beeman said. He also added that the people of Afghanistan are prone to change loyalties on a weekly or monthly basis.
The U.S. Department of Defense reports more than 792 servicemen and women have been killed in or around Afghanistan in the past 8 years. 612 were killed by "hostile action."
Currently, 117 MN National Guard Soldiers from Duluth's 114th are in the country, 24 additional Minnesotans are on a Mentoring Liaison Team. Another 130 Army Reservists from Minnesota were deployed to Afghanistan a month and a half ago.
The family of Aaron Taylor is thinking of each and every one of them, as they continue Aaron's mission. "He was working with a good bunch of guys and he was proud to work with them," Kyle Taylor concluded.
(Copyright 2009 by KARE. All Rights Reserved.)
Tuesday, September 29, 2009
William O. Beeman--Iran's Nuclear Program: Facts Americans Need to Know (New America Media)
Iran’s Nuclear Program: Facts Americans Need to Know
New America Media, News Analysis,
William O. Beeman,
Posted: Sep 29, 2009
The recent news that Iran is in the process of building a second uranium enrichment facility sent politicians and the press into a tizzy. Consequently, the American public is once again being barraged with half-truths and misstatements about Iran’s nuclear program.
In the spirit of public service, here are 10 basic facts about Iran’s nuclear energy program that Americans desperately need to know.
1. No one has presented any concrete evidence that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. This has been asserted in every inspection report of Iran carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and our own American National Intelligence Estimate.
2. Iranian officials have renounced nuclear weapons as un-Islamic and unnecessary for Iran’s defense. Iran has not launched a first strike against any nation for more than 300 years, and it will not attack Israel or any other nation. It will, however, defend itself.
3. Iran would have to build numerous facilities to process nuclear material before it could even think about producing a weapon.
4. The facility discovered last week in Qom is incomplete, non-operational and has not had any nuclear material introduced into it. It is designed, not as a weapons manufacturing plant, but as a mini-version of the enrichment facility at Natanz. It was probably intended as a back-up if Natanz were bombed.
5. The Iranians make a strong claim that they were not required to report the facility until 180 days before fissile material was introduced. It is simply not true that they are in unambiguous violation of their “international obligations,” as asserted by President Obama.
6. The United States knew about the Qom facility four years ago and chose not to reveal its knowledge. In fact, if the facility were illegal, the United States was obliged to reveal it. Either the facility was not illegal, or the United States is itself in violation of its treaty obligations.
7. The Qom facility was not “exposed” by the United States. It was revealed by a voluntary letter from Iran to the IAEA several days earlier than the American announcement.
8. If operational, the Qom plant would at best be able to produce enough raw fissile material to produce only one bomb per year. In order for such a bomb to be built, the enriched uranium would still have to be sent through numerous non-existent processing facilities before emerging as a weapon. By contrast, Israel, Pakistan and India all have large stockpiles of nuclear warheads ready to launch.
9. Iran actually needs nuclear energy to generate electricity, as it asserts. Currently, Iran uses natural gas for its electricity generation. As Iran’s crude oil supplies dwindle, that gas is needed to “re-inject” the oil fields to increase oil production. It is also more profitable for Iran to sell the remaining gas abroad in liquid form than to use it to generate electric power.
10. Iran will not give up nuclear enrichment under pressure. The nuclear energy program was started nearly 40 years ago under U.S. ally Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Iranians of all ages and all economic classes take pride in the development of nuclear energy as proof of Iran’s scientific and engineering prowess. They see efforts to curtail this as attempts by the West to suppress their progress. Whoever is elected president in Iran in the future will enthusiastically support the nuclear program.
So, why have our national leaders misled the public about this program? One reason is that Iran has become the universal bogeyman for American politicians. No one has ever lost a vote by attacking Iran and many have been attacked for seeming to be “soft” on Iran. Moreover, Israel and its supporters have successfully promulgated the equation that to be less than hostile to Iran is to be anti-Israel or even anti-Semitic. Neoconservatives in the Bush administration also had plans for regime change in Iran dating back to the early 1990’s, and portraying Iran as a nuclear menace would build public support for an attack on the Islamic Republic.
Americans may think that an Iranian nuclear weapons program exists because of the clever rhetoric used by Iran’s detractors—even Obama. Phrases like, “We must prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,” or “If Iran gets a nuclear weapon, the world is in danger,” are weasel phrases designed to mislead the public. The same tricks were used to convince the public that Iraq was behind the 9-11 attacks on New York and Washington.
One thing is certain. If the American public does not wake up and realize that it is being deceived on Iran, either Israel or the United States or both could attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, Iran would retaliate, and the world conflagration would truly begin.
William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Minn. He is past-president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association. He has conducted research in Iran for over 40 years and is author, most recently, of "The 'Great Satan' vs. the 'Mad Mullahs': How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other," (University of Chicago Press, 2008).
New America Media, News Analysis,
William O. Beeman,
Posted: Sep 29, 2009
The recent news that Iran is in the process of building a second uranium enrichment facility sent politicians and the press into a tizzy. Consequently, the American public is once again being barraged with half-truths and misstatements about Iran’s nuclear program.
In the spirit of public service, here are 10 basic facts about Iran’s nuclear energy program that Americans desperately need to know.
1. No one has presented any concrete evidence that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. This has been asserted in every inspection report of Iran carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and our own American National Intelligence Estimate.
2. Iranian officials have renounced nuclear weapons as un-Islamic and unnecessary for Iran’s defense. Iran has not launched a first strike against any nation for more than 300 years, and it will not attack Israel or any other nation. It will, however, defend itself.
3. Iran would have to build numerous facilities to process nuclear material before it could even think about producing a weapon.
4. The facility discovered last week in Qom is incomplete, non-operational and has not had any nuclear material introduced into it. It is designed, not as a weapons manufacturing plant, but as a mini-version of the enrichment facility at Natanz. It was probably intended as a back-up if Natanz were bombed.
5. The Iranians make a strong claim that they were not required to report the facility until 180 days before fissile material was introduced. It is simply not true that they are in unambiguous violation of their “international obligations,” as asserted by President Obama.
6. The United States knew about the Qom facility four years ago and chose not to reveal its knowledge. In fact, if the facility were illegal, the United States was obliged to reveal it. Either the facility was not illegal, or the United States is itself in violation of its treaty obligations.
7. The Qom facility was not “exposed” by the United States. It was revealed by a voluntary letter from Iran to the IAEA several days earlier than the American announcement.
8. If operational, the Qom plant would at best be able to produce enough raw fissile material to produce only one bomb per year. In order for such a bomb to be built, the enriched uranium would still have to be sent through numerous non-existent processing facilities before emerging as a weapon. By contrast, Israel, Pakistan and India all have large stockpiles of nuclear warheads ready to launch.
9. Iran actually needs nuclear energy to generate electricity, as it asserts. Currently, Iran uses natural gas for its electricity generation. As Iran’s crude oil supplies dwindle, that gas is needed to “re-inject” the oil fields to increase oil production. It is also more profitable for Iran to sell the remaining gas abroad in liquid form than to use it to generate electric power.
10. Iran will not give up nuclear enrichment under pressure. The nuclear energy program was started nearly 40 years ago under U.S. ally Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Iranians of all ages and all economic classes take pride in the development of nuclear energy as proof of Iran’s scientific and engineering prowess. They see efforts to curtail this as attempts by the West to suppress their progress. Whoever is elected president in Iran in the future will enthusiastically support the nuclear program.
So, why have our national leaders misled the public about this program? One reason is that Iran has become the universal bogeyman for American politicians. No one has ever lost a vote by attacking Iran and many have been attacked for seeming to be “soft” on Iran. Moreover, Israel and its supporters have successfully promulgated the equation that to be less than hostile to Iran is to be anti-Israel or even anti-Semitic. Neoconservatives in the Bush administration also had plans for regime change in Iran dating back to the early 1990’s, and portraying Iran as a nuclear menace would build public support for an attack on the Islamic Republic.
Americans may think that an Iranian nuclear weapons program exists because of the clever rhetoric used by Iran’s detractors—even Obama. Phrases like, “We must prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,” or “If Iran gets a nuclear weapon, the world is in danger,” are weasel phrases designed to mislead the public. The same tricks were used to convince the public that Iraq was behind the 9-11 attacks on New York and Washington.
One thing is certain. If the American public does not wake up and realize that it is being deceived on Iran, either Israel or the United States or both could attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, Iran would retaliate, and the world conflagration would truly begin.
William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Minn. He is past-president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association. He has conducted research in Iran for over 40 years and is author, most recently, of "The 'Great Satan' vs. the 'Mad Mullahs': How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other," (University of Chicago Press, 2008).
Monday, September 28, 2009
William O. Beeman speaks on Iran on Minnesota Public Radio
Friends,
I appeared today (September 28) on Minnesota Public Radio's Midday program talking about Iran, the recent "discovery" of the nuclear facility at Qom and its implications for future relations with Iran. You can access the program directly below.
Best,
Bill Beeman
I appeared today (September 28) on Minnesota Public Radio's Midday program talking about Iran, the recent "discovery" of the nuclear facility at Qom and its implications for future relations with Iran. You can access the program directly below.
Best,
Bill Beeman
Saturday, September 26, 2009
Willaiam O. Beeman--New U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Iran Will Backfire (New America Media)
New U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Iran Will Backfire
New America Media, News Analysis,
William O. Beeman, Posted: Sep 24, 2009
The U.S. Congress, with the support of the Obama administration, may think it is getting tough with Iran through a series of resolutions supporting increased economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic. The effect of these measures will be exactly the opposite of what Congress intends. In fact, besides having no tangible effect, they are actually being welcomed by Iran’s leaders.
The U.S. sanctions provide cover for stern, unpopular economic measures the Iranian government wants desperately to enact, but can’t in the current political climate. Having the United States to blame makes these moves justifiable to the restive Iranian public, already in turmoil over the contested July 12 presidential election.
The most foolish of the U.S. measures is a proposed resolution to embargo gasoline imports to Iran. Lobbyists who oppose Iran and its policies have told Congress that Iran does not produce enough gasoline for its internal needs, and must import it from abroad. This is true.
What the U.S. Congress does not understand, however, is that the Iranian government subsidizes the gasoline it imports so the cost to the public is roughly 10 cents per liter, or just short of 40 cents per gallon. The cost is ruinous and the government has acted to curb the costs. In 2007 the government imposed rationing on the public -- 100 liters per month for individuals and 600 liters per month for taxicabs and other transport vehicles. Moreover, a program of equipping vehicles for natural gas is well underway. The free market is also active. For those who need more than the allotted 100 liters of gasoline, it can be purchased on the open market for approximately $2 (U.S.) per gallon.
The Iranian government aims to completely eliminate gasoline imports by 2013, and it is making significant progress toward that goal. In order to progress, they would like to introduce further rationing, and transfer gas purchases gradually to free-market prices. However, they know that they will meet tremendous public resistance. When rationing was initially introduced, there were public protests, and threats of public transportation strikes.
In this light, the U.S. Congress’ call for sanctions allows the Iranian government to further ration gasoline and blame America for the need to do it.
Of course, American calls for an embargo are futile anyway, and the Iranian leaders know very well that pointing fingers at the United States to justify rationing would be a cynical charade. Gasoline is sold through independent brokers worldwide. These are private entrepreneurs operating under very few restrictions. The idea that any U.S. measure would stop gasoline imports into Iran is a practical absurdity, short of blockading the Straits of Hormuz, the entrance to the Persian Gulf.
Other sanctions have made life somewhat more uncomfortable for the Iranian middle and lower economic groups, but they have not stopped banking or trade. Anything available in the United States is also available in Iran, albeit at elevated prices. When prices go up in Iran due to inflation resulting from bad government economic policies, once again Iranian leaders blame the United States.
The international community is also not likely to support further economic sanctions against Iran. Russia and China in particular have lucrative trade agreements with Tehran, and expect to expand these relationships in the future. Moreover, each has a veto on the United Nations Security Council where such measures must be ratified.
The most disturbing aspect of the American call for tougher economic sanctions is that no one can say what they are designed to accomplish. Some see them as a measure to force Iran to suspend uranium enrichment. However, Iran maintains that uranium enrichment as an inalienable right under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), if used for peaceful purposes. Since there is no concrete evidence that Iran has a nuclear weapons program, and Iranian leaders have themselves denounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons, Iranians are adamant that they will not be forced into doing something that no other signatory to the NPT is being required to do.
Although Iran’s internal politics are chaotic at present, in the long run the United States must engage Iran in dialogue about a whole host of issues – refugees, drug trafficking, environmental issues, regional security and containment of disease, to name just a few. The persistence of the Congressional clamor for these ineffective and meaningless sanctions only serves as a barrier to more productive relations.
William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn. He is past president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association, and former director of Middle East Studies at Brown University. His most recent book is “The ‘Great Satan’ vs. the ‘Mad Mullahs’: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other” (University of Chicago Press).
New America Media, News Analysis,
William O. Beeman, Posted: Sep 24, 2009
The U.S. Congress, with the support of the Obama administration, may think it is getting tough with Iran through a series of resolutions supporting increased economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic. The effect of these measures will be exactly the opposite of what Congress intends. In fact, besides having no tangible effect, they are actually being welcomed by Iran’s leaders.
The U.S. sanctions provide cover for stern, unpopular economic measures the Iranian government wants desperately to enact, but can’t in the current political climate. Having the United States to blame makes these moves justifiable to the restive Iranian public, already in turmoil over the contested July 12 presidential election.
The most foolish of the U.S. measures is a proposed resolution to embargo gasoline imports to Iran. Lobbyists who oppose Iran and its policies have told Congress that Iran does not produce enough gasoline for its internal needs, and must import it from abroad. This is true.
What the U.S. Congress does not understand, however, is that the Iranian government subsidizes the gasoline it imports so the cost to the public is roughly 10 cents per liter, or just short of 40 cents per gallon. The cost is ruinous and the government has acted to curb the costs. In 2007 the government imposed rationing on the public -- 100 liters per month for individuals and 600 liters per month for taxicabs and other transport vehicles. Moreover, a program of equipping vehicles for natural gas is well underway. The free market is also active. For those who need more than the allotted 100 liters of gasoline, it can be purchased on the open market for approximately $2 (U.S.) per gallon.
The Iranian government aims to completely eliminate gasoline imports by 2013, and it is making significant progress toward that goal. In order to progress, they would like to introduce further rationing, and transfer gas purchases gradually to free-market prices. However, they know that they will meet tremendous public resistance. When rationing was initially introduced, there were public protests, and threats of public transportation strikes.
In this light, the U.S. Congress’ call for sanctions allows the Iranian government to further ration gasoline and blame America for the need to do it.
Of course, American calls for an embargo are futile anyway, and the Iranian leaders know very well that pointing fingers at the United States to justify rationing would be a cynical charade. Gasoline is sold through independent brokers worldwide. These are private entrepreneurs operating under very few restrictions. The idea that any U.S. measure would stop gasoline imports into Iran is a practical absurdity, short of blockading the Straits of Hormuz, the entrance to the Persian Gulf.
Other sanctions have made life somewhat more uncomfortable for the Iranian middle and lower economic groups, but they have not stopped banking or trade. Anything available in the United States is also available in Iran, albeit at elevated prices. When prices go up in Iran due to inflation resulting from bad government economic policies, once again Iranian leaders blame the United States.
The international community is also not likely to support further economic sanctions against Iran. Russia and China in particular have lucrative trade agreements with Tehran, and expect to expand these relationships in the future. Moreover, each has a veto on the United Nations Security Council where such measures must be ratified.
The most disturbing aspect of the American call for tougher economic sanctions is that no one can say what they are designed to accomplish. Some see them as a measure to force Iran to suspend uranium enrichment. However, Iran maintains that uranium enrichment as an inalienable right under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), if used for peaceful purposes. Since there is no concrete evidence that Iran has a nuclear weapons program, and Iranian leaders have themselves denounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons, Iranians are adamant that they will not be forced into doing something that no other signatory to the NPT is being required to do.
Although Iran’s internal politics are chaotic at present, in the long run the United States must engage Iran in dialogue about a whole host of issues – refugees, drug trafficking, environmental issues, regional security and containment of disease, to name just a few. The persistence of the Congressional clamor for these ineffective and meaningless sanctions only serves as a barrier to more productive relations.
William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn. He is past president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association, and former director of Middle East Studies at Brown University. His most recent book is “The ‘Great Satan’ vs. the ‘Mad Mullahs’: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other” (University of Chicago Press).
Friday, August 28, 2009
Nuclear drive a casualty of Iran's turmoil Experts say Tehran is unlikely to speed up its program (L.A. Times)
latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iran-nukes28-2009aug28,0,4625620.story
latimes.com
Nuclear drive a casualty of Iran's turmoil
Experts say Tehran is unlikely to speed up its program, giving the U.S. and its allies more time to work with.
Commentary by William O. Beeman: Iran's nuclear program has served as an excuse for launching an attack on the Islamic Republic since 2003. It is clear that Iran is far away from mastering the fuel cycle that would allow it to create fuel for generation of energy. Iran's attackers use weasel-words like "nuclear weapons development capacity" to make the program seem vastly more threatening than it is. In fact, there is no evidence whatever that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. This does not stop politicians in the United States, Israel and elsewhere from presenting Iranian nuclear weapons development as a fait accompli. As Borzou Daragahi points out, there would be many bumps in the road before Iran could come close to developing a weapon, if such a program actually existed, and the current political turmoil sets the clock back even farther. In the meantime, Pakistan becomes less and less stable every day, and Pakistan has nuclear bombs ready to launch. No one in Washington or Tel Aviv seems to care.
By Borzou Daragahi
August 28, 2009
Reporting from Beirut
Iran's political crisis could prevent the nation from making any swift move to ratchet up its nuclear program, said analysts and officials, giving President Obama and Western allies more time to grapple with the issue.
The chaos over the disputed reelection of hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad brings into question who calls the shots in Tehran, and what any deal with the Islamic Republic involving its nuclear program would look like.
The Obama administration, concerned that Tehran is seeking to amass the materials needed to manufacture nuclear weapons, set an informal deadline of September for Iran to respond positively to an offer to discuss the matter rather than risk new economic sanctions.
"The infighting in Tehran has sent up a smoke screen that further confuses the picture from the outside, and the picture was plenty opaque to begin with," said a U.S. official in Washington who is involved in formulating nuclear policy and spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.
Tehran has long insisted that its nuclear research program is meant solely to provide electricity for its growing population. Its production of reactor-grade uranium has become a source of national pride, the atomic symbol emblazoned on the back of Iran's 50,000-rial bills.
But most Western arms-control experts believe Iran is trying to achieve the ability to quickly manufacture a nuclear bomb. And Iran continues to defy United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding that it stop producing the enriched uranium, material that, if further refined, could be turned into the fissile material for a bomb.
The International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, is set to take up its latest quarterly status report on Iran's nuclear program in early September.
In recent weeks, Iran granted IAEA inspectors access to a heavy-water reactor and parts of the country's enrichment facility after previously barring them. The move suggests an effort by Tehran to ease pressure on itself and on its most likely supporters at the Security Council -- Russia and China -- before any new talks on sanctions.
Although Iranian scientists have continued to enrich low-grade uranium during the nation's political crisis, news agencies have reported that Tehran has not taken steps to increase its processing capacity during the last quarter. Experts say that may have more to do with technical quirks than political decisions.
For now, most Iran watchers agree that Tehran will not only be unable to respond positively to the Obama administration's offer of talks, but also is in too much political disarray to make the major decisions necessary to build a nuclear weapon. Such steps would include further enriching its uranium supply to weapons grade, or constructing controversial new facilities for speeding up the process.
"The nuclear dossier has been stalled and is in a stagnant position, with no back or forth moves," said Ahmad Shirzad, an Iranian nuclear scientist and political analyst. "The recent events in Iran put all important decision-making in limbo. The postelection events have not completely unfolded, and Mr. Ahmadinejad has not come to a conclusion what to do."
Iran's 20-year foray into nuclear technology has long benefited from a broad consensus among the nation's political elites, or at least acquiescence by foes of the program. Important institutions such as the Expediency Council, led by Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani; the presidency; the Supreme National Security Council and parliament, along with supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have played a role in the program's creation and sustenance.
Conservative Ahmadinejad likes to take credit for Iran's recent nuclear progress. But Tehran actually relaunched its dormant program under the 1980s premiership of his primary rival, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, and the first breakthroughs on enrichment came during the presidency of Ahmadinejad's reformist predecessor, Mohammad Khatami.
"Nuclear policy has not changed regardless of the domestic problems, as the nuclear policy, like any other strategic policy, was predetermined more than two decades ago," said Ali Khorram, a former Iranian diplomat based in Tehran.
Since the disputed June election, Iran's feuding factions have been preoccupied with political infighting. Rafsanjani skipped Ahmadinejad's inauguration and the president skipped a session of the Expediency Council. At a ceremony honoring the new judiciary chief, who is a conservative rival to Ahmadinejad, the president arrived an hour late and left in haste after delivering a blistering speech calling on the jurist to go after those he termed elitists, alluding to Rafsanjani.
Within Iran's treacherous domestic political arena, any sign of weakness, or of bowing to the West, either by slowing Tehran's missile program or suspending the production of reactor-grade uranium, could be used by rivals to pounce, political analysts say. Therefore, it is likely that the current program, in which reactor-grade nuclear material is processed by at least 5,000 spinning centrifuges, will keep moving forward at its current pace.
"The nuclear program is a touchstone issue for the entire government," said the U.S. official. "No one on either side of the current controversy is going to risk his credibility by even suggesting a change in posture or a substantive pause."
Iran's political hard-liners have made dramatic moves during previous periods of domestic discord. Such measures as stoning women or questioning the Holocaust provoked an international reaction that unified squabbling domestic factions and silenced critics.
But because of the extent of the current political feuding and the stakes involved, experts say, it is unlikely that Tehran will make a dramatic move toward constructing a nuclear weapon.
"It will be hard to get an approval by all concerned," said Jalil Roshandel, an Iran expert at East Carolina University.
Moreover, he said, continued public support of Ahmadinejad's nuclear policies is no longer a given.
"Public opinion is divided, dispersed or, at best, indifferent," he said.
A "breakout" move on the nuclear issue risks not only public scorn, but also tighter sanctions, an embargo on sales of refined petroleum to Tehran or even armed conflict.
Iran's rulers may not want to risk testing the loyalty of an already volatile and angry populace..
"We must remember that the nuclear program is a means to an end," said Meir Javedanfar, an Iran expert based in Tel Aviv. "Khamenei would not sacrifice his regime over it."
Anger over Ahmadinejad's domestic policies has already emboldened figures close to the opposition to speak out more forcefully against his approach on the nuclear issue.
"The Iranian authorities should know what they should expect if they do not enter the negotiations seriously and do not adhere to the repeated resolutions of the Security Council on the suspension of the uranium enrichment program," warned a commentary in the reformist newspaper Mardom Salari.
Internal paralysis, international isolation and stagnant oil prices, analysts say, could work dramatically in the West's favor, giving Tehran the incentive to make a quick deal with the West in order to concentrate on shoring up domestic stability and its faltering economy.
"So far, since the election, Iran seems to be a bit more flexible than before," said Anoush Ehteshami, a professor of international relations at Durham University in Britain.
"Given the current political climate at home, it makes sense to try to contain the nuclear crisis for as long as possible."
But some warn that any deal with Iran's current government would strengthen its legitimacy, betraying an election protest movement that has captured the world's imagination and challenged decades-old ideas about Iran's political realities.
"The Iranian people will never forget if Western liberalism and the international community abandons the Iranian nation's struggle for freedom," said Reza Kaviani, a Tehran-based analyst and opposition supporter.
daragahi@latimes.com
Special correspondent Ramin Mostaghim in Tehran contributed to this report.
Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times
latimes.com
Nuclear drive a casualty of Iran's turmoil
Experts say Tehran is unlikely to speed up its program, giving the U.S. and its allies more time to work with.
Commentary by William O. Beeman: Iran's nuclear program has served as an excuse for launching an attack on the Islamic Republic since 2003. It is clear that Iran is far away from mastering the fuel cycle that would allow it to create fuel for generation of energy. Iran's attackers use weasel-words like "nuclear weapons development capacity" to make the program seem vastly more threatening than it is. In fact, there is no evidence whatever that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. This does not stop politicians in the United States, Israel and elsewhere from presenting Iranian nuclear weapons development as a fait accompli. As Borzou Daragahi points out, there would be many bumps in the road before Iran could come close to developing a weapon, if such a program actually existed, and the current political turmoil sets the clock back even farther. In the meantime, Pakistan becomes less and less stable every day, and Pakistan has nuclear bombs ready to launch. No one in Washington or Tel Aviv seems to care.
By Borzou Daragahi
August 28, 2009
Reporting from Beirut
Iran's political crisis could prevent the nation from making any swift move to ratchet up its nuclear program, said analysts and officials, giving President Obama and Western allies more time to grapple with the issue.
The chaos over the disputed reelection of hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad brings into question who calls the shots in Tehran, and what any deal with the Islamic Republic involving its nuclear program would look like.
The Obama administration, concerned that Tehran is seeking to amass the materials needed to manufacture nuclear weapons, set an informal deadline of September for Iran to respond positively to an offer to discuss the matter rather than risk new economic sanctions.
"The infighting in Tehran has sent up a smoke screen that further confuses the picture from the outside, and the picture was plenty opaque to begin with," said a U.S. official in Washington who is involved in formulating nuclear policy and spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.
Tehran has long insisted that its nuclear research program is meant solely to provide electricity for its growing population. Its production of reactor-grade uranium has become a source of national pride, the atomic symbol emblazoned on the back of Iran's 50,000-rial bills.
But most Western arms-control experts believe Iran is trying to achieve the ability to quickly manufacture a nuclear bomb. And Iran continues to defy United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding that it stop producing the enriched uranium, material that, if further refined, could be turned into the fissile material for a bomb.
The International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, is set to take up its latest quarterly status report on Iran's nuclear program in early September.
In recent weeks, Iran granted IAEA inspectors access to a heavy-water reactor and parts of the country's enrichment facility after previously barring them. The move suggests an effort by Tehran to ease pressure on itself and on its most likely supporters at the Security Council -- Russia and China -- before any new talks on sanctions.
Although Iranian scientists have continued to enrich low-grade uranium during the nation's political crisis, news agencies have reported that Tehran has not taken steps to increase its processing capacity during the last quarter. Experts say that may have more to do with technical quirks than political decisions.
For now, most Iran watchers agree that Tehran will not only be unable to respond positively to the Obama administration's offer of talks, but also is in too much political disarray to make the major decisions necessary to build a nuclear weapon. Such steps would include further enriching its uranium supply to weapons grade, or constructing controversial new facilities for speeding up the process.
"The nuclear dossier has been stalled and is in a stagnant position, with no back or forth moves," said Ahmad Shirzad, an Iranian nuclear scientist and political analyst. "The recent events in Iran put all important decision-making in limbo. The postelection events have not completely unfolded, and Mr. Ahmadinejad has not come to a conclusion what to do."
Iran's 20-year foray into nuclear technology has long benefited from a broad consensus among the nation's political elites, or at least acquiescence by foes of the program. Important institutions such as the Expediency Council, led by Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani; the presidency; the Supreme National Security Council and parliament, along with supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have played a role in the program's creation and sustenance.
Conservative Ahmadinejad likes to take credit for Iran's recent nuclear progress. But Tehran actually relaunched its dormant program under the 1980s premiership of his primary rival, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, and the first breakthroughs on enrichment came during the presidency of Ahmadinejad's reformist predecessor, Mohammad Khatami.
"Nuclear policy has not changed regardless of the domestic problems, as the nuclear policy, like any other strategic policy, was predetermined more than two decades ago," said Ali Khorram, a former Iranian diplomat based in Tehran.
Since the disputed June election, Iran's feuding factions have been preoccupied with political infighting. Rafsanjani skipped Ahmadinejad's inauguration and the president skipped a session of the Expediency Council. At a ceremony honoring the new judiciary chief, who is a conservative rival to Ahmadinejad, the president arrived an hour late and left in haste after delivering a blistering speech calling on the jurist to go after those he termed elitists, alluding to Rafsanjani.
Within Iran's treacherous domestic political arena, any sign of weakness, or of bowing to the West, either by slowing Tehran's missile program or suspending the production of reactor-grade uranium, could be used by rivals to pounce, political analysts say. Therefore, it is likely that the current program, in which reactor-grade nuclear material is processed by at least 5,000 spinning centrifuges, will keep moving forward at its current pace.
"The nuclear program is a touchstone issue for the entire government," said the U.S. official. "No one on either side of the current controversy is going to risk his credibility by even suggesting a change in posture or a substantive pause."
Iran's political hard-liners have made dramatic moves during previous periods of domestic discord. Such measures as stoning women or questioning the Holocaust provoked an international reaction that unified squabbling domestic factions and silenced critics.
But because of the extent of the current political feuding and the stakes involved, experts say, it is unlikely that Tehran will make a dramatic move toward constructing a nuclear weapon.
"It will be hard to get an approval by all concerned," said Jalil Roshandel, an Iran expert at East Carolina University.
Moreover, he said, continued public support of Ahmadinejad's nuclear policies is no longer a given.
"Public opinion is divided, dispersed or, at best, indifferent," he said.
A "breakout" move on the nuclear issue risks not only public scorn, but also tighter sanctions, an embargo on sales of refined petroleum to Tehran or even armed conflict.
Iran's rulers may not want to risk testing the loyalty of an already volatile and angry populace..
"We must remember that the nuclear program is a means to an end," said Meir Javedanfar, an Iran expert based in Tel Aviv. "Khamenei would not sacrifice his regime over it."
Anger over Ahmadinejad's domestic policies has already emboldened figures close to the opposition to speak out more forcefully against his approach on the nuclear issue.
"The Iranian authorities should know what they should expect if they do not enter the negotiations seriously and do not adhere to the repeated resolutions of the Security Council on the suspension of the uranium enrichment program," warned a commentary in the reformist newspaper Mardom Salari.
Internal paralysis, international isolation and stagnant oil prices, analysts say, could work dramatically in the West's favor, giving Tehran the incentive to make a quick deal with the West in order to concentrate on shoring up domestic stability and its faltering economy.
"So far, since the election, Iran seems to be a bit more flexible than before," said Anoush Ehteshami, a professor of international relations at Durham University in Britain.
"Given the current political climate at home, it makes sense to try to contain the nuclear crisis for as long as possible."
But some warn that any deal with Iran's current government would strengthen its legitimacy, betraying an election protest movement that has captured the world's imagination and challenged decades-old ideas about Iran's political realities.
"The Iranian people will never forget if Western liberalism and the international community abandons the Iranian nation's struggle for freedom," said Reza Kaviani, a Tehran-based analyst and opposition supporter.
daragahi@latimes.com
Special correspondent Ramin Mostaghim in Tehran contributed to this report.
Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times
Tuesday, August 25, 2009
With Each New Assessment, Iran's Nuclear Clock Is Reset Politics Plays a Role in How Intelligence Is Interpreted --(Jewish Daily Forward)
With Each New Assessment, Iran's Nuclear Clock Is Reset
Politics Plays a Role in How Intelligence Is Interpreted
By Gal Beckerman
Published August 19, 2009, issue of August 28, 2009.
Commentary by William O. Beeman: There is no evidence whatever that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. Yet American and Israeli politicians have continually made political hay by claiming that there is one, and that production of an Iranian nuclear bomb is "one year away." This has been going on every year since the early 1990's. Additionally, the Mujaheddin-e Khalk (MEK or MKO), a U.S.-certified terrorist group dedicated to the overthrow of Iran's government continues to curry favor with the west by supplying dubious information about Iran's nuclear intentions. This masquerade needs to be exposed. In the article below from the Jewish Daily Forward, Gal Beckerman points out the chicanery in these claims, and the venal motives of those who make them.
The senior Israeli official's tone was dire. In only a few years, the Iranians would be ready to launch a nuclear bomb. He minced no words. "If Iran is not interrupted in this program by some foreign power, it will have the device in more or less five years."
The year this apocalyptic prediction was made: 1995.
As we all know, Israel survived the year 2000. Iran did not get the bomb. And earlier this month, it was revealed that the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research's latest estimate has pushed that dreaded date back to 2013, when it posits that Iran will finally be able to produce highly enriched uranium, a key ingredient in any nuclear weapon.
Then again, the State Department could be as wrong as that Israeli official back in 1995. To listen to the drumbeat emanating from Tel Aviv, the Iranians are much, much closer. In March, Amos Yadlin, the head of Israeli military intelligence, announced that Iran had "crossed the technological threshold." In only a year, they would be equipped with what they need to build some kind of crude nuclear device.
It's hard to know how to make sense of all these divergent estimates. Though they have become more numerous and more conflicting since the beginning of this year, analyses of Iran's nuclear capabilities have always been a matter of broad interpretation. From the moment that Iran announced in the mid-1980s its intention to launch a nuclear program, intelligence agencies in Israel and the United States - which analysts agree both look at the same raw data - have set and reset the nuclear clock over and over again.
Israeli intelligence, in particular, has announced a "point of no return" almost every year, a continually unfulfilled prediction that some say erodes the credibility of its analysts.
What some see as the fine point of when exactly Iran gets the bomb is not inconsequential. The time frame for both diplomacy and a military response that would have serious ramifications hinge on this question. It is for this reason, a wide range of independent observers agree, that politics has played the most central role in how intelligence on Iran and its nuclear program is interpreted and packaged for the public.
"Clearly the fact that some of these assessments seem to change rather rapidly has fueled the suspicion that much of it is actually politically motivated," said Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council.
The problem, according to Parsi and others, is that the elements that make up any assessment of Iran's actual progress can be read differently.
From a technical standpoint, there are a series of steps on the path toward making a bomb, each of which can be interpreted as the menacing "threshold." Beginning with building large quantities of centrifuges to producing low-enriched uranium and then more highly enriched weapons-grade uranium to finally having a device to launch a bomb, the red lights could start flashing at any point.
By all accounts, Iran has managed to produce low-enriched uranium, possibly enough to make a crude bomb. Low-level enrichment for civilian nuclear uses is legal under international law. But based on its incomplete answers to the International Atomic Energy Agency, world leaders, neighboring countries and many security analysts are deeply concerned that this is not all Iran has in mind. The question of Iranian nuclear weapons development remains murky. According to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, Iran stopped all work on a nuclear weapons program in 2003. But this piece of intelligence is also disputed.
"This is one of these cases that where you stand determines to a large extent what is your assessment," said Shlomo Brom, a former Brigadier General in the Israeli Army and now senior research fellow and director of the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. "If you are at the possible receiving end of this thing - and that is the feeling of most Israelis - then you don't want to take chances. You look at the worst possible scenario. It's only if you're in an institute somewhere in the Western world then you can make sober analysis and make predictions based on the more probable assumptions."
Further underlining the degree to which politics plays a role in these predictions is the long history of unrealized Armageddon scenarios - and it is not Israeli intelligence alone that has sounded the alarms.
In 1992, Robert Gates, then director of the CIA, pointedly upended conventional thinking about Iran's nuclear progress when he gave a much shorter time span for attainment of the bomb. "Is it a problem today?" he asked at the time, "probably not. But three, four, five years from now it could be a serious problem."
Another rash of predictions arrived in 1995. When Israeli government officials were quoted in American newspapers talking about a five-year timeline, officials with the Clinton administration quickly countered with qualifications and their own counter predictions. The small conflict led to a meeting in Jerusalem between William Perry, the defense secretary and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. They emerged from their discussions to announce that they were in agreement - Iran would get the bomb in seven to 15 years (next year, that is, at the latest).
Much of the speculation about Iran throughout the 1990s had to do with the possibility that its nuclear program was being boosted with outside help, from Russian loose nukes to technical help from North Korea. At least one of these outside elements did evade American intelligence, the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan who is known to have aided the Iranians in advancing their program at least twice, in the late 1980s and mid 1990s.
This unknown variable of outside help also allowed for a wide range of timelines.
Throughout the last decade, the warnings have become more dire at the same time that it has become harder to see into what David Albright, a physicist who is president of the Institute for Science and International Security, called "the black box of Iran's decision making." This further unknown - what Iranian leaders intend - is one more fluid element that gives both the skeptics and alarmists an opportunity to project their own thinking and come up with independent predictions.
Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu, for one, views Iran's leadership as "a messianic apocalyptic cult" who will not be deterred by Israel's own nuclear weapons capability. "When the wide-eyed believer gets hold of the reins of power and the weapons of mass death, then the entire world should start worrying, and that is what is happening in Iran," he told the Atlantic's Jeffrey Goldberg in May.
In contrast, Anthony Cordesman, a widely respected Middle East strategic analyst who has worked for both Democratic and Republican administrations, and Abdullah Toukan, an adviser to the late King Hussein of Jordan, present an Iran that is a rational, if hostile, actor, influenced by concrete geopolitical perceptions of its own. These include "unfriendly neighbors surrounding them, including nuclear tipped Pakistan" just to Iran's east; the "grave threat to its security" that Iran sees in America's military presence in Iraq immediately to its west and the presence of the American Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf waters lapping its south, the two men wrote in a recent study. This is seen also in the context of what was, until recently, America's declared policy of "regime change," they note. Finally, say Cordesman and Toukan, Iran's fear of "Israeli intentions to destabilize Iran and attack its nuclear facilities," drive it to develop its capabilities all the more.
"The Israelis always like to posit that Iran is one year away," Albright said. "There is an honesty to these assessments because they do have technical analysts in Israel who are looking very closely. They could be talking about a certain number of centrifuges built, a certain type of covert facility, various other things, but it's always one year away."
Many American analysts think these Israeli nightmare scenarios are distracting from what might be the most plausible explanation of Iran's intentions.
Gary Sick served on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan and was the principal White House aide for Iran during the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis. He believes that Iran has been slowly engaged since the 1970s in building a peaceful civilian nuclear program that has what he called "surge capacity" of 18 months. That is the amount of time it would take for Iran to boost low-enriched uranium for power plants and other non-military uses to highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium and deploy this as an atomic bomb, Sick said.
According to Sick, this interpretation is shared by many other analysts and backed up by statements from those who began the program under the Shah in the 1970s. But others warn that Iran may be developing a nuclear weapon capability secretly that it could deploy much more quickly.
Either way would mean that Iran is seeking a kind of nuclear ambiguity. It wants to be threatening without actually publicly introducing another nuclear weapon into the Middle East - a clear turning point likely only to set off a race by its neighbors to obtain nuclear weapons of their own. It is a position not dissimilar from the one now held by Israel, which still does not publicly disclose that it has the bomb.
Asked why this more nuanced scenario - one that would do nothing to assuage or discredit Israeli fears - is not more widely discussed, Sick answered, "It doesn't sell newspapers."
Contact Gal Beckerman at beckerman@forward.com
Politics Plays a Role in How Intelligence Is Interpreted
By Gal Beckerman
Published August 19, 2009, issue of August 28, 2009.
Commentary by William O. Beeman: There is no evidence whatever that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. Yet American and Israeli politicians have continually made political hay by claiming that there is one, and that production of an Iranian nuclear bomb is "one year away." This has been going on every year since the early 1990's. Additionally, the Mujaheddin-e Khalk (MEK or MKO), a U.S.-certified terrorist group dedicated to the overthrow of Iran's government continues to curry favor with the west by supplying dubious information about Iran's nuclear intentions. This masquerade needs to be exposed. In the article below from the Jewish Daily Forward, Gal Beckerman points out the chicanery in these claims, and the venal motives of those who make them.
The senior Israeli official's tone was dire. In only a few years, the Iranians would be ready to launch a nuclear bomb. He minced no words. "If Iran is not interrupted in this program by some foreign power, it will have the device in more or less five years."
The year this apocalyptic prediction was made: 1995.
As we all know, Israel survived the year 2000. Iran did not get the bomb. And earlier this month, it was revealed that the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research's latest estimate has pushed that dreaded date back to 2013, when it posits that Iran will finally be able to produce highly enriched uranium, a key ingredient in any nuclear weapon.
Then again, the State Department could be as wrong as that Israeli official back in 1995. To listen to the drumbeat emanating from Tel Aviv, the Iranians are much, much closer. In March, Amos Yadlin, the head of Israeli military intelligence, announced that Iran had "crossed the technological threshold." In only a year, they would be equipped with what they need to build some kind of crude nuclear device.
It's hard to know how to make sense of all these divergent estimates. Though they have become more numerous and more conflicting since the beginning of this year, analyses of Iran's nuclear capabilities have always been a matter of broad interpretation. From the moment that Iran announced in the mid-1980s its intention to launch a nuclear program, intelligence agencies in Israel and the United States - which analysts agree both look at the same raw data - have set and reset the nuclear clock over and over again.
Israeli intelligence, in particular, has announced a "point of no return" almost every year, a continually unfulfilled prediction that some say erodes the credibility of its analysts.
What some see as the fine point of when exactly Iran gets the bomb is not inconsequential. The time frame for both diplomacy and a military response that would have serious ramifications hinge on this question. It is for this reason, a wide range of independent observers agree, that politics has played the most central role in how intelligence on Iran and its nuclear program is interpreted and packaged for the public.
"Clearly the fact that some of these assessments seem to change rather rapidly has fueled the suspicion that much of it is actually politically motivated," said Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council.
The problem, according to Parsi and others, is that the elements that make up any assessment of Iran's actual progress can be read differently.
From a technical standpoint, there are a series of steps on the path toward making a bomb, each of which can be interpreted as the menacing "threshold." Beginning with building large quantities of centrifuges to producing low-enriched uranium and then more highly enriched weapons-grade uranium to finally having a device to launch a bomb, the red lights could start flashing at any point.
By all accounts, Iran has managed to produce low-enriched uranium, possibly enough to make a crude bomb. Low-level enrichment for civilian nuclear uses is legal under international law. But based on its incomplete answers to the International Atomic Energy Agency, world leaders, neighboring countries and many security analysts are deeply concerned that this is not all Iran has in mind. The question of Iranian nuclear weapons development remains murky. According to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, Iran stopped all work on a nuclear weapons program in 2003. But this piece of intelligence is also disputed.
"This is one of these cases that where you stand determines to a large extent what is your assessment," said Shlomo Brom, a former Brigadier General in the Israeli Army and now senior research fellow and director of the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. "If you are at the possible receiving end of this thing - and that is the feeling of most Israelis - then you don't want to take chances. You look at the worst possible scenario. It's only if you're in an institute somewhere in the Western world then you can make sober analysis and make predictions based on the more probable assumptions."
Further underlining the degree to which politics plays a role in these predictions is the long history of unrealized Armageddon scenarios - and it is not Israeli intelligence alone that has sounded the alarms.
In 1992, Robert Gates, then director of the CIA, pointedly upended conventional thinking about Iran's nuclear progress when he gave a much shorter time span for attainment of the bomb. "Is it a problem today?" he asked at the time, "probably not. But three, four, five years from now it could be a serious problem."
Another rash of predictions arrived in 1995. When Israeli government officials were quoted in American newspapers talking about a five-year timeline, officials with the Clinton administration quickly countered with qualifications and their own counter predictions. The small conflict led to a meeting in Jerusalem between William Perry, the defense secretary and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. They emerged from their discussions to announce that they were in agreement - Iran would get the bomb in seven to 15 years (next year, that is, at the latest).
Much of the speculation about Iran throughout the 1990s had to do with the possibility that its nuclear program was being boosted with outside help, from Russian loose nukes to technical help from North Korea. At least one of these outside elements did evade American intelligence, the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan who is known to have aided the Iranians in advancing their program at least twice, in the late 1980s and mid 1990s.
This unknown variable of outside help also allowed for a wide range of timelines.
Throughout the last decade, the warnings have become more dire at the same time that it has become harder to see into what David Albright, a physicist who is president of the Institute for Science and International Security, called "the black box of Iran's decision making." This further unknown - what Iranian leaders intend - is one more fluid element that gives both the skeptics and alarmists an opportunity to project their own thinking and come up with independent predictions.
Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu, for one, views Iran's leadership as "a messianic apocalyptic cult" who will not be deterred by Israel's own nuclear weapons capability. "When the wide-eyed believer gets hold of the reins of power and the weapons of mass death, then the entire world should start worrying, and that is what is happening in Iran," he told the Atlantic's Jeffrey Goldberg in May.
In contrast, Anthony Cordesman, a widely respected Middle East strategic analyst who has worked for both Democratic and Republican administrations, and Abdullah Toukan, an adviser to the late King Hussein of Jordan, present an Iran that is a rational, if hostile, actor, influenced by concrete geopolitical perceptions of its own. These include "unfriendly neighbors surrounding them, including nuclear tipped Pakistan" just to Iran's east; the "grave threat to its security" that Iran sees in America's military presence in Iraq immediately to its west and the presence of the American Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf waters lapping its south, the two men wrote in a recent study. This is seen also in the context of what was, until recently, America's declared policy of "regime change," they note. Finally, say Cordesman and Toukan, Iran's fear of "Israeli intentions to destabilize Iran and attack its nuclear facilities," drive it to develop its capabilities all the more.
"The Israelis always like to posit that Iran is one year away," Albright said. "There is an honesty to these assessments because they do have technical analysts in Israel who are looking very closely. They could be talking about a certain number of centrifuges built, a certain type of covert facility, various other things, but it's always one year away."
Many American analysts think these Israeli nightmare scenarios are distracting from what might be the most plausible explanation of Iran's intentions.
Gary Sick served on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan and was the principal White House aide for Iran during the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis. He believes that Iran has been slowly engaged since the 1970s in building a peaceful civilian nuclear program that has what he called "surge capacity" of 18 months. That is the amount of time it would take for Iran to boost low-enriched uranium for power plants and other non-military uses to highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium and deploy this as an atomic bomb, Sick said.
According to Sick, this interpretation is shared by many other analysts and backed up by statements from those who began the program under the Shah in the 1970s. But others warn that Iran may be developing a nuclear weapon capability secretly that it could deploy much more quickly.
Either way would mean that Iran is seeking a kind of nuclear ambiguity. It wants to be threatening without actually publicly introducing another nuclear weapon into the Middle East - a clear turning point likely only to set off a race by its neighbors to obtain nuclear weapons of their own. It is a position not dissimilar from the one now held by Israel, which still does not publicly disclose that it has the bomb.
Asked why this more nuanced scenario - one that would do nothing to assuage or discredit Israeli fears - is not more widely discussed, Sick answered, "It doesn't sell newspapers."
Contact Gal Beckerman at beckerman@forward.com
Saturday, August 22, 2009
The Nexus of Politics and Terror (Keith Olberman)
Last night (Friday, August 21, 2009) on his MSNBC program, Countdown, Keith Olberman re-ran his now famous video documentation of White House scandals and crises throughout the Bush administration, showing decisively that every time the President’s credibility was in question, the Bush admininistration immediately issued a phony or questionable terror alert. This is something every American of every political persuasion needs to see. It shows a truly venal and disingenuous administration willing to frighten an unsuspecting public with utterly false evidence of danger in order to boost its own political fortunes. That Tom Ridge should now verify what Olberman so clearly demonstrated is not surprising. We should be roundly ashamed as a nation that we allowed these monsters to hold sway over our sensibilities for so long. If there is “gut hatred” of Bush, it is well deserved. He violated us just as surely as Bernard Madoff violated his unsuspecting investors.
Go to: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3036677/ and select #3 The Nexus of Politics and Terror to see Olberman's devastating analysis, or view below:
— William O. Beeman
Go to: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3036677/ and select #3 The Nexus of Politics and Terror to see Olberman's devastating analysis, or view below:
Visit msnbc.com for Breaking News, World News, and News about the Economy
— William O. Beeman
Thursday, August 06, 2009
William O. Beeman--The Propaganda Value of a Detained Journalist (New America Media)
The Propaganda Value of a Detained Journalist
New America Media, News Analysis,
William O. Beeman,
Posted: Aug 06, 2009
Editor’s Note: New America Media correspondent Shane Bauer is one of three Americans presumed to be detained by the Iranian government near the Iran-Iraq border last. Commentator William O. Beeman writes that their situation raises profound political questions.
“In the wrong place at the wrong time” is an apt description for three Americans currently being detained in Iran. They will likely be released, but not before Iranian authorities have wrung maximal publicity over their situation, painting them as Western intelligence operatives. The process could take months.
The timing for this event could not be more inopportune. Iran is on high emotional alert. It is flush with righteous indignation and paranoia vis-à-vis Western nations. It has undergone a contentious election where opponents of President Ahmadinejad were accused of collaboration with Western powers. Understanding the current state of mind in Iran is crucial to predicting the fate of the three travelers.
Certainly people all over the world in wilderness areas make inadvertent trips across international borders without incident. The Iraqi Kurdistan border, where journalists and adventurers Shane Bauer, Sara Shourd and Joshua Fattal entered Iran on July 31 is unmarked. The three seem to have been innocent, if a little naïve. They left an indisposed companion, Shon Meckfessel, and their belongings behind in their hotel room in the town of Sulaimaniyah. They reportedly had no extensive gear on their persons, suggesting they were on a short day trip.
However, the border itself is one of the prime difficulties in their case. Its remoteness has made it a prime area for illicit traffic in both directions. Smugglers operate freely across the border. Iranians escaping to the West have used it freely. More importantly, however, the United States and Israel have been suspected of infiltrating operatives into Iran through this area.
Iran has arrested a number of “suspicious” individuals over the past few years. They are universally accused of spying and of complicity in trying to foment a “velvet” revolution, similar to those underwritten by the Bush administration throughout the former Soviet Union. Celebrated incarcerations of individuals like Woodrow Wilson Center administrator Haleh Esfandiari, journalist Roxana Saberi and photojournalist Iason Athanasiadis (also known as Jason Fowdon) were also based on accusations of spying.
Predictably then, Bauer, Shourd and Fattal have also been labeled as spies. Past precedent in these earlier cases suggests what will occur for the detainees. First, they are likely to receive humane treatment. Being Americans they have attracted extensive international attention. Iranian officials have been careful to make sure that their international “guests” are treated well. Past detainees report that they were comfortably housed, well fed and allowed outside reading material and contacts.
Second, the Americans will likely be released, as others in their situation have been, after extensive investigation.
Third, they will be used to make political points by Iranian authorities—both for internal and for international consumption.
Iran will insist that their detention is legal, since every nation has the right to defend its borders. Even the most die-hard American opponents of Iranian policy will not be able to counter this assertion.
However, it is predictable that there will be accusations that the hikers never crossed the border, and that Iran grabbed them illegally. They may be labeled as “hostages” in the U.S. media.
Iran will also try to get the three detainees to admit and apologize for their actions, preferably on television. There will be attempts to make them admit that they were engaged in spying as a condition of their release. This will serve a number of purposes. First, it will bolster the image of “Iran under siege” from the West, shoring up the credentials of conservative leaders. Second, it will serve to taint the opposition to the current leadership. Attempts will be made to tie these three to presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi.
Iran may also try to use these three as bargaining chips in ongoing negotiations with the United States over a variety of matters of controversy including relief from economic sanctions and relaxation of criticism of Iran’s nuclear energy program.
Finally, Iranian authorities will likely pardon them, commute an imposed sentence, or allow them to leave the country on bail pending trial as a show of generosity.
The saddest part of cases like this is that the fact that the United States has no diplomatic relations with Iran makes negotiations next to impossible. Either Washington must rely on the Swiss embassy (which represents U.S. affairs in Tehran), or resort to public pleas and threats. This gives the United States very little leverage. Extraordinary measures, such as former President Bill Clinton’s trip to North Korea to secure the release of journalists Euna Lee and Laura Ling, would probably work with Iran, but would trigger huge, hostile reactions from the Republican Party who would claim that the Obama administration was unduly “dignifying” the Iranian regime.
One long-shot might be to appeal to Syria to intervene for the detainees' release. Shane Bauer had been reporting from Syria prior to this incident and had established his bona fides as a serious reporter there. Iran is not influenced by many outside nations, but they still retain close ties to Damascus. The United States has also been warming to Syria recently, so this mediation might conceivably help shorten the detention.
Sadly, we can foresee future incidents of this sort from time to time until U.S.-Iranian affairs stabilize. It is not necessary for the United States to approve of the actions of a nation like Iran to seek regularized diplomatic relations. This case proves clearly why the communication opened through stable diplomatic channels is so essential in today’s international community.
William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. He has conducted research in Iran for more than 40 years. His latest book is, 'The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other' (Chicago, 2008).
New America Media, News Analysis,
William O. Beeman,
Posted: Aug 06, 2009
Editor’s Note: New America Media correspondent Shane Bauer is one of three Americans presumed to be detained by the Iranian government near the Iran-Iraq border last. Commentator William O. Beeman writes that their situation raises profound political questions.
“In the wrong place at the wrong time” is an apt description for three Americans currently being detained in Iran. They will likely be released, but not before Iranian authorities have wrung maximal publicity over their situation, painting them as Western intelligence operatives. The process could take months.
The timing for this event could not be more inopportune. Iran is on high emotional alert. It is flush with righteous indignation and paranoia vis-à-vis Western nations. It has undergone a contentious election where opponents of President Ahmadinejad were accused of collaboration with Western powers. Understanding the current state of mind in Iran is crucial to predicting the fate of the three travelers.
Certainly people all over the world in wilderness areas make inadvertent trips across international borders without incident. The Iraqi Kurdistan border, where journalists and adventurers Shane Bauer, Sara Shourd and Joshua Fattal entered Iran on July 31 is unmarked. The three seem to have been innocent, if a little naïve. They left an indisposed companion, Shon Meckfessel, and their belongings behind in their hotel room in the town of Sulaimaniyah. They reportedly had no extensive gear on their persons, suggesting they were on a short day trip.
However, the border itself is one of the prime difficulties in their case. Its remoteness has made it a prime area for illicit traffic in both directions. Smugglers operate freely across the border. Iranians escaping to the West have used it freely. More importantly, however, the United States and Israel have been suspected of infiltrating operatives into Iran through this area.
Iran has arrested a number of “suspicious” individuals over the past few years. They are universally accused of spying and of complicity in trying to foment a “velvet” revolution, similar to those underwritten by the Bush administration throughout the former Soviet Union. Celebrated incarcerations of individuals like Woodrow Wilson Center administrator Haleh Esfandiari, journalist Roxana Saberi and photojournalist Iason Athanasiadis (also known as Jason Fowdon) were also based on accusations of spying.
Predictably then, Bauer, Shourd and Fattal have also been labeled as spies. Past precedent in these earlier cases suggests what will occur for the detainees. First, they are likely to receive humane treatment. Being Americans they have attracted extensive international attention. Iranian officials have been careful to make sure that their international “guests” are treated well. Past detainees report that they were comfortably housed, well fed and allowed outside reading material and contacts.
Second, the Americans will likely be released, as others in their situation have been, after extensive investigation.
Third, they will be used to make political points by Iranian authorities—both for internal and for international consumption.
Iran will insist that their detention is legal, since every nation has the right to defend its borders. Even the most die-hard American opponents of Iranian policy will not be able to counter this assertion.
However, it is predictable that there will be accusations that the hikers never crossed the border, and that Iran grabbed them illegally. They may be labeled as “hostages” in the U.S. media.
Iran will also try to get the three detainees to admit and apologize for their actions, preferably on television. There will be attempts to make them admit that they were engaged in spying as a condition of their release. This will serve a number of purposes. First, it will bolster the image of “Iran under siege” from the West, shoring up the credentials of conservative leaders. Second, it will serve to taint the opposition to the current leadership. Attempts will be made to tie these three to presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi.
Iran may also try to use these three as bargaining chips in ongoing negotiations with the United States over a variety of matters of controversy including relief from economic sanctions and relaxation of criticism of Iran’s nuclear energy program.
Finally, Iranian authorities will likely pardon them, commute an imposed sentence, or allow them to leave the country on bail pending trial as a show of generosity.
The saddest part of cases like this is that the fact that the United States has no diplomatic relations with Iran makes negotiations next to impossible. Either Washington must rely on the Swiss embassy (which represents U.S. affairs in Tehran), or resort to public pleas and threats. This gives the United States very little leverage. Extraordinary measures, such as former President Bill Clinton’s trip to North Korea to secure the release of journalists Euna Lee and Laura Ling, would probably work with Iran, but would trigger huge, hostile reactions from the Republican Party who would claim that the Obama administration was unduly “dignifying” the Iranian regime.
One long-shot might be to appeal to Syria to intervene for the detainees' release. Shane Bauer had been reporting from Syria prior to this incident and had established his bona fides as a serious reporter there. Iran is not influenced by many outside nations, but they still retain close ties to Damascus. The United States has also been warming to Syria recently, so this mediation might conceivably help shorten the detention.
Sadly, we can foresee future incidents of this sort from time to time until U.S.-Iranian affairs stabilize. It is not necessary for the United States to approve of the actions of a nation like Iran to seek regularized diplomatic relations. This case proves clearly why the communication opened through stable diplomatic channels is so essential in today’s international community.
William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. He has conducted research in Iran for more than 40 years. His latest book is, 'The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other' (Chicago, 2008).
Saturday, July 18, 2009
William O. Beeman--Iran's Current Turmoil Has Deep Roots (New America Media)
Iran’s Current Turmoil Has Deep Roots
New America Media, News Analysis, William O. Beeman, Posted: Jul 17, 2009 Review it on NewsTrust
The turbulent internal politics of Iran following the June 12 election have been most often portrayed as a clash between secularizing reform forces and entrenched religious forces. However, this is a mischaracterization. The controversy is fundamentally between two very old, very entrenched religious philosophies that have been debated for more than 300 years. It’s a debate at the heart of every major political uprising in the nation’s history from that time forward. Even if the present controversy is quelled, this debate will continue for the immediate future, likely resulting in a major governmental shift.
The fundamental debate is over the role of religion in the governance of the state. The Safavid Dynasty, founded in the 17th Century, marks the beginning of modern Iran. The Safavids were an Azerbaijani Turkish Shi’a Muslim religious order with strong ties to Sufi mysticism. They eventually conquered the Caucasus, Central Asia and Northern India.
From the very beginning the question of the role of religion in the state was a great issue. The Safavids established “Twelver” Shi’a Islam as the state religion, and from that time forward most of the institutions of modern Shi’ism were established. This included the doctrine that all Shi’a believers should choose a “person worthy of emulation” to serve as their spiritual guide. Eventually, these “Marjeh-ye Taqlid” were recognized as Grand Ayatollahs, renowned for their scholarship, which was established in a “thesis” that included their views of Islamic laws. They also believed that the Twelfth Imam after the Prophet Mohammad, called the “Mahdi,” had vanished in the Golden Mosque in Samarra and would eventually return at the end of time, with Jesus, to render the final judgment of humankind. The Mahdi remains for modern Shi’a believers the ultimate true authority.
The wisest religious scholars warned the Safavids that Islamic clerics should not get involved with government, lest they become corrupt. They pointed out that Islam says very little about statecraft or the formation of governmental institutions and that the compromises of politics are often incompatible with religious piety.
The Safavids didn’t listen. They became powerful and eventually did become corrupt, until they were weakened and conquered by forces from Afghanistan. Another Turkish Dynasty, the Qajars, arose in the 19th Century, with the same fundamental problems of reconciling religious institutions with the State. The Qajar shahs were often at odds with the clergy—particularly when they began to meet the economic and military challenges of Europe by selling “concessions” to Europeans for the exploitation of Iran’s natural resources and economic institutions. The result was an Islamic backlash with open rebellion against the state that launched the modern Islamic movement and led to Iran’s first constitution in 1905.
Toward the end of the Qajar period, prominent Islamic scholars Shaykh Fazollah Nuri and Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein Na’ini maintained opposite viewpoints about the role of clerics in government. As Iran scholar Abbas Milani pointed out in a July 15 article in The New Republic, Sheikh Nuri believed that, in the absence of the hidden Mahdi, religious clerics had ultimate authority in the modern state, and could veto legislation if it was not sufficiently Islamic.
Ayatollah Na’ini asserted that no human government could substitute for the true “Islamic government” to be established by the Mahdi at his return. In the interim, humans had to do the best they could. For Na’ini, this was a constitutional democracy in which, according to Milani, “The role of ayatollahs . . . would be to "advise" the rulers and ensure that laws inimical to sharia were not implemented. But it would not be to rule the country themselves.” Na’ini approved the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty, which ruled Iran until the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who lead the Islamic Revolution which deposed the shah, at first seemed to embrace Na’ini’s philosophy of clerical non-involvement. After the revolution succeeded, however, he reversed course, and embraced Nuri’s philosophy, to the consternation of the majority of the Grand Ayatollahs. The Iranian constitution, consequently, rests on the principle of the “Velayat-e Faqih,” or the “Regency of the Chief Jurisprudent,” in which a senior scholar is chosen as Regent for the absent Mahdi. This is Iran’s “Supreme Leader” today.
Clerics who opposed this doctrine at the time were stripped of their credentials, and some were placed under house arrest.
When Ayatollah Khomeini died, it was difficult to find a successor who would take on the role of Supreme Leader. Ali Khamene’i was finally chosen. He was not a cleric of the first rank, but he was quickly elevated to the rank of Ayatollah. His legitimacy was questioned from the moment he took office.
The controversy still rages. Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, one of the most conservative clerics in the holy shrine city of Qom, and spiritual advisor to President Ahmadinejad, is a supporter of the Nuri position. He has declared that elections are unnecessary now that proper Islamic rule is in place. He reportedly told election workers before the June 12 election that it would be permissible for them to fix the election to make sure that Ahmadinejad could continue in office to support religious rule.
Ahmadinejad’s chief rival, Mir Hossein Mousavi, is no less pious, but he espouses the religious philosophy embodied in the writings of Ayatollah Na’ini—that a secular democracy should be the basic form of government for Iran, with religious scholars serving merely as advisors.
This is also the position favored by the most influential Grand Ayatollah in Iraq, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani of Najaf. Some of the most revered clerics in Iran have likewise denounced the election, thus tacitly revealing their opposition to the principle of the Supreme Leader.
The current attacks questioning the election are thus seen by both Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamene’i as attacks against the most fundamental principle of the current constitution of the Islamic Republic. If the reformers prevail, the constitution would likely be rewritten, and the office of Supreme Leader would be eliminated or greatly reduced in influence. This was threatening not only to the two top office holders, but to everyone else whose power depended on them, including the Revolutionary Guard, and the Basij militia forces, both of which were established to “guard the principles of the Revolution.”
Even if the current controversy dies down, and Ahmadinejad assumes a second presidential term, the crisis will continue. Supreme Leader Khamene’i has no obvious successor, and with the majority of Grand Ayatollahs opposing the very existence of the office, it is unclear who will be found to fill it.
William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota. He has conducted research on Iran for more than 30 years and lived through the Revolution of 1978-79. He is the author of The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.
Saturday, June 27, 2009
William O. Beeman--Iran’s Ongoing Revolution - New America Media
Iran’s Ongoing Revolution - NAM
Iran’s Ongoing Revolution
New America Media, News analysis, William O. Beeman, Posted: Jun 26, 2009
Additional Commentary from William O. Beeman: I wrote the piece below on Tuesday, June 23. I now think that the prediction of the Iranian leadership's demise is somewhat precipitous. The Iranian government has launced an unprecedented crackdown on protestors of the election, which has quieted the protest. We learn from China and other places that such measures can definitely be effective in quelling resistance. (please see my earlier commments on this below). However, I stand by my feeling that the Iranian government has created a breach with its own citizens. Eventually, this event will live in memory, and will form the basis for govenmental change. I stand behind my characterization of the course of an ongoing resistance, and suggest that observers continue to note the culturally potent symbolic elements of resistance that characterize Iranian political, social and religious life. Today Roya Hakakian admonished all of us not to make predicting the Iranian Revolution our chief occupation. Prediction is hard, but it is a sure bet that change will come to Iran over the next 5-10 years--if the world will let Iranians do their own work and not interfere.
Iran’s most visible leaders, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Spiritual Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i are on the brink of losing their respective offices in the wake of the controversial presidential election in Iran June 12. It may not happen immediately, but it is a likely outcome over the long term.
Should this happen, many sectors of the American punditocracy will be thoroughly embarrassed. Having built these two figures up to mythic status, they will now have to face Iran as it really is, not as they would like to style it. It is, and has been for many years, not a calcified theocracy controlled by old mullahs. It is rather a nation on the brink of change as a new generation assumes power, and as the influence of women in the society rockets to the forefront.
Ayatollah Khamene’i has now been denounced by name in the streets — an unprecedented event. Furthermore, it is rumored that his rival, former President Ayatollah Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, head of the Expediency Council, which mediates between the powerful Guardian Council and the Iranian Parliament, and the Assembly of Experts, which oversees the authority of the Spiritual Leader, is lobbying the bodies he heads to replace the Spiritual Leader.
Mr. Ahmadinejad has been accused of rigging the election along with the son of Ayatollah Khamene’i, Mojtaba, and key members of the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij strike force. Statistical analyses of the official vote published in the Washington Post a few days after the election suggest that the numbers are artificial. Documents from the Ministry of the Interior showing the “real” vote tall--in which Mr. Moussavi was the clear winner--are in wide circulation.
However, it is now clear that the presidential election has become irrelevant in Iranian political life going forward. The Iranian president is relatively powerless in any case. What is more important is that the people feel that they have been violated by the power elite of the country and are now bent on changing the very foundation of their government.
If sea change is truly in the works in Iran, how will it proceed?
People can only imagine what they can imagine. In Iran today both the people and the establishment have only one model for social and governmental change, and that is the original Islamic revolution of 1978-79. Because both sides are working with the same vocabulary of symbolism, they are groping to command those potent images that will galvanize public support in their favor.
The master vocabulary of revolution in Iran is the historical martyrdom of Imam Hossein, grandson of the Prophet Mohammad, who was killed on the plains of Karbala in present day Iraq in 680. Imam Hossein is the central figure in Shi’a Islam, and his death is commemorated perpetually in Iranian life.
President Ahmadinejad’s chief rival, Mir Hossein Moussavi, co-opted the symbolism of the Karbala tragedy early on. For his campaign, he adopted the color green, the color most associated with Islam itself, with descendants of the Prophet, and with the martyrdom of Imam Hossein. After the election, he declared himself “ready for martyrdom,” and his supporters appeared in the streets shouting “Ya Hossein,” echoing the cries shouted by groups of mourners in the annual commemoration of Imam Hoseein’s death. As a religious cry, it could not be faulted by the police and security forces. They have also taken to shouting “Allahu Akbar—God is Great,” which is both a symbolic cry in favor of change, but also a subtle reminder that change--even revolutionary change--is always in the hands of God.
Not to be outdone, the clerical establishment countered the idea of martyrdom in the election with the Iranian soldier-martyrs of the Iran-Iraq war.
The original revolution fed on occasions for public assembly, notably the three-, seven-, and 40-day mourning ceremonies for the dead. This created a cycle of martyrdom as protesters against the Pahlavi government assembled, were killed by the Shah’s forces, and were in turn mourned in an ongoing fashion. The entire Revolution took more than a year to complete before the Shah finally gave up and left. The world can expect a long and drawn-out process of resistance in this action as well—a point made by Dr. Gary Sick of Columbia University in an article printed on The Daily Beast. Dr. Sick served as a military intelligence officer during the earlier Revolution
The original revolution was led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini from his exile in France. He used the technology of the day--long distance telephone and tape cassettes--to spread his revolutionary message.
In today’s resistance a remarkably appropriate figure may be poised to likewise lead from abroad--Nobel Prize Winner Shirin Ebadi who finds herself in Europe at this time. The technology of today--the Internet and the cell phone may be the organizing force that drives this current force for change.
Those who think that change will bring an end to Islamic influence in Iran are dead wrong. Neither side in the current conflict has denounced the Islamic Republic. However the current opposition wants to change the basis for Islamic government. At the core is the controversial doctrine of the Velayat-e Faqih, the Rule of the Chief Jurisprudent, in which the Spiritual Leader rules in place of the Hidden 12th Imam of Shi’a Islam, who has been in hiding since the 9th Century.
Only Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers supported this doctrine. All other Shi’a Grand Ayatollahs rejected it, or had serious reservations. Chief among the objectors today is Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who is Iranian, and serves as the chief religious authority in Najaf, Iraq. Ayatollah Sistani has more followers than any other Shi’a leader.
Ayatollah Rafsanjani would reportedly replace Ayatollah Khamene’i with a triumvirate of knowledgeable clerics, of which he might be one. There is currently no willing successor to Ayatollah Khamene’i, so this problem was going to have to be addressed in the future anyway.
It is likely that the Guardian Council, which vets political candidates and approves laws passed by parliament, would also have its powers curtailed.
Iran watchers are looking carefully to see how successful the opposition organization has become and whether it will be able to sustain itself and develop a potent ideology and leadership for the long haul. It will also be important to see how the cycle of demonstrations, strikes and confrontations plays itself out over time.
One thing is certain, change has once again begun in Iran, and however it plays out, it will leave the nation in a very different state than it is in today.
William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota. He has conducted research on Iran for more than 30 years, and lived through the Revolution of 1978-79. He is the author of "The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other."
Iran’s Ongoing Revolution
New America Media, News analysis, William O. Beeman, Posted: Jun 26, 2009
Additional Commentary from William O. Beeman: I wrote the piece below on Tuesday, June 23. I now think that the prediction of the Iranian leadership's demise is somewhat precipitous. The Iranian government has launced an unprecedented crackdown on protestors of the election, which has quieted the protest. We learn from China and other places that such measures can definitely be effective in quelling resistance. (please see my earlier commments on this below). However, I stand by my feeling that the Iranian government has created a breach with its own citizens. Eventually, this event will live in memory, and will form the basis for govenmental change. I stand behind my characterization of the course of an ongoing resistance, and suggest that observers continue to note the culturally potent symbolic elements of resistance that characterize Iranian political, social and religious life. Today Roya Hakakian admonished all of us not to make predicting the Iranian Revolution our chief occupation. Prediction is hard, but it is a sure bet that change will come to Iran over the next 5-10 years--if the world will let Iranians do their own work and not interfere.
Iran’s most visible leaders, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Spiritual Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i are on the brink of losing their respective offices in the wake of the controversial presidential election in Iran June 12. It may not happen immediately, but it is a likely outcome over the long term.
Should this happen, many sectors of the American punditocracy will be thoroughly embarrassed. Having built these two figures up to mythic status, they will now have to face Iran as it really is, not as they would like to style it. It is, and has been for many years, not a calcified theocracy controlled by old mullahs. It is rather a nation on the brink of change as a new generation assumes power, and as the influence of women in the society rockets to the forefront.
Ayatollah Khamene’i has now been denounced by name in the streets — an unprecedented event. Furthermore, it is rumored that his rival, former President Ayatollah Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, head of the Expediency Council, which mediates between the powerful Guardian Council and the Iranian Parliament, and the Assembly of Experts, which oversees the authority of the Spiritual Leader, is lobbying the bodies he heads to replace the Spiritual Leader.
Mr. Ahmadinejad has been accused of rigging the election along with the son of Ayatollah Khamene’i, Mojtaba, and key members of the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij strike force. Statistical analyses of the official vote published in the Washington Post a few days after the election suggest that the numbers are artificial. Documents from the Ministry of the Interior showing the “real” vote tall--in which Mr. Moussavi was the clear winner--are in wide circulation.
However, it is now clear that the presidential election has become irrelevant in Iranian political life going forward. The Iranian president is relatively powerless in any case. What is more important is that the people feel that they have been violated by the power elite of the country and are now bent on changing the very foundation of their government.
If sea change is truly in the works in Iran, how will it proceed?
People can only imagine what they can imagine. In Iran today both the people and the establishment have only one model for social and governmental change, and that is the original Islamic revolution of 1978-79. Because both sides are working with the same vocabulary of symbolism, they are groping to command those potent images that will galvanize public support in their favor.
The master vocabulary of revolution in Iran is the historical martyrdom of Imam Hossein, grandson of the Prophet Mohammad, who was killed on the plains of Karbala in present day Iraq in 680. Imam Hossein is the central figure in Shi’a Islam, and his death is commemorated perpetually in Iranian life.
President Ahmadinejad’s chief rival, Mir Hossein Moussavi, co-opted the symbolism of the Karbala tragedy early on. For his campaign, he adopted the color green, the color most associated with Islam itself, with descendants of the Prophet, and with the martyrdom of Imam Hossein. After the election, he declared himself “ready for martyrdom,” and his supporters appeared in the streets shouting “Ya Hossein,” echoing the cries shouted by groups of mourners in the annual commemoration of Imam Hoseein’s death. As a religious cry, it could not be faulted by the police and security forces. They have also taken to shouting “Allahu Akbar—God is Great,” which is both a symbolic cry in favor of change, but also a subtle reminder that change--even revolutionary change--is always in the hands of God.
Not to be outdone, the clerical establishment countered the idea of martyrdom in the election with the Iranian soldier-martyrs of the Iran-Iraq war.
The original revolution fed on occasions for public assembly, notably the three-, seven-, and 40-day mourning ceremonies for the dead. This created a cycle of martyrdom as protesters against the Pahlavi government assembled, were killed by the Shah’s forces, and were in turn mourned in an ongoing fashion. The entire Revolution took more than a year to complete before the Shah finally gave up and left. The world can expect a long and drawn-out process of resistance in this action as well—a point made by Dr. Gary Sick of Columbia University in an article printed on The Daily Beast. Dr. Sick served as a military intelligence officer during the earlier Revolution
The original revolution was led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini from his exile in France. He used the technology of the day--long distance telephone and tape cassettes--to spread his revolutionary message.
In today’s resistance a remarkably appropriate figure may be poised to likewise lead from abroad--Nobel Prize Winner Shirin Ebadi who finds herself in Europe at this time. The technology of today--the Internet and the cell phone may be the organizing force that drives this current force for change.
Those who think that change will bring an end to Islamic influence in Iran are dead wrong. Neither side in the current conflict has denounced the Islamic Republic. However the current opposition wants to change the basis for Islamic government. At the core is the controversial doctrine of the Velayat-e Faqih, the Rule of the Chief Jurisprudent, in which the Spiritual Leader rules in place of the Hidden 12th Imam of Shi’a Islam, who has been in hiding since the 9th Century.
Only Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers supported this doctrine. All other Shi’a Grand Ayatollahs rejected it, or had serious reservations. Chief among the objectors today is Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who is Iranian, and serves as the chief religious authority in Najaf, Iraq. Ayatollah Sistani has more followers than any other Shi’a leader.
Ayatollah Rafsanjani would reportedly replace Ayatollah Khamene’i with a triumvirate of knowledgeable clerics, of which he might be one. There is currently no willing successor to Ayatollah Khamene’i, so this problem was going to have to be addressed in the future anyway.
It is likely that the Guardian Council, which vets political candidates and approves laws passed by parliament, would also have its powers curtailed.
Iran watchers are looking carefully to see how successful the opposition organization has become and whether it will be able to sustain itself and develop a potent ideology and leadership for the long haul. It will also be important to see how the cycle of demonstrations, strikes and confrontations plays itself out over time.
One thing is certain, change has once again begun in Iran, and however it plays out, it will leave the nation in a very different state than it is in today.
William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota. He has conducted research on Iran for more than 30 years, and lived through the Revolution of 1978-79. He is the author of "The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other."
Thursday, June 25, 2009
The Iranian Turmoil--latest thinking--William O. Beeman
I recognize a real social movement when I see one, and the Iranian turmoil is likely to have long-term consequences. Eventually, I believe those agitating for governmental change are going to prevail and revise the constitution, but it will take better organization and a long time to come to fruition.
On the other hand, I recognize several things about the current regime:
1. Ahmadinejad's supporters, the Abadgaran, Isargaran, etc. had a large component of Iraq war veterans. They complained bitterly that they didn't get enough power when AN was elected, and he responded by giving many of them very important posts throughout his administration, where he had the authority. They are now dependent on his retaining is office for them to stay in power. I wrote about this in the last chapter of the Great Satan book. These folks are real power-mongers. They want to maintain their status at any cost.
2. As Neil MacFarquhar noted in today's NYT, Ayatollah Khamene'i also has a coterie of folks dependent on him. If he goes, so do they. Same deal, patron-client relations mean that they will fight fiercely to make sure he stays in his post. Thus for both AN and AK, they are shored up by people whose very lives and fortunes depend on their staying in office, and they will go to ruthless measures to see that this is accomplished.
3. The Iranian regime has saddled up to both China and Russia, and has seen how useful their models for government are--placate the people with electronic toys and slightly improved living conditions and crack down ruthlessly on dissent. I think this is what they have decided to do.
4. Russia and China have a very important stake in keeping things as they are. They have good energy and trade deals with Iran, and these relations are a counter to the United States and Europe. I would not be surprised if they have a heavy hand in this. There are confusing reports of soldiers who don't speak Persian breaking heads in Tehran and elsewhere.
William O. Beeman
On the other hand, I recognize several things about the current regime:
1. Ahmadinejad's supporters, the Abadgaran, Isargaran, etc. had a large component of Iraq war veterans. They complained bitterly that they didn't get enough power when AN was elected, and he responded by giving many of them very important posts throughout his administration, where he had the authority. They are now dependent on his retaining is office for them to stay in power. I wrote about this in the last chapter of the Great Satan book. These folks are real power-mongers. They want to maintain their status at any cost.
2. As Neil MacFarquhar noted in today's NYT, Ayatollah Khamene'i also has a coterie of folks dependent on him. If he goes, so do they. Same deal, patron-client relations mean that they will fight fiercely to make sure he stays in his post. Thus for both AN and AK, they are shored up by people whose very lives and fortunes depend on their staying in office, and they will go to ruthless measures to see that this is accomplished.
3. The Iranian regime has saddled up to both China and Russia, and has seen how useful their models for government are--placate the people with electronic toys and slightly improved living conditions and crack down ruthlessly on dissent. I think this is what they have decided to do.
4. Russia and China have a very important stake in keeping things as they are. They have good energy and trade deals with Iran, and these relations are a counter to the United States and Europe. I would not be surprised if they have a heavy hand in this. There are confusing reports of soldiers who don't speak Persian breaking heads in Tehran and elsewhere.
William O. Beeman
Tuesday, June 23, 2009
The Crisis in Iran Is Just Beginning - The Daily Beast
The Crisis in Iran Is Just Beginning - The Daily Beast
The Crisis in Iran Is Just Beginning
by Gary Sick
June 22, 2009 | 11:28pm
AP Photo Gary Sick, the key White House official during the 1979 hostage crisis, says this revolution may be more of a marathon than a sprint, with no clear winner or loser. The watchwords for Obama: Do no harm.
Commentary by William O. Beeman: Gary Sick's analysis below reflects both wisdom and experience. Having personally lived through the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 I can verify what he says about the long-term nature of social change. His statement that Iranians prefer chess to football is only partially true. They like football a lot, but only as punctuation for the greater long game. It is also important to note that this was predictable. I have been writing for a number of years that a generational turnover was about to happen in Iran that would precipitate social change. Added to this is the extraordinary rise of female power in Iran. Added to this is the fact that there is no clear successor to Ayatollah Khamene'i. The core principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the "velayat-e faqih" or "regency of the chief jurisprudent," where the chief religious figure of the nation rules in place of the "hidden" 12th Imam of Shi'ism, is under fire. Only Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers subscribed to this principle. The other Grand Ayatollahs of the Shi'a world were opposed, claiming that clerical participation in politics would lead to corruption. Well, the corruption is now palpable and real, and exposed for all to see. The Iranian Presidency is now a side issue in the greater game of control of the nation.
____________________
As I set forth on a long vacation trip, here are a few observations about the situation in Iran based on my own experience of watching the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis from the White House 30 years ago.
Don’t expect that this will be resolved cleanly with a win or loss in short period of time. The Iranian revolution, which is usually regarded as one of the most accelerated overthrows of a well-entrenched power structure in history, started in about January 1978, and the shah departed in January 1979. During that period, there were long pauses and periods of quiescence that could lead one to believe that the revolt had subsided. This is not a sprint; it is a marathon. Endurance is at least as important as speed.
The Iranians prefer chess to football, and a “win” may involve a negotiated solution in which everyone saves face.
There may not be a clear winner or loser. Iranians are clever and wily politicians. They prefer chess to football, and a “win” may involve a negotiated solution in which everyone saves face. The current leadership has chosen, probably unwisely, to make this a test of strength, but if they conclude that it is a no-win situation, they could settle for a compromise. The shape of a compromise is impossible to guess at this point, but it would probably involve significant concessions concealed behind a great public show of unity.
Leadership is the key. Ayatollah Khamenei, the rahbar or leader, has chosen—again probably unwisely—to get out in front as the spokesman of the regime. Unlike his predecessor, the father of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini, he has openly taken sides with one faction over another. He is clearly speaking for the ultraconservative leaders of the Revolutionary Guards and their equally reactionary clerical supporters, who fear any possible threat to their dominant power. Curiously, President Ahmadinejad has largely vanished from sight, which adds to the impression that he is more of a pawn than a prime mover in this affair.
On the other side is Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, the erstwhile colleague and now principal antagonist of the rahbar. He has chosen, as he usually does, to stay behind the scenes as a master strategist, leaving the public field to Mir Hossein Mousavi and the other disappointed candidates and their followers.
The irony of two former colleagues now competing for power over the expiring corpse of the Islamic republic that they created with such grandiose expectations is lost on no one. The important subtext, however, is that these two understand very well what they are doing. They know how a revolt can be turned into a revolution. They also know they have everything to lose. The shared consciousness of high stakes has until now prevented an all-out political confrontation between rival factions in the elite. That may help explain why the rahbar and the Revolutionary Guards were so reckless in their insolent contempt of the reformers and the public. They may have believed that no one would dare take it to this level.
Now that it has arrived at this point, both protagonists are faced with decisions of unprecedented gravity. There has been nothing like this in the 30-year history of the Islamic republic, and today there is no Khomeini father figure to moderate and mediate among the warring factions. They must improvise in conditions of severe uncertainty. If anyone tells you that they know how this will turn out, treat their words with the same regard you would have for any fortune teller peering into a crystal ball.
For the United States, the watchwords should be: Do no harm. The situation in Iran is being exploited for short-term domestic political purposes by those who have been looking for an opening to attack the Obama administration. Wouldn’t it feel good to give full-throated expression to American opposition to the existing power structure in Iran? Perhaps so—but it could also be a fatal blow to the demonstrators risking their lives on the streets of Tehran and it could scotch any chance of eventual negotiations with whatever government emerges from this trial by fire.
The crisis in Iran is an Iranian crisis and it can only be resolved by the Iranian people and their leaders. There is no need to conceal our belief in freedom of speech and assembly and our support for the resolution of political disputes without bloodshed. But we should not be stampeded by domestic political concerns into pretending that our intervention in this crisis could be anything but pernicious.
Can President Obama play chess as well as he plays basketball?
Gary Sick served on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan. He was the principal White House aide for Iran during the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis and is the author of two books on U.S.-Iranian relations. Mr. Sick has a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University, where he is senior research scholar, adjunct professor of international affairs and former director of the Middle East Institute (2000-2003).
The Crisis in Iran Is Just Beginning
by Gary Sick
June 22, 2009 | 11:28pm
AP Photo Gary Sick, the key White House official during the 1979 hostage crisis, says this revolution may be more of a marathon than a sprint, with no clear winner or loser. The watchwords for Obama: Do no harm.
Commentary by William O. Beeman: Gary Sick's analysis below reflects both wisdom and experience. Having personally lived through the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 I can verify what he says about the long-term nature of social change. His statement that Iranians prefer chess to football is only partially true. They like football a lot, but only as punctuation for the greater long game. It is also important to note that this was predictable. I have been writing for a number of years that a generational turnover was about to happen in Iran that would precipitate social change. Added to this is the extraordinary rise of female power in Iran. Added to this is the fact that there is no clear successor to Ayatollah Khamene'i. The core principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the "velayat-e faqih" or "regency of the chief jurisprudent," where the chief religious figure of the nation rules in place of the "hidden" 12th Imam of Shi'ism, is under fire. Only Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers subscribed to this principle. The other Grand Ayatollahs of the Shi'a world were opposed, claiming that clerical participation in politics would lead to corruption. Well, the corruption is now palpable and real, and exposed for all to see. The Iranian Presidency is now a side issue in the greater game of control of the nation.
____________________
As I set forth on a long vacation trip, here are a few observations about the situation in Iran based on my own experience of watching the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis from the White House 30 years ago.
Don’t expect that this will be resolved cleanly with a win or loss in short period of time. The Iranian revolution, which is usually regarded as one of the most accelerated overthrows of a well-entrenched power structure in history, started in about January 1978, and the shah departed in January 1979. During that period, there were long pauses and periods of quiescence that could lead one to believe that the revolt had subsided. This is not a sprint; it is a marathon. Endurance is at least as important as speed.
The Iranians prefer chess to football, and a “win” may involve a negotiated solution in which everyone saves face.
There may not be a clear winner or loser. Iranians are clever and wily politicians. They prefer chess to football, and a “win” may involve a negotiated solution in which everyone saves face. The current leadership has chosen, probably unwisely, to make this a test of strength, but if they conclude that it is a no-win situation, they could settle for a compromise. The shape of a compromise is impossible to guess at this point, but it would probably involve significant concessions concealed behind a great public show of unity.
Leadership is the key. Ayatollah Khamenei, the rahbar or leader, has chosen—again probably unwisely—to get out in front as the spokesman of the regime. Unlike his predecessor, the father of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini, he has openly taken sides with one faction over another. He is clearly speaking for the ultraconservative leaders of the Revolutionary Guards and their equally reactionary clerical supporters, who fear any possible threat to their dominant power. Curiously, President Ahmadinejad has largely vanished from sight, which adds to the impression that he is more of a pawn than a prime mover in this affair.
On the other side is Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, the erstwhile colleague and now principal antagonist of the rahbar. He has chosen, as he usually does, to stay behind the scenes as a master strategist, leaving the public field to Mir Hossein Mousavi and the other disappointed candidates and their followers.
The irony of two former colleagues now competing for power over the expiring corpse of the Islamic republic that they created with such grandiose expectations is lost on no one. The important subtext, however, is that these two understand very well what they are doing. They know how a revolt can be turned into a revolution. They also know they have everything to lose. The shared consciousness of high stakes has until now prevented an all-out political confrontation between rival factions in the elite. That may help explain why the rahbar and the Revolutionary Guards were so reckless in their insolent contempt of the reformers and the public. They may have believed that no one would dare take it to this level.
Now that it has arrived at this point, both protagonists are faced with decisions of unprecedented gravity. There has been nothing like this in the 30-year history of the Islamic republic, and today there is no Khomeini father figure to moderate and mediate among the warring factions. They must improvise in conditions of severe uncertainty. If anyone tells you that they know how this will turn out, treat their words with the same regard you would have for any fortune teller peering into a crystal ball.
For the United States, the watchwords should be: Do no harm. The situation in Iran is being exploited for short-term domestic political purposes by those who have been looking for an opening to attack the Obama administration. Wouldn’t it feel good to give full-throated expression to American opposition to the existing power structure in Iran? Perhaps so—but it could also be a fatal blow to the demonstrators risking their lives on the streets of Tehran and it could scotch any chance of eventual negotiations with whatever government emerges from this trial by fire.
The crisis in Iran is an Iranian crisis and it can only be resolved by the Iranian people and their leaders. There is no need to conceal our belief in freedom of speech and assembly and our support for the resolution of political disputes without bloodshed. But we should not be stampeded by domestic political concerns into pretending that our intervention in this crisis could be anything but pernicious.
Can President Obama play chess as well as he plays basketball?
Gary Sick served on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan. He was the principal White House aide for Iran during the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis and is the author of two books on U.S.-Iranian relations. Mr. Sick has a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University, where he is senior research scholar, adjunct professor of international affairs and former director of the Middle East Institute (2000-2003).
Saturday, June 20, 2009
William O. Beeman--IT'S THE AFTERMATH OF THE IRANIAN ELECTION THAT COUNTS (New America Media)
Note: The article below has been modified from the original.
IT'S THE AFTERMATH OF THE IRANIAN ELECTION THAT COUNTS
New America Media, News Analysis, William O. Beeman, Posted: Jun 18, 2009
The Iranian presidential election is over, and while the world focuses on
whether President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was reelected fairly, or whether his
rival Mir Hussein Moussavi was the winner, the most serious issue for Iran
and the rest of the world is the role of the Iranian government in
conducting the election.
Government officials made many mistakes both before and after the election
that will cost them their public support. Erosion of public confidence in
the government -- already shaky before the election -- will lead to
instability, and instability in Iran means instability throughout the
region.
The most significant mistake was to unilaterally and uncritically back the
highly controversial President Ahmadinejad. He had significant support in
rural areas and among pensioners and some members of the traditional
classes, as well as the more fervently conservative sectors of the military.
But even clerical leaders expressed wariness with his grandstanding
extremist rhetoric, and his short-term giveaway economic policies that
ignored the need for infrastructure and new employment. The middle and upper
classes viewed with dismay the erosion in civil liberties under his
administration, and cringed at his millenarian personal beliefs.
If Mr. Moussavi prevailed, relatively little would have changed in Iran, but
the establishment would have retained some thread of contact with his
supporters. The establishment powers needed much more wiggle room in this
controversial election.
It may well be that Ahmadinejad actually won the election. He garnered about
the same percentage of votes, approximately 62 percent, as he had in the
runoff election in 2005. However, the way in which his victory was presented
to the public showed absolute disdain for both the Iranian people and the
electoral process. One wonders what official decided to announce that he had
won before the prescribed three-day waiting period had expired.
It made the world wonder how such a declaration was logistically possible
given the number of votes that had to be counted by hand.
Then President Ahmadinejad himself showed a cocky disdain for those who
questioned the election, likening them to disgruntled soccer fans, and
referring to them as "dust." The large-scale street protests were met with
force, and the government tried to crack down, unsuccessfully, on
transmission of information about the civil unrest.
One could see the fabric of Iran ripping and tearing with Ahmadinejad's
words and the government's subsequent deeds.
Authority in Iran depends on the existence of a social contract between
subordinate and super-ordinate powers. The super-ordinate figures are
paradoxically the most fragile in their position. They must attend to the
needs of subordinates, or risk being toppled from power -- or at the very
least undermined. Every Iranian working in a bureaucratic office knows that
the bad boss is eventually done in by his employees who lose things,
misroute files, and steal -- or in extreme cases, launch embarrassing
protests. Then they claim their subordinate status as an excuse.
In this regard, the Iranian government conduct vis-a-vis the protestors and
street demonstrators in the wake of the elections is the telling event. By
sanctioning the beating of women and young people, house arrests and
crackdowns, the authorities in Iran essentially are breaking their contract
with the people. Social order begins to fray. Ayatollah Khamene'i must
re-establish his credentials with the public if he hopes to keep the power
structure intact, and it may now be too late.
This was the lesson Ayatollah Khomeini was able to teach the nation when the
authority of his religious-based movement was challenged by other actors in
the revolution of 1978-79. He co-opted and outflanked his enemies by
adopting their radical agenda and garnering the support of the public.
As Iranian analysts have been pointing out for years, demography is playing
a huge role in this social drama. The majority of the voting population
(even with an arbitrary raising of the voting age to 18 to curtail youth
power) was bound to tip the scales in this or the next election. The tip
appears to have happened sooner than later. The power of women has also
grown to be enormous and they are very angry.
It is also telling that those being affected by the government's
heavy-handed treatment are a broad spectrum of the population, just as in
the original revolution of 1978-79. The restrictions on the foreign press
are also significant.
Who knows why the Iranian government acted in this reckless manner?
Certainly paranoia about Western interference in Iranian internal affairs
has been growing in Iran in recent years. CIA and Mossad operatives are
known to be operating in Iran. "Color" revolutions in the former Soviet
Union supported by the United States increased this anxiety. When
Ahmadinejad's chief opponent, Mir Hossein Moussavi, appeared with a "green"
color theme, this may have set off alarms and lack of caution.
The next 10 days will be very significant to see how this series of events
plays out. The large difference between 1978-79 and today is the extremely
complex power structures ensconced in the Iranian constitution. Toppling a
single figure or small group of figures will not automatically result in
governmental change, despite the loss of the public contract with authority.
Time will certainly tell.
-----------------------
William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology
at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. He has lived and worked in Iran
for more than 30 years. His most recent book is "The 'Great Satan' vs. the
'Mad Mullahs': How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other,"
(University of Chicago Press, 2008).
IT'S THE AFTERMATH OF THE IRANIAN ELECTION THAT COUNTS
New America Media, News Analysis, William O. Beeman, Posted: Jun 18, 2009
The Iranian presidential election is over, and while the world focuses on
whether President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was reelected fairly, or whether his
rival Mir Hussein Moussavi was the winner, the most serious issue for Iran
and the rest of the world is the role of the Iranian government in
conducting the election.
Government officials made many mistakes both before and after the election
that will cost them their public support. Erosion of public confidence in
the government -- already shaky before the election -- will lead to
instability, and instability in Iran means instability throughout the
region.
The most significant mistake was to unilaterally and uncritically back the
highly controversial President Ahmadinejad. He had significant support in
rural areas and among pensioners and some members of the traditional
classes, as well as the more fervently conservative sectors of the military.
But even clerical leaders expressed wariness with his grandstanding
extremist rhetoric, and his short-term giveaway economic policies that
ignored the need for infrastructure and new employment. The middle and upper
classes viewed with dismay the erosion in civil liberties under his
administration, and cringed at his millenarian personal beliefs.
If Mr. Moussavi prevailed, relatively little would have changed in Iran, but
the establishment would have retained some thread of contact with his
supporters. The establishment powers needed much more wiggle room in this
controversial election.
It may well be that Ahmadinejad actually won the election. He garnered about
the same percentage of votes, approximately 62 percent, as he had in the
runoff election in 2005. However, the way in which his victory was presented
to the public showed absolute disdain for both the Iranian people and the
electoral process. One wonders what official decided to announce that he had
won before the prescribed three-day waiting period had expired.
It made the world wonder how such a declaration was logistically possible
given the number of votes that had to be counted by hand.
Then President Ahmadinejad himself showed a cocky disdain for those who
questioned the election, likening them to disgruntled soccer fans, and
referring to them as "dust." The large-scale street protests were met with
force, and the government tried to crack down, unsuccessfully, on
transmission of information about the civil unrest.
One could see the fabric of Iran ripping and tearing with Ahmadinejad's
words and the government's subsequent deeds.
Authority in Iran depends on the existence of a social contract between
subordinate and super-ordinate powers. The super-ordinate figures are
paradoxically the most fragile in their position. They must attend to the
needs of subordinates, or risk being toppled from power -- or at the very
least undermined. Every Iranian working in a bureaucratic office knows that
the bad boss is eventually done in by his employees who lose things,
misroute files, and steal -- or in extreme cases, launch embarrassing
protests. Then they claim their subordinate status as an excuse.
In this regard, the Iranian government conduct vis-a-vis the protestors and
street demonstrators in the wake of the elections is the telling event. By
sanctioning the beating of women and young people, house arrests and
crackdowns, the authorities in Iran essentially are breaking their contract
with the people. Social order begins to fray. Ayatollah Khamene'i must
re-establish his credentials with the public if he hopes to keep the power
structure intact, and it may now be too late.
This was the lesson Ayatollah Khomeini was able to teach the nation when the
authority of his religious-based movement was challenged by other actors in
the revolution of 1978-79. He co-opted and outflanked his enemies by
adopting their radical agenda and garnering the support of the public.
As Iranian analysts have been pointing out for years, demography is playing
a huge role in this social drama. The majority of the voting population
(even with an arbitrary raising of the voting age to 18 to curtail youth
power) was bound to tip the scales in this or the next election. The tip
appears to have happened sooner than later. The power of women has also
grown to be enormous and they are very angry.
It is also telling that those being affected by the government's
heavy-handed treatment are a broad spectrum of the population, just as in
the original revolution of 1978-79. The restrictions on the foreign press
are also significant.
Who knows why the Iranian government acted in this reckless manner?
Certainly paranoia about Western interference in Iranian internal affairs
has been growing in Iran in recent years. CIA and Mossad operatives are
known to be operating in Iran. "Color" revolutions in the former Soviet
Union supported by the United States increased this anxiety. When
Ahmadinejad's chief opponent, Mir Hossein Moussavi, appeared with a "green"
color theme, this may have set off alarms and lack of caution.
The next 10 days will be very significant to see how this series of events
plays out. The large difference between 1978-79 and today is the extremely
complex power structures ensconced in the Iranian constitution. Toppling a
single figure or small group of figures will not automatically result in
governmental change, despite the loss of the public contract with authority.
Time will certainly tell.
-----------------------
William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology
at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. He has lived and worked in Iran
for more than 30 years. His most recent book is "The 'Great Satan' vs. the
'Mad Mullahs': How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other,"
(University of Chicago Press, 2008).
Thursday, June 11, 2009
Beeman--Elections and Governmental Structure in Iran
In 2005, I wrote an article for the Brown Journal of World Affairs laying out the structure of Iranian government and election procedures that are followed in Iran. The article has proved to be very popular and sturdy, and was incorporated into my book, The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other (Greenwood Press, 2005; 2nd Edition, University of Chicago Press, 2008). The article can be found here:
http://www.bjwa.org/article.php?id=NYybYi5qit7Wdt5H9f79JylSLrCi7itJgdAJcms5
The article is in PDF format, and you may have to register with the Brown Journal of World Affairs before you can access it. It will explain in brief how Iranian governmental bodies are elected or selected, and how elections proceed.
The election this Friday, June 12, which pits front-runners Mir-Hossein Mousavi and existing president Ahmadinejad is especially interesting because a near majority of eligible voters are young people who do not remember the revolution of 1978-79.
Turnout will be essential in this election, and the participation of women absolutely crucial to victory for any candidate. The election was advanced by one year, presumably because of dissatisfaction with President Ahmadinejad.
http://www.bjwa.org/article.php?id=NYybYi5qit7Wdt5H9f79JylSLrCi7itJgdAJcms5
The article is in PDF format, and you may have to register with the Brown Journal of World Affairs before you can access it. It will explain in brief how Iranian governmental bodies are elected or selected, and how elections proceed.
The election this Friday, June 12, which pits front-runners Mir-Hossein Mousavi and existing president Ahmadinejad is especially interesting because a near majority of eligible voters are young people who do not remember the revolution of 1978-79.
Turnout will be essential in this election, and the participation of women absolutely crucial to victory for any candidate. The election was advanced by one year, presumably because of dissatisfaction with President Ahmadinejad.
Monday, May 25, 2009
Have We Already Lost Iran? Flint Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett [New York Times]
The New York Times
May 24, 2009
Op-Ed Contributors
Have We Already Lost Iran?
By FLYNT LEVERETT and HILLARY MANN LEVERETT
Washington
Commentary by William O. Beeman:
The ducks at AIPAC, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) are pecking the Obama administration to death on Iran. Dennis Ross, in particular, as outlined in the article below, is a fifth-column neoconservative connected with WINEP who is trying to make sure that negotiation with Iran fails in anticipation of an eventual military attack on the Islamic Republic. ("We tried everything, and so now we have to bomb them"). Americans should understand that the little rat terriers at these institutions are obsessed with Iran, and will not give up their monomaniacal inability to support any rapprochement between Iran and the West. As long as we have such people in positions of power, the Middle East region will continue to be an unstable and dangerous place.
PRESIDENT OBAMA’S Iran policy has, in all likelihood, already failed. On its present course, the White House’s approach will not stop Tehran’s development of a nuclear fuel program — or, as Iran’s successful test of a medium-range, solid-fuel missile last week underscored, military capacities of other sorts. It will also not provide an alternative to continued antagonism between the United States and Iran — a posture that for 30 years has proved increasingly damaging to the interests of the United States and its allies in the Middle East.
This judgment may seem both premature and overly severe. We do not make it happily. We voted for Barack Obama in 2008, and we still want him to succeed in reversing the deterioration in America’s strategic position. But we also believe that successful diplomacy with Iran is essential to that end. Unless President Obama and his national security team take a fundamentally different approach to Tehran, they will not achieve a breakthrough.
This is a genuine shame, for President Obama had the potential to do so much better for America’s position in the Middle East. In his greeting to “the people and leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran” on the Persian New Year in March, Mr. Obama included language meant to assuage Iranian skepticism about America’s willingness to end efforts to topple the regime and pursue comprehensive diplomacy.
Iranian diplomats have told us that the president’s professed willingness to deal with Iran on the “basis of mutual interest” in an atmosphere of “mutual respect” was particularly well received in Tehran. They say that the quick response of the nation’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — which included the unprecedented statement that “should you change, our behavior will change, too” — was a sincere signal of Iran’s openness to substantive diplomatic proposals from the new American administration.
Unfortunately, Mr. Obama is backing away from the bold steps required to achieve strategic, Nixon-to-China-type rapprochement with Tehran. Administration officials have professed disappointment that Iranian leaders have not responded more warmly to Mr. Obama’s rhetoric. Many say that the detention of the Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi (who was released this month) and Ayatollah Khamenei’s claim last week that America is “fomenting terrorism” inside Iran show that trying to engage Tehran is a fool’s errand.
But this ignores the real reason Iranian leaders have not responded to the new president more enthusiastically: the Obama administration has done nothing to cancel or repudiate an ostensibly covert but well-publicized program, begun in President George W. Bush’s second term, to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to destabilize the Islamic Republic. Under these circumstances, the Iranian government — regardless of who wins the presidential elections on June 12 — will continue to suspect that American intentions toward the Islamic Republic remain, ultimately, hostile.
In this context, the Saberi case should be interpreted not as the work of unspecified “hard-liners” in Tehran out to destroy prospects for improved relations with Washington, but rather as part of the Iranian leadership’s misguided but fundamentally defensive reaction to an American government campaign to bring about regime change. Similarly, Ayatollah Khamenei’s charge that “money, arms and organizations are being used by the Americans directly across our western border to fight the Islamic Republic’s system” reflects legitimate concern about American intentions. Mr. Obama has reinforced this concern by refusing to pursue an American-Iranian “grand bargain” — a comprehensive framework for resolving major bilateral differences and fundamentally realigning relations.
More broadly, President Obama has made several policy and personnel decisions that have undermined the promise of his encouraging rhetoric about Iran. On the personnel front, the problem begins at the top, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. As a presidential candidate, then-Senator Clinton ran well to the right of Mr. Obama on Iran, even saying she would “totally obliterate” Iran if it attacked Israel. Since becoming secretary of state, Clinton has told a number of allies in Europe and the Persian Gulf that she is skeptical that diplomacy with Iran will prove fruitful and testified to Congress that negotiations are primarily useful to garner support for “crippling” multilateral sanctions against Iran.
First of all, this posture is feckless, as Secretary Clinton does not have broad international support for sanctions that would come anywhere close to being crippling. More significantly, this posture is cynically counterproductive, for it eviscerates the credibility of any American diplomatic overtures in the eyes of Iranian leaders across the Islamic Republic’s political spectrum.
Even more disturbing is President Obama’s willingness to have Dennis Ross become the point person for Iran policy at the State Department. Mr. Ross has long been an advocate of what he describes as an “engagement with pressure” strategy toward Tehran, meaning that the United States should project a willingness to negotiate with Iran largely to elicit broader regional and international support for intensifying economic pressure on the Islamic Republic.
In conversations with Mr. Ross before Mr. Obama’s election, we asked him if he really believed that engage-with-pressure would bring concessions from Iran. He forthrightly acknowledged that this was unlikely. Why, then, was he advocating a diplomatic course that, in his judgment, would probably fail? Because, he told us, if Iran continued to expand its nuclear fuel program, at some point in the next couple of years President Bush’s successor would need to order military strikes against Iranian nuclear targets. Citing past “diplomacy” would be necessary for that president to claim any military action was legitimate.
Iranian officials are fully aware of Mr. Ross’s views — and are increasingly suspicious that he is determined that the Obama administration make, as one senior Iranian diplomat said to us, “an offer we can’t accept,” simply to gain international support for coercive action.
Understandably, given that much of Mr. Obama’s national security team doesn’t share his vision of rapprochement with Iran, America’s overall policy is incoherent. For example, while the administration recently completed a much-ballyhooed review of Iran policy, it has made no changes in its approach to the nuclear issue. Administration officials argue, with what seem to be straight faces, that the Iranian leadership should be impressed simply because American representatives will now show up for any nuclear negotiations with Iran that might take place.
Similarly, some officials suggest that the administration might be prepared to accept limited uranium enrichment on Iranian soil as part of a settlement — effectively asking to be given “credit” merely for acknowledging a well-established reality. Based on our own experience negotiating with Iranians, and our frequent discussions with Iranian diplomats and political figures since leaving the government, we think that it will take a lot more to persuade Tehran of America’s new seriousness.
Tehran will certainly not be persuaded of American seriousness if Washington acquiesces to Israeli insistence on a deadline for successful American engagement with Iran. Although the White House spokesman, Robert Gibbs, had told reporters that no such deadline would be imposed, President Obama himself said, after his meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, that he wants to see “progress” in nuclear negotiations before the end of the year. He also endorsed the creation of a high-level Israeli-American working group to identify more coercive options if Iran does not meet American conditions for limiting its nuclear activities.
More specifically, Secretary Clinton and Mr. Ross have been pushing the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany to intensify multilateral sanctions against Iran if Tehran has not agreed to limit the expansion of its nuclear-fuel cycle program by the time the United Nations General Assembly convenes in New York at the end of September.
This diplomatic approach is guaranteed to fail. Having a deadline for successful negotiations will undercut the perceived credibility of American diplomacy in Tehran and serve only to prepare the way for more coercive measures. Mr. Obama’s justification for a deadline — that previous American-Iranian negotiations produced “a lot of talk but not always action and follow-through” — is incorrect as far as Iranian behavior was concerned. For example, during talks over Afghanistan after 9/11 in which one of us (Hillary) took part, Tehran deported hundreds of Qaeda and Taliban operatives who had sought sanctuary in Iran, and also helped establish the new Afghan government. It was Washington, not Tehran, that arbitrarily ended these productive talks.
Beyond the nuclear issue, the administration’s approach to Iran degenerates into an only slightly prettified version of George W. Bush’s approach — that is, an effort to contain a perceived Iranian threat without actually trying to resolve underlying political conflicts. Obama administration officials are buying into a Bush-era delusion: that concern about a rising Iranian threat could unite Israel and moderate Arab states in a grand alliance under Washington’s leadership.
President Obama and his team should not be excused for their failure to learn the lessons of recent history in the Middle East — that the prospect of strategic cooperation with Israel is profoundly unpopular with Arab publics and that even moderate Arab regimes cannot sustain such cooperation. The notion of an Israeli-moderate Arab coalition united to contain Iran is not only delusional, it would leave the Palestinian and Syrian-Lebanese tracks of the Arab-Israeli conflict unresolved and prospects for their resolution in free fall. These tracks cannot be resolved without meaningful American interaction with Iran and its regional allies, Hamas and Hezbollah.
Why has President Obama put himself in a position from which he cannot deliver on his own professed interest in improving relations with the Islamic Republic? Some diplomatic veterans who have spoken with him have told us that the president said that he did not realize, when he came to office, how “hard” the Iran problem would be. But what is hard about the Iran problem is not periodic inflammatory statements from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or episodes like Ms. Saberi’s detention. What is really hard is that getting America’s Iran policy “right” would require a president to take positions that some allies and domestic constituencies won’t like.
To fix our Iran policy, the president would have to commit not to use force to change the borders or the form of government of the Islamic Republic. He would also have to accept that Iran will continue enriching uranium, and that the only realistic potential resolution to the nuclear issue would leave Iran in effect like Japan — a nation with an increasingly sophisticated nuclear fuel-cycle program that is carefully safeguarded to manage proliferation risks. Additionally, the president would have to accept that Iran’s relationships with Hamas and Hezbollah will continue, and be willing to work with Tehran to integrate these groups into lasting settlements of the Middle East’s core political conflicts.
It was not easy for President Richard Nixon to discard a quarter-century of failed policy toward the People’s Republic of China and to reorient America’s posture toward Beijing in ways that have served America’s interests extremely well for more than 30 years. That took strategic vision, political ruthlessness and personal determination. We hope that President Obama — contrary to his record so far — will soon begin to demonstrate those same qualities in forging a new approach toward Iran.
Flynt Leverett directs the New America Foundation’s geopolitics of energy initiative and teaches at Penn State’s School of International Affairs. Hillary Mann Leverett is the president of a political risk consultancy. Both are former National Security Council staff members.
Sunday, May 24, 2009
Zakaria--Everything you know about Iran is Wrong (Newsweek)
They May Not Want The Bomb
And other unexpected truths.
NEWSWEEK
May 23, 2009
By Fareed Zakaria
Comment by William O. Beeman:
Fareed Zakaria verifies what Iranian experts have been saying for years about Iran--that it is not a theocracy, that it is not a dictatorship in the conventional sense of the term, that Iranians do not have a nuclear weapons program, that Iranian elections are not unfair, that Iranian women are not hopelessly repressed. It is frustrating that unquestioned experts on Iran could have been shouting these truths for years with no effect. Let us hope that a media star like Zakaria can make a dent in the baseless AIPAC-inspired attacks on Iran, and that a saner policy toward the Islamic Republic will emerge in the Obama administration
Everything you know about Iran is wrong, or at least more complicated than you think. Take the bomb. The regime wants to be a nuclear power but could well be happy with a peaceful civilian program (which could make the challenge it poses more complex). What's the evidence? Well, over the last five years, senior Iranian officials at every level have repeatedly asserted that they do not intend to build nuclear weapons. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has quoted the regime's founding father, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who asserted that such weapons were "un-Islamic." The country's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a fatwa in 2004 describing the use of nuclear weapons as immoral. In a subsequent sermon, he declared that "developing, producing or stockpiling nuclear weapons is forbidden under Islam." Last year Khamenei reiterated all these points after meeting with the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei. Now, of course, they could all be lying. But it seems odd for a regime that derives its legitimacy from its fidelity to Islam to declare constantly that these weapons are un-Islamic if it intends to develop them. It would be far shrewder to stop reminding people of Khomeini's statements and stop issuing new fatwas against nukes.
Following a civilian nuclear strategy has big benefits. The country would remain within international law, simply asserting its rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a position that has much support across the world. That would make comprehensive sanctions against Iran impossible. And if Tehran's aim is to expand its regional influence, it doesn't need a bomb to do so. Simply having a clear "breakout" capacity—the ability to weaponize within a few months—would allow it to operate with much greater latitude and impunity in the Middle East and Central Asia.
Iranians aren't suicidal. In an interview last week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the Iranian regime as "a messianic, apocalyptic cult." In fact, Iran has tended to behave in a shrewd, calculating manner, advancing its interests when possible, retreating when necessary. The Iranians allied with the United States and against the Taliban in 2001, assisting in the creation of the Karzai government. They worked against the United States in Iraq, where they feared the creation of a pro-U.S. puppet on their border. Earlier this year, during the Gaza war, Israel warned Hizbullah not to launch rockets against it, and there is much evidence that Iran played a role in reining in their proxies. Iran's ruling elite is obsessed with gathering wealth and maintaining power. The argument made by those—including many Israelis for coercive sanctions against Iran is that many in the regime have been squirreling away money into bank accounts in Dubai and Switzerland for their children and grandchildren. These are not actions associated with people who believe that the world is going to end soon.
Quantcast
One of Netanyahu's advisers said of Iran, "Think Amalek." The Bible says that the Amalekites were dedicated enemies of the Jewish people. In 1 Samuel 15, God says, "Go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass." Now, were the president of Iran and his advisers to have cited a religious text that gave divine sanction for the annihilation of an entire race, they would be called, well, messianic.
Iran isn't a dictatorship. It is certainly not a democracy. The regime jails opponents, closes down magazines and tolerates few challenges to its authority. But neither is it a monolithic dictatorship. It might be best described as an oligarchy, with considerable debate and dissent within the elites. Even the so-called Supreme Leader has a constituency, the Assembly of Experts, who selected him and whom he has to keep happy. Ahmadinejad is widely seen as the "mad mullah" who runs the country, but he is not the unquestioned chief executive and is actually a thorn in the side of the clerical establishment. He is a layman with no family connections to major ayatollahs—which makes him a rare figure in the ruling class. He was not initially the favored candidate of the Supreme Leader in the 2005 election. Even now the mullahs clearly dislike him, and he, in turn, does things deliberately designed to undermine their authority. Iran might be ready to deal. We can't know if a deal is possible since we've never tried to negotiate one, not directly. While the regime appears united in its belief that Iran has the right to a civilian nuclear program—a position with broad popular support—some leaders seem sensitive to the costs of the current approach. It is conceivable that these "moderates" would appreciate the potential benefits of limiting their nuclear program, including trade, technology and recognition by the United States. The Iranians insist they must be able to enrich uranium on their own soil. One proposal is for this to take place in Iran but only under the control of an international consortium. It's not a perfect solution because the Iranians could—if they were very creative and dedicated—cheat. But neither is it perfect from the Iranian point of view because it would effectively mean a permanent inspections regime in their country. But both sides might get enough of what they consider crucial for it to work. Why not try this before launching the next Mideast war?
© 2009
And other unexpected truths.
NEWSWEEK
May 23, 2009
By Fareed Zakaria
Comment by William O. Beeman:
Fareed Zakaria verifies what Iranian experts have been saying for years about Iran--that it is not a theocracy, that it is not a dictatorship in the conventional sense of the term, that Iranians do not have a nuclear weapons program, that Iranian elections are not unfair, that Iranian women are not hopelessly repressed. It is frustrating that unquestioned experts on Iran could have been shouting these truths for years with no effect. Let us hope that a media star like Zakaria can make a dent in the baseless AIPAC-inspired attacks on Iran, and that a saner policy toward the Islamic Republic will emerge in the Obama administration
Everything you know about Iran is wrong, or at least more complicated than you think. Take the bomb. The regime wants to be a nuclear power but could well be happy with a peaceful civilian program (which could make the challenge it poses more complex). What's the evidence? Well, over the last five years, senior Iranian officials at every level have repeatedly asserted that they do not intend to build nuclear weapons. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has quoted the regime's founding father, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who asserted that such weapons were "un-Islamic." The country's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a fatwa in 2004 describing the use of nuclear weapons as immoral. In a subsequent sermon, he declared that "developing, producing or stockpiling nuclear weapons is forbidden under Islam." Last year Khamenei reiterated all these points after meeting with the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei. Now, of course, they could all be lying. But it seems odd for a regime that derives its legitimacy from its fidelity to Islam to declare constantly that these weapons are un-Islamic if it intends to develop them. It would be far shrewder to stop reminding people of Khomeini's statements and stop issuing new fatwas against nukes.
Following a civilian nuclear strategy has big benefits. The country would remain within international law, simply asserting its rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a position that has much support across the world. That would make comprehensive sanctions against Iran impossible. And if Tehran's aim is to expand its regional influence, it doesn't need a bomb to do so. Simply having a clear "breakout" capacity—the ability to weaponize within a few months—would allow it to operate with much greater latitude and impunity in the Middle East and Central Asia.
Iranians aren't suicidal. In an interview last week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the Iranian regime as "a messianic, apocalyptic cult." In fact, Iran has tended to behave in a shrewd, calculating manner, advancing its interests when possible, retreating when necessary. The Iranians allied with the United States and against the Taliban in 2001, assisting in the creation of the Karzai government. They worked against the United States in Iraq, where they feared the creation of a pro-U.S. puppet on their border. Earlier this year, during the Gaza war, Israel warned Hizbullah not to launch rockets against it, and there is much evidence that Iran played a role in reining in their proxies. Iran's ruling elite is obsessed with gathering wealth and maintaining power. The argument made by those—including many Israelis for coercive sanctions against Iran is that many in the regime have been squirreling away money into bank accounts in Dubai and Switzerland for their children and grandchildren. These are not actions associated with people who believe that the world is going to end soon.
Quantcast
One of Netanyahu's advisers said of Iran, "Think Amalek." The Bible says that the Amalekites were dedicated enemies of the Jewish people. In 1 Samuel 15, God says, "Go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass." Now, were the president of Iran and his advisers to have cited a religious text that gave divine sanction for the annihilation of an entire race, they would be called, well, messianic.
Iran isn't a dictatorship. It is certainly not a democracy. The regime jails opponents, closes down magazines and tolerates few challenges to its authority. But neither is it a monolithic dictatorship. It might be best described as an oligarchy, with considerable debate and dissent within the elites. Even the so-called Supreme Leader has a constituency, the Assembly of Experts, who selected him and whom he has to keep happy. Ahmadinejad is widely seen as the "mad mullah" who runs the country, but he is not the unquestioned chief executive and is actually a thorn in the side of the clerical establishment. He is a layman with no family connections to major ayatollahs—which makes him a rare figure in the ruling class. He was not initially the favored candidate of the Supreme Leader in the 2005 election. Even now the mullahs clearly dislike him, and he, in turn, does things deliberately designed to undermine their authority. Iran might be ready to deal. We can't know if a deal is possible since we've never tried to negotiate one, not directly. While the regime appears united in its belief that Iran has the right to a civilian nuclear program—a position with broad popular support—some leaders seem sensitive to the costs of the current approach. It is conceivable that these "moderates" would appreciate the potential benefits of limiting their nuclear program, including trade, technology and recognition by the United States. The Iranians insist they must be able to enrich uranium on their own soil. One proposal is for this to take place in Iran but only under the control of an international consortium. It's not a perfect solution because the Iranians could—if they were very creative and dedicated—cheat. But neither is it perfect from the Iranian point of view because it would effectively mean a permanent inspections regime in their country. But both sides might get enough of what they consider crucial for it to work. Why not try this before launching the next Mideast war?
© 2009
Monday, May 11, 2009
William O. Beeman--Roxana Saberi’s Release Bodes Well for U.S.-Iran Relations (New America Media)
Roxana Saberi’s Release Bodes Well for U.S.-Iran Relations
New America Media, Commentary, William O. Beeman, Posted: May 11, 2009
Roxana Saberi, the 32-year-old Iranian-American journalist convicted of espionage in Iran has been released to her family, and will soon return to the United States.
While her international community of family, colleagues and friends can rejoice in her release, it was predictable from the moment of her arrest, based on the history of such events in Iran in the past.
Although no one will know for sure exactly how events proceeded against her, it is possible to speculate how Saberi’s arraignment and trial developed.
The espionage charges against Saberi were utterly unfounded. They were likely the result of an escalation within the Iranian judicial system as official after official tried to cover their tracks for a series of abortive attempts to charge her with a crime.
She was first detained for the relatively minor offense of having purchased a bottle of wine. Since religious minorities in Iran are allowed to manufacture, sell and consume alcohol, the country is awash in liquor. It is easily obtainable by everyone—even government officials. Most likely the arresting official did not know that Saberi was an American passport holder born in the United States, and was probably chagrined to discover that this case was likely to create international brouhaha.
A more serious charge was then sought to justify the first arrest. The discovery that her press credentials had expired some months earlier provided that opportunity. Saberi had continued to file stories for a number of American news outlets, reportedly because officials assured her that the expiration of her press pass was inconsequential. Since she could demonstrate that Iranian officials had allowed her to continue writing, this charge would also not hold water.
Finally, the serious charge of espionage was lodged. As foolish and unsubstantiated as this charge was, it was plausible in Iran. Rumors that American CIA operatives were active in Iran were widely promulgated in Iran. These suspicions were reinforced through extensive documentation found in New York Times reporter James Risen’s 2006 book “State of War.” Additionally, on April 4, the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz confirmed an earlier rumor that an Iranian nuclear scientist had been assassinated by the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad, inside Iran.
Iran experienced one horrendous situation involving a foreigner arrested for spying in Iran in 2003. Canadian-Iranian Zahra Kazemi was raped, beaten and tortured to death (although Iranian authorities claimed she died of a stroke) for allegedly having photographed prohibited parts of Evin Prison, where she was later incarcerated. Her death caused an international uproar. The Iranian government, clearly badly burned by the Kazemi case has since been careful to make sure that her situation is not repeated.
Foreigners -- dual nationals -- accused of espionage have been held for a time, usually in conspicuously humane circumstances, while the government wrings as much publicity out of the event as possible for a domestic and regional audience. The accused prisoners are then released in a show of clemency.
This was the case with Haleh Esfandiari, director of the Middle East program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Ms. Efandiari was visiting her 90-year-old mother in 2006 when she was arrested. It is likely that her connection to Lee Hamilton, director of the Wilson Center, made her an object of suspicion. Hamilton had long connections to the CIA and to groups promoting democratic revolutions in places like Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.
Kian Tajbakhsh was arrested at about the same time on the same charges. Tajbakhsh worked for George Soros’ Open Society Institute. Soros had also been active in the same “revolutions” in the region.
Both Esfandiari and Tajbakhsh were held under relatively humane circumstances and released some months later.
The Iranian presidential election next month was also a likely reason for a quick dispensation of Saberi’s case. Iran would like the world to focus on the election, and not on an ongoing saga of an international journalist in their prison system.
In the Saberi case, Iran actually did itself some good. It showed that it had a functioning judicial system—however imperfect—with an appeals process that eventually yielded the correct result.
The Obama administration, by engaging in diplomacy and sober statements of concern regarding Saberi, not only aided the process of her release, but likely set the stage for further improved relations between the United States and Iran. We now have a situation where Iran undertook an action of which the United States disapproved. The United States expressed itself in a non-hostile manner, and the Iranian government responded with a positive redress of that action. This bodes well for future U.S.-Iranian relations. It is only regrettable that this had to come at the price of Saberi’s unjust incarceration.
William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology at the University of Minnesota. He is past president of the Middle East section of the American Anthropological Association. He has lived and worked in Iran for more than 30 years. His most recent book is The “’Great Satan’ vs. the ‘Mad Mullahs’: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other” (University of Chicago Press, 2008).
Thursday, April 30, 2009
Lecturer Beeman dicusses U.S.-Iranian relations (Wheaton Wire)
Lecturer Beeman dicusses U.S.-Iranian relations
By: Elspeth Lodge '10
Posted: 4/29/09
The United States and Iran have been 'ghahr' with each other for approximately 30 years now: while the two countries do not diplomatically talk to each other, they have not exactly broken off their relationship. "We keep sticking needles in each other from afar," confides William Beeman, Middle East Studies Specialist and Professor and Chair of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities.
There is a need for "someone to force the relationship back together," due to the U.S. not understanding Iranian's cultural differences from the United States.
Beeman gave his lecture titled "Learning to Live with Iran: How Cultural Awareness Can Improve U.S.-Iranian Relations" to a full crowd. He meant to impart an understanding of Iran's cultural mechanisms, which are very foreign to the American sensibility.
"The people who want to create change in Iran have got to deal with this," says Beeman. "It is true that the United States and Iran have cultural conceptions of each other that sometimes get in the way of understanding each other. As an anthropologist I am especially aware of cultural differences."
"Iranians, like all humans have the same basic wants and desires in life. There is no 'Iranian mind' any more than there is an 'Arab mind' to site the egregious and misleading title of Raphael Patai's thoroughly discredited book of three decades ago."
Beeman uses a PowerPoint presentation to discuss a myriad of culture oriented topics including. but not limited to, patterns of interaction, complexity in Iranian interaction, independent symbiosis in Iranian hierarchy, and dimensions of different social status. And, of course, he discusses Iranian linguistics. "I'm a linguist, I can't resist," he says.
One example of a cultural misunderstanding of Iran is how political structures function and the basic schema of Iranian government, which according to Beeman, is "a very complex structure." It is designed to keep one group of people in power for a very long period of time; terms of political office are staggered. In effect no group is completely out of power at one time.
An example of one misunderstanding of government is something so simple as how the Iranian president functions. While in the U.S. the executive branch has a great deal of power, in Iran the president has very little power in any arena. He has no control over military, foreign affairs, or the infamous Iranian nuclear program.
Beeman also covers political strategies and factions and the emerging factors, such as media, which are effecting the government. He imparts that the Internet is alive and well in Iran, saying "every candidate has a blog." Beeman also cites that women are becoming more involved, as evident by the fact that more woman than ever are attending universities and literacy rates have increased. There is also an emerging youth population which will soon have a major impact on the balance of the political system.
There are many polarities between the U.S. and Iranian culture. While Iran recognizes hierarchy, the U.S. suppresses hierarchy. While Iran makes distinctions between the private and public political spheres, people in the U.S. try to conflate the private and public spheres of politics. Iranian culture values personalism in public business -- family and personal ties are essential. Contrastingly the U.S. culture denies personalism.
"It is only with the Obama administration that we are starting to see a thaw. I am hoping that with the Obama administration [Iran and the U.S.] will have a greater understanding of each other," says Beeman. © Copyright 2009 Wheaton Wire
By: Elspeth Lodge '10
Posted: 4/29/09
The United States and Iran have been 'ghahr' with each other for approximately 30 years now: while the two countries do not diplomatically talk to each other, they have not exactly broken off their relationship. "We keep sticking needles in each other from afar," confides William Beeman, Middle East Studies Specialist and Professor and Chair of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities.
There is a need for "someone to force the relationship back together," due to the U.S. not understanding Iranian's cultural differences from the United States.
Beeman gave his lecture titled "Learning to Live with Iran: How Cultural Awareness Can Improve U.S.-Iranian Relations" to a full crowd. He meant to impart an understanding of Iran's cultural mechanisms, which are very foreign to the American sensibility.
"The people who want to create change in Iran have got to deal with this," says Beeman. "It is true that the United States and Iran have cultural conceptions of each other that sometimes get in the way of understanding each other. As an anthropologist I am especially aware of cultural differences."
"Iranians, like all humans have the same basic wants and desires in life. There is no 'Iranian mind' any more than there is an 'Arab mind' to site the egregious and misleading title of Raphael Patai's thoroughly discredited book of three decades ago."
Beeman uses a PowerPoint presentation to discuss a myriad of culture oriented topics including. but not limited to, patterns of interaction, complexity in Iranian interaction, independent symbiosis in Iranian hierarchy, and dimensions of different social status. And, of course, he discusses Iranian linguistics. "I'm a linguist, I can't resist," he says.
One example of a cultural misunderstanding of Iran is how political structures function and the basic schema of Iranian government, which according to Beeman, is "a very complex structure." It is designed to keep one group of people in power for a very long period of time; terms of political office are staggered. In effect no group is completely out of power at one time.
An example of one misunderstanding of government is something so simple as how the Iranian president functions. While in the U.S. the executive branch has a great deal of power, in Iran the president has very little power in any arena. He has no control over military, foreign affairs, or the infamous Iranian nuclear program.
Beeman also covers political strategies and factions and the emerging factors, such as media, which are effecting the government. He imparts that the Internet is alive and well in Iran, saying "every candidate has a blog." Beeman also cites that women are becoming more involved, as evident by the fact that more woman than ever are attending universities and literacy rates have increased. There is also an emerging youth population which will soon have a major impact on the balance of the political system.
There are many polarities between the U.S. and Iranian culture. While Iran recognizes hierarchy, the U.S. suppresses hierarchy. While Iran makes distinctions between the private and public political spheres, people in the U.S. try to conflate the private and public spheres of politics. Iranian culture values personalism in public business -- family and personal ties are essential. Contrastingly the U.S. culture denies personalism.
"It is only with the Obama administration that we are starting to see a thaw. I am hoping that with the Obama administration [Iran and the U.S.] will have a greater understanding of each other," says Beeman. © Copyright 2009 Wheaton Wire
Saturday, April 18, 2009
Minneapolis Star-Tribune: Editorial: Step up push for Saberi's release
Editorial: Step up push for Saberi's release
Senior statesman could help secure journalist's freedom.
The news about North Dakota journalist Roxana Saberi is increasingly grim. First arrested in Iran, ostensibly for buying wine, the 31-year-old journalist is now held in a notorious Iranian prison on espionage charges. Her quickie trial on Monday played out behind closed doors. A military tribunal is now secretly weighing her fate.
Still, there's reason to be optimistic about the scholar/beauty queen's prospects. Experts point out that others jailed in Iran under similar circumstances were released relatively quickly. And while Iran remains a nation of hardline theology, it is increasingly aware of its worldwide reputation and diplomacy's opportunities. There are more advantages than disadvantages for this status-conscious nation to let Saberi go. The thousands of supporters who have rallied on Facebook and elsewhere shouldn't lose hope because there's more work to do on her behalf.
Although the espionage charge may give some pause, here's some perspective. State Department officials, as well as North Dakota Sen. Kent Conrad and U.S. Rep. Earl Pomeroy, have bluntly dismissed the allegations. Iran has offered up zero evidence, and the fact that her trial was done in a day suggests to University of Minnesota expert William Beeman that officials didn't have much on her.
Beeman, chair of the Department of Anthropology, is an author and linguist who has worked in Iran for the past 30 years. He believes there's strong precedent for Saberi's release. In 2006 and 2007, several scholars and journalists with dual Iranian-American citizenship like Saberi's were imprisoned in Iran on antigovernment activity charges. Three were released after several months. Beeman said Saberi's situation seems similar, and he's hopeful that Iranians will realize that they've made a point with her arrest -- that foreigners must respect their laws -- and then let her go.
Iran has also previously capitalized on its ability to generate international goodwill by releasing high-profile prisoners. In spring 2007, it allowed 15 British soldiers and marines to return home as an "Easter present" to the British people. Now's an excellent time for a similar gesture. Clemency for Saberi would only improve Iran's global stature. It would also be a welcome gesture to a powerful, popular new American president as both nations move toward more rationale relations.
Thanks to the Internet, this newspaper is read far beyond Minnesota. Comments from Iranian U.N. ministry officials suggest they've seen previous Saberi editorials. It bears repeating their message: The push for Saberi's release will continue. The Council on Foreign Relations this week offered up an excellent idea: enlisting a senior statesman whom Iranians would respect. CFR Iranian expert Elliot Abrams said Minnesota is home to just such a world figure. His name? Walter Mondale.
Mondale was traveling this week and couldn't be reached. But organizations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists and the Society of Professional Journalists would do well to ask for his help. Every avenue that can help bring Saberi home must be explored.
_____________________
CHANCE FOR RELEASE
"My feeling is that she will be released and I hope I'm right. I think there's been enough international attention to this; it gives the Iranians a chance to show that they are civilized and extend clemency to people.''
William Beeman, chair of the University of Minnesota Department of Anthropology and author of "'The Great Satan' vs. the 'Mad Mullahs': How the U.S. and Iran Demonize Each Other.''
Senior statesman could help secure journalist's freedom.
The news about North Dakota journalist Roxana Saberi is increasingly grim. First arrested in Iran, ostensibly for buying wine, the 31-year-old journalist is now held in a notorious Iranian prison on espionage charges. Her quickie trial on Monday played out behind closed doors. A military tribunal is now secretly weighing her fate.
Still, there's reason to be optimistic about the scholar/beauty queen's prospects. Experts point out that others jailed in Iran under similar circumstances were released relatively quickly. And while Iran remains a nation of hardline theology, it is increasingly aware of its worldwide reputation and diplomacy's opportunities. There are more advantages than disadvantages for this status-conscious nation to let Saberi go. The thousands of supporters who have rallied on Facebook and elsewhere shouldn't lose hope because there's more work to do on her behalf.
Although the espionage charge may give some pause, here's some perspective. State Department officials, as well as North Dakota Sen. Kent Conrad and U.S. Rep. Earl Pomeroy, have bluntly dismissed the allegations. Iran has offered up zero evidence, and the fact that her trial was done in a day suggests to University of Minnesota expert William Beeman that officials didn't have much on her.
Beeman, chair of the Department of Anthropology, is an author and linguist who has worked in Iran for the past 30 years. He believes there's strong precedent for Saberi's release. In 2006 and 2007, several scholars and journalists with dual Iranian-American citizenship like Saberi's were imprisoned in Iran on antigovernment activity charges. Three were released after several months. Beeman said Saberi's situation seems similar, and he's hopeful that Iranians will realize that they've made a point with her arrest -- that foreigners must respect their laws -- and then let her go.
Iran has also previously capitalized on its ability to generate international goodwill by releasing high-profile prisoners. In spring 2007, it allowed 15 British soldiers and marines to return home as an "Easter present" to the British people. Now's an excellent time for a similar gesture. Clemency for Saberi would only improve Iran's global stature. It would also be a welcome gesture to a powerful, popular new American president as both nations move toward more rationale relations.
Thanks to the Internet, this newspaper is read far beyond Minnesota. Comments from Iranian U.N. ministry officials suggest they've seen previous Saberi editorials. It bears repeating their message: The push for Saberi's release will continue. The Council on Foreign Relations this week offered up an excellent idea: enlisting a senior statesman whom Iranians would respect. CFR Iranian expert Elliot Abrams said Minnesota is home to just such a world figure. His name? Walter Mondale.
Mondale was traveling this week and couldn't be reached. But organizations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists and the Society of Professional Journalists would do well to ask for his help. Every avenue that can help bring Saberi home must be explored.
_____________________
CHANCE FOR RELEASE
"My feeling is that she will be released and I hope I'm right. I think there's been enough international attention to this; it gives the Iranians a chance to show that they are civilized and extend clemency to people.''
William Beeman, chair of the University of Minnesota Department of Anthropology and author of "'The Great Satan' vs. the 'Mad Mullahs': How the U.S. and Iran Demonize Each Other.''
Expert on Iran says clemency possible for Saberi; ND congressional delegation reacts with dismay to conviction
Published April 18 2009
Expert on Iran says clemency possible for Saberi;
ND congressional delegation reacts with dismay to conviction
FARGO – An expert on Iran said today that given the harsh sentence American journalist Roxana Saberi received, it’s possible the Iranian government may grant clemency as an act of generosity.
By: Sherri Richards, INFORUM
FARGO – An expert on Iran said today that given the harsh sentence American journalist Roxana Saberi received, it’s possible the Iranian government may grant clemency as an act of generosity.
“That’s something that’s not unknown,” said William O. Beeman, an anthropology professor at the University of Minnesota who has studied Iran for 30 years.
“Put someone in dire straits and then grant them clemency, and the person is grateful,” Beeman said today.
North Dakota’s congressional delegation reacted with dismay to news of Saberi’s conviction in an Iranian court.
In separate statements, they said they would continue to work with the U.S. State Department to bring Saberi home.
Fargo native Saberi, 31, has been jailed in Iran since late January. Authorities originally said she was being held for working without press credentials. She was later charged with espionage, and a trial was held in Iranian court Monday behind closed doors.
Her attorney said today she had been convicted and sentenced to eight years in prison.
Sen. Byron Dorgan called the verdict a “shocking miscarriage of justice.”
“The Iranian government has held a secret trial, will not make public any evidence, and sentenced an American citizen to eight years in prison for a crime she didn’t commit,” Dorgan said in his statement. “I call on the Iranian government to show compassion and release Roxana Saberi and allow her to leave Iran and come home to the United States.”
Sen. Kent Conrad called the ruling “preposterous,” and said that, “Iran is doing enormous damage to their creditability on the world stage with behavior like this.”
Rep. Earl Pomeroy described Saberi as a “fine young woman of intelligence and integrity,” and hoped she would be allowed to return to the United States as a humanitarian consideration.
Beeman said it’s possible Saberi will not be immediately incarcerated, released on bail, and be allowed to leave the country.
“I think that we’re not completely without hope in this situation,” Beeman said.
He said the harsh rhetoric against the Iranian system that the sentence will spur is going to be counterproductive, and that Saberi’s situation is an opportunity to continue toward better relations between the U.S. and Iran.
He hopes Saberi will not be incarcerated, for any amount of time.
“I think everyone, internationally and those people looking at this case in Iran, knows the charges are groundless. This (incarceration) would really set back U.S.-Iranian relations,” he said.
Her parents, who traveled to Iran from their home in Fargo in a bid to help win their daughter's release, could not be reached for comment today.
Expert on Iran says clemency possible for Saberi;
ND congressional delegation reacts with dismay to conviction
FARGO – An expert on Iran said today that given the harsh sentence American journalist Roxana Saberi received, it’s possible the Iranian government may grant clemency as an act of generosity.
By: Sherri Richards, INFORUM
FARGO – An expert on Iran said today that given the harsh sentence American journalist Roxana Saberi received, it’s possible the Iranian government may grant clemency as an act of generosity.
“That’s something that’s not unknown,” said William O. Beeman, an anthropology professor at the University of Minnesota who has studied Iran for 30 years.
“Put someone in dire straits and then grant them clemency, and the person is grateful,” Beeman said today.
North Dakota’s congressional delegation reacted with dismay to news of Saberi’s conviction in an Iranian court.
In separate statements, they said they would continue to work with the U.S. State Department to bring Saberi home.
Fargo native Saberi, 31, has been jailed in Iran since late January. Authorities originally said she was being held for working without press credentials. She was later charged with espionage, and a trial was held in Iranian court Monday behind closed doors.
Her attorney said today she had been convicted and sentenced to eight years in prison.
Sen. Byron Dorgan called the verdict a “shocking miscarriage of justice.”
“The Iranian government has held a secret trial, will not make public any evidence, and sentenced an American citizen to eight years in prison for a crime she didn’t commit,” Dorgan said in his statement. “I call on the Iranian government to show compassion and release Roxana Saberi and allow her to leave Iran and come home to the United States.”
Sen. Kent Conrad called the ruling “preposterous,” and said that, “Iran is doing enormous damage to their creditability on the world stage with behavior like this.”
Rep. Earl Pomeroy described Saberi as a “fine young woman of intelligence and integrity,” and hoped she would be allowed to return to the United States as a humanitarian consideration.
Beeman said it’s possible Saberi will not be immediately incarcerated, released on bail, and be allowed to leave the country.
“I think that we’re not completely without hope in this situation,” Beeman said.
He said the harsh rhetoric against the Iranian system that the sentence will spur is going to be counterproductive, and that Saberi’s situation is an opportunity to continue toward better relations between the U.S. and Iran.
He hopes Saberi will not be incarcerated, for any amount of time.
“I think everyone, internationally and those people looking at this case in Iran, knows the charges are groundless. This (incarceration) would really set back U.S.-Iranian relations,” he said.
Her parents, who traveled to Iran from their home in Fargo in a bid to help win their daughter's release, could not be reached for comment today.
Thursday, February 12, 2009
William O. Beeman--A New Era in U.S.-Iranian Relations? [Foreign Policy in Focus]
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5867
Foreign Policy in Focus
A New Era in U.S.-Iranian Relations?
William O. Beeman | February 12, 2009
Editor: John Feffer
Foreign Policy In Focus www.fpif.org
Iran is in the middle of celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Iranian revolution that ousted Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and with him, the extraordinary influence the United States had on Iranian life. According to many right-wing pundits, the revolution was the start of an era of hostility between the United States and the Muslim world — an era that they see as still underway.
President Barack Obama, however, has inaugurated a new rhetoric on Iran. The United States doesn't assume an automatically hostile posture toward Iran or the Muslim world but will base its actions and reactions on deeds rather than perceptions of ideology. That Obama's mere willingness to talk to Iran comes across as earth-shattering in some quarters reveals the depths of our past mutual hostility.
After the Revolution
The Iranian Revolution wasn't anti-American, but an anti-colonial revolution directed at all outside control of Iranian affairs. Americans forget one of the great slogans of the revolution: "Neither East nor West." The United States unfortunately inherited the mantle of Great Britain and Russia, who oppressed the Iranian state for more than 150 years before Ayatollah Khomeini began to rail against the Shah. Iran was just as upset with those powers as with the United States, and still remains distrustful of all European influence in its affairs.
Even after 1979, Iran sought not simply to oppose the United States, but rather to chart its own course as a regional power, an industrial leader, an economic force in the region, and a diplomatic broker for its neighbors. Although its revolutionary ideals drove many of its early policies — such as the founding support for Hezbollah in Lebanon — these ideals soon proved to have little currency in an Islamic world that viewed the Iranian Shi'a with suspicion.
The original revolutionary ideals, initially hailed throughout the Islamic world, now have little practical force, and Iran has changed in turn. Today Iran's politics are less ideological and religious than practical. It has good diplomatic relations with all of its neighbors, and despite the fiery pronouncements of its largely powerless president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, operates with caution in the region. It no longer has any effective control over Hezbollah and never had much direct influence over Hamas or other regional oppositionist groups.
Better Weather Ahead?
There are now many possibilities for building ties with the United States if Americans can only wake up to them. The United States has common cause with Iran on many fronts. In political terms, the United States and Iran both oppose Islamic extremists like al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Despite attempts by the Bush administration to tie Iran to these groups to frighten the American public, Iranians oppose these extremist groups because the latter utterly reject Shi'ism — even to the point of sanctioning the murder of Shi'a believers, such as the Hazara minority in Afghanistan.
Like the United States, Iran favors stability in the region. Contrary to the Bush-era accusations, Tehran's leaders aren't pleased with the militarism of individuals like Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq, and have worked to quiet his opposition groups in Iraq in the name of a more comprehensive stability for the Shi'a community, which will eventually rule Iraq. Tehran's leaders also want stability in Afghanistan. Iran hosts millions of Afghan refugees. It would like most of them to go home, and that can't happen until Afghanistan is quiet once again.
Other areas of potential cooperation include prevention of drug trafficking, environmental protection, health care, trade stabilization, and international transport. Iran also has a strong stake in culture and tourism. The whole world travels to Iran to see the astonishing historical and archaeological sites — except for Americans.
It's no paradox that Iranians love Americans and American culture. Iranians prioritize independence and nationalist sentiment over opposition to the West. As long as the United States doesn't try to dominate Iran, treating the Islamic Republic with "mutual respect" (to quote Obama), Iranians have no problem with Washington. Iran's youthful population now has a majority of citizens who have no experience of the original revolution, or remembrance of Ayatollah Khomeini or other revolutionary leaders.
Washington won't likely offer Iran congratulations on the anniversary of its revolution. But stopping the U.S. invective will be congratulations enough. It's time to realize that a generation has passed since the hostile U.S. reception of the revolution. With a new generation comes a new opportunity. With luck we'll see the mood of Washington change. It was always permissible to denigrate Iran in American politics. A good first step toward a "breakthrough with Iran" would be for the Obama administration to declare such cheap political rhetoric no longer acceptable.
Foreign Policy In Focus contributor William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. He is president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association and the author, most recently, of The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.
Foreign Policy in Focus
A New Era in U.S.-Iranian Relations?
William O. Beeman | February 12, 2009
Editor: John Feffer
Foreign Policy In Focus www.fpif.org
Iran is in the middle of celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Iranian revolution that ousted Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and with him, the extraordinary influence the United States had on Iranian life. According to many right-wing pundits, the revolution was the start of an era of hostility between the United States and the Muslim world — an era that they see as still underway.
President Barack Obama, however, has inaugurated a new rhetoric on Iran. The United States doesn't assume an automatically hostile posture toward Iran or the Muslim world but will base its actions and reactions on deeds rather than perceptions of ideology. That Obama's mere willingness to talk to Iran comes across as earth-shattering in some quarters reveals the depths of our past mutual hostility.
After the Revolution
The Iranian Revolution wasn't anti-American, but an anti-colonial revolution directed at all outside control of Iranian affairs. Americans forget one of the great slogans of the revolution: "Neither East nor West." The United States unfortunately inherited the mantle of Great Britain and Russia, who oppressed the Iranian state for more than 150 years before Ayatollah Khomeini began to rail against the Shah. Iran was just as upset with those powers as with the United States, and still remains distrustful of all European influence in its affairs.
Even after 1979, Iran sought not simply to oppose the United States, but rather to chart its own course as a regional power, an industrial leader, an economic force in the region, and a diplomatic broker for its neighbors. Although its revolutionary ideals drove many of its early policies — such as the founding support for Hezbollah in Lebanon — these ideals soon proved to have little currency in an Islamic world that viewed the Iranian Shi'a with suspicion.
The original revolutionary ideals, initially hailed throughout the Islamic world, now have little practical force, and Iran has changed in turn. Today Iran's politics are less ideological and religious than practical. It has good diplomatic relations with all of its neighbors, and despite the fiery pronouncements of its largely powerless president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, operates with caution in the region. It no longer has any effective control over Hezbollah and never had much direct influence over Hamas or other regional oppositionist groups.
Better Weather Ahead?
There are now many possibilities for building ties with the United States if Americans can only wake up to them. The United States has common cause with Iran on many fronts. In political terms, the United States and Iran both oppose Islamic extremists like al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Despite attempts by the Bush administration to tie Iran to these groups to frighten the American public, Iranians oppose these extremist groups because the latter utterly reject Shi'ism — even to the point of sanctioning the murder of Shi'a believers, such as the Hazara minority in Afghanistan.
Like the United States, Iran favors stability in the region. Contrary to the Bush-era accusations, Tehran's leaders aren't pleased with the militarism of individuals like Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq, and have worked to quiet his opposition groups in Iraq in the name of a more comprehensive stability for the Shi'a community, which will eventually rule Iraq. Tehran's leaders also want stability in Afghanistan. Iran hosts millions of Afghan refugees. It would like most of them to go home, and that can't happen until Afghanistan is quiet once again.
Other areas of potential cooperation include prevention of drug trafficking, environmental protection, health care, trade stabilization, and international transport. Iran also has a strong stake in culture and tourism. The whole world travels to Iran to see the astonishing historical and archaeological sites — except for Americans.
It's no paradox that Iranians love Americans and American culture. Iranians prioritize independence and nationalist sentiment over opposition to the West. As long as the United States doesn't try to dominate Iran, treating the Islamic Republic with "mutual respect" (to quote Obama), Iranians have no problem with Washington. Iran's youthful population now has a majority of citizens who have no experience of the original revolution, or remembrance of Ayatollah Khomeini or other revolutionary leaders.
Washington won't likely offer Iran congratulations on the anniversary of its revolution. But stopping the U.S. invective will be congratulations enough. It's time to realize that a generation has passed since the hostile U.S. reception of the revolution. With a new generation comes a new opportunity. With luck we'll see the mood of Washington change. It was always permissible to denigrate Iran in American politics. A good first step toward a "breakthrough with Iran" would be for the Obama administration to declare such cheap political rhetoric no longer acceptable.
Foreign Policy In Focus contributor William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. He is president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association and the author, most recently, of The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.
Wednesday, February 11, 2009
US professor William O. Beeman: Obama transition team has no expertise on Iran [IRNA]
US professor William O. Beeman: Obama transition team has no expertise on Iran
New York, Feb 11, IRNA -- William O. Beeman, Professor and Chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota said that Obama transition team has no expertise on Iran, but, the fact that President Obama called for dialog with Iranians was a huge development.
He said that in a new American administration it takes some time to confirm new officials, and to get the new organization in place. Also, right now the priority of this administration has been on domestic economic matters.
Q. In the past three weeks, the new US Administration has just made a series of statements, threats, judgments …etc on Iran. Do you see a resolve on part of the US to have direct dialogue with Iran?
A. It is too soon to tell what precise actions the Obama administration will be taking with regard to Iran. In a new American administration it takes some time to confirm new officials, and to get the new organization in place. Also, right now the priority of this administration has been on domestic economic matters. Nevertheless, there is reason for caution. The Obama transition team has almost no expertise on Iran. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) is a prominent neoconservative organization supported by AIPAC. Former Ambassador Dennis Ross is an important member of this and several other anti-Iranian groups. The White House has said that he will be “special envoy” to Iran. This is a mistake, in my opinion. Moreover, the influence of WINEP should be severely curtailed if relations with Iran are to be improved. WINEP favors military action against Iran, and has been instrumental in spreading false information about Iran’s nuclear program.
Q. Aside from sugar coating the same nature of rhetoric that we’d heard from previous administration, is there any move or gesture by this administration that proves such tendency?
A. It is important to remember that attacking Iran has been a common political activity for both Democrats and Republicans. The American public now believes that Iran is a danger to the United States thanks to consistent negative publicity on Iran. So, any administration official that expresses any kind of sympathy toward Iran is going to be in a dangerous political position. For this reason we should expect the Obama administration to go VERY SLOWLY in approaching Iran. The mere fact that President Obama called for dialog with Iranians was a huge development, and it created a lot of criticism for him.
Q. In your view how is Obama going to be able to create stability in the Middle East using Iran’s assistance as it is in the view of some analysts.
A. I am not sure that the Obama administration appreciates how much help Iran can be in stabilizing the region. Iran can help in Iraq, Afghanistan and in the Gulf region. Iran has no control over Hezbollah or Hamas, but they can be used as intermediaries for these groups. The sooner the United States sees Iran as a partner and not an enemy, the sooner progress will be made toward peace in the region.
Q. Some share the view that Israel is extremely worried about the improvement in US Iran relationship and by creating obstacles is trying to prevent such improvements. Do you agree with that view?
A. Israel has ALWAYS been worried whenever Iran and the United States seem to become friendly. Whenever talks start, Israelis put out report, directly and through organizations like WINEP and AIPAC, about Iran supporting terrorism, attacking Americans in Iraq or elsewhere, or developing some non-existent weapon. Israel will DEFINITELY try hard to sabotage any rapprochement between Iran and the United States. This is absolutely certain. I only hope that the Obama administration and more sober foreign policy specialists can help expose these tricks. Mostly it is important to get to the American public to tell them that these accusations are not real, that they are designed to torpedo movement toward normal relations.
End News / IRNA / News Code 350244
New York, Feb 11, IRNA -- William O. Beeman, Professor and Chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota said that Obama transition team has no expertise on Iran, but, the fact that President Obama called for dialog with Iranians was a huge development.
He said that in a new American administration it takes some time to confirm new officials, and to get the new organization in place. Also, right now the priority of this administration has been on domestic economic matters.
Q. In the past three weeks, the new US Administration has just made a series of statements, threats, judgments …etc on Iran. Do you see a resolve on part of the US to have direct dialogue with Iran?
A. It is too soon to tell what precise actions the Obama administration will be taking with regard to Iran. In a new American administration it takes some time to confirm new officials, and to get the new organization in place. Also, right now the priority of this administration has been on domestic economic matters. Nevertheless, there is reason for caution. The Obama transition team has almost no expertise on Iran. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) is a prominent neoconservative organization supported by AIPAC. Former Ambassador Dennis Ross is an important member of this and several other anti-Iranian groups. The White House has said that he will be “special envoy” to Iran. This is a mistake, in my opinion. Moreover, the influence of WINEP should be severely curtailed if relations with Iran are to be improved. WINEP favors military action against Iran, and has been instrumental in spreading false information about Iran’s nuclear program.
Q. Aside from sugar coating the same nature of rhetoric that we’d heard from previous administration, is there any move or gesture by this administration that proves such tendency?
A. It is important to remember that attacking Iran has been a common political activity for both Democrats and Republicans. The American public now believes that Iran is a danger to the United States thanks to consistent negative publicity on Iran. So, any administration official that expresses any kind of sympathy toward Iran is going to be in a dangerous political position. For this reason we should expect the Obama administration to go VERY SLOWLY in approaching Iran. The mere fact that President Obama called for dialog with Iranians was a huge development, and it created a lot of criticism for him.
Q. In your view how is Obama going to be able to create stability in the Middle East using Iran’s assistance as it is in the view of some analysts.
A. I am not sure that the Obama administration appreciates how much help Iran can be in stabilizing the region. Iran can help in Iraq, Afghanistan and in the Gulf region. Iran has no control over Hezbollah or Hamas, but they can be used as intermediaries for these groups. The sooner the United States sees Iran as a partner and not an enemy, the sooner progress will be made toward peace in the region.
Q. Some share the view that Israel is extremely worried about the improvement in US Iran relationship and by creating obstacles is trying to prevent such improvements. Do you agree with that view?
A. Israel has ALWAYS been worried whenever Iran and the United States seem to become friendly. Whenever talks start, Israelis put out report, directly and through organizations like WINEP and AIPAC, about Iran supporting terrorism, attacking Americans in Iraq or elsewhere, or developing some non-existent weapon. Israel will DEFINITELY try hard to sabotage any rapprochement between Iran and the United States. This is absolutely certain. I only hope that the Obama administration and more sober foreign policy specialists can help expose these tricks. Mostly it is important to get to the American public to tell them that these accusations are not real, that they are designed to torpedo movement toward normal relations.
End News / IRNA / News Code 350244
Tuesday, February 03, 2009
Willliam O. Beeman--A New Era in U.S.-Iranian Relations?
A New Era in U.S.-Iranian Relations?
William O. Beeman
Iran is in the midst of celebration of the 30th Anniversary of the Iranian Revolution. Since the United States has also had a recent revolution of sorts in its political life, it would make sense to see how these two events might coincide to produce a new future relationship between the two nations.
The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 ousted Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and with him the extraordinary influence that the United States had on Iranian life. According to many right-wing pundits, the revolution was the start of an era of hostility between the United States and the Muslim world—an era that they see as still underway.
However, now with President Barak Obama in the White House, clearly a new rhetoric has taken hold—one in which the United States does not assume an automatically hostile posture toward Iran or the Muslim world, but will base its actions and reactions on deeds rather than perception of ideology. The depths of our past mutual hostility can be seen in the fact that President Obama’s mere willingness to talk to Iran is seen as earth-shattering in some quarters.
In this light it is important to look at matters from an Iranian perspective. The Iranian Revolution was not an anti-American Revolution, it was an anti-colonial revolution directed at all outside control of Iranian affairs. Americans forget that one of the great slogans of the Revolution was “Neither East nor West.” The United States unfortunately inherited the mantle of Great Britain and Russia, who had oppressed the Iranian State for more than 150 years before Ayatollah Khomeini began to rail against the Shah. Iran was just as upset with those powers as with the United States, and still remains distrustful of all European influence in its affairs.
Even after the Revolution, Iran sought not simply to oppose the United States, but rather to chart its own course as a regional power, an industrial leader, an economic force in the region and as a diplomatic broker for its neighbors. Although its revolutionary ideals were the driving force in many of its early policies—such as the founding support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, these ideals soon proved to have little currency in an Islamic world where the Iranian Shi’a were viewed with suspicion.
So, the original Revolutionary ideals, initially hailed throughout the Islamic world now have little practical force, and Iran has changed in turn. Today Iran’s politics are less ideological and religious than practical. It has good diplomatic relations with all of its neighbors, and despite the fiery pronouncements of its largely powerless president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, operates with caution in the region. It no longer has any effective control over Hezbollah, and never had much direct influence over Hamas or other regional oppositionist groups.
Indeed, now there are many possibilities for building ties with the United States if Americans can only wake up to them. The U.S. has common cause with Iran on many fronts. In political terms, the United States and Iran both oppose Islamic extremists like Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Despite attempts on the part of the Bush administration to tie Iran to these groups to frighten the American public, the truth is that Iranians oppose them fervently. One prime reason is because these extremist groups utterly reject Shi’ism, even to the point of sanctioning the murder of Shi’a believers, such as the Hazara minority in Afghanistan.
Like the United States Iran also favors stability in the region. Again, contrary to the Bush-era accusations, Tehran’s leaders are not pleased with the militarism of individuals like Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq, and have worked to quiet his opposition groups in Iraq in the name of a more comprehensive stability for the Shi’a community, which must eventually rule Iraq. Tehran’s leaders also want stability in Afghanistan. Iran is host to millions of Afghan refugees. They would like most of them to go home, and that can’t happen until Afghanistan is quiet once again.
Other areas of potential cooperation include prevention of drug trafficking, environmental protection, health care, trade stabilization and international transport. Iran also has a strong stake in culture and tourism. The whole world travels to Iran to see the astonishing historical and archaeological sites—except for Americans.
Americans see it as a paradox that Iranians love Americans and American culture, but this is no surprise given the primacy of Iranian independence rather than opposition to the West in its national sentiment. As long as the United States does not try to dominate Iran, treating the Islamic Republic with “mutual respect” (to quote President Obama), Iranians have no problem with Washington. Iran’s youthful population now has a majority of citizens who have no experience of the original Revolution, or remembrance of Ayatollah Khomeini or other Revolutionary leaders.
It is not likely that any administration will offer Iran congratulations on the anniversary of its Revolution, but just stopping the invective pouring out of Washington will be congratulations enough. It is time to realize that a generation has passed since the United States’ hostile reception of the Revolution. With a new generation comes a new opportunity. With luck we will see the mood of Washington change. It was always permissible to denigrate Iran in American politics. A good first step toward a “breakthrough with Iran” would be to let it be known that this cheap political rhetoric is no longer acceptable in the Obama Era.
__________________________
William O. Beeman is Professor and Chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, and past President of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association. His most recent book is The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other (Chicago, 2008).
William O. Beeman
Iran is in the midst of celebration of the 30th Anniversary of the Iranian Revolution. Since the United States has also had a recent revolution of sorts in its political life, it would make sense to see how these two events might coincide to produce a new future relationship between the two nations.
The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 ousted Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and with him the extraordinary influence that the United States had on Iranian life. According to many right-wing pundits, the revolution was the start of an era of hostility between the United States and the Muslim world—an era that they see as still underway.
However, now with President Barak Obama in the White House, clearly a new rhetoric has taken hold—one in which the United States does not assume an automatically hostile posture toward Iran or the Muslim world, but will base its actions and reactions on deeds rather than perception of ideology. The depths of our past mutual hostility can be seen in the fact that President Obama’s mere willingness to talk to Iran is seen as earth-shattering in some quarters.
In this light it is important to look at matters from an Iranian perspective. The Iranian Revolution was not an anti-American Revolution, it was an anti-colonial revolution directed at all outside control of Iranian affairs. Americans forget that one of the great slogans of the Revolution was “Neither East nor West.” The United States unfortunately inherited the mantle of Great Britain and Russia, who had oppressed the Iranian State for more than 150 years before Ayatollah Khomeini began to rail against the Shah. Iran was just as upset with those powers as with the United States, and still remains distrustful of all European influence in its affairs.
Even after the Revolution, Iran sought not simply to oppose the United States, but rather to chart its own course as a regional power, an industrial leader, an economic force in the region and as a diplomatic broker for its neighbors. Although its revolutionary ideals were the driving force in many of its early policies—such as the founding support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, these ideals soon proved to have little currency in an Islamic world where the Iranian Shi’a were viewed with suspicion.
So, the original Revolutionary ideals, initially hailed throughout the Islamic world now have little practical force, and Iran has changed in turn. Today Iran’s politics are less ideological and religious than practical. It has good diplomatic relations with all of its neighbors, and despite the fiery pronouncements of its largely powerless president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, operates with caution in the region. It no longer has any effective control over Hezbollah, and never had much direct influence over Hamas or other regional oppositionist groups.
Indeed, now there are many possibilities for building ties with the United States if Americans can only wake up to them. The U.S. has common cause with Iran on many fronts. In political terms, the United States and Iran both oppose Islamic extremists like Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Despite attempts on the part of the Bush administration to tie Iran to these groups to frighten the American public, the truth is that Iranians oppose them fervently. One prime reason is because these extremist groups utterly reject Shi’ism, even to the point of sanctioning the murder of Shi’a believers, such as the Hazara minority in Afghanistan.
Like the United States Iran also favors stability in the region. Again, contrary to the Bush-era accusations, Tehran’s leaders are not pleased with the militarism of individuals like Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq, and have worked to quiet his opposition groups in Iraq in the name of a more comprehensive stability for the Shi’a community, which must eventually rule Iraq. Tehran’s leaders also want stability in Afghanistan. Iran is host to millions of Afghan refugees. They would like most of them to go home, and that can’t happen until Afghanistan is quiet once again.
Other areas of potential cooperation include prevention of drug trafficking, environmental protection, health care, trade stabilization and international transport. Iran also has a strong stake in culture and tourism. The whole world travels to Iran to see the astonishing historical and archaeological sites—except for Americans.
Americans see it as a paradox that Iranians love Americans and American culture, but this is no surprise given the primacy of Iranian independence rather than opposition to the West in its national sentiment. As long as the United States does not try to dominate Iran, treating the Islamic Republic with “mutual respect” (to quote President Obama), Iranians have no problem with Washington. Iran’s youthful population now has a majority of citizens who have no experience of the original Revolution, or remembrance of Ayatollah Khomeini or other Revolutionary leaders.
It is not likely that any administration will offer Iran congratulations on the anniversary of its Revolution, but just stopping the invective pouring out of Washington will be congratulations enough. It is time to realize that a generation has passed since the United States’ hostile reception of the Revolution. With a new generation comes a new opportunity. With luck we will see the mood of Washington change. It was always permissible to denigrate Iran in American politics. A good first step toward a “breakthrough with Iran” would be to let it be known that this cheap political rhetoric is no longer acceptable in the Obama Era.
__________________________
William O. Beeman is Professor and Chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, and past President of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association. His most recent book is The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other (Chicago, 2008).
Thursday, January 29, 2009
Interview with Roberto Gonzales, author of "American Counterinsurgency" (Inside Higher Ed)
Interview with Roberto Gonzales, author of ‘American Counterinsurgency’
(University of Chicago Press, 2009)
Commentary by William O. Beeman: The Human Terrain System of the U.S. military, where social scientists are embedded with combat troops to give cultural and social advice has created controversy in Anthropology and other disciplines. The central issue is the potential for violation of professional codes of ethics that dictate that social scientists do nothing to harm the people among whom they live and learn from in the course of their research. Roberto Gonzales provides great insight about this problem in his new book and in the interview below
The Human Terrain System, a program which embeds social scientists with brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan, is billed as a mechanism for improving the U.S. military’s knowledge of culture and local populations — heretofore perceived as sorely lacking. “It’s a chance to change the military; it’s a chance to change the Army,” one HTS member said at the American Anthropological Association’s annual meeting in November. The HTS Web site states that the program “does not collect intelligence or have a role in targeting.” However, AAA’s executive board has formally opposed the program, citing a number of ethical issues including the potential misuse of anthropological information for targeting purposes — which would violate the bedrock principle that those studied should not be harmed.
One of the leading critics of HTS has been Roberto J. González, an associate professor of anthropology at San Jose State University. In American Counterinsurgency: Human Science and the Human Terrain, forthcoming February 1 from Prickly Paradigm Press, and distributed by University of Chicago Press, González strongly critiques the human terrain concept in its historical and contemporary contexts. He answered some questions for Inside Higher Ed.
Q. Would you summarize the magnitude and mission of the Human Terrain System, as you understand it, today?
A. The Human Terrain System (HTS) is a $200 million U.S. Army program that embeds anthropologists and other social scientists with combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan. The program’s building blocks are five-person “human terrain teams” that include armed personnel. Approximately 25 teams have been deployed since the program began in 2006, mostly in Iraq. According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s budget justification, the goal of the program is “to collect data on human terrain, create, store, and disseminate information from this data, and use the resulting information as an element of combat power.” In other words, HTS is designed to help the military gather ethnographic information — intelligence data about Iraqis and Afghans — in order to improve its war fighting capabilities. Human terrain team members are employed by BAE Systems, a British firm awarded the contract to manage the program.
A revealing description of HTS was published in Military Review. In it, the authors state that the program is designed to “understand the people among whom our forces operate as well as the cultural characteristics and propensities of the enemies we now fight.” They also note that HTS is a “CORDS for the 21st Century” — a reference to a Vietnam-War era counterinsurgency initiative (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support). CORDS gave birth to the infamous Phoenix Program, a secret operation in which ethnographic data on Vietnamese civilians was collected and turned over to CIA-funded paramilitary troops. In the end, Phoenix operatives assassinated more than 26,000 suspected Viet Cong sympathizers. The possibility that HTS might be used for such purposes deeply concerns me, and it’s what inspired me to write American Counterinsurgency.
Q. You write, “The way in which HTS has been packaged — as a kinder, gentler counterinsurgency — is completely unsupported by evidence.” Instead, you argue that HTS was created “primarily as a tool for espionage and intelligence gathering.” Could you summarize the evidence you rely upon in making this argument?
A. To fully understand HTS, we should place it in the broader context of what might be called today’s “cult of counterinsurgency,” which centers around the personality of General David Petraeus. For several years, he and a loyal group of advisors — many with Ph.D.s in the social sciences — have been involved in an effort to whitewash counterinsurgency. In other words, they have tried to clean up the image of counterguerrilla warfare, which is always a dirty business. The U.S. military has more than a century of experience of this kind of warfare (going back to the bloody “Indian Wars” of the 1800s and the cruel campaign against Filipino revolutionaries in the early 1900s), yet Petraeus and others have portrayed it as a newer, gentler method of fighting — “the graduate level of war” in the words of one enthusiast. HTS was developed as a central component of this “new” old method.
Many sources indicate that HTS was designed primarily as an intelligence-gathering program. As I’ve mentioned, government budget documents and military journals describe the program as means of collecting ethnographic intelligence to boost “combat power.” In the Department of Defense’s 2008 Global War on Terror Amendment, human terrain teams are described as military intelligence assets which “have proven invaluable in identifying and tracking threats.” The statements of brigade commanders are also revealing. For example, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Gian Gentile recently wrote that “these human terrain teams, whether they want to acknowledge it or not ... contribute to the collective knowledge of a commander which allows him to target and kill the enemy.” This fits the military’s definition of human intelligence.
Q. In your book, you trace the term “human terrain,” prefacing the chapter on the term’s origins by writing, “When I first heard the term ‘human terrain,’ a nightmarish vision came to mind.” If Webster’s asked you to write a definition of the term, what would you write?
A. I’ve always felt uneasy about the Orwellian juxtaposition of the words “human” and “terrain.” Linguistic anthropology tells us that in military contexts, such a term will tend to objectify and dehumanize people, because it implies that they are geographic space to be conquered. Personally I wouldn’t want to give “human terrain” the legitimacy that goes along with a spot in Webster’s Dictionary! But if I had to provide a definition of the term, it would probably be something like: “a euphemism referring to civilians living in a war zone, or under military occupation.” (Last year, the American Dialect Society declared “human terrain team” the most euphemistic term of 2007!)
In conducting research for my book, I learned that human terrain appeared more than 40 years ago in a report by the U.S. House Un-American Activities Committee — the same committee responsible for whipping up anti-communist hysteria in the 1950s. The report (Guerrilla Warfare Advocates in the United States) evoked images of a country threatened from within. It warned that militants like the Black Panther Party might possess “superior control of the human terrain.” From these beginnings, human terrain was linked to domestic counterinsurgency campaigns at a dark moment in U.S. history, when the FBI’s Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) — which brutally repressed political dissent within our country — was in full gear.
Q. The Human Terrain teams themselves have been in the headlines. But you write of human terrain as a much broader phenomenon, one that’s being embraced by the military, industries, and research universities. How so?
A. HTS has indeed been in the news, especially since three of its social scientists have been tragically killed in action over the past nine months. In American Counterinsurgency, I wanted to go beyond the headlines, to examine the development of the human terrain concept and how it has been transformed over the years. I discovered that the concept was reborn in the early 21st century, when influential people like retired Lieutenant Colonel (and neoconservative pundit) Ralph Peters, Major General Robert Scales, and Senator John McCain embraced the concept. It diffused quickly across the armed forces and into the private sphere and university research labs. After Robert Gates replaced Donald Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary, there was a boom in funding for projects focused on human terrain research and “culture-centric” warfare, and this attracted dozens of companies from what Dwight Eisenhower once called the “military-industrial complex” — BAE Systems, Aptima Corporation, MITRE, RAND Corporation, Wexford Group, MTC Technologies, NEK Advanced Securities Group, and Alpha Ten to name a few. Today contract funds connected to human terrain dwarf funds allocated by the National Science Foundation for basic anthropology research.
Modeling and simulation programs and dynamic social network analysis are the latest fads in human terrain research. Engineers, computer programmers, and social scientists seek to integrate ethnographic data into predictive computer programs. Each year the Pentagon spends tens of millions of dollars in a quest to find a technological holy grail that forecasts political hot spots — organized protest marches, riots, or full-blown terror attacks. Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania, Dartmouth, Purdue, and other universities are competing with private corporations for these funds. It’s become a real growth industry.
Q. You write of parallels between HTS and anthropology’s historical role in helping colonial powers retain control of their empires. In your opinion, are there any ways that social scientists can productively engage with the U.S. military, without binding themselves in that colonial legacy?
A. Many people have written about anthropology’s support of colonial governments in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Oceania — not to mention its role in the subjugation of Native American peoples — but it’s a much more complex picture. History tells us that anthropology has occasionally played an essential role in resisting imperialism. For example, in the 1930s a young Kikuyu man named Jomo Kenyatta from British East Africa (today Kenya) arrived in London and attended seminars led by the renowned anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski. In 1938 Kenyatta published a stirring ethnography of Kikuyu life, Facing Mount Kenya, which inspired many people by examining the painful consequences of British colonialism from an insider’s perspective. He used anthropology as a tool for challenging — not supporting — colonial rule. Kenyatta became a revolutionary leader and eventually the first Prime Minister and President of independent Kenya in the 1960s. His experience illustrates how students of the human sciences are as capable of challenging imperialism as they are of serving it.
With respect to working with the U.S. military, I think that there are many anthropologists who have consulted for the armed forces ethically — that is, without violating professional codes of ethics established over the past 60 years. For example, medical anthropologists such as Genevieve Ames have conducted research on the way that U.S. “military culture” might contribute to excessive drinking and tobacco use. Others, like William Beeman, have addressed officers at the Naval Postgraduate School to explain why many Iraqis are revolting against the U.S. in a way similar to the revolts against Great Britain in the 1920s. These social scientists are doing fine work that bears no resemblance to neo-colonial counterinsurgency projects such as HTS.
Q. Is there a way for HTS to fix itself — and if so, where would you start — or is it, in your opinion, fundamentally flawed?
A. Some argue that HTS is suffering from poor management and lack of oversight, and that if these problems could be corrected then it would be successful. I disagree. Conceptually, the entire program is flawed because human terrain team members are thrust into an impossible situation in which they are torn between conflicting interests. I’ve interviewed current and former HTS employees who have expressed serious concerns about this. On the one hand, they must be loyal to combat brigades — in fact, the Human Terrain Team Handbook stipulates that the teams “belong to the [brigade] Commander.” On the other hand, the teams’ social scientists are expected to respect and trust Iraqis and Afghans who they are interviewing. One can imagine all sorts of situations in which team members might confront grave ethical dilemmas: What should team members do if a commander requests field notes or targeting information in preparation for an attack? Are human terrain teams obliged to identify Iraqis or Afghans suspected of having ties to insurgents? How is it possible for embedded social scientists to obtain informed consent if they are attached to armed units conducting door-to-door searches? Each of these situations demonstrates basic flaws with the HTS concept. Like all counterinsurgency projects, it is designed to control or suppress popular movements. This runs completely counter to normal anthropological approaches which seek to bridge societies by promoting cross-cultural understanding. You can be a counterinsurgent, or you can be an anthropologist, but you can’t be both.
(University of Chicago Press, 2009)
Commentary by William O. Beeman: The Human Terrain System of the U.S. military, where social scientists are embedded with combat troops to give cultural and social advice has created controversy in Anthropology and other disciplines. The central issue is the potential for violation of professional codes of ethics that dictate that social scientists do nothing to harm the people among whom they live and learn from in the course of their research. Roberto Gonzales provides great insight about this problem in his new book and in the interview below
The Human Terrain System, a program which embeds social scientists with brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan, is billed as a mechanism for improving the U.S. military’s knowledge of culture and local populations — heretofore perceived as sorely lacking. “It’s a chance to change the military; it’s a chance to change the Army,” one HTS member said at the American Anthropological Association’s annual meeting in November. The HTS Web site states that the program “does not collect intelligence or have a role in targeting.” However, AAA’s executive board has formally opposed the program, citing a number of ethical issues including the potential misuse of anthropological information for targeting purposes — which would violate the bedrock principle that those studied should not be harmed.
One of the leading critics of HTS has been Roberto J. González, an associate professor of anthropology at San Jose State University. In American Counterinsurgency: Human Science and the Human Terrain, forthcoming February 1 from Prickly Paradigm Press, and distributed by University of Chicago Press, González strongly critiques the human terrain concept in its historical and contemporary contexts. He answered some questions for Inside Higher Ed.
Q. Would you summarize the magnitude and mission of the Human Terrain System, as you understand it, today?
A. The Human Terrain System (HTS) is a $200 million U.S. Army program that embeds anthropologists and other social scientists with combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan. The program’s building blocks are five-person “human terrain teams” that include armed personnel. Approximately 25 teams have been deployed since the program began in 2006, mostly in Iraq. According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s budget justification, the goal of the program is “to collect data on human terrain, create, store, and disseminate information from this data, and use the resulting information as an element of combat power.” In other words, HTS is designed to help the military gather ethnographic information — intelligence data about Iraqis and Afghans — in order to improve its war fighting capabilities. Human terrain team members are employed by BAE Systems, a British firm awarded the contract to manage the program.
A revealing description of HTS was published in Military Review. In it, the authors state that the program is designed to “understand the people among whom our forces operate as well as the cultural characteristics and propensities of the enemies we now fight.” They also note that HTS is a “CORDS for the 21st Century” — a reference to a Vietnam-War era counterinsurgency initiative (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support). CORDS gave birth to the infamous Phoenix Program, a secret operation in which ethnographic data on Vietnamese civilians was collected and turned over to CIA-funded paramilitary troops. In the end, Phoenix operatives assassinated more than 26,000 suspected Viet Cong sympathizers. The possibility that HTS might be used for such purposes deeply concerns me, and it’s what inspired me to write American Counterinsurgency.
Q. You write, “The way in which HTS has been packaged — as a kinder, gentler counterinsurgency — is completely unsupported by evidence.” Instead, you argue that HTS was created “primarily as a tool for espionage and intelligence gathering.” Could you summarize the evidence you rely upon in making this argument?
A. To fully understand HTS, we should place it in the broader context of what might be called today’s “cult of counterinsurgency,” which centers around the personality of General David Petraeus. For several years, he and a loyal group of advisors — many with Ph.D.s in the social sciences — have been involved in an effort to whitewash counterinsurgency. In other words, they have tried to clean up the image of counterguerrilla warfare, which is always a dirty business. The U.S. military has more than a century of experience of this kind of warfare (going back to the bloody “Indian Wars” of the 1800s and the cruel campaign against Filipino revolutionaries in the early 1900s), yet Petraeus and others have portrayed it as a newer, gentler method of fighting — “the graduate level of war” in the words of one enthusiast. HTS was developed as a central component of this “new” old method.
Many sources indicate that HTS was designed primarily as an intelligence-gathering program. As I’ve mentioned, government budget documents and military journals describe the program as means of collecting ethnographic intelligence to boost “combat power.” In the Department of Defense’s 2008 Global War on Terror Amendment, human terrain teams are described as military intelligence assets which “have proven invaluable in identifying and tracking threats.” The statements of brigade commanders are also revealing. For example, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Gian Gentile recently wrote that “these human terrain teams, whether they want to acknowledge it or not ... contribute to the collective knowledge of a commander which allows him to target and kill the enemy.” This fits the military’s definition of human intelligence.
Q. In your book, you trace the term “human terrain,” prefacing the chapter on the term’s origins by writing, “When I first heard the term ‘human terrain,’ a nightmarish vision came to mind.” If Webster’s asked you to write a definition of the term, what would you write?
A. I’ve always felt uneasy about the Orwellian juxtaposition of the words “human” and “terrain.” Linguistic anthropology tells us that in military contexts, such a term will tend to objectify and dehumanize people, because it implies that they are geographic space to be conquered. Personally I wouldn’t want to give “human terrain” the legitimacy that goes along with a spot in Webster’s Dictionary! But if I had to provide a definition of the term, it would probably be something like: “a euphemism referring to civilians living in a war zone, or under military occupation.” (Last year, the American Dialect Society declared “human terrain team” the most euphemistic term of 2007!)
In conducting research for my book, I learned that human terrain appeared more than 40 years ago in a report by the U.S. House Un-American Activities Committee — the same committee responsible for whipping up anti-communist hysteria in the 1950s. The report (Guerrilla Warfare Advocates in the United States) evoked images of a country threatened from within. It warned that militants like the Black Panther Party might possess “superior control of the human terrain.” From these beginnings, human terrain was linked to domestic counterinsurgency campaigns at a dark moment in U.S. history, when the FBI’s Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) — which brutally repressed political dissent within our country — was in full gear.
Q. The Human Terrain teams themselves have been in the headlines. But you write of human terrain as a much broader phenomenon, one that’s being embraced by the military, industries, and research universities. How so?
A. HTS has indeed been in the news, especially since three of its social scientists have been tragically killed in action over the past nine months. In American Counterinsurgency, I wanted to go beyond the headlines, to examine the development of the human terrain concept and how it has been transformed over the years. I discovered that the concept was reborn in the early 21st century, when influential people like retired Lieutenant Colonel (and neoconservative pundit) Ralph Peters, Major General Robert Scales, and Senator John McCain embraced the concept. It diffused quickly across the armed forces and into the private sphere and university research labs. After Robert Gates replaced Donald Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary, there was a boom in funding for projects focused on human terrain research and “culture-centric” warfare, and this attracted dozens of companies from what Dwight Eisenhower once called the “military-industrial complex” — BAE Systems, Aptima Corporation, MITRE, RAND Corporation, Wexford Group, MTC Technologies, NEK Advanced Securities Group, and Alpha Ten to name a few. Today contract funds connected to human terrain dwarf funds allocated by the National Science Foundation for basic anthropology research.
Modeling and simulation programs and dynamic social network analysis are the latest fads in human terrain research. Engineers, computer programmers, and social scientists seek to integrate ethnographic data into predictive computer programs. Each year the Pentagon spends tens of millions of dollars in a quest to find a technological holy grail that forecasts political hot spots — organized protest marches, riots, or full-blown terror attacks. Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania, Dartmouth, Purdue, and other universities are competing with private corporations for these funds. It’s become a real growth industry.
Q. You write of parallels between HTS and anthropology’s historical role in helping colonial powers retain control of their empires. In your opinion, are there any ways that social scientists can productively engage with the U.S. military, without binding themselves in that colonial legacy?
A. Many people have written about anthropology’s support of colonial governments in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Oceania — not to mention its role in the subjugation of Native American peoples — but it’s a much more complex picture. History tells us that anthropology has occasionally played an essential role in resisting imperialism. For example, in the 1930s a young Kikuyu man named Jomo Kenyatta from British East Africa (today Kenya) arrived in London and attended seminars led by the renowned anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski. In 1938 Kenyatta published a stirring ethnography of Kikuyu life, Facing Mount Kenya, which inspired many people by examining the painful consequences of British colonialism from an insider’s perspective. He used anthropology as a tool for challenging — not supporting — colonial rule. Kenyatta became a revolutionary leader and eventually the first Prime Minister and President of independent Kenya in the 1960s. His experience illustrates how students of the human sciences are as capable of challenging imperialism as they are of serving it.
With respect to working with the U.S. military, I think that there are many anthropologists who have consulted for the armed forces ethically — that is, without violating professional codes of ethics established over the past 60 years. For example, medical anthropologists such as Genevieve Ames have conducted research on the way that U.S. “military culture” might contribute to excessive drinking and tobacco use. Others, like William Beeman, have addressed officers at the Naval Postgraduate School to explain why many Iraqis are revolting against the U.S. in a way similar to the revolts against Great Britain in the 1920s. These social scientists are doing fine work that bears no resemblance to neo-colonial counterinsurgency projects such as HTS.
Q. Is there a way for HTS to fix itself — and if so, where would you start — or is it, in your opinion, fundamentally flawed?
A. Some argue that HTS is suffering from poor management and lack of oversight, and that if these problems could be corrected then it would be successful. I disagree. Conceptually, the entire program is flawed because human terrain team members are thrust into an impossible situation in which they are torn between conflicting interests. I’ve interviewed current and former HTS employees who have expressed serious concerns about this. On the one hand, they must be loyal to combat brigades — in fact, the Human Terrain Team Handbook stipulates that the teams “belong to the [brigade] Commander.” On the other hand, the teams’ social scientists are expected to respect and trust Iraqis and Afghans who they are interviewing. One can imagine all sorts of situations in which team members might confront grave ethical dilemmas: What should team members do if a commander requests field notes or targeting information in preparation for an attack? Are human terrain teams obliged to identify Iraqis or Afghans suspected of having ties to insurgents? How is it possible for embedded social scientists to obtain informed consent if they are attached to armed units conducting door-to-door searches? Each of these situations demonstrates basic flaws with the HTS concept. Like all counterinsurgency projects, it is designed to control or suppress popular movements. This runs completely counter to normal anthropological approaches which seek to bridge societies by promoting cross-cultural understanding. You can be a counterinsurgent, or you can be an anthropologist, but you can’t be both.
Saturday, January 24, 2009
The Iranian Veto on Mideast Peace (The Terror Journal)
The Iranian Veto on Mideast Peace
Commentary by William O. Beeman: Neoconservatives in the United States from organizations such as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and many supporters of the Israeli incursion in Gaza have tried to claim that Israel is "really" fighting Iran, not Hamas. These groups call Hamas a "proxy" of Iran. In fact, the claims of Iranian support of Gaza are hugely exaggerated, and show the poverty of Israel's argument for its disproportionate response to Hamas' pitiful offensive to Israel's isolation of Gaza, an isolation that has left thousands starving and without medical supplies. The "blame Iran" strategy is a desperate red herring that masks the recalcitrance of Israeli leaders to find a serious negotiated peace with the Palestinian community. It also masks the somewhat venal political posturing by political parties in Israel in advance of an upcoming general election, in which each party tries to show itself to be tougher than the other parties. Targeting Iran is a safe political stance, as it always garners public support, even when this posture is based on lies. Readers should interpret Robert Kaplan and others cited below as reflecting this neoconservative ideology.
In the political calculus driving Israel’s war with Hamas in Gaza, Iranian ambition has emerged as a critical–if not always clearly defined–variable. In Washington, President Bush has supported Israel’s strike as necessary self-defense, though some analysts believe an Israeli defeat by Iran-supported Hamas would embolden Tehran and weaken prospects for U.S. diplomacy in the region. And while Israel publicly stresses the need to tackle Hamas rocket fire, analysts, including CFR’s Steven A. Cook, note Israel’s desire to reassert its dominance following the disastrous 2006 war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Launching its attack in the final hours of the reliably pro-Israeli Bush administration, writes CFR Senior Fellow Michael Gerson in the Washington Post, is no coincidence, either.
Iran’s mullahs, meanwhile, have followed up the rearmament of Hezbollah by demonstrating an interest in influencing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza. Hours after Israel launched “Operation Cast Lead” on Hamas targets, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, blasted the “horrific atrocity of the Zionist regime,” lashed out at the Bush administration for “complicity in the large crime,” brushed aside European governments for “their indifference,” and chastised the “silence” of Arab regimes–Egypt and Jordan chief among them. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has also weighed in (IRNA), and an Iranian general has called for an oil embargo against the West (Straits Times) to protest Israeli action. As the Wall Street Journal observes, attention on Gaza “could become a convenient distraction” for Iranian leaders besieged by worsening economic news at home.
Yet parsing Iran’s broader goals–and discerning its ability to implement them–remain points of departure in foreign policy circles. Some analysts see a clear connection between Israel and Iran in Gaza. As Robert D. Kaplan writes in the Atlantic, Israel’s attack on Iranian-backed Hamas–considered a Foreign Terror Organization (FTO) by the U.S. government with a stated aim of destroying Israel–”is, in effect, an attack on Iran’s empire.” Israeli intelligence sources from 2003 estimate that Iran contributes $3 million to Hamas annually (PDF). But other observers say ties between Iran and Hamas are less substantive than Israel claims. William O. Beeman, a professor of anthropology at the University of Minnesota, argues that isolation of Gaza in recent years has effectively limited Iranian material support, a belief shared by Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in a new interview with CFR.org. According to a November 2008 Congressional Research Service report (PDF), Hamas reportedly received about 10 percent of its funding from Iran in the early 1990s but has since turned to “wealthy Persian Gulf donors and supporters in Europe and elsewhere.”
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Crisis Guide: The Israeli-PalestinianThere is more agreement on how the various outcomes in Gaza will ripple across the region. For Israel, defeat is not an option, though analysts differ on how victory might be defined. Surrounded by forces hostile to the Jewish state, some believe Israel must reassert the military dominance it lost in Lebanon in 2006. Haaretz columnist David Grossman suggests a cease-fire would better suit Israel’s strategic aims. For the United States and the incoming Obama administration, a victory is also seen as essential. As former U.S. ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk suggests, a convincing defeat of Hamas could lead Iran to reevaluate its support (NYT) for terrorists and even prompt a change of course on its nuclear program. An Israeli defeat and a Hamas victory, on the other hand, could bolster Iranian influence and ambitions in the Arab world, some analysts argue.
Outside of those who believe Egypt should be forced to take control of Gaza (FOX), most analysts agree the United States must broaden its regional strategy to help stem the violence. Washington Post columnist Jim Hoagland suggests Washington should reach out to its moderate Arab allies in the region “put on the spot by Israel’s Gaza onslaught.” One possible avenue of cooperation, Hoagland suggests, is to begin selling civilian nuclear technology to the United Arab Emirates as a show of goodwill in the region. Mohammad Yaghi, a Palestinian political expert with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, agrees that the only way out of the impasse is to encourage moderate Arab states to push Hamas into a peace deal. Yet as one Egyptian official tells the International Crisis Group, countering the influence of Iran and other actors will also be key. “The situation in Gaza has more to do with Hamas’s relations with the region than confrontation with Israel,” he said.
Commentary by William O. Beeman: Neoconservatives in the United States from organizations such as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and many supporters of the Israeli incursion in Gaza have tried to claim that Israel is "really" fighting Iran, not Hamas. These groups call Hamas a "proxy" of Iran. In fact, the claims of Iranian support of Gaza are hugely exaggerated, and show the poverty of Israel's argument for its disproportionate response to Hamas' pitiful offensive to Israel's isolation of Gaza, an isolation that has left thousands starving and without medical supplies. The "blame Iran" strategy is a desperate red herring that masks the recalcitrance of Israeli leaders to find a serious negotiated peace with the Palestinian community. It also masks the somewhat venal political posturing by political parties in Israel in advance of an upcoming general election, in which each party tries to show itself to be tougher than the other parties. Targeting Iran is a safe political stance, as it always garners public support, even when this posture is based on lies. Readers should interpret Robert Kaplan and others cited below as reflecting this neoconservative ideology.
In the political calculus driving Israel’s war with Hamas in Gaza, Iranian ambition has emerged as a critical–if not always clearly defined–variable. In Washington, President Bush has supported Israel’s strike as necessary self-defense, though some analysts believe an Israeli defeat by Iran-supported Hamas would embolden Tehran and weaken prospects for U.S. diplomacy in the region. And while Israel publicly stresses the need to tackle Hamas rocket fire, analysts, including CFR’s Steven A. Cook, note Israel’s desire to reassert its dominance following the disastrous 2006 war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Launching its attack in the final hours of the reliably pro-Israeli Bush administration, writes CFR Senior Fellow Michael Gerson in the Washington Post, is no coincidence, either.
Iran’s mullahs, meanwhile, have followed up the rearmament of Hezbollah by demonstrating an interest in influencing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza. Hours after Israel launched “Operation Cast Lead” on Hamas targets, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, blasted the “horrific atrocity of the Zionist regime,” lashed out at the Bush administration for “complicity in the large crime,” brushed aside European governments for “their indifference,” and chastised the “silence” of Arab regimes–Egypt and Jordan chief among them. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has also weighed in (IRNA), and an Iranian general has called for an oil embargo against the West (Straits Times) to protest Israeli action. As the Wall Street Journal observes, attention on Gaza “could become a convenient distraction” for Iranian leaders besieged by worsening economic news at home.
Yet parsing Iran’s broader goals–and discerning its ability to implement them–remain points of departure in foreign policy circles. Some analysts see a clear connection between Israel and Iran in Gaza. As Robert D. Kaplan writes in the Atlantic, Israel’s attack on Iranian-backed Hamas–considered a Foreign Terror Organization (FTO) by the U.S. government with a stated aim of destroying Israel–”is, in effect, an attack on Iran’s empire.” Israeli intelligence sources from 2003 estimate that Iran contributes $3 million to Hamas annually (PDF). But other observers say ties between Iran and Hamas are less substantive than Israel claims. William O. Beeman, a professor of anthropology at the University of Minnesota, argues that isolation of Gaza in recent years has effectively limited Iranian material support, a belief shared by Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in a new interview with CFR.org. According to a November 2008 Congressional Research Service report (PDF), Hamas reportedly received about 10 percent of its funding from Iran in the early 1990s but has since turned to “wealthy Persian Gulf donors and supporters in Europe and elsewhere.”
Bookmark and Share
Crisis Guide: The Israeli-PalestinianThere is more agreement on how the various outcomes in Gaza will ripple across the region. For Israel, defeat is not an option, though analysts differ on how victory might be defined. Surrounded by forces hostile to the Jewish state, some believe Israel must reassert the military dominance it lost in Lebanon in 2006. Haaretz columnist David Grossman suggests a cease-fire would better suit Israel’s strategic aims. For the United States and the incoming Obama administration, a victory is also seen as essential. As former U.S. ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk suggests, a convincing defeat of Hamas could lead Iran to reevaluate its support (NYT) for terrorists and even prompt a change of course on its nuclear program. An Israeli defeat and a Hamas victory, on the other hand, could bolster Iranian influence and ambitions in the Arab world, some analysts argue.
Outside of those who believe Egypt should be forced to take control of Gaza (FOX), most analysts agree the United States must broaden its regional strategy to help stem the violence. Washington Post columnist Jim Hoagland suggests Washington should reach out to its moderate Arab allies in the region “put on the spot by Israel’s Gaza onslaught.” One possible avenue of cooperation, Hoagland suggests, is to begin selling civilian nuclear technology to the United Arab Emirates as a show of goodwill in the region. Mohammad Yaghi, a Palestinian political expert with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, agrees that the only way out of the impasse is to encourage moderate Arab states to push Hamas into a peace deal. Yet as one Egyptian official tells the International Crisis Group, countering the influence of Iran and other actors will also be key. “The situation in Gaza has more to do with Hamas’s relations with the region than confrontation with Israel,” he said.
Wednesday, January 21, 2009
Tehran Wanted to Deny Carter any Kind of Victory--Interview with William O. Beeman (Rooz Online)
Tehran Wanted to Deny Carter any Kind of Victory
Interview with William O. Beeman - 2009.01.21
Barack Obama’s views on the Middle East are not very different from the Bush Administration’s, said Professor William Beeman, Chair of Anthropology and specialist in Middle East Studies at the University of Minnesota, in an interview with Rooz.
However Barack Obama’s promise of change during the presidential election has led many to expect his Middle East foreign policy approach to differ from that of President Bush.
Almost thirty years ago Iran’s revolution, and the hostage taking tragedy, was tied to U.S. presidential elections and now, once again, Iran seems to be one of the major foreign policy issues that the new President will face in the White House. Iran’s increasing influence throughout the Middle East, from Afghanistan to Lebanon and Palestine, and Tehran’s nuclear program has been the major concerns of the U.S. towards Iran over the past years.
Beeman's most recent work, The “Great Satan vs. the Mad Mullahs: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other”, deals with the highly negative rhetoric and discourse between Iran and the United States over the three decades since the Iranian revolution, and its effects on national attitudes toward the Bush administration's policy towards Iran, as well as the possibility of military confrontation between the two nations.
In an interview with Rooz, Beeman explained how the delay in releasing American hostages in 1980, contributed to the fall of President Jimmy Carter. “I believe the Iranian government wanted to deny Carter any kind of victory, so yes, I believe the delay from the Iranian side was enacted on purpose,” said Beeman adding that, “The characterizations of Carter in Iran were very bitter, likening him to all kinds of mythological villains.”
At this time many Iranians are hoping that Obama’s election will bring a new approach by the new administration to start talking to the Iranian government, and an end to three decades of punishment of the Iranian people because of Iranian government’s international defiance, Beeman believes that picking Denis Ross, as the key person at the State Department to deal with Iran will be a mistake. “The neoconservatives do not want a different policy,” said Beeman adding that, “They want to continue to attack Iran, or have Israel do it, and the Obama administration is not able to do anything about it.”
Rooz: Do you believe that in 1980 there existed politicians in the United States who were interested in using the hostage issue in order to influence the results of the presidential elections?
William Beeman (WB): We will probably never know whether there was a real "October Surprise," though there has been much evidence in support of it. There is no question that ANY issue coming before an election is used by both parties to affect the outcome of the election--even the silliest and most trivial matters become important, largely because voters are very shallow in their opinions and in their research of candidates.
Rooz: Do you believe in the October Surprise Conspiracy theory in the 1980 elections? And that Ronald Reagan’s elections campaign had attempted to convince Iranian officials in its talks with them to postpone the release of the American hostages until after the elections in the US in return for providing American weapons to Iran?
WB: Personally, I don't believe in the conspiracy. Moreover, the hostage crisis had been settled by the time of the elections. It was only the actual release of the hostages that was delayed. I think that Carter's overall incompetence, particularly the abortive rescue mission, was the more important factor affecting the election.
R: Why did the congressional and the Senate investigations about the possibility of an October Surprise lead to no proof in this regard?
WB: I am assuming that there was no proof because there was no proof. As I said above, it almost doesn't matter. The hostage crisis had already doomed the Carter administration. I suppose that if the hostages had been released before the election, things might have been different, but Carter was already far down in the polls. Also, the U.S. economy was in terrible shape, and that usually is more important than any foreign policy issue in determining the election.
R: Was there a pre-determined desire to disprove the October Surprise possibility?
WB: Certainly, the Republicans wanted to disprove this. They wanted their candidate to be elected on his merits, not by default.
R: In the last meeting of the Iranian Parliament on the subject in October 1980, in which it had to decide on the release of the hostages, representatives who were opposed to the release of the hostages who constituted a minority prevented Parliament from reaching a decision through an obstruction thus postponing the release of the Americans to after the elections (specifically, 20 minutes after President Reagan was sworn in). Do you believe that this was an accidental event?
WB: Quite aside from whether Reagan made a "deal" with the Iranians, I believe the Iranian government wanted to deny Carter any kind of victory, so yes, I believe the delay from the Iranian side was enacted on purpose. The characterizations of Carter in Iran were very bitter--likening him to all kinds of mythological villains, like Zohak, the White Div, and Yazid.
R: To what extent did the hostage taking of American diplomats in Iran impact the outcome of US presidential election in 1980?
WB: It was important, because it showed Carter to be ineffective.
R: In addition to some American analysts supporting the October Surprise theory, the then-President of Iran and the Foreign Minister at the time (who was subsequently executed by the regime) have both stressed how Iranian officials from the ruling party met with officials from the US Republican party and agreed to postpone releasing the hostages to after the 1980 elections so that Carter would not use the opportunity for his re-election bid. The Russian intelligence apparatus in 1993 in response to a Congressional inquiry about the October Surprise, also confirmed the views of the Iranian officials. Were the above-mentioned Russians and Iranians points either wrong or they have been untruthful?
WB: There was definitely a confluence of interests between the Republicans and Iranian officials, all of whom wanted to deny Carter a victory. There is some indication that Iran and the U.S. were on somewhat better footing in the Reagan administration than, say, today. The Iran-Contra affair could not have taken place if there was not some kind of communication between the two parties. Also, accusations of support of terrorists, despite Iran's support of Hezbollah, did not occur during the Reagan administration. The U.S. was blaming Libya during this time for support of terrorism (under AIPAC guidance). Also, Iran was engaging in arms trafficking with Israel, so things were somewhat friendlier between Iran and the U.S. It certainly could stem from this communality of interest. It is also interesting that initially, Iranian officials expressed a preference for George W. Bush, saying that Iran had generally fared better under Republicans than Democrats. Of course the Bush administration broke that pattern.
R: Tuesday, the 20th, is the swearing in day of Barack Obama as the next President of the U.S. In your view, what role did issues in the Middle East, and particularly Iran, play in electing Obama to the presidency?
WB: Not very much. Obama's views on the Middle East are not very different from the current administration. He has called for negotiations in preference to force as a way of dealing with the problems of the region, and he called for American withdrawal from Iraq. The Republicans tried to use these two positions against him without success. Most Americans seem to agree with Obama on these points.
R: What has been the impact of issues regarding Iran on the US presidential election until now?
WB: Only Obama's opinion that talks should be undertaken with Iran was even used in debate. Obama has officially called for Iran to suspend nuclear enrichment and "stop supporting terrorism." The neo-cons are very cynical. They think that they can agree to let talks take place on the assumption that they will fail, and then the U.S. can go ahead with its former hostile posturing.
R: Do you have a personal anecdote that may be of interest to Iranian readers about the U.S. presidential election in 1980 and the impact of the timing of the release of the American hostages after the election?
WB: Yes, Professor Marvin Zonis and I were consulting with Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance. As soon as we left his office, he resigned his position. He showed us that he was disgusted with the ineffectiveness of the Carter administration and was furious at the rescue mission, which was undertaken without his knowledge while he was on vacation. The mission (which failed) was a total surprise to him. I later cited this incident in calling for Colin Powell to resign after his fatal speech to the United Nations, because he had been equally badly used by the Bush administration.
You should know that I was in Iran until February 1979, and witnessed the entire revolution, but not the hostage crisis. A number of my friends were hostages.
R: You mentioned that Obama's foreign policy would not be much different than George W. Bush. With Denis Ross, as the key person to deal with Iran at the State Department, and given his background in this field, how will Obama's premise of change be accomplished?
WB: Clearly, it won't. Ross is being pushed by the neocons (WINEP, AEI), and the Obama transition team is in the pocket of AIPAC. They want to plant their operatives in the Obama administration.
R: President Bush changed the Republican's pattern toward Iran. Is there any potential that Democrats break their pattern as well and initiate a more friendly relation with Iran?
WB: Obviously, I hope so, but both Democrats and Republicans have had more or less the same policy toward Iran since the Revolution. No politician ever lost a vote by attacking Iran.
R: Thomas Friedman once said, Iran and the United States are natural allies. How does the possible designation of Denis Ross contribute to this?
It won't. Picking Ross is a mistake, if the idea is to have a different policy toward Iran. The neocons do not want a different policy. They want to continue to attack Iran, or have Israel do it, and the Obama administration not able to do anything about it.
R: The United States is facing with a variety of difficulties in the Middle East and the possibility of going to war with Iran seems pretty slim. Can the Obama administration live with a nuclear Iran, in case both countries compromise on some of their positions and policies?
WB: Do you believe Iran has an active nuclear weapons program? I don't. We can definitely live with Iran having nuclear power. The US is selling nuclear power to the UAE for heaven's sake.
Regarding the wall of mistrust between the two countries, in what sort of scenario would negotiations with Iran succeed?
It all starts with opening formal relations. Right now the U.S. and Iran have no relations whatever. Until they do, nothing can proceed.
Interview with William O. Beeman - 2009.01.21
Barack Obama’s views on the Middle East are not very different from the Bush Administration’s, said Professor William Beeman, Chair of Anthropology and specialist in Middle East Studies at the University of Minnesota, in an interview with Rooz.
However Barack Obama’s promise of change during the presidential election has led many to expect his Middle East foreign policy approach to differ from that of President Bush.
Almost thirty years ago Iran’s revolution, and the hostage taking tragedy, was tied to U.S. presidential elections and now, once again, Iran seems to be one of the major foreign policy issues that the new President will face in the White House. Iran’s increasing influence throughout the Middle East, from Afghanistan to Lebanon and Palestine, and Tehran’s nuclear program has been the major concerns of the U.S. towards Iran over the past years.
Beeman's most recent work, The “Great Satan vs. the Mad Mullahs: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other”, deals with the highly negative rhetoric and discourse between Iran and the United States over the three decades since the Iranian revolution, and its effects on national attitudes toward the Bush administration's policy towards Iran, as well as the possibility of military confrontation between the two nations.
In an interview with Rooz, Beeman explained how the delay in releasing American hostages in 1980, contributed to the fall of President Jimmy Carter. “I believe the Iranian government wanted to deny Carter any kind of victory, so yes, I believe the delay from the Iranian side was enacted on purpose,” said Beeman adding that, “The characterizations of Carter in Iran were very bitter, likening him to all kinds of mythological villains.”
At this time many Iranians are hoping that Obama’s election will bring a new approach by the new administration to start talking to the Iranian government, and an end to three decades of punishment of the Iranian people because of Iranian government’s international defiance, Beeman believes that picking Denis Ross, as the key person at the State Department to deal with Iran will be a mistake. “The neoconservatives do not want a different policy,” said Beeman adding that, “They want to continue to attack Iran, or have Israel do it, and the Obama administration is not able to do anything about it.”
Rooz: Do you believe that in 1980 there existed politicians in the United States who were interested in using the hostage issue in order to influence the results of the presidential elections?
William Beeman (WB): We will probably never know whether there was a real "October Surprise," though there has been much evidence in support of it. There is no question that ANY issue coming before an election is used by both parties to affect the outcome of the election--even the silliest and most trivial matters become important, largely because voters are very shallow in their opinions and in their research of candidates.
Rooz: Do you believe in the October Surprise Conspiracy theory in the 1980 elections? And that Ronald Reagan’s elections campaign had attempted to convince Iranian officials in its talks with them to postpone the release of the American hostages until after the elections in the US in return for providing American weapons to Iran?
WB: Personally, I don't believe in the conspiracy. Moreover, the hostage crisis had been settled by the time of the elections. It was only the actual release of the hostages that was delayed. I think that Carter's overall incompetence, particularly the abortive rescue mission, was the more important factor affecting the election.
R: Why did the congressional and the Senate investigations about the possibility of an October Surprise lead to no proof in this regard?
WB: I am assuming that there was no proof because there was no proof. As I said above, it almost doesn't matter. The hostage crisis had already doomed the Carter administration. I suppose that if the hostages had been released before the election, things might have been different, but Carter was already far down in the polls. Also, the U.S. economy was in terrible shape, and that usually is more important than any foreign policy issue in determining the election.
R: Was there a pre-determined desire to disprove the October Surprise possibility?
WB: Certainly, the Republicans wanted to disprove this. They wanted their candidate to be elected on his merits, not by default.
R: In the last meeting of the Iranian Parliament on the subject in October 1980, in which it had to decide on the release of the hostages, representatives who were opposed to the release of the hostages who constituted a minority prevented Parliament from reaching a decision through an obstruction thus postponing the release of the Americans to after the elections (specifically, 20 minutes after President Reagan was sworn in). Do you believe that this was an accidental event?
WB: Quite aside from whether Reagan made a "deal" with the Iranians, I believe the Iranian government wanted to deny Carter any kind of victory, so yes, I believe the delay from the Iranian side was enacted on purpose. The characterizations of Carter in Iran were very bitter--likening him to all kinds of mythological villains, like Zohak, the White Div, and Yazid.
R: To what extent did the hostage taking of American diplomats in Iran impact the outcome of US presidential election in 1980?
WB: It was important, because it showed Carter to be ineffective.
R: In addition to some American analysts supporting the October Surprise theory, the then-President of Iran and the Foreign Minister at the time (who was subsequently executed by the regime) have both stressed how Iranian officials from the ruling party met with officials from the US Republican party and agreed to postpone releasing the hostages to after the 1980 elections so that Carter would not use the opportunity for his re-election bid. The Russian intelligence apparatus in 1993 in response to a Congressional inquiry about the October Surprise, also confirmed the views of the Iranian officials. Were the above-mentioned Russians and Iranians points either wrong or they have been untruthful?
WB: There was definitely a confluence of interests between the Republicans and Iranian officials, all of whom wanted to deny Carter a victory. There is some indication that Iran and the U.S. were on somewhat better footing in the Reagan administration than, say, today. The Iran-Contra affair could not have taken place if there was not some kind of communication between the two parties. Also, accusations of support of terrorists, despite Iran's support of Hezbollah, did not occur during the Reagan administration. The U.S. was blaming Libya during this time for support of terrorism (under AIPAC guidance). Also, Iran was engaging in arms trafficking with Israel, so things were somewhat friendlier between Iran and the U.S. It certainly could stem from this communality of interest. It is also interesting that initially, Iranian officials expressed a preference for George W. Bush, saying that Iran had generally fared better under Republicans than Democrats. Of course the Bush administration broke that pattern.
R: Tuesday, the 20th, is the swearing in day of Barack Obama as the next President of the U.S. In your view, what role did issues in the Middle East, and particularly Iran, play in electing Obama to the presidency?
WB: Not very much. Obama's views on the Middle East are not very different from the current administration. He has called for negotiations in preference to force as a way of dealing with the problems of the region, and he called for American withdrawal from Iraq. The Republicans tried to use these two positions against him without success. Most Americans seem to agree with Obama on these points.
R: What has been the impact of issues regarding Iran on the US presidential election until now?
WB: Only Obama's opinion that talks should be undertaken with Iran was even used in debate. Obama has officially called for Iran to suspend nuclear enrichment and "stop supporting terrorism." The neo-cons are very cynical. They think that they can agree to let talks take place on the assumption that they will fail, and then the U.S. can go ahead with its former hostile posturing.
R: Do you have a personal anecdote that may be of interest to Iranian readers about the U.S. presidential election in 1980 and the impact of the timing of the release of the American hostages after the election?
WB: Yes, Professor Marvin Zonis and I were consulting with Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance. As soon as we left his office, he resigned his position. He showed us that he was disgusted with the ineffectiveness of the Carter administration and was furious at the rescue mission, which was undertaken without his knowledge while he was on vacation. The mission (which failed) was a total surprise to him. I later cited this incident in calling for Colin Powell to resign after his fatal speech to the United Nations, because he had been equally badly used by the Bush administration.
You should know that I was in Iran until February 1979, and witnessed the entire revolution, but not the hostage crisis. A number of my friends were hostages.
R: You mentioned that Obama's foreign policy would not be much different than George W. Bush. With Denis Ross, as the key person to deal with Iran at the State Department, and given his background in this field, how will Obama's premise of change be accomplished?
WB: Clearly, it won't. Ross is being pushed by the neocons (WINEP, AEI), and the Obama transition team is in the pocket of AIPAC. They want to plant their operatives in the Obama administration.
R: President Bush changed the Republican's pattern toward Iran. Is there any potential that Democrats break their pattern as well and initiate a more friendly relation with Iran?
WB: Obviously, I hope so, but both Democrats and Republicans have had more or less the same policy toward Iran since the Revolution. No politician ever lost a vote by attacking Iran.
R: Thomas Friedman once said, Iran and the United States are natural allies. How does the possible designation of Denis Ross contribute to this?
It won't. Picking Ross is a mistake, if the idea is to have a different policy toward Iran. The neocons do not want a different policy. They want to continue to attack Iran, or have Israel do it, and the Obama administration not able to do anything about it.
R: The United States is facing with a variety of difficulties in the Middle East and the possibility of going to war with Iran seems pretty slim. Can the Obama administration live with a nuclear Iran, in case both countries compromise on some of their positions and policies?
WB: Do you believe Iran has an active nuclear weapons program? I don't. We can definitely live with Iran having nuclear power. The US is selling nuclear power to the UAE for heaven's sake.
Regarding the wall of mistrust between the two countries, in what sort of scenario would negotiations with Iran succeed?
It all starts with opening formal relations. Right now the U.S. and Iran have no relations whatever. Until they do, nothing can proceed.
Tuesday, January 13, 2009
Obama pledges new tack on Iran (The National--Abu Dhabi, UAE)
Obama pledges new tack on Iran
Michael Theodoulou, Foreign Correspondent
* Last Updated: January 12. 2009 9:30AM UAE / January 12. 2009 5:30AM GMT
Commentary by William O. Beeman: President Elect Obama's transition team is notoriously weak on comprehensive Middle East expertise, and the persons who have been advising the Obama transition team are closely associated with neoconservatives who have dominated the Bush administration. Dennis Ross is on the roster of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) which has kept up the drumbeat for attacks on Iran, and has urged a hard military line against the Palestinian community. Another Obama advisor is Martin Indyk, the former deputy director of research at AIPAC [American Israel Public Affairs Committee] and co-founder of WINEP. These individuals will largely assure that Bush-era policies in the Middle East will continue during the Obama administration.
Yasser Arafat, right, the late Palestinian president, welcomes Dennis Ross, a US state department co-ordinator in the Middle East, on his arrival for a meeting in Gaza City in this Dec 1996 file photo. Mohammed Rawas / AP
Barack Obama, the US president-elect, has renewed a pledge to engage Iran swiftly in a new approach to curb Tehran’s nuclear quest that he portrayed as one of the “biggest challenges” facing his administration.
His remarks, made in an interview with a US television network yesterday, will offer some reassurance to those in Tehran and Washington hoping for an improved relationship between the superpower and the strategically important Islamic republic.
That scenario is unlikely to please Israel, which is striving to present its onslaught against a vastly outgunned Hamas in the Gaza Strip as a proxy war against Iran, which is supposedly committed to the destruction of the state.
Advocates of rapprochement between Washington and Tehran were dismayed by credible reports in recent days that Mr Obama is ready to make Dennis Ross his main point man on Iran. Although Mr Ross is a highly experienced diplomat, his critics say he is too close to Israel and hawkish on Iran, a bewilderingly complex country of which he has little experience. Similar misgivings apply to Rahm Emanuel, Mr Obama’s chief of staff, and to Hillary Clinton, his secretary of state.
Mr Obama acknowledged that “Iran is going to be one of our biggest challenges” and warned that a nuclear-armed Iran “could potentially trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East”.
He also expressed concern about Iran’s support for Hizbollah and Hamas. But he promised: “We are going to have to take a new approach. And I’ve outlined my belief that engagement is the place to start.” He would make clear “that we respect the aspirations of the Iranian people, but that we also have certain expectations in terms of how an international actor behaves”.
Mr Obama had raised hopes of better relations early during his election campaign by promising to break with George W Bush’s policy of not talking to Iran until it suspended uranium enrichment.
But following his presidential victory, Mr Obama served notice he would be no pushover, declaring: “Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon, I believe, is unacceptable. We have to mount an international effort to prevent that happening.”
His words yesterday signal a different approach to that supported by Mr Ross, who apparently has been offered a new state department post designed to manage Washington’s relationship with Iran. But the suggestion that Mr Ross will be an exalted Middle East super-envoy with a defining say on Iran policy may be fanciful. That he had secured such a post came in a leaked internal memo between members of a pro-Israeli Washington think tank for which Mr Ross works.
Instead, it is likely Mr Ross will be one of a “team of [state department] equals” advising Mr Obama on Iran, according to a blog by Jim Lobe, a Washington-based expert on US foreign policy.
Mr Ross put his name to a bipartisan report in November that urged Mr Obama to beef up the US’s military presence in the Gulf to strengthen Washington’s negotiating hand immediately on taking office. If muscular diplomacy failed, the United States would then be primed for military action “as a last resort”, the report said.
“Ross is in lockstep with the Bush administration on Iran – including ritual recitation of neo-conservative talking points on Iran’s nuclear programme. He is not likely to be trusted or welcomed by Iranian officials,” said Professor William Beeman, an Iran expert at the University of Minnesota.
Mr Ross is a veteran of the Arab-Israeli conflict, having led US peace efforts in the Middle East peace efforts for both Presidents Bill Clinton and George HW Bush.
He played a leading role in an interim peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in 1995, worked on the failed effort to arrange peace between Israel and Syria and the ultimately unsuccessful Camp David talks between Israel and the Palestinians in 2000.
Palestinians regarded Mr Ross as pro-Israeli in peace talks – a reputation he shares among Iranian officials. Press TV, Iran’s English language satellite channel, has described him as a “notorious Israel-firster”.
Henry Precht, a retired US diplomat who headed the state department’s Iran desk during the 1979 Islamic Revolution, suspects that Mr Obama will be loath to upset Israel by pressing it simultaneously on two issues.
“If he wants to appear to be doing something un-Bush-like on the Arab-Israeli front and working seriously for land for peace, he will have to forgo any real and positive change on the Iran front,” he said in an interview.
“Dennis Ross will do nicely in holding that front stable.” Putting Iran “in the ice box” might also appeal to Washington because “progress in any conceivable event will come very slowly”.
mtheodoulou@thenational.ae
Michael Theodoulou, Foreign Correspondent
* Last Updated: January 12. 2009 9:30AM UAE / January 12. 2009 5:30AM GMT
Commentary by William O. Beeman: President Elect Obama's transition team is notoriously weak on comprehensive Middle East expertise, and the persons who have been advising the Obama transition team are closely associated with neoconservatives who have dominated the Bush administration. Dennis Ross is on the roster of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) which has kept up the drumbeat for attacks on Iran, and has urged a hard military line against the Palestinian community. Another Obama advisor is Martin Indyk, the former deputy director of research at AIPAC [American Israel Public Affairs Committee] and co-founder of WINEP. These individuals will largely assure that Bush-era policies in the Middle East will continue during the Obama administration.
Yasser Arafat, right, the late Palestinian president, welcomes Dennis Ross, a US state department co-ordinator in the Middle East, on his arrival for a meeting in Gaza City in this Dec 1996 file photo. Mohammed Rawas / AP
Barack Obama, the US president-elect, has renewed a pledge to engage Iran swiftly in a new approach to curb Tehran’s nuclear quest that he portrayed as one of the “biggest challenges” facing his administration.
His remarks, made in an interview with a US television network yesterday, will offer some reassurance to those in Tehran and Washington hoping for an improved relationship between the superpower and the strategically important Islamic republic.
That scenario is unlikely to please Israel, which is striving to present its onslaught against a vastly outgunned Hamas in the Gaza Strip as a proxy war against Iran, which is supposedly committed to the destruction of the state.
Advocates of rapprochement between Washington and Tehran were dismayed by credible reports in recent days that Mr Obama is ready to make Dennis Ross his main point man on Iran. Although Mr Ross is a highly experienced diplomat, his critics say he is too close to Israel and hawkish on Iran, a bewilderingly complex country of which he has little experience. Similar misgivings apply to Rahm Emanuel, Mr Obama’s chief of staff, and to Hillary Clinton, his secretary of state.
Mr Obama acknowledged that “Iran is going to be one of our biggest challenges” and warned that a nuclear-armed Iran “could potentially trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East”.
He also expressed concern about Iran’s support for Hizbollah and Hamas. But he promised: “We are going to have to take a new approach. And I’ve outlined my belief that engagement is the place to start.” He would make clear “that we respect the aspirations of the Iranian people, but that we also have certain expectations in terms of how an international actor behaves”.
Mr Obama had raised hopes of better relations early during his election campaign by promising to break with George W Bush’s policy of not talking to Iran until it suspended uranium enrichment.
But following his presidential victory, Mr Obama served notice he would be no pushover, declaring: “Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon, I believe, is unacceptable. We have to mount an international effort to prevent that happening.”
His words yesterday signal a different approach to that supported by Mr Ross, who apparently has been offered a new state department post designed to manage Washington’s relationship with Iran. But the suggestion that Mr Ross will be an exalted Middle East super-envoy with a defining say on Iran policy may be fanciful. That he had secured such a post came in a leaked internal memo between members of a pro-Israeli Washington think tank for which Mr Ross works.
Instead, it is likely Mr Ross will be one of a “team of [state department] equals” advising Mr Obama on Iran, according to a blog by Jim Lobe, a Washington-based expert on US foreign policy.
Mr Ross put his name to a bipartisan report in November that urged Mr Obama to beef up the US’s military presence in the Gulf to strengthen Washington’s negotiating hand immediately on taking office. If muscular diplomacy failed, the United States would then be primed for military action “as a last resort”, the report said.
“Ross is in lockstep with the Bush administration on Iran – including ritual recitation of neo-conservative talking points on Iran’s nuclear programme. He is not likely to be trusted or welcomed by Iranian officials,” said Professor William Beeman, an Iran expert at the University of Minnesota.
Mr Ross is a veteran of the Arab-Israeli conflict, having led US peace efforts in the Middle East peace efforts for both Presidents Bill Clinton and George HW Bush.
He played a leading role in an interim peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in 1995, worked on the failed effort to arrange peace between Israel and Syria and the ultimately unsuccessful Camp David talks between Israel and the Palestinians in 2000.
Palestinians regarded Mr Ross as pro-Israeli in peace talks – a reputation he shares among Iranian officials. Press TV, Iran’s English language satellite channel, has described him as a “notorious Israel-firster”.
Henry Precht, a retired US diplomat who headed the state department’s Iran desk during the 1979 Islamic Revolution, suspects that Mr Obama will be loath to upset Israel by pressing it simultaneously on two issues.
“If he wants to appear to be doing something un-Bush-like on the Arab-Israeli front and working seriously for land for peace, he will have to forgo any real and positive change on the Iran front,” he said in an interview.
“Dennis Ross will do nicely in holding that front stable.” Putting Iran “in the ice box” might also appeal to Washington because “progress in any conceivable event will come very slowly”.
mtheodoulou@thenational.ae
Saturday, January 10, 2009
UNSC Votes for Ceasefire in Gaza
UNSC votes for ceasefire in Gaza
09 January 2009 Friday 22:14
Commentary by William O. Beeman: Coverage of the fighting in Gaza has been scant in the United States. Iran's PressTV is one of the only entities with broadcasts on the ground and running commentary. Their coverage is being picked up by the international press, including this story from Haber27 (Haber="news"), a major Turkish news site. Americans who want accurate information about the events in Gaza are advised to seek non-U.S. sources for their information.
The UN Security Council has voted for an immediate and durable ceasefire in the Gaza Strip leading to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces. However, the United States abstained from voting on the ceasefire resolution while all other fourteen members voted in favor of the binding resolution.
Resolution 1860 also called for 'unimpeded provision' and distribution of aid in the coastal enclave and the reopening of all border crossings to the region, which has been under Israeli siege during the past eight months.
Earlier Friday, Saudi Arabia and Britain said that a final text on the Gaza conflict was agreed on by Western and Arab nations.
And they were expecting a vote by the UN Security Council in New York, after diplomats spent three days forging the language.
Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, called the compromise 'a historic event,' speaking to reporters late Thursday following hours of negotiations between the two sides.
However, after showing up late for the meeting, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice abstained from voting.
The US abstention dashed all the hopes that diplomats had previously fostered for a unanimous vote in favor of the resolution, Press TV's Mike Mazzocco reported from the UN headquarters on Thursday.
Now all delegations, especially those looking for a ceasefire, are looking to Israel to stop its military incursion into Gaza, he added.
"At this point no one is sure whether this resolution will be backed up by force or at all if Israel does not withdraw its forces from Gaza. Palestinian delegation says they expect two more days of the Israeli incursion into Gaza," said the correspondent.
Mazzocco pointed out that Israel's UN Ambassador Gabriela Shalev had walked out of the meeting in a huff, brushing off reporters and giving no indication that Tel Aviv planned to implement the resolution.
"Responsibility for the current hostilities lies squarely with Hamas… The international community must focus its attention on the cessation of Hamas's terrorist activity," Shalev told the Council.
Rice's comments during the meeting indicated that the US was unhappy with the fact that the resolution did not include an explicit condemnation of Hamas, Mazzocco reported.
Commenting on the resolution, Professor William Beeman of the University of Minnesota said that the call for ceasefire endangers the absolute victory that Israel seeks.
Despite US efforts to give Israel more time to destroy Hamas the regime has been battling in Gaza for two weeks without much success, said Beeman, referring to the three UN motions that the US has vetoed since the beginning of the conflict.
"Israel can not be successful in Gaza. Nevertheless they are reaching very hard for a victory that can not take place," he added.
Meanwhile, Arab League chief Amr Mussa welcomed the resolution and stressed that 'there was no American veto.'
"The important thing is for Israel to respect and implement the will of the international community," he added.
Other Arab officials also welcomed the motion as they are under heavy pressure from their people to prevent the continuation of Israel's 14-day onslaught against Gazans.
Following the adoption of the resolution, US Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon said that he was relieved to see the motion pass through and called on all sides to 'fully' respect its content.
"I am heartened and relieved at the adoption by the Council today of a resolution to bring an end to this tragic situation. Your decision signals the will of the international community. It must be fully respected by all parties to this conflict," he said.
Just hours after the council voted for the resolution Israeli fire hit at least thirty targets in the Gaza Strip, killing at least nine other Palestinians including four children.
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Arkadaşına Gönder
Yazdır
09 January 2009 Friday 22:14
Commentary by William O. Beeman: Coverage of the fighting in Gaza has been scant in the United States. Iran's PressTV is one of the only entities with broadcasts on the ground and running commentary. Their coverage is being picked up by the international press, including this story from Haber27 (Haber="news"), a major Turkish news site. Americans who want accurate information about the events in Gaza are advised to seek non-U.S. sources for their information.
The UN Security Council has voted for an immediate and durable ceasefire in the Gaza Strip leading to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces. However, the United States abstained from voting on the ceasefire resolution while all other fourteen members voted in favor of the binding resolution.
Resolution 1860 also called for 'unimpeded provision' and distribution of aid in the coastal enclave and the reopening of all border crossings to the region, which has been under Israeli siege during the past eight months.
Earlier Friday, Saudi Arabia and Britain said that a final text on the Gaza conflict was agreed on by Western and Arab nations.
And they were expecting a vote by the UN Security Council in New York, after diplomats spent three days forging the language.
Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, called the compromise 'a historic event,' speaking to reporters late Thursday following hours of negotiations between the two sides.
However, after showing up late for the meeting, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice abstained from voting.
The US abstention dashed all the hopes that diplomats had previously fostered for a unanimous vote in favor of the resolution, Press TV's Mike Mazzocco reported from the UN headquarters on Thursday.
Now all delegations, especially those looking for a ceasefire, are looking to Israel to stop its military incursion into Gaza, he added.
"At this point no one is sure whether this resolution will be backed up by force or at all if Israel does not withdraw its forces from Gaza. Palestinian delegation says they expect two more days of the Israeli incursion into Gaza," said the correspondent.
Mazzocco pointed out that Israel's UN Ambassador Gabriela Shalev had walked out of the meeting in a huff, brushing off reporters and giving no indication that Tel Aviv planned to implement the resolution.
"Responsibility for the current hostilities lies squarely with Hamas… The international community must focus its attention on the cessation of Hamas's terrorist activity," Shalev told the Council.
Rice's comments during the meeting indicated that the US was unhappy with the fact that the resolution did not include an explicit condemnation of Hamas, Mazzocco reported.
Commenting on the resolution, Professor William Beeman of the University of Minnesota said that the call for ceasefire endangers the absolute victory that Israel seeks.
Despite US efforts to give Israel more time to destroy Hamas the regime has been battling in Gaza for two weeks without much success, said Beeman, referring to the three UN motions that the US has vetoed since the beginning of the conflict.
"Israel can not be successful in Gaza. Nevertheless they are reaching very hard for a victory that can not take place," he added.
Meanwhile, Arab League chief Amr Mussa welcomed the resolution and stressed that 'there was no American veto.'
"The important thing is for Israel to respect and implement the will of the international community," he added.
Other Arab officials also welcomed the motion as they are under heavy pressure from their people to prevent the continuation of Israel's 14-day onslaught against Gazans.
Following the adoption of the resolution, US Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon said that he was relieved to see the motion pass through and called on all sides to 'fully' respect its content.
"I am heartened and relieved at the adoption by the Council today of a resolution to bring an end to this tragic situation. Your decision signals the will of the international community. It must be fully respected by all parties to this conflict," he said.
Just hours after the council voted for the resolution Israeli fire hit at least thirty targets in the Gaza Strip, killing at least nine other Palestinians including four children.
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Wednesday, January 07, 2009
LA Times--William O. Beeman Response to Halevi and Oren "Defeat Iran to Defeat Hamas"
Re “Defeat Hamas to defeat Iran,” Opinion, Jan. 4
In maintaining that Israel is really fighting Iran in Gaza, not Hamas or the Palestinians, Yossi Klein Halevi and Michael B. Oren conveniently ignore the historical relations between Hamas and Iran. <
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-halevi4-2009jan04,0,3919516.story
>
Hamas arose during the first Palestinian intifada with its own philosophy and beliefs. Iran's initial offers of aid were spurned by Hamas' leadership as pure opportunism.
Today, Iran provides little more than lip service to Hamas' cause for its own propaganda efforts.
Even now, the Israeli government seems to be exaggerating Iran's role in order to create an enemy proportionate to Israel's hammering of the people of Gaza. It is despicable to cruelly smash a small, inadequately armed group of virtual prisoners.
William O. Beeman
Minneapolis
The writer is a professor and chair of the department of anthropology at the University of Minnesota.
In maintaining that Israel is really fighting Iran in Gaza, not Hamas or the Palestinians, Yossi Klein Halevi and Michael B. Oren conveniently ignore the historical relations between Hamas and Iran. <
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-halevi4-2009jan04,0,3919516.story
>
Hamas arose during the first Palestinian intifada with its own philosophy and beliefs. Iran's initial offers of aid were spurned by Hamas' leadership as pure opportunism.
Today, Iran provides little more than lip service to Hamas' cause for its own propaganda efforts.
Even now, the Israeli government seems to be exaggerating Iran's role in order to create an enemy proportionate to Israel's hammering of the people of Gaza. It is despicable to cruelly smash a small, inadequately armed group of virtual prisoners.
William O. Beeman
Minneapolis
The writer is a professor and chair of the department of anthropology at the University of Minnesota.
Thursday, January 01, 2009
Hamas is Not Iran's Puppet--William O. Beeman (New America Media)
Hamas is Not Iran's Puppet
New America Media, Commentary, William O. Beeman, Posted: Dec 31, 2008
Editor’s Note: The popular wisdom that Iran is pulling the strings behind
Hamas doesn’t take into account the geography of Gaza argues William O.
Beeman. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at
the University of Minnesota and past-president of the Middle East Section
of the American Anthropological Association. He is the author of “The
‘Great Satan’ vs. the ‘Mad Mullahs’: How the United States and Iran
Demonize Each Other,” published by the University of Chicago Press
(2008).
________________________
The conflict between Israel and Hamas is not a proxy war between Israel and
Iran. This is a myth that has grown up during the Bush administration, and
is now widely promulgated with little or no support.
Iran has, it is true, been sympathetic to the Hamas situation, particularly
since the U.S.-endorsed Palestinian elections of 2006, when Hamas won a
plurality of votes, allowing it to form a government. Subsequently, the new
Palestinian government was rejected by Israel and the United States, and an
economic embargo plunged the Palestinians into economic chaos. At that
point Iran provided substantial humanitarian aid.
In the present conflict, Iran is also sending two ships to provide
humanitarian assistance.
However, American and Israeli analysts would have the world believe that
Hamas could not carry out any actions against Israel if they were not
directed by Iran. As George Joffee of the Cambridge Centre of International
Studies maintained in 2006 in an interview with U.S.-based Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty, “The Israeli government has alleged that
indirectly through Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran is engaged in trying to
control the events inside the Occupied Territories and there have been
allegations with no proof at all, of involvement in some of the more
violent activities there. Those links I suspect are largely Israeli
propaganda and don't really carry water.”
The same is true today.
No one promulgating the theory that Hamas’s attacks on Israel are
directed by Iran bothers to think much about geography. Hamas has been
effectively sealed off from the world by Israel, and by Egypt. The Israelis
have essentially controlled the import of food and medical supplies. The
idea of Iran shipping arms to Hamas under these conditions is patently
absurd. The rockets launched against Israel that started the current
conflict were clearly homemade, low-level weapons, not sophisticated arms.
A parallel claim is that Iranians are providing training to Hamas. Given
the rhetoric, one would imagine that this is being done on a massive scale.
However, on March 9, 2008 the Times of London reported that 150 Hamas
fighters were being trained in Tehran. Hamas itself claims to have 15,000
fighters, and Israel has millions of potential fighters at its command.
Thus training for a team of 150, if the facts are correct, is hardly much
of a threat to Israel.
Hezbollah in Lebanon is sometimes cited as an Iranian cat’s-paw in the
region, but Hezbollah has no geographical access to Gaza. Therefore they
are limited to leading protests in Lebanon. Timur Goksel, former adviser to
U.N. Peacekeepers in Lebanon, told Reuters News Agency on Dec. 30, “With
all their rhetoric about Palestine, there is not much [Hezbollah] can do
about Gaza, short of getting Lebanon involved in another disaster. So they
are leading the popular reaction.”
Egypt is not a conduit for Iranian arms either. President Hosni Mubarak is
caught in a dilemma with regard to Gaza. He receives aid from the United
States, and has a long-standing peace treaty with Israel. Moreover, his
secular government is desperately afraid of Islamic extremism, which they
see as a threat. Because Hamas has a religious base, not a secular one like
Fatah, its rival for power in the Palestinian community, they are seen as
dangerous. For this reason, Egypt has kept the border crossing to Gaza
firmly closed except for humanitarian emergencies.
Why then does the myth of Iranian military support persist? One reason is
that it has been a long-standing American foreign policy belief that
resistance movements cannot exist without state support. Before Iran was
targeted as the source for support, Libya was the U.S. bogeyman. It is
instructive to look at rhetoric against Libya from the 1980s and see that
exactly the same accusations that were leveled at Libya then are being
hurled at Iran today.
Finally, Iran does not help matters. The rhetoric of the original Iranian
revolution is still alive and well in some segments of Iranian political
life. Iran ousted a Western-supported leader, the Shah, and tried in the
early days of the revolution to promulgate this action elsewhere in the
Middle East. Hezbollah and Hamas were sympathetic rhetorical partners. Iran
supported Hezbollah in its early days, but no longer controls its
operations. Iran had nothing to do with the founding of Hamas, but sees its
conflict with Israel as sympathetic with its revolutionary ideals. This
does not mean that Iran is controlling the action.
The more apoplectic visions of Iranian involvement see Iran developing
nuclear weapons and supplying them to both Hezbollah and Hamas. However,
not only is there no evidence that Iran has a nuclear weapons program; the
simple logistics of transfer of such weapons to a place like Gaza are
virtually impossible.
For Israel, and the world, blaming Iran for its troubles with Hamas does
not advance the peace process. Nor would attacking Iran mitigate in any way
the tensions that exist between Israel and its neighbors.
(Note: Please consult the original article for links to references and footnotes to quoted sources)
New America Media, Commentary, William O. Beeman, Posted: Dec 31, 2008
Editor’s Note: The popular wisdom that Iran is pulling the strings behind
Hamas doesn’t take into account the geography of Gaza argues William O.
Beeman. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at
the University of Minnesota and past-president of the Middle East Section
of the American Anthropological Association. He is the author of “The
‘Great Satan’ vs. the ‘Mad Mullahs’: How the United States and Iran
Demonize Each Other,” published by the University of Chicago Press
(2008).
________________________
The conflict between Israel and Hamas is not a proxy war between Israel and
Iran. This is a myth that has grown up during the Bush administration, and
is now widely promulgated with little or no support.
Iran has, it is true, been sympathetic to the Hamas situation, particularly
since the U.S.-endorsed Palestinian elections of 2006, when Hamas won a
plurality of votes, allowing it to form a government. Subsequently, the new
Palestinian government was rejected by Israel and the United States, and an
economic embargo plunged the Palestinians into economic chaos. At that
point Iran provided substantial humanitarian aid.
In the present conflict, Iran is also sending two ships to provide
humanitarian assistance.
However, American and Israeli analysts would have the world believe that
Hamas could not carry out any actions against Israel if they were not
directed by Iran. As George Joffee of the Cambridge Centre of International
Studies maintained in 2006 in an interview with U.S.-based Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty, “The Israeli government has alleged that
indirectly through Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran is engaged in trying to
control the events inside the Occupied Territories and there have been
allegations with no proof at all, of involvement in some of the more
violent activities there. Those links I suspect are largely Israeli
propaganda and don't really carry water.”
The same is true today.
No one promulgating the theory that Hamas’s attacks on Israel are
directed by Iran bothers to think much about geography. Hamas has been
effectively sealed off from the world by Israel, and by Egypt. The Israelis
have essentially controlled the import of food and medical supplies. The
idea of Iran shipping arms to Hamas under these conditions is patently
absurd. The rockets launched against Israel that started the current
conflict were clearly homemade, low-level weapons, not sophisticated arms.
A parallel claim is that Iranians are providing training to Hamas. Given
the rhetoric, one would imagine that this is being done on a massive scale.
However, on March 9, 2008 the Times of London reported that 150 Hamas
fighters were being trained in Tehran. Hamas itself claims to have 15,000
fighters, and Israel has millions of potential fighters at its command.
Thus training for a team of 150, if the facts are correct, is hardly much
of a threat to Israel.
Hezbollah in Lebanon is sometimes cited as an Iranian cat’s-paw in the
region, but Hezbollah has no geographical access to Gaza. Therefore they
are limited to leading protests in Lebanon. Timur Goksel, former adviser to
U.N. Peacekeepers in Lebanon, told Reuters News Agency on Dec. 30, “With
all their rhetoric about Palestine, there is not much [Hezbollah] can do
about Gaza, short of getting Lebanon involved in another disaster. So they
are leading the popular reaction.”
Egypt is not a conduit for Iranian arms either. President Hosni Mubarak is
caught in a dilemma with regard to Gaza. He receives aid from the United
States, and has a long-standing peace treaty with Israel. Moreover, his
secular government is desperately afraid of Islamic extremism, which they
see as a threat. Because Hamas has a religious base, not a secular one like
Fatah, its rival for power in the Palestinian community, they are seen as
dangerous. For this reason, Egypt has kept the border crossing to Gaza
firmly closed except for humanitarian emergencies.
Why then does the myth of Iranian military support persist? One reason is
that it has been a long-standing American foreign policy belief that
resistance movements cannot exist without state support. Before Iran was
targeted as the source for support, Libya was the U.S. bogeyman. It is
instructive to look at rhetoric against Libya from the 1980s and see that
exactly the same accusations that were leveled at Libya then are being
hurled at Iran today.
Finally, Iran does not help matters. The rhetoric of the original Iranian
revolution is still alive and well in some segments of Iranian political
life. Iran ousted a Western-supported leader, the Shah, and tried in the
early days of the revolution to promulgate this action elsewhere in the
Middle East. Hezbollah and Hamas were sympathetic rhetorical partners. Iran
supported Hezbollah in its early days, but no longer controls its
operations. Iran had nothing to do with the founding of Hamas, but sees its
conflict with Israel as sympathetic with its revolutionary ideals. This
does not mean that Iran is controlling the action.
The more apoplectic visions of Iranian involvement see Iran developing
nuclear weapons and supplying them to both Hezbollah and Hamas. However,
not only is there no evidence that Iran has a nuclear weapons program; the
simple logistics of transfer of such weapons to a place like Gaza are
virtually impossible.
For Israel, and the world, blaming Iran for its troubles with Hamas does
not advance the peace process. Nor would attacking Iran mitigate in any way
the tensions that exist between Israel and its neighbors.
(Note: Please consult the original article for links to references and footnotes to quoted sources)
Wednesday, December 03, 2008
Still Preparing to Attack Iran: The Neoconservatives in the Obama Era
Still Preparing to Attack Iran: The Neoconservatives in the Obama Era
Tuesday 02 December 2008
by: Robert Dreyfuss, TomDispatch.com
Commentary by William O. Beeman: Robert Dreyfuss makes it clear that the neoconservatives bent on attacking Iran are not going to give up just because Barak Obama has been elected President. His cynical portrait of Patrick Clawson's strategy to placate the American Public with insincere, empty talks with Iran just to be able to say, "we tried!" before dropping the bombs, shows just how sick organizations such as WINEP and AEI really are in their obsession with Iran. Iran is waiting for the United States to acknowledge its inalienable rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, rights which include the enrichment of uranium for peaceful purposes. Iranians are proud people, and they will not be treated as a nation less than Pakistan or India, who have been given a pass by the United States on nuclear development, despite frightening violence in their borders. Until the United States stops targeting Iran for exceptional treatment, the Iranians are not going to cooperate with American demands. Notably, they are cooperating fully with the IAEA, whom they respect as a bona fide international agency.
What, exactly, does Barack Obama's mild-mannered choice to head the Department of Health and Human Services, former Senator Tom Daschle, have to do with neocons who want to bomb Iran?
A familiar coalition of hawks, hardliners, and neoconservatives expects Barack Obama's proposed talks with Iran to fail - and they're already proposing an escalating set of measures instead. Some are meant to occur alongside any future talks. These include steps to enhance coordination with Israel, tougher sanctions against Iran, and a region-wide military buildup of U.S. strike forces, including the prepositioning of military supplies within striking distance of that country.
Once the future negotiations break down, as they are convinced will happen, they propose that Washington quickly escalate to war-like measures, including a U.S. Navy-enforced embargo on Iranian fuel imports and a blockade of that country's oil exports. Finally, of course, comes the strategic military attack against the Islamic Republic of Iran that so many of them have wanted for so long.
It's tempting to dismiss the hawks now as twice-removed from power: first, figures like John Bolton, Paul Wolfowitz, and Douglas Feith were purged from top posts in the Bush administration after 2004; then the election of Barack Obama and the announcement Monday of his centrist, realist-minded team of establishment foreign policy gurus seemed to nail the doors to power shut for the neocons, who have bitterly criticized the president-elect's plans to talk with Iran, withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq, and abandon the reckless Global War on Terrorism rhetoric of the Bush era.
"Kinetic Action" Against Iran
When it comes to Iran, however, it's far too early to dismiss the hawks. To be sure, they are now plying their trade from outside the corridors of power, but they have more friends inside the Obama camp than most people realize. Several top advisers to Obama - including Tony Lake, UN Ambassador-designate Susan Rice, Tom Daschle, and Dennis Ross, along with leading Democratic hawks like Richard Holbrooke, close to Vice-President-elect Joe Biden or Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton - have made common cause with war-minded think-tank hawks at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and other hardline institutes.
Last spring, Tony Lake and Susan Rice, for example, took part in a WINEP "2008 Presidential Task Force" study which resulted in a report entitled, "Strengthening the Partnership: How to Deepen U.S.-Israel Cooperation on the Iranian Nuclear Challenge." The Institute, part of the Washington-based Israel lobby, was founded in coordination with the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and has been vigorously supporting a confrontation with Iran. The task force report, issued in June, was overseen by four WINEP heavyweights: Robert Satloff, WINEP's executive director, Patrick Clawson, its chief Iran analyst, David Makovsky, a senior fellow, and Dennis Ross, an adviser to Obama who is also a WINEP fellow.
Endorsed by both Lake and Rice, the report opted for an alarmist view of Iran's nuclear program and proposed that the next president set up a formal U.S.-Israeli mechanism for coordinating policy toward Iran (including any future need for "preventive military action"). It drew attention to Israeli fears that "the United States may be reconciling itself to the idea of 'living with an Iranian nuclear bomb,'" and it raised the spurious fear that Iran plans to arm terrorist groups with nuclear weapons.
There is, of course, nothing wrong with consultations between the United States and Israel. But the WINEP report is clearly predisposed to the idea that the United States ought to give undue weight to Israel's inflated concerns about Iran. And it ignores or dismisses a number of facts: that Iran has no nuclear weapon, that Iran has not enriched uranium to weapons grade, that Iran may not have the know-how to actually construct a weapon even if, sometime in the future, it does manage to acquire bomb-grade material, and that Iran has no known mechanism for delivering such a weapon.
WINEP is correct that the United States must communicate closely with Israel about Iran. Practically speaking, however, a U.S.-Israeli dialogue over Iran's "nuclear challenge" will have to focus on matters entirely different from those in WINEP's agenda. First, the United States must make it crystal clear to Israel that under no circumstances will it tolerate or support a unilateral Israeli attack against Iran. Second, Washington must make it clear that if Israel were indeed to carry out such an attack, the United States would condemn it, refuse to widen the war by coming to Israel's aid, and suspend all military aid to the Jewish state. And third, Israel must get the message that, even given the extreme and unlikely possibility that the United States deems it necessary to go to war with Iran, there would be no role for Israel.
Just as in the wars against Iraq in 1990-1991 and 2003-2008, the United States hardly needs Israeli aid, which would be both superfluous and inflammatory. Dennis Ross and others at WINEP, however, would strongly disagree that Israel is part of the problem, not part of the solution.
Ross, who served as Middle East envoy for George H.W. Bush and then Bill Clinton, was also a key participant in a September 2008 task force chaired by two former senators, Daniel Coats (R.-Ind.) and Chuck Robb (D.-Va.), and led by Michael Makovsky, brother of WINEP's David Makovsky, who served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the heyday of the Pentagon neocons from 2002-2006. Robb, incidentally, had already served as the neocons' channel into the 2006 Iraq Study Group, chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton. According to Bob Woodward's latest book, The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008, it was Robb who insisted that the Baker-Hamilton task force include an option for a "surge" in Iraq.
The report of the Coats-Robb task force - "Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear Development" - went far beyond the WINEP task force report that Lake and Rice signed off on. It concluded that any negotiations with Iran were unlikely to succeed and should, in any case, be short-lived. As the report put the matter, "It must be clear that any U.S.-Iranian talks will not be open-ended, but will be limited to a pre-determined time period so that Tehran does not try to 'run out the clock.'"
Anticipating the failure of the talks, the task force (including Ross) urged "prepositioning military assets," coupled with a "show of force" in the region. This would be followed almost immediately by a blockade of Iranian gasoline imports and oil exports, meant to paralyze Iran's economy, followed by what they call, vaguely, "kinetic action."
That "kinetic action" - a U.S. assault on Iran - should, in fact, be massive, suggested the Coats-Robb report. Besides hitting dozens of sites alleged to be part of Iran's nuclear research program, the attacks would target Iranian air defense and missile sites, communications systems, Revolutionary Guard facilities, key parts of Iran's military-industrial complex, munitions storage facilities, airfields, aircraft facilities, and all of Iran's naval facilities. Eventually, they say, the United States would also have to attack Iran's ground forces, electric power plants and electrical grids, bridges, and "manufacturing plants, including steel, autos, buses, etc."
This is, of course, a hair-raising scenario. Such an attack on a country that had committed no act of war against the United States or any of its allies would cause countless casualties, virtually destroy Iran's economy and infrastructure, and wreak havoc throughout the region. That such a high-level group of luminaries should even propose steps like these - and mean it - can only be described as lunacy. That an important adviser to President-elect Obama would sign on to such a report should be shocking, though it has received next to no attention.
Palling Around With the Neocons
At a November 6 forum at WINEP, Patrick Clawson, the erudite, neoconservative strategist who serves as the organization's deputy director for research, laid out the institute's view of how to talk to Iran in the Obama era. Doing so, he said, is critically important, but only to show the rest of the world that the United States has taken the last step for peace - before, of course, attacking. Then, and only then, will the United States have the legitimacy it needs to launch military action against Iran.
"What we've got to do is to show the world that we're making a big deal of engaging the Iranians," he said, tossing a bone to the new administration. "I'd throw everything, including the kitchen sink, into it." He advocates this approach only because he believes it won't work. "The principal target with these offers [to Iran] is not Iran," he adds. "The principal target of these offers is American public opinion and world public opinion."
The Coats-Robb report, Meeting the Challenge," was written by one of the hardest of Washington's neoconservative hardliners, Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute. Rubin, who spent most of the years since 9/11 either working for AEI or, before and during the war in Iraq, for the Wolfowitz-Feith team at the Pentagon, recently penned a report for the Institute entitled: "Can A Nuclear Iran Be Deterred or Contained?" Not surprisingly, he believes the answer to be a resounding "no," although he does suggest that any effort to contain a nuclear Iran would certainly require permanent U.S. bases spread widely in the region, including in Iraq:
"If U.S. forces are to contain the Islamic Republic, they will require basing not only in GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries, but also in Afghanistan, Iraq, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Without a sizeable regional presence, the Pentagon will not be able to maintain the predeployed resources and equipment necessary to contain Iran, and Washington will signal its lack of commitment to every ally in the region. Because containment is as much psychological as physical, basing will be its backbone."
The Coats-Robb report was issued by a little-known group called the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC). That organization, too, turns out to be interwoven with WINEP, not least because its foreign policy director is Michael Makovsky. Perhaps the most troubling participant in the Bipartisan Policy Center is Barack Obama's éminence grise and one of his most important advisers during the campaign, Tom Daschle, who is slated to be his secretary of health and human services. So far, Daschle has not repudiated BPC's provocative report.
Ross, along with Richard Holbrooke, recently made appearances amid another collection of superhawks who came together to found a new organization, United Against Nuclear Iran. UANI is led by Mark Wallace, the husband of Nicole Wallace, a key member of Senator John McCain's campaign team. Among UANI's leadership team are Ross and Holbrooke, along with such hardliners as Jim Woolsey, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Fouad Ajami, the Arab-American scholar who is a principal theorist on Middle East policy for the neoconservative movement.
UANI is primarily a propaganda outfit. Its mission, it says, is to "inform the public about the nature of the Iranian regime, including its desire and intent to possess nuclear weapons, as well as Iran's role as a state sponsor of global terrorism, and a major violator of human rights at home and abroad" and to "heighten awareness nationally and internationally about the danger that a nuclear-armed Iran poses to the region and the world."
Barack Obama has, of course, repeatedly declared his intention to embark on a different path by opening talks with Iran. He's insisted that diplomacy, not military action, will be at the core of his approach to Tehran. During the election campaign, however, he also stated no less repeatedly that he will not take the threat of military action "off the table."
Organizations like WINEP, AIPAC, AEI, BPC, and UANI see it as their mission to push the United States toward a showdown with Iran. Don't sell them short. Those who believe that such a confrontation would be inconceivable under President Obama ought to ask Tony Lake, Susan Rice, Dennis Ross, Tom Daschle, and Richard Holbrooke whether they agree - and, if so, why they're still palling around with neoconservative hardliners.
--------
Robert Dreyfuss, an independent journalist in Alexandria, Virginia, is a contributing editor at The Nation magazine, whose website hosts his The Dreyfuss Report, and has written frequently for Rolling Stone, The American Prospect, Mother Jones, and the Washington Monthly. He is the author of "Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam."
Tuesday 02 December 2008
by: Robert Dreyfuss, TomDispatch.com
Commentary by William O. Beeman: Robert Dreyfuss makes it clear that the neoconservatives bent on attacking Iran are not going to give up just because Barak Obama has been elected President. His cynical portrait of Patrick Clawson's strategy to placate the American Public with insincere, empty talks with Iran just to be able to say, "we tried!" before dropping the bombs, shows just how sick organizations such as WINEP and AEI really are in their obsession with Iran. Iran is waiting for the United States to acknowledge its inalienable rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, rights which include the enrichment of uranium for peaceful purposes. Iranians are proud people, and they will not be treated as a nation less than Pakistan or India, who have been given a pass by the United States on nuclear development, despite frightening violence in their borders. Until the United States stops targeting Iran for exceptional treatment, the Iranians are not going to cooperate with American demands. Notably, they are cooperating fully with the IAEA, whom they respect as a bona fide international agency.
What, exactly, does Barack Obama's mild-mannered choice to head the Department of Health and Human Services, former Senator Tom Daschle, have to do with neocons who want to bomb Iran?
A familiar coalition of hawks, hardliners, and neoconservatives expects Barack Obama's proposed talks with Iran to fail - and they're already proposing an escalating set of measures instead. Some are meant to occur alongside any future talks. These include steps to enhance coordination with Israel, tougher sanctions against Iran, and a region-wide military buildup of U.S. strike forces, including the prepositioning of military supplies within striking distance of that country.
Once the future negotiations break down, as they are convinced will happen, they propose that Washington quickly escalate to war-like measures, including a U.S. Navy-enforced embargo on Iranian fuel imports and a blockade of that country's oil exports. Finally, of course, comes the strategic military attack against the Islamic Republic of Iran that so many of them have wanted for so long.
It's tempting to dismiss the hawks now as twice-removed from power: first, figures like John Bolton, Paul Wolfowitz, and Douglas Feith were purged from top posts in the Bush administration after 2004; then the election of Barack Obama and the announcement Monday of his centrist, realist-minded team of establishment foreign policy gurus seemed to nail the doors to power shut for the neocons, who have bitterly criticized the president-elect's plans to talk with Iran, withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq, and abandon the reckless Global War on Terrorism rhetoric of the Bush era.
"Kinetic Action" Against Iran
When it comes to Iran, however, it's far too early to dismiss the hawks. To be sure, they are now plying their trade from outside the corridors of power, but they have more friends inside the Obama camp than most people realize. Several top advisers to Obama - including Tony Lake, UN Ambassador-designate Susan Rice, Tom Daschle, and Dennis Ross, along with leading Democratic hawks like Richard Holbrooke, close to Vice-President-elect Joe Biden or Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton - have made common cause with war-minded think-tank hawks at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and other hardline institutes.
Last spring, Tony Lake and Susan Rice, for example, took part in a WINEP "2008 Presidential Task Force" study which resulted in a report entitled, "Strengthening the Partnership: How to Deepen U.S.-Israel Cooperation on the Iranian Nuclear Challenge." The Institute, part of the Washington-based Israel lobby, was founded in coordination with the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and has been vigorously supporting a confrontation with Iran. The task force report, issued in June, was overseen by four WINEP heavyweights: Robert Satloff, WINEP's executive director, Patrick Clawson, its chief Iran analyst, David Makovsky, a senior fellow, and Dennis Ross, an adviser to Obama who is also a WINEP fellow.
Endorsed by both Lake and Rice, the report opted for an alarmist view of Iran's nuclear program and proposed that the next president set up a formal U.S.-Israeli mechanism for coordinating policy toward Iran (including any future need for "preventive military action"). It drew attention to Israeli fears that "the United States may be reconciling itself to the idea of 'living with an Iranian nuclear bomb,'" and it raised the spurious fear that Iran plans to arm terrorist groups with nuclear weapons.
There is, of course, nothing wrong with consultations between the United States and Israel. But the WINEP report is clearly predisposed to the idea that the United States ought to give undue weight to Israel's inflated concerns about Iran. And it ignores or dismisses a number of facts: that Iran has no nuclear weapon, that Iran has not enriched uranium to weapons grade, that Iran may not have the know-how to actually construct a weapon even if, sometime in the future, it does manage to acquire bomb-grade material, and that Iran has no known mechanism for delivering such a weapon.
WINEP is correct that the United States must communicate closely with Israel about Iran. Practically speaking, however, a U.S.-Israeli dialogue over Iran's "nuclear challenge" will have to focus on matters entirely different from those in WINEP's agenda. First, the United States must make it crystal clear to Israel that under no circumstances will it tolerate or support a unilateral Israeli attack against Iran. Second, Washington must make it clear that if Israel were indeed to carry out such an attack, the United States would condemn it, refuse to widen the war by coming to Israel's aid, and suspend all military aid to the Jewish state. And third, Israel must get the message that, even given the extreme and unlikely possibility that the United States deems it necessary to go to war with Iran, there would be no role for Israel.
Just as in the wars against Iraq in 1990-1991 and 2003-2008, the United States hardly needs Israeli aid, which would be both superfluous and inflammatory. Dennis Ross and others at WINEP, however, would strongly disagree that Israel is part of the problem, not part of the solution.
Ross, who served as Middle East envoy for George H.W. Bush and then Bill Clinton, was also a key participant in a September 2008 task force chaired by two former senators, Daniel Coats (R.-Ind.) and Chuck Robb (D.-Va.), and led by Michael Makovsky, brother of WINEP's David Makovsky, who served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the heyday of the Pentagon neocons from 2002-2006. Robb, incidentally, had already served as the neocons' channel into the 2006 Iraq Study Group, chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton. According to Bob Woodward's latest book, The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008, it was Robb who insisted that the Baker-Hamilton task force include an option for a "surge" in Iraq.
The report of the Coats-Robb task force - "Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear Development" - went far beyond the WINEP task force report that Lake and Rice signed off on. It concluded that any negotiations with Iran were unlikely to succeed and should, in any case, be short-lived. As the report put the matter, "It must be clear that any U.S.-Iranian talks will not be open-ended, but will be limited to a pre-determined time period so that Tehran does not try to 'run out the clock.'"
Anticipating the failure of the talks, the task force (including Ross) urged "prepositioning military assets," coupled with a "show of force" in the region. This would be followed almost immediately by a blockade of Iranian gasoline imports and oil exports, meant to paralyze Iran's economy, followed by what they call, vaguely, "kinetic action."
That "kinetic action" - a U.S. assault on Iran - should, in fact, be massive, suggested the Coats-Robb report. Besides hitting dozens of sites alleged to be part of Iran's nuclear research program, the attacks would target Iranian air defense and missile sites, communications systems, Revolutionary Guard facilities, key parts of Iran's military-industrial complex, munitions storage facilities, airfields, aircraft facilities, and all of Iran's naval facilities. Eventually, they say, the United States would also have to attack Iran's ground forces, electric power plants and electrical grids, bridges, and "manufacturing plants, including steel, autos, buses, etc."
This is, of course, a hair-raising scenario. Such an attack on a country that had committed no act of war against the United States or any of its allies would cause countless casualties, virtually destroy Iran's economy and infrastructure, and wreak havoc throughout the region. That such a high-level group of luminaries should even propose steps like these - and mean it - can only be described as lunacy. That an important adviser to President-elect Obama would sign on to such a report should be shocking, though it has received next to no attention.
Palling Around With the Neocons
At a November 6 forum at WINEP, Patrick Clawson, the erudite, neoconservative strategist who serves as the organization's deputy director for research, laid out the institute's view of how to talk to Iran in the Obama era. Doing so, he said, is critically important, but only to show the rest of the world that the United States has taken the last step for peace - before, of course, attacking. Then, and only then, will the United States have the legitimacy it needs to launch military action against Iran.
"What we've got to do is to show the world that we're making a big deal of engaging the Iranians," he said, tossing a bone to the new administration. "I'd throw everything, including the kitchen sink, into it." He advocates this approach only because he believes it won't work. "The principal target with these offers [to Iran] is not Iran," he adds. "The principal target of these offers is American public opinion and world public opinion."
The Coats-Robb report, Meeting the Challenge," was written by one of the hardest of Washington's neoconservative hardliners, Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute. Rubin, who spent most of the years since 9/11 either working for AEI or, before and during the war in Iraq, for the Wolfowitz-Feith team at the Pentagon, recently penned a report for the Institute entitled: "Can A Nuclear Iran Be Deterred or Contained?" Not surprisingly, he believes the answer to be a resounding "no," although he does suggest that any effort to contain a nuclear Iran would certainly require permanent U.S. bases spread widely in the region, including in Iraq:
"If U.S. forces are to contain the Islamic Republic, they will require basing not only in GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries, but also in Afghanistan, Iraq, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Without a sizeable regional presence, the Pentagon will not be able to maintain the predeployed resources and equipment necessary to contain Iran, and Washington will signal its lack of commitment to every ally in the region. Because containment is as much psychological as physical, basing will be its backbone."
The Coats-Robb report was issued by a little-known group called the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC). That organization, too, turns out to be interwoven with WINEP, not least because its foreign policy director is Michael Makovsky. Perhaps the most troubling participant in the Bipartisan Policy Center is Barack Obama's éminence grise and one of his most important advisers during the campaign, Tom Daschle, who is slated to be his secretary of health and human services. So far, Daschle has not repudiated BPC's provocative report.
Ross, along with Richard Holbrooke, recently made appearances amid another collection of superhawks who came together to found a new organization, United Against Nuclear Iran. UANI is led by Mark Wallace, the husband of Nicole Wallace, a key member of Senator John McCain's campaign team. Among UANI's leadership team are Ross and Holbrooke, along with such hardliners as Jim Woolsey, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Fouad Ajami, the Arab-American scholar who is a principal theorist on Middle East policy for the neoconservative movement.
UANI is primarily a propaganda outfit. Its mission, it says, is to "inform the public about the nature of the Iranian regime, including its desire and intent to possess nuclear weapons, as well as Iran's role as a state sponsor of global terrorism, and a major violator of human rights at home and abroad" and to "heighten awareness nationally and internationally about the danger that a nuclear-armed Iran poses to the region and the world."
Barack Obama has, of course, repeatedly declared his intention to embark on a different path by opening talks with Iran. He's insisted that diplomacy, not military action, will be at the core of his approach to Tehran. During the election campaign, however, he also stated no less repeatedly that he will not take the threat of military action "off the table."
Organizations like WINEP, AIPAC, AEI, BPC, and UANI see it as their mission to push the United States toward a showdown with Iran. Don't sell them short. Those who believe that such a confrontation would be inconceivable under President Obama ought to ask Tony Lake, Susan Rice, Dennis Ross, Tom Daschle, and Richard Holbrooke whether they agree - and, if so, why they're still palling around with neoconservative hardliners.
--------
Robert Dreyfuss, an independent journalist in Alexandria, Virginia, is a contributing editor at The Nation magazine, whose website hosts his The Dreyfuss Report, and has written frequently for Rolling Stone, The American Prospect, Mother Jones, and the Washington Monthly. He is the author of "Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam."
Tuesday, November 18, 2008
'Joint experts' statement on Iran' recommends sweeping changes to US policy
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=97803
'Joint experts' statement on Iran' recommends sweeping changes to US policy
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
Commentary by William O. Beeman: This represents a consensus by all credible experts dealing with Iran. I fully subscribe to these remarks.
Document
Editor's note: The following is a declaration put out by the American Foreign Policy Project, a group of top experts from across the political spectrum who work together to come up with policy ideas on the major foreign affairs issues facing the United States.
Despite recent glimmers of diplomacy, the United States and Iran remain locked in a cycle of threats and defiance that destabilizes the Middle East and weakens US national security.
Today, Iran and the United States are unable to coordinate campaigns against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, their common enemies. Iran is either withholding help or acting to thwart US interests in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Gaza. Within Iran, a looming sense of external threat has empowered hard-liners and given them both motive and pretext to curb civil liberties and further restrict democracy. On the nuclear front, Iran continues to enrich uranium in spite of binding UN resolutions, backed by economic sanctions, calling for it to suspend enrichment.
US efforts to manage Iran through isolation, threats and sanctions have been tried intermittently for more than two decades. In that time they have not solved any major problem in US-Iran relations, and have made most of them worse. Faced with the manifest failure of past efforts to isolate or economically coerce Iran, some now advocate escalation of sanctions or even military attack. But dispassionate analysis shows that an attack would almost certainly backfire, wasting lives, fomenting extremism and damaging the long-term security interests of both the US and Israel. And long experience has shown that prospects for successfully coercing Iran through achievable economic sanctions are remote at best.
Fortunately, we are not forced to choose between a coercive strategy that has clearly failed and a military option that has very little chance of success. There is another way, one far more likely to succeed: Open the door to direct, unconditional and comprehensive negotiations at the senior diplomatic level where personal contacts can be developed, intentions tested, and possibilities explored on both sides. Adopt policies to facilitate unofficial contacts between scholars, professionals, religious leaders, lawmakers and ordinary citizens. Paradoxical as it may seem amid all the heated media rhetoric, sustained engagement is far more likely to strengthen United States national security at this stage than either escalation to war or continued efforts to threaten, intimidate or coerce Iran.
Here are five key steps the United States should take to implement an effective diplomatic strategy with Iran:
1. Replace calls for regime change with a long-term strategy
Threats are not cowing Iran and the current regime in Tehran is not in imminent peril. But few leaders will negotiate in good faith with a government they think is trying to subvert them, and that perception may well be the single greatest barrier under US control to meaningful dialogue with Iran. The United States needs to stop the provocations and take a long-term view with this regime, as it did with the Soviet Union and China. We might begin by facilitating broad-ranging people-to-people contacts, opening a US interest section in Tehran, and promoting cultural exchanges.
2. Support human rights through effective, international means
While the United States is rightly concerned with Iran's worsening record of human rights violations, the best way to address that concern is through supporting recognized international efforts. Iranian human rights and democracy advocates confirm that American political interference masquerading as "democracy promotion" is harming, not helping, the cause of democracy in Iran.
3. Allow Iran a place at the table - alongside other key states - in shaping the future of Iraq, Afghanistan and the region.
This was the recommendation of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group with regard to Iraq. It may be counter-intuitive in today's political climate - but it is sound policy. Iran has a long-term interest in the stability of its neighbors. Moreover, the United States and Iran support the same government in Iraq and face common enemies (the Taliban and Al-Qaeda) in Afghanistan. Iran has shown it can be a valuable ally when included as a partner, and a troublesome thorn when not. Offering Iran a place at the table cannot assure cooperation, but it will greatly increase the likelihood of cooperation by giving Iran something it highly values that it can lose by non-cooperation. The United States might start by appointing a special envoy with broad authority to deal comprehensively and constructively with Iran (as opposed to trading accusations) and explore its willingness to work with the United States on issues of common concern.
4. Address the nuclear issue within the context of a broader US-Iran opening
Nothing is gained by imposing peremptory preconditions on dialogue. The United States should take an active leadership role in ongoing multilateral talks to resolve the nuclear impasse in the context of wide-ranging dialogue with Iran. Negotiators should give the nuclear talks a reasonable deadline, and retain the threat of tougher sanctions if negotiations fail. They should also, however, offer the credible prospect of security assurances and specific, tangible benefits such as the easing of US sanctions in response to positive policy shifts in Iran. Active US involvement may not cure all, but it certainly will change the equation, particularly if it is part of a broader opening.
5. Re-energize the Arab-Israeli peace process and act as an honest broker in that process
Israel's security lies in making peace with its neighbors. Any US moves towards mediating the Arab-Israeli crisis in a balanced way would ease tensions in the region, and would be positively received as a step forward for peace. As a practical matter, however, experience has shown that any long-term solution to Israel's problems with the Palestinians and Lebanon probably will require dealing, directly or indirectly, with Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran supports these organizations, and thus has influence with them. If properly managed, a US rapprochement with Iran, even an opening of talks, could help in dealing with Arab-Israeli issues, benefiting Israel as well as its neighbors.
Long-standing diplomatic practice makes clear that talking directly to a foreign government in no way signals approval of the government, its policies or its actions. Indeed, there are numerous instances in our history when clear-eyed US diplomacy with regimes we deemed objectionable - e.g., Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Libya and Iran itself (cooperating in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban after 9/11) - produced positive results in difficult situations.
After many years of mutual hostility, no one should expect that engaging Iran will be easy. It may prove impossible. But past policies have not worked, and what has been largely missing from US policy for most of the past three decades is a sustained commitment to real diplomacy with Iran. The time has come to see what true diplomacy can accomplish.
Annex: Basic Misconceptions about Iran
US policies towards Iran have failed to achieve their objectives. A key reason for their failure is that they are rooted in fundamental misconceptions about Iran. This annex addresses eight key misconceptions that have driven US policy in the wrong direction.
Myth # 1. President Ahmadinejad calls the shots on nuclear and foreign policy.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has grabbed the world's attention with his inflammatory and sometimes offensive statements. But he does not call the shots on Iran's nuclear and foreign policy. The ultimate decision-maker is Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the commander-in-chief of Iran's forces. Despite his frequently hostile rhetoric aimed at Israel and the West, Khamenei's track record reveals a cautious decision-maker who acts after consulting advisors holding a range of views, including views sharply critical of Ahmadinejad. That said, it is clear that US policies and rhetoric have bolstered hard-liners in Iran, just as Ahmadinejad's confrontational rhetoric has bolstered hard-liners here.
Myth # 2. The political system of the Islamic Republic is frail and ripe for regime change.
In fact, there is currently no significant support within Iran for extra-constitutional regime change. Yes, there is popular dissatisfaction, but Iranians also recall the aftermath of their own revolution in 1979: lawlessness, mass executions, and the emigration of over half a million people, followed by a costly war. They have seen the outcome of US-sponsored regime change in Afghanistan and in Iraq. They want no part of it. Regime change may come to Iran, but it would be folly to bet on it happening soon.
Myth # 3. The Iranian leadership's religious beliefs render them undeterrable.
The recent history of Iran makes crystal clear that national self-preservation and regional influence - not some quest for martyrdom in the service of Islam - is Iran's main foreign policy goal. For example:
l In the 1990s, Iran chose a closer relationship with Russia over support for rebellious Chechen Muslims.
l Iran actively supported and helped to finance the US invasion of Afghanistan.
l Iran has ceased its efforts to export the Islamic revolution to other Persian Gulf states, in favor of developing good relations with the governments of those states.
l During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran took the pragmatic step of developing secret ties and trading arms with Israel, even as Iran and Israel denounced each other in public.
Myth # 4. Iran's current leadership is implacably opposed to the United States.
Iran will not accept preconditions for dialogue with the United States, any more than the United States would accept preconditions for talking to Iran. But Iran is clearly open to broad-ranging dialogue with the United States. In fact, it has made multiple peace overtures that the United States has rebuffed. Right after 9/11, Iran worked with the United States to get rid of the Taliban in Afghanistan, including paying for the Afghan troops serving under US command. Iran helped establish the US-backed government and then contributed more than $750 million to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Iran expressed interest in a broader dialogue in 2002 and 2003. Instead, it was labeled part of an "axis of evil."
In 2005, reform-minded President Khatami was replaced by the hardliner, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But the same Supreme Leader who authorized earlier overtures is still in office today and he acknowledged, as recently as January 2008, that "the day that relations with America prove beneficial for the Iranian nation, I will be the first one to approve of that." All this does not prove that Iran will bargain in good faith with us. But it does disprove the claim that we know for sure they will not.
Myth # 5. Iran has declared its intention to attack Israel in order to "wipe Israel off the map."
This claim is based largely on a speech by President Ahmadinejad on Oct. 26, 2005, quoting a remark by Ayatollah Khomeini made decades ago: "This regime that is occupying Qods [Jerusalem] must be wiped off/eliminated from the pages of history/our times." Both before and since, Ahmadinejad has made numerous other, offensive, insulting and threatening remarks about Israel and other nations - most notably his indefensible denial of the Holocaust.
However, he has been criticized within Iran for these remarks. Supreme Leader Khamenei himself has "clarified" that "the Islamic Republic has never threatened and will never threaten any country" and specifically that Iran will not attack Israel unless Iran is attacked first. Ahmadinejad also has made clear, or been forced to clarify, that he was referring to regime change through demographics (giving the Palestinians a vote in a unitary state), not war.
What we know is that Ahmadinejad's recent statements do not appear to have materially altered Iran's long-standing policy - which, for decades, has been to deny the legitimacy of Israel; to arm and aid groups opposing Israel in Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank; but also, to promise to accept any deal with Israel that the Palestinians accept.
Myth # 6. US-sponsored "democracy promotion" can help bring about true democracy in Iran.
Instead of fostering democratic elements inside Iran, US-backed "democracy promotion" has provided an excuse to stifle them. That is why champions of human rights and democracy in Iran agree with the dissident who said, "The best thing the Americans can do for democracy in Iran is not to support it."
Myth # 7. Iran is clearly and firmly committed to developing nuclear weapons.
If Iraq teaches anything, it is the need to be both rigorous and honest when confronted with ambiguous evidence about WMDs. Yet once again we find proponents of conflict over-stating their case, this time by claiming that Iran has declared an intention to acquire nuclear weapons. In fact, Iranian leaders have consistently denied any such intention and even said that such weapons are "against Islam."
The issue is not what Iran is saying, but what it is doing, and here the facts are murky. We know that Iran is openly enriching uranium and learning to do it more efficiently, but claims this is only for peaceful use. There are detailed but disputed allegations that Iran secretly worked on nuclear weapons design before Ahmadinejad came to power, concerns that such work continues, and certainty that Iran is not cooperating fully with efforts to resolve the allegations. We also know that Iran has said it will negotiate on its enrichment program - without preconditions - and submit to intrusive inspections as part of a final deal. Past negotiations between Iran and a group of three European countries plus China and Russia have not gone anywhere, but the United States, Iran's chief nemesis, has not been active in those talks.
The facts viewed as a whole give cause for deep concern, but they are not unambiguous and in fact support a variety of interpretations: that Iran views enrichment chiefly as a source of national pride (akin to our moon landing); that Iran is advancing towards weapons capability but sees this as a bargaining chip to use in broader negotiations with the United States; that Iran is intent on achieving the capability to build a weapon on short notice as a deterrent to feared US or Israeli attack; or that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons to support aggressive goals. The only effective way to illuminate - and constructively alter - Iran's intentions is through skillful and careful diplomacy. History shows that sanctions alone are unlikely to succeed, and a strategy limited to escalating threats or attacking Iran is likely to backfire - creating or hardening a resolve to acquire nuclear weapons while inciting a backlash against us throughout the region.
Myth # 8. Iran and the United States have no basis for dialogue.
Those who favored refusing Iran's offers of dialogue in 2002 and 2003 - when they thought the US position so strong there was no need to talk - now assert that our position is so weak we cannot afford to talk. Wrong in both cases. Iran is eager for an end to sanctions and isolation, and needs access to world-class technology to bring new supplies of oil and gas online. Both countries share an interest in stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan, which border Iran. Both support the Maliki government in Iraq, and face common enemies (the Taliban and Al-Qaeda) in Afghanistan. Both countries share the goal of combating narco-trafficking in the region. These opportunities exist, and the two governments have pursued them very occasionally in the past, but they have mostly been obscured in the belligerent rhetoric from both sides.
About the signatories: who they are and what they've done
l Ali Banuazizi
Professor of Political Science and Director, Islamic Civilization and Societies Program, Boston College. Dr. Banuazizi is the Past President of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) and of the International Society for Iranian Studies. He served as the Editor of the Journal of Iranian Studies from 1968 to 1982. A leading expert on Iran and the Middle East Politics, he was a member of the Council of Foreign Relations' Task Force on Public Diplomacy.
l Mehrzad Boroujerdi
Associate Professor of Political Science at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs; Founding Director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program. Dr. Boroujerdi is the author of "Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism" (1996). His articles have appeared in numerous scholarly journals and more than a dozen edited books and Persian-language journals. He is the general editor of the "Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East" series published by Syracuse University Press and served for seven years (2000 to 2007) as the book review editor of the International Journal of Middle East Studies. He is currently engaged in a major study of the current and next generation of political leaders in Iran.
l Juan R.I. Cole
Richard P. Mitchell Collegiate Professor of History at the University of Michigan. Juan Cole commands Arabic, Persian and Urdu, and has lived in various places in the Muslim world for extended periods of time. He also brings three decades of experience in studying and writing about contemporary Islamic movements and the relationship of the West and the Muslim world. His most recent book, "Engaging the Muslim World," will be published by Palgrave Macmillan in March 2009. He has a regular column at Salon.com, and is a frequent guest commentator on national radio and television news shows.
l Ambassador James F. Dobbins.
Former Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Representative to the Afghan opposition in the wake of September 11, 2001. For over three decades, Ambassador Dobbins has served both Republican and Democratic administrations in diplomatic roles around the world, often in times of crisis. Immediately after September 11, 2001, he served as the Bush administration's Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Representative to the Afghan opposition, interacting successfully with the Iranians in a cooperative effort to topple the Taliban and promote the emergence of a friendly and democratic government in Kabul. His many other high-level posts include service as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe; Special Assistant to the President for the Western Hemisphere; Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for the Balkans; Ambassador to the European Community; and the Clinton Administration's Special Envoy for Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
l Rola el-Husseini.
Assistant Professor, the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. Rola el-Husseini specializes in Lebanon and Shi'a political thought. She is finishing a book on elite politics in postwar Lebanon, along with a comparative study of the impact of Iran on Iraqi and Lebanese Shi'a political thought. At the Bush School, she teaches courses on Middle East Politics, Political Islam, and Authoritarianism in the Arab World.
l Farideh Farhi
Independent Researcher and Affiliate Graduate Faculty at the University of Hawai'i-Manoa. Farideh Farhi is the author of "States and Urban-Based Revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua" along with numerous articles and book chapters on contemporary Iranian politics and foreign policy. She also authored the Asia Society's report on Iran's 2001 elections; the International Crisis Group's report on the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran; and, a soon to be published World Bank study, "Contested Governance and the Need for Reform: The Case of the Islamic Republic of Iran." She has taught at the University of Colorado, Boulder; University of Hawai'i; University of Tehran and Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran. Her research sponsors include the United States Institute of Peace, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars where she was recently a Public Policy Scholar. She travels widely and lectures regularly on Iranian politics and foreign relations at research institutions in Washington, D.C. and around the country.
l Geoffrey E. Forden
Research Associate in MIT's Program on Science, Technology and Society. Geoffrey Forden is among America's foremost experts on how proliferators acquire the know-how and industrial infrastructure to produce weapons of mass destruction. In 2002-2003, Dr. Forden served as the first Chief of Multidiscipline Analysis Section for UNMOVIC, the UN agency responsible for verifying and monitoring the dismantlement of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. He has also served as a strategic weapons analyst in the National Security Division of the Congressional Budget Office.
l Hadi Ghaemi
Coordinator, International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran. Hadi Ghaemi is the coordinator of the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, and an internationally recognized expert on the situation of human rights in Iran. Ghaemi's reports and writings have focused international attention on the Iranian government's repression of free speech and persecution of civil society activists. He works closely with human rights defenders inside Iran to document and report on human rights violations. In 2003, he received a research and writing grant from the MacArthur Foundation. He served as the Iran and UAE researcher for Human Rights Watch until 2007. Ghaemi received his Ph.D. in physics from Boston University in 1994, and he was on the faculty at the City University of New York until 2000.
l Philip Giraldi
Former CIA Counter-terrorism Specialist. Philip Giraldi is a former CIA counter-terrorism specialist and military intelligence officer who served eighteen years overseas in Turkey, Italy, Germany, and Spain, where he was Chief of Base in Barcelona from 1989 to 1992. As a recognized authority on international security and counterterrorism issues he has appeared often on radio and TV, including "Good Morning America," "60 Minutes," MSNBC, NPR, BBC World News, FOX News, Polish National Television, Croatian National Television, al-Jazeera, and al-Arabiya. Currently, he is President of San Marco International, a consulting firm that specializes in international security management and risk assessment, and also a partner in Cannistraro Associates, a security consultancy located in McLean, Virginia.
l Farhad Kazemi
Professor of Politics and Middle Eastern Studies at New York University. As a leading scholar on issues of the Middle East, Dr. Kazemi is a member of the Advisory Group for Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World, appointed in 2003. He is also President of the Middle Eastern Studies Association, former President of the Society for Iranian Studies, and a leading member of such organizations as the American Political Science Association, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Atlantic Council.
l Stephen Kinzer
Author and award-winning foreign correspondent. Stephen Kinzer is an award-winning foreign correspondent who has covered more than 50 countries on five continents - primarily for the New York Times, where he worked for more than 20 years. He is the author of numerous books and articles focusing on Iran and the Middle East, including "All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror" and "Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq." He now teaches journalism and political science at Northwestern University, contributes articles to the New York Review of Books and other periodicals, and writes a world affairs column for The Guardian.
l Ambassador William G. Miller
Senior Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Ambassador (ret.) William Green Miller has been a Senior Advisor for Search for Common Ground's US-Iran Program since 1998. The former US Ambassador to Ukraine (1993-1998) served six years in Iran as an FSO and fourteen years on Capitol Hill as staff director for three Senate committees. He served as President of the American Committee on US-Soviet relations and the International Foundation. Formerly an Associate Dean and professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Ambassador Miller is presently a Senior Policy Fellow the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
l Emile A. Nakhleh
Retired Senior Intelligence Service Officer and Director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program in the Directorate of Intelligence at the CIA. During his fifteen years of service at the CIA, Dr. Emile A. Nakhleh held a variety of key positions, including Director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program in the Directorate of Intelligence and Chief of the Regional Analysis Unit in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Dr. Nakhleh was a founding member of the Senior Analytic Service and chaired the first SAS Council. He was awarded several senior intelligence commendation medals, including the Intelligence Commendation Medal (1997), the William Langer Award (2004), the Director's Medal (2004), and the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal (2006). His research has focused on political Islam in the Middle East and the rest of the Muslim world as well as on political and educational reform, regime stability, and governance in the greater Middle East.
l Augustus Richard Norton
Professor of International Relations and Anthropology at Boston University. A. Richard Norton served as an advisor to the Iraq Study Group (Baker-Hamilton Commission), and he is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. His research experience in the Middle East spans near three decades, including residences in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon. His current research interests include inter-sectarian relations in the Middle East, reformist Muslim thought, and strategies of political reform and opposition in authoritarian states. In the 1990s he headed a widely-cited three-year project funded by the Ford Foundation that examined the state-society relations in the Middle East and the question of civil society in the region. He is also a co-founder of the Boston Forum on the Middle East and the Conference Group on the Middle East.
l Richard Parker
Founder and Executive Director, American Foreign Policy Project; Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. Dr. Parker is a professor at University of Connecticut School of Law and Founder and Executive Director of the new American Foreign Policy Project (AFPP). AFPP convenes large teams of top experts to collaboratively develop sound policy on the toughest national security and foreign policy issues of the day. It translates these policies into effective messages in ready-to-use talking point format, and then disseminates these messages to leaders, key influencers and the public through a variety of channels - briefings, traditional media, blogs, and a unique, highly-searchable website, americanforeignpolicy.org. Dr. Parker has served as Assistant General Counsel in the Office of the United States Trade Representative and Special Counsel to the Deputy Administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency. He holds a BA in Public and International Affairs from Princeton University, a JD from Yale Law School, and a DPhil in International Relations from Oxford University, which he attended as a Rhodes Scholar.
l Trita Parsi
Award-winning author; President, National Iranian-American Council. Trita Parsi is the author of "Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Iran, Israel and the United States," which won the 2008 Silver Medal Recipient of the Council on Foreign Relations Arthur Ross Book Award. Fluent in Persian/Farsi, Dr. Parsi is regularly consulted by Western, Middle Eastern and Asian governments on Middle East affairs, and he is a co-founder and current President of the National Iranian American Council, a non-partisan, non-profit organization promoting Iranian-American participation in American civic life. His articles on Middle East affairs have been published in the numerous newspapers and magazines and he is a frequent commentor on radio and television news shows. He has also worked for the Swedish Permanent Mission to the UN, serving in the Security Council handling the affairs of Afghanistan, Iraq, Tajikistan and Western Sahara, and the General Assembly's Third Committee addressing human rights in Iran, Afghanistan, Myanmar and Iraq. Dr. Parsi was born in Iran and grew up in Sweden.
l Ambassador Thomas Pickering
Vice-Chairman, Hills & Company; Former US Ambassador to the UN, Russia, Israel and other nations. Ambassador Pickering has had a career spanning five decades as a US diplomat, serving as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador to Russia, India, Israel, Nigeria, Jordan and El Salvador. He also served on assignments in Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. He holds the personal rank of Career Ambassador, the highest in the US Foreign Service. He has held numerous other positions at the State Department, including Executive Secretary and Special Assistant to Secretaries Rogers and Kissinger and Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Oceans, Environmental and Scientific Affairs. He is currently Vice-chairman of Hills & Company, an international consulting firm providing advice to US businesses on investment, trade, and risk assessment issues abroad, particularly in emerging market economies. He is based in Washington, DC.
l Barnett R. Rubin
Director of Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation of New York University; Former Special Advisor to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan. Barnett Rubin has written numerous books and articles on conflict prevention, state formation, and human rights. His articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs, International Affairs, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The New York Review of Books, and elsewhere. In late 2001, he served as Special Advisor to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan during the negotiations that produced the Bonn Agreement, and he also advised the United Nations on the drafting of the constitution of Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Compact, and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. He has served as the Director of the Center for Preventive Action, and Director, Peace and Conflict Studies, at the Council on Foreign Relations, as well as the Director of the Center for the Study of Central Asia at Columbia University. Currently, he is Director of Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation of New York University, where he directs the program on the Reconstruction of Afghanistan.
l Gary G. Sick
Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University SIPA's Middle East Institute; Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at SIPA. Professor Sick served on the National Security Council under Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan. He was the principal White House aide for Iran during the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis. Sick is a Captain (Ret.) in the US Navy, with service in the Persian Gulf, North Africa, and the Mediterranean. He was the deputy director for International Affairs at the Ford Foundation from 1982 to 1987, where he was responsible for programs relating to US foreign policy. He is also a member of the board (emeritus) of Human Rights Watch in New York and the chairman of the Advisory Committee of Human Rights Watch/Middle East.
l John Tirman
Executive Director & Principal Research Scientist, Center for International Studies, MIT. Tirman is the author or co-author and editor of ten books on international affairs and US foreign policy, including "Terror, Insurgency, and States" (2007), "The Maze of Fear: Security & Migration After 9/1" (2004) and "By the Crusader's Sword: The Human Toll of American Wars" (forthcoming). His articles on Iran have appeared in a wide variety of periodicals, including the Boston Globe, Strategic Insights, and AlterNet, as well as reports published by MIT. He has organized projects on Iran, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf at the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and MIT, as well as a major historical research effort on the history of the US-Iran relationship in partnership with the National Security Archive and Brown University's Watson Institute.
l James Walsh
Research Associate, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Walsh's research and writings focus on international security, and in particular, topics involving weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. He has testified before the United States Senate on the issue of nuclear terrorism as well as on Iran's nuclear program. He has also chaired the Harvard University International Working Group on Radiological Terrorism. Among his current projects are two series of dialogues on nuclear issues, one with representatives from North Korea and one with leading figures in Iran. He has appeared frequently in the media as an expert on weapons of mass destruction and terrorism issues, including more than 300 appearances on CNN. His most recent publications include a chapter on Iran's nuclear program in "Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation: Strategies for Overlapping Dangers" and a chapter on nuclear weapons in "A Muslim-Christian Study and Action Guide to the Nuclear Weapons Danger." He has also published "Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation" for the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by Hans Blix (2006).
'Joint experts' statement on Iran' recommends sweeping changes to US policy
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
Commentary by William O. Beeman: This represents a consensus by all credible experts dealing with Iran. I fully subscribe to these remarks.
Document
Editor's note: The following is a declaration put out by the American Foreign Policy Project, a group of top experts from across the political spectrum who work together to come up with policy ideas on the major foreign affairs issues facing the United States.
Despite recent glimmers of diplomacy, the United States and Iran remain locked in a cycle of threats and defiance that destabilizes the Middle East and weakens US national security.
Today, Iran and the United States are unable to coordinate campaigns against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, their common enemies. Iran is either withholding help or acting to thwart US interests in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Gaza. Within Iran, a looming sense of external threat has empowered hard-liners and given them both motive and pretext to curb civil liberties and further restrict democracy. On the nuclear front, Iran continues to enrich uranium in spite of binding UN resolutions, backed by economic sanctions, calling for it to suspend enrichment.
US efforts to manage Iran through isolation, threats and sanctions have been tried intermittently for more than two decades. In that time they have not solved any major problem in US-Iran relations, and have made most of them worse. Faced with the manifest failure of past efforts to isolate or economically coerce Iran, some now advocate escalation of sanctions or even military attack. But dispassionate analysis shows that an attack would almost certainly backfire, wasting lives, fomenting extremism and damaging the long-term security interests of both the US and Israel. And long experience has shown that prospects for successfully coercing Iran through achievable economic sanctions are remote at best.
Fortunately, we are not forced to choose between a coercive strategy that has clearly failed and a military option that has very little chance of success. There is another way, one far more likely to succeed: Open the door to direct, unconditional and comprehensive negotiations at the senior diplomatic level where personal contacts can be developed, intentions tested, and possibilities explored on both sides. Adopt policies to facilitate unofficial contacts between scholars, professionals, religious leaders, lawmakers and ordinary citizens. Paradoxical as it may seem amid all the heated media rhetoric, sustained engagement is far more likely to strengthen United States national security at this stage than either escalation to war or continued efforts to threaten, intimidate or coerce Iran.
Here are five key steps the United States should take to implement an effective diplomatic strategy with Iran:
1. Replace calls for regime change with a long-term strategy
Threats are not cowing Iran and the current regime in Tehran is not in imminent peril. But few leaders will negotiate in good faith with a government they think is trying to subvert them, and that perception may well be the single greatest barrier under US control to meaningful dialogue with Iran. The United States needs to stop the provocations and take a long-term view with this regime, as it did with the Soviet Union and China. We might begin by facilitating broad-ranging people-to-people contacts, opening a US interest section in Tehran, and promoting cultural exchanges.
2. Support human rights through effective, international means
While the United States is rightly concerned with Iran's worsening record of human rights violations, the best way to address that concern is through supporting recognized international efforts. Iranian human rights and democracy advocates confirm that American political interference masquerading as "democracy promotion" is harming, not helping, the cause of democracy in Iran.
3. Allow Iran a place at the table - alongside other key states - in shaping the future of Iraq, Afghanistan and the region.
This was the recommendation of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group with regard to Iraq. It may be counter-intuitive in today's political climate - but it is sound policy. Iran has a long-term interest in the stability of its neighbors. Moreover, the United States and Iran support the same government in Iraq and face common enemies (the Taliban and Al-Qaeda) in Afghanistan. Iran has shown it can be a valuable ally when included as a partner, and a troublesome thorn when not. Offering Iran a place at the table cannot assure cooperation, but it will greatly increase the likelihood of cooperation by giving Iran something it highly values that it can lose by non-cooperation. The United States might start by appointing a special envoy with broad authority to deal comprehensively and constructively with Iran (as opposed to trading accusations) and explore its willingness to work with the United States on issues of common concern.
4. Address the nuclear issue within the context of a broader US-Iran opening
Nothing is gained by imposing peremptory preconditions on dialogue. The United States should take an active leadership role in ongoing multilateral talks to resolve the nuclear impasse in the context of wide-ranging dialogue with Iran. Negotiators should give the nuclear talks a reasonable deadline, and retain the threat of tougher sanctions if negotiations fail. They should also, however, offer the credible prospect of security assurances and specific, tangible benefits such as the easing of US sanctions in response to positive policy shifts in Iran. Active US involvement may not cure all, but it certainly will change the equation, particularly if it is part of a broader opening.
5. Re-energize the Arab-Israeli peace process and act as an honest broker in that process
Israel's security lies in making peace with its neighbors. Any US moves towards mediating the Arab-Israeli crisis in a balanced way would ease tensions in the region, and would be positively received as a step forward for peace. As a practical matter, however, experience has shown that any long-term solution to Israel's problems with the Palestinians and Lebanon probably will require dealing, directly or indirectly, with Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran supports these organizations, and thus has influence with them. If properly managed, a US rapprochement with Iran, even an opening of talks, could help in dealing with Arab-Israeli issues, benefiting Israel as well as its neighbors.
Long-standing diplomatic practice makes clear that talking directly to a foreign government in no way signals approval of the government, its policies or its actions. Indeed, there are numerous instances in our history when clear-eyed US diplomacy with regimes we deemed objectionable - e.g., Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Libya and Iran itself (cooperating in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban after 9/11) - produced positive results in difficult situations.
After many years of mutual hostility, no one should expect that engaging Iran will be easy. It may prove impossible. But past policies have not worked, and what has been largely missing from US policy for most of the past three decades is a sustained commitment to real diplomacy with Iran. The time has come to see what true diplomacy can accomplish.
Annex: Basic Misconceptions about Iran
US policies towards Iran have failed to achieve their objectives. A key reason for their failure is that they are rooted in fundamental misconceptions about Iran. This annex addresses eight key misconceptions that have driven US policy in the wrong direction.
Myth # 1. President Ahmadinejad calls the shots on nuclear and foreign policy.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has grabbed the world's attention with his inflammatory and sometimes offensive statements. But he does not call the shots on Iran's nuclear and foreign policy. The ultimate decision-maker is Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the commander-in-chief of Iran's forces. Despite his frequently hostile rhetoric aimed at Israel and the West, Khamenei's track record reveals a cautious decision-maker who acts after consulting advisors holding a range of views, including views sharply critical of Ahmadinejad. That said, it is clear that US policies and rhetoric have bolstered hard-liners in Iran, just as Ahmadinejad's confrontational rhetoric has bolstered hard-liners here.
Myth # 2. The political system of the Islamic Republic is frail and ripe for regime change.
In fact, there is currently no significant support within Iran for extra-constitutional regime change. Yes, there is popular dissatisfaction, but Iranians also recall the aftermath of their own revolution in 1979: lawlessness, mass executions, and the emigration of over half a million people, followed by a costly war. They have seen the outcome of US-sponsored regime change in Afghanistan and in Iraq. They want no part of it. Regime change may come to Iran, but it would be folly to bet on it happening soon.
Myth # 3. The Iranian leadership's religious beliefs render them undeterrable.
The recent history of Iran makes crystal clear that national self-preservation and regional influence - not some quest for martyrdom in the service of Islam - is Iran's main foreign policy goal. For example:
l In the 1990s, Iran chose a closer relationship with Russia over support for rebellious Chechen Muslims.
l Iran actively supported and helped to finance the US invasion of Afghanistan.
l Iran has ceased its efforts to export the Islamic revolution to other Persian Gulf states, in favor of developing good relations with the governments of those states.
l During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran took the pragmatic step of developing secret ties and trading arms with Israel, even as Iran and Israel denounced each other in public.
Myth # 4. Iran's current leadership is implacably opposed to the United States.
Iran will not accept preconditions for dialogue with the United States, any more than the United States would accept preconditions for talking to Iran. But Iran is clearly open to broad-ranging dialogue with the United States. In fact, it has made multiple peace overtures that the United States has rebuffed. Right after 9/11, Iran worked with the United States to get rid of the Taliban in Afghanistan, including paying for the Afghan troops serving under US command. Iran helped establish the US-backed government and then contributed more than $750 million to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Iran expressed interest in a broader dialogue in 2002 and 2003. Instead, it was labeled part of an "axis of evil."
In 2005, reform-minded President Khatami was replaced by the hardliner, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But the same Supreme Leader who authorized earlier overtures is still in office today and he acknowledged, as recently as January 2008, that "the day that relations with America prove beneficial for the Iranian nation, I will be the first one to approve of that." All this does not prove that Iran will bargain in good faith with us. But it does disprove the claim that we know for sure they will not.
Myth # 5. Iran has declared its intention to attack Israel in order to "wipe Israel off the map."
This claim is based largely on a speech by President Ahmadinejad on Oct. 26, 2005, quoting a remark by Ayatollah Khomeini made decades ago: "This regime that is occupying Qods [Jerusalem] must be wiped off/eliminated from the pages of history/our times." Both before and since, Ahmadinejad has made numerous other, offensive, insulting and threatening remarks about Israel and other nations - most notably his indefensible denial of the Holocaust.
However, he has been criticized within Iran for these remarks. Supreme Leader Khamenei himself has "clarified" that "the Islamic Republic has never threatened and will never threaten any country" and specifically that Iran will not attack Israel unless Iran is attacked first. Ahmadinejad also has made clear, or been forced to clarify, that he was referring to regime change through demographics (giving the Palestinians a vote in a unitary state), not war.
What we know is that Ahmadinejad's recent statements do not appear to have materially altered Iran's long-standing policy - which, for decades, has been to deny the legitimacy of Israel; to arm and aid groups opposing Israel in Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank; but also, to promise to accept any deal with Israel that the Palestinians accept.
Myth # 6. US-sponsored "democracy promotion" can help bring about true democracy in Iran.
Instead of fostering democratic elements inside Iran, US-backed "democracy promotion" has provided an excuse to stifle them. That is why champions of human rights and democracy in Iran agree with the dissident who said, "The best thing the Americans can do for democracy in Iran is not to support it."
Myth # 7. Iran is clearly and firmly committed to developing nuclear weapons.
If Iraq teaches anything, it is the need to be both rigorous and honest when confronted with ambiguous evidence about WMDs. Yet once again we find proponents of conflict over-stating their case, this time by claiming that Iran has declared an intention to acquire nuclear weapons. In fact, Iranian leaders have consistently denied any such intention and even said that such weapons are "against Islam."
The issue is not what Iran is saying, but what it is doing, and here the facts are murky. We know that Iran is openly enriching uranium and learning to do it more efficiently, but claims this is only for peaceful use. There are detailed but disputed allegations that Iran secretly worked on nuclear weapons design before Ahmadinejad came to power, concerns that such work continues, and certainty that Iran is not cooperating fully with efforts to resolve the allegations. We also know that Iran has said it will negotiate on its enrichment program - without preconditions - and submit to intrusive inspections as part of a final deal. Past negotiations between Iran and a group of three European countries plus China and Russia have not gone anywhere, but the United States, Iran's chief nemesis, has not been active in those talks.
The facts viewed as a whole give cause for deep concern, but they are not unambiguous and in fact support a variety of interpretations: that Iran views enrichment chiefly as a source of national pride (akin to our moon landing); that Iran is advancing towards weapons capability but sees this as a bargaining chip to use in broader negotiations with the United States; that Iran is intent on achieving the capability to build a weapon on short notice as a deterrent to feared US or Israeli attack; or that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons to support aggressive goals. The only effective way to illuminate - and constructively alter - Iran's intentions is through skillful and careful diplomacy. History shows that sanctions alone are unlikely to succeed, and a strategy limited to escalating threats or attacking Iran is likely to backfire - creating or hardening a resolve to acquire nuclear weapons while inciting a backlash against us throughout the region.
Myth # 8. Iran and the United States have no basis for dialogue.
Those who favored refusing Iran's offers of dialogue in 2002 and 2003 - when they thought the US position so strong there was no need to talk - now assert that our position is so weak we cannot afford to talk. Wrong in both cases. Iran is eager for an end to sanctions and isolation, and needs access to world-class technology to bring new supplies of oil and gas online. Both countries share an interest in stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan, which border Iran. Both support the Maliki government in Iraq, and face common enemies (the Taliban and Al-Qaeda) in Afghanistan. Both countries share the goal of combating narco-trafficking in the region. These opportunities exist, and the two governments have pursued them very occasionally in the past, but they have mostly been obscured in the belligerent rhetoric from both sides.
About the signatories: who they are and what they've done
l Ali Banuazizi
Professor of Political Science and Director, Islamic Civilization and Societies Program, Boston College. Dr. Banuazizi is the Past President of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) and of the International Society for Iranian Studies. He served as the Editor of the Journal of Iranian Studies from 1968 to 1982. A leading expert on Iran and the Middle East Politics, he was a member of the Council of Foreign Relations' Task Force on Public Diplomacy.
l Mehrzad Boroujerdi
Associate Professor of Political Science at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs; Founding Director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program. Dr. Boroujerdi is the author of "Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism" (1996). His articles have appeared in numerous scholarly journals and more than a dozen edited books and Persian-language journals. He is the general editor of the "Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East" series published by Syracuse University Press and served for seven years (2000 to 2007) as the book review editor of the International Journal of Middle East Studies. He is currently engaged in a major study of the current and next generation of political leaders in Iran.
l Juan R.I. Cole
Richard P. Mitchell Collegiate Professor of History at the University of Michigan. Juan Cole commands Arabic, Persian and Urdu, and has lived in various places in the Muslim world for extended periods of time. He also brings three decades of experience in studying and writing about contemporary Islamic movements and the relationship of the West and the Muslim world. His most recent book, "Engaging the Muslim World," will be published by Palgrave Macmillan in March 2009. He has a regular column at Salon.com, and is a frequent guest commentator on national radio and television news shows.
l Ambassador James F. Dobbins.
Former Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Representative to the Afghan opposition in the wake of September 11, 2001. For over three decades, Ambassador Dobbins has served both Republican and Democratic administrations in diplomatic roles around the world, often in times of crisis. Immediately after September 11, 2001, he served as the Bush administration's Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Representative to the Afghan opposition, interacting successfully with the Iranians in a cooperative effort to topple the Taliban and promote the emergence of a friendly and democratic government in Kabul. His many other high-level posts include service as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe; Special Assistant to the President for the Western Hemisphere; Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for the Balkans; Ambassador to the European Community; and the Clinton Administration's Special Envoy for Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
l Rola el-Husseini.
Assistant Professor, the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. Rola el-Husseini specializes in Lebanon and Shi'a political thought. She is finishing a book on elite politics in postwar Lebanon, along with a comparative study of the impact of Iran on Iraqi and Lebanese Shi'a political thought. At the Bush School, she teaches courses on Middle East Politics, Political Islam, and Authoritarianism in the Arab World.
l Farideh Farhi
Independent Researcher and Affiliate Graduate Faculty at the University of Hawai'i-Manoa. Farideh Farhi is the author of "States and Urban-Based Revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua" along with numerous articles and book chapters on contemporary Iranian politics and foreign policy. She also authored the Asia Society's report on Iran's 2001 elections; the International Crisis Group's report on the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran; and, a soon to be published World Bank study, "Contested Governance and the Need for Reform: The Case of the Islamic Republic of Iran." She has taught at the University of Colorado, Boulder; University of Hawai'i; University of Tehran and Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran. Her research sponsors include the United States Institute of Peace, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars where she was recently a Public Policy Scholar. She travels widely and lectures regularly on Iranian politics and foreign relations at research institutions in Washington, D.C. and around the country.
l Geoffrey E. Forden
Research Associate in MIT's Program on Science, Technology and Society. Geoffrey Forden is among America's foremost experts on how proliferators acquire the know-how and industrial infrastructure to produce weapons of mass destruction. In 2002-2003, Dr. Forden served as the first Chief of Multidiscipline Analysis Section for UNMOVIC, the UN agency responsible for verifying and monitoring the dismantlement of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. He has also served as a strategic weapons analyst in the National Security Division of the Congressional Budget Office.
l Hadi Ghaemi
Coordinator, International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran. Hadi Ghaemi is the coordinator of the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, and an internationally recognized expert on the situation of human rights in Iran. Ghaemi's reports and writings have focused international attention on the Iranian government's repression of free speech and persecution of civil society activists. He works closely with human rights defenders inside Iran to document and report on human rights violations. In 2003, he received a research and writing grant from the MacArthur Foundation. He served as the Iran and UAE researcher for Human Rights Watch until 2007. Ghaemi received his Ph.D. in physics from Boston University in 1994, and he was on the faculty at the City University of New York until 2000.
l Philip Giraldi
Former CIA Counter-terrorism Specialist. Philip Giraldi is a former CIA counter-terrorism specialist and military intelligence officer who served eighteen years overseas in Turkey, Italy, Germany, and Spain, where he was Chief of Base in Barcelona from 1989 to 1992. As a recognized authority on international security and counterterrorism issues he has appeared often on radio and TV, including "Good Morning America," "60 Minutes," MSNBC, NPR, BBC World News, FOX News, Polish National Television, Croatian National Television, al-Jazeera, and al-Arabiya. Currently, he is President of San Marco International, a consulting firm that specializes in international security management and risk assessment, and also a partner in Cannistraro Associates, a security consultancy located in McLean, Virginia.
l Farhad Kazemi
Professor of Politics and Middle Eastern Studies at New York University. As a leading scholar on issues of the Middle East, Dr. Kazemi is a member of the Advisory Group for Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World, appointed in 2003. He is also President of the Middle Eastern Studies Association, former President of the Society for Iranian Studies, and a leading member of such organizations as the American Political Science Association, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Atlantic Council.
l Stephen Kinzer
Author and award-winning foreign correspondent. Stephen Kinzer is an award-winning foreign correspondent who has covered more than 50 countries on five continents - primarily for the New York Times, where he worked for more than 20 years. He is the author of numerous books and articles focusing on Iran and the Middle East, including "All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror" and "Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq." He now teaches journalism and political science at Northwestern University, contributes articles to the New York Review of Books and other periodicals, and writes a world affairs column for The Guardian.
l Ambassador William G. Miller
Senior Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Ambassador (ret.) William Green Miller has been a Senior Advisor for Search for Common Ground's US-Iran Program since 1998. The former US Ambassador to Ukraine (1993-1998) served six years in Iran as an FSO and fourteen years on Capitol Hill as staff director for three Senate committees. He served as President of the American Committee on US-Soviet relations and the International Foundation. Formerly an Associate Dean and professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Ambassador Miller is presently a Senior Policy Fellow the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
l Emile A. Nakhleh
Retired Senior Intelligence Service Officer and Director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program in the Directorate of Intelligence at the CIA. During his fifteen years of service at the CIA, Dr. Emile A. Nakhleh held a variety of key positions, including Director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program in the Directorate of Intelligence and Chief of the Regional Analysis Unit in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Dr. Nakhleh was a founding member of the Senior Analytic Service and chaired the first SAS Council. He was awarded several senior intelligence commendation medals, including the Intelligence Commendation Medal (1997), the William Langer Award (2004), the Director's Medal (2004), and the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal (2006). His research has focused on political Islam in the Middle East and the rest of the Muslim world as well as on political and educational reform, regime stability, and governance in the greater Middle East.
l Augustus Richard Norton
Professor of International Relations and Anthropology at Boston University. A. Richard Norton served as an advisor to the Iraq Study Group (Baker-Hamilton Commission), and he is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. His research experience in the Middle East spans near three decades, including residences in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon. His current research interests include inter-sectarian relations in the Middle East, reformist Muslim thought, and strategies of political reform and opposition in authoritarian states. In the 1990s he headed a widely-cited three-year project funded by the Ford Foundation that examined the state-society relations in the Middle East and the question of civil society in the region. He is also a co-founder of the Boston Forum on the Middle East and the Conference Group on the Middle East.
l Richard Parker
Founder and Executive Director, American Foreign Policy Project; Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. Dr. Parker is a professor at University of Connecticut School of Law and Founder and Executive Director of the new American Foreign Policy Project (AFPP). AFPP convenes large teams of top experts to collaboratively develop sound policy on the toughest national security and foreign policy issues of the day. It translates these policies into effective messages in ready-to-use talking point format, and then disseminates these messages to leaders, key influencers and the public through a variety of channels - briefings, traditional media, blogs, and a unique, highly-searchable website, americanforeignpolicy.org. Dr. Parker has served as Assistant General Counsel in the Office of the United States Trade Representative and Special Counsel to the Deputy Administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency. He holds a BA in Public and International Affairs from Princeton University, a JD from Yale Law School, and a DPhil in International Relations from Oxford University, which he attended as a Rhodes Scholar.
l Trita Parsi
Award-winning author; President, National Iranian-American Council. Trita Parsi is the author of "Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Iran, Israel and the United States," which won the 2008 Silver Medal Recipient of the Council on Foreign Relations Arthur Ross Book Award. Fluent in Persian/Farsi, Dr. Parsi is regularly consulted by Western, Middle Eastern and Asian governments on Middle East affairs, and he is a co-founder and current President of the National Iranian American Council, a non-partisan, non-profit organization promoting Iranian-American participation in American civic life. His articles on Middle East affairs have been published in the numerous newspapers and magazines and he is a frequent commentor on radio and television news shows. He has also worked for the Swedish Permanent Mission to the UN, serving in the Security Council handling the affairs of Afghanistan, Iraq, Tajikistan and Western Sahara, and the General Assembly's Third Committee addressing human rights in Iran, Afghanistan, Myanmar and Iraq. Dr. Parsi was born in Iran and grew up in Sweden.
l Ambassador Thomas Pickering
Vice-Chairman, Hills & Company; Former US Ambassador to the UN, Russia, Israel and other nations. Ambassador Pickering has had a career spanning five decades as a US diplomat, serving as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador to Russia, India, Israel, Nigeria, Jordan and El Salvador. He also served on assignments in Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. He holds the personal rank of Career Ambassador, the highest in the US Foreign Service. He has held numerous other positions at the State Department, including Executive Secretary and Special Assistant to Secretaries Rogers and Kissinger and Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Oceans, Environmental and Scientific Affairs. He is currently Vice-chairman of Hills & Company, an international consulting firm providing advice to US businesses on investment, trade, and risk assessment issues abroad, particularly in emerging market economies. He is based in Washington, DC.
l Barnett R. Rubin
Director of Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation of New York University; Former Special Advisor to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan. Barnett Rubin has written numerous books and articles on conflict prevention, state formation, and human rights. His articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs, International Affairs, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The New York Review of Books, and elsewhere. In late 2001, he served as Special Advisor to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan during the negotiations that produced the Bonn Agreement, and he also advised the United Nations on the drafting of the constitution of Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Compact, and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. He has served as the Director of the Center for Preventive Action, and Director, Peace and Conflict Studies, at the Council on Foreign Relations, as well as the Director of the Center for the Study of Central Asia at Columbia University. Currently, he is Director of Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation of New York University, where he directs the program on the Reconstruction of Afghanistan.
l Gary G. Sick
Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University SIPA's Middle East Institute; Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at SIPA. Professor Sick served on the National Security Council under Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan. He was the principal White House aide for Iran during the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis. Sick is a Captain (Ret.) in the US Navy, with service in the Persian Gulf, North Africa, and the Mediterranean. He was the deputy director for International Affairs at the Ford Foundation from 1982 to 1987, where he was responsible for programs relating to US foreign policy. He is also a member of the board (emeritus) of Human Rights Watch in New York and the chairman of the Advisory Committee of Human Rights Watch/Middle East.
l John Tirman
Executive Director & Principal Research Scientist, Center for International Studies, MIT. Tirman is the author or co-author and editor of ten books on international affairs and US foreign policy, including "Terror, Insurgency, and States" (2007), "The Maze of Fear: Security & Migration After 9/1" (2004) and "By the Crusader's Sword: The Human Toll of American Wars" (forthcoming). His articles on Iran have appeared in a wide variety of periodicals, including the Boston Globe, Strategic Insights, and AlterNet, as well as reports published by MIT. He has organized projects on Iran, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf at the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and MIT, as well as a major historical research effort on the history of the US-Iran relationship in partnership with the National Security Archive and Brown University's Watson Institute.
l James Walsh
Research Associate, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Walsh's research and writings focus on international security, and in particular, topics involving weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. He has testified before the United States Senate on the issue of nuclear terrorism as well as on Iran's nuclear program. He has also chaired the Harvard University International Working Group on Radiological Terrorism. Among his current projects are two series of dialogues on nuclear issues, one with representatives from North Korea and one with leading figures in Iran. He has appeared frequently in the media as an expert on weapons of mass destruction and terrorism issues, including more than 300 appearances on CNN. His most recent publications include a chapter on Iran's nuclear program in "Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation: Strategies for Overlapping Dangers" and a chapter on nuclear weapons in "A Muslim-Christian Study and Action Guide to the Nuclear Weapons Danger." He has also published "Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation" for the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by Hans Blix (2006).
Wednesday, November 12, 2008
Obama's Iranian Opening--William O. Beeman (New America Media)
http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=88a1d22a728c890da5ad472365553a50
Obama’s Iranian Opening
New America Media, News Analysis, William O. Beeman, Posted: Nov 12, 2008
Editor’s note: Diplomacy between the United States and Iran has been at a standstill. President-elect Barack Obama has a great opportunity to end the cold war between the two nations. NAM contributing writer William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota.
President-elect Barack Obama has a serious opening to improving relations with Iran, if he knows how to exercise it. Unfortunately, his transition advisory team is weak on Middle East affairs, and almost non-existent on Iran. This leaves the president-elect prey to the same forces that have tried to sabotage progress on rapprochement with Iran during the Bush administration.
Paradoxically the Bush administration in its last days is flirting with a thaw on Iranian relations. They have been giving serious consideration to establishing a real United States Interests Section in Tehran. Iranians have had an Interests Section in Washington for decades. By contrast, the Swiss Embassy has represented U.S. interests with Swiss personnel.
The difficulty facing Obama is that U.S.-Iranian relations have fallen into the general question of Israel’s difficulty with the Palestinian community. This line has been promulgated by Israel, and also by American lobbyists for Israel, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Any move toward rapprochement with Iran is now seen as anti-Israel. In his appearance before AIPAC during the campaign, President-elect Obama vowed to protect Israel, putting him at odds with an earlier pledge to talk to Iran “without preconditions.”
In fact, Iran poses no danger to Israel, a fact acknowledged by outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, as well as Kadima Party leader and Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who said as much in private talks reported by the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz in October 2007.
Obama’s successful election has created an unprecedented positive climate in Iran toward the United States. This is based not only on the substantive hope for change, but also on the person of Barack Hussein Obama. Symbolism matters. President-elect Obama’s middle name, which was used to induce suspicion among the American public by Republicans during the presidential campaign, is pure gold in Iran. Imam Hussein, the grandson of the prophet Mohammad, is the central religious figure in Shi’ism. His martyrdom in the 7th Century is the centerpiece in religious observance in Iran. Moreover, there are prophetic rumors flying in Iran of a new “dark” leader coming from the West to bring reform and salvation.
Merely talking to Iran would not pose a problem. Iran’s detractors, however, object strenuously to going to the conference table without making Iran pay a price up front.
It is important to clarify what the portmanteau concept "without preconditions" really refers to. Every time the Bush administration has professed its willingness to talk to Iran, it has made it a precondition that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program. Iran did this unilaterally in 2003, and – guess what – the Bush administration still wouldn't talk to them, having utterly rebuffed the famous proposal sent to them via the Swiss embassy.
The call for Iranian suspension of uranium enrichment was clearly stated in Security Council Resolution 1696 not as an end in itself, but as a confidence-building measure to assure Iran's non-violation of Article IV of the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), while asserting Iran's "inalienable right" (NPT preamble) to peaceful nuclear development, including uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes. Because there has never been any proof of an Iranian nuclear arms program, and the U.S. NIE report of 2007 asserted that Iran had no nuclear arms program, the resolution is effectively moot. Moreover it is not "international law" as the Bush administration has asserted. For this reason the precondition that Iran cease uranium enrichment before the United States would talk to it is anathema to Iran. It is tantamount to de facto deprivation of what Iranians see as their inalienable right under the NPT.
If the Obama administration would drop this sole precondition—there has never been any other— Iran's nuclear program could still be on the table for discussion, and Iran-U.S. relations would move forward.
William O. Beeman is president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association, and has conducted research in Iran for more than 30 years. The second edition of his book, "The 'Great Satan' vs. the 'Mad Mullahs': How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other," has been published by the University of Chicago Press.
--
Obama’s Iranian Opening
New America Media, News Analysis, William O. Beeman, Posted: Nov 12, 2008
Editor’s note: Diplomacy between the United States and Iran has been at a standstill. President-elect Barack Obama has a great opportunity to end the cold war between the two nations. NAM contributing writer William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota.
President-elect Barack Obama has a serious opening to improving relations with Iran, if he knows how to exercise it. Unfortunately, his transition advisory team is weak on Middle East affairs, and almost non-existent on Iran. This leaves the president-elect prey to the same forces that have tried to sabotage progress on rapprochement with Iran during the Bush administration.
Paradoxically the Bush administration in its last days is flirting with a thaw on Iranian relations. They have been giving serious consideration to establishing a real United States Interests Section in Tehran. Iranians have had an Interests Section in Washington for decades. By contrast, the Swiss Embassy has represented U.S. interests with Swiss personnel.
The difficulty facing Obama is that U.S.-Iranian relations have fallen into the general question of Israel’s difficulty with the Palestinian community. This line has been promulgated by Israel, and also by American lobbyists for Israel, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Any move toward rapprochement with Iran is now seen as anti-Israel. In his appearance before AIPAC during the campaign, President-elect Obama vowed to protect Israel, putting him at odds with an earlier pledge to talk to Iran “without preconditions.”
In fact, Iran poses no danger to Israel, a fact acknowledged by outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, as well as Kadima Party leader and Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who said as much in private talks reported by the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz in October 2007.
Obama’s successful election has created an unprecedented positive climate in Iran toward the United States. This is based not only on the substantive hope for change, but also on the person of Barack Hussein Obama. Symbolism matters. President-elect Obama’s middle name, which was used to induce suspicion among the American public by Republicans during the presidential campaign, is pure gold in Iran. Imam Hussein, the grandson of the prophet Mohammad, is the central religious figure in Shi’ism. His martyrdom in the 7th Century is the centerpiece in religious observance in Iran. Moreover, there are prophetic rumors flying in Iran of a new “dark” leader coming from the West to bring reform and salvation.
Merely talking to Iran would not pose a problem. Iran’s detractors, however, object strenuously to going to the conference table without making Iran pay a price up front.
It is important to clarify what the portmanteau concept "without preconditions" really refers to. Every time the Bush administration has professed its willingness to talk to Iran, it has made it a precondition that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program. Iran did this unilaterally in 2003, and – guess what – the Bush administration still wouldn't talk to them, having utterly rebuffed the famous proposal sent to them via the Swiss embassy.
The call for Iranian suspension of uranium enrichment was clearly stated in Security Council Resolution 1696 not as an end in itself, but as a confidence-building measure to assure Iran's non-violation of Article IV of the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), while asserting Iran's "inalienable right" (NPT preamble) to peaceful nuclear development, including uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes. Because there has never been any proof of an Iranian nuclear arms program, and the U.S. NIE report of 2007 asserted that Iran had no nuclear arms program, the resolution is effectively moot. Moreover it is not "international law" as the Bush administration has asserted. For this reason the precondition that Iran cease uranium enrichment before the United States would talk to it is anathema to Iran. It is tantamount to de facto deprivation of what Iranians see as their inalienable right under the NPT.
If the Obama administration would drop this sole precondition—there has never been any other— Iran's nuclear program could still be on the table for discussion, and Iran-U.S. relations would move forward.
William O. Beeman is president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association, and has conducted research in Iran for more than 30 years. The second edition of his book, "The 'Great Satan' vs. the 'Mad Mullahs': How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other," has been published by the University of Chicago Press.
--
Monday, November 10, 2008
Brown Daily Herald: Brown, Military's Research Connections Up for Debate: Broad Range of Faculty Stances
Brown, military's research connections up for debate
Broad range of faculty stances
Alex Roehrkasse
Issue date: 11/10/08 Section: Campus News
A Human Terrain System soldier conducting interviews in Afghanistan. Brown professors have both participated in and criticized the program.
Media Credit: File Photo
A Human Terrain System soldier conducting interviews in Afghanistan. Brown professors have both participated in and criticized the program.
The question of the military's support for university research has been a sticking point in ethical discourse among academics at least since World War II. Then, researchers in the physical sciences engaged in intense debates over the ethical implications of their work in developing the atomic bomb.
Now, with the recent inception of a handful of new military programs for research funding and the growth of available military research money despite dwindling financial awards from other government agencies, the debate has once again flared up. As both participants in and critics of military-supported research programs, some Brown faculty have placed themselves at the center of this debate.
On the one hand, Professor of Anthropology Catherine Lutz has been an outspoken opponent of the military's efforts to draw from university expertise, having published extensively on the subject. On the other hand, former Watson Institute fellow Michael Bhatia '99, who was killed this May while participating in a military research program in Afghanistan, was a strong supporter of such efforts. Another perspective on the merits and pitfalls of such collaboration is held by Brown researchers in the physical sciences, who have been less present in public debates on the ethics of military work but have received approximately $8.6 million - six percent of Brown's research budget - in fiscal year 2008 from the Department of Defense, according to University records.
An anthropological quandary
The most noticeable upsurge in the discourse on the ethics of collaboration with the military has been among anthropologists. With two ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military has been exploring new ways to bring ethnographers into the fold of security research and operations.
As early as 2003, the Department of Defense began hiring anthropologists to find ways to ameliorate U.S. troops' unfamiliarity with Iraqi culture and society. With a substantial monetary infusion into the program in 2007, the Human Terrain System began to reach out more broadly to American academics willing to be embedded with combat troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Through the program, participating scholars who do research in these places have the opportunity to conduct their work with the protection of U.S. security forces. In exchange, these specialists help soldiers navigate unfamiliar and uncertain terrain, serving as linguistic and cultural liaisons.
"The use of social science is necessary to and legitimate in military operations," the program's Web site states.
The Human Terrain System program sparked an intense and ongoing debate within the anthropological discipline. Many anthropologists took issue with the dangers of sharing their specialized knowledge with an organization that could endanger the people they study.
"Anthropologists are in an absolutely unique position," said William Beeman, adjunct professor of anthropology. "We're the people who really know the situation on the ground. We know the languages. We know the culture. So you really walk a fine line deciding to what degree you're going to advise people."
Beeman said he has done extensive consulting with the Department of Defense and other government agencies, and called the idea that social science researchers can and should abstain completely from military work both "unreasonable" and "unethical."
Last year, the American Anthropological Association denounced the program on the grounds that researchers could not obtain informed consent from their subjects in a combat environment and could endanger them by providing information to the military. The association also formed a commission to reevaluate the ethics of anthropologists' engagement with the military and intelligence communities.
"We do not recommend non-engagement, but instead emphasize differences in kinds of engagement and accompanying ethical considerations," the commission said in its November 2007 report.
In September, the association approved amendments to its code of ethics.
"In relation with his or her own government, host governments, or sponsors of research, an anthropologist should be honest and candid. Anthropologists must not compromise their professional responsibilities and ethics and should not agree to conditions which inappropriately change the purpose, focus or intended outcomes of their research," the revision stated.
Brown faculty enter the debate
At Brown, debates about the Human Terrain System took a more solemn turn after Bhatia's death in May. Bhatia was a graduate student at Oxford in the department of politics and international relations. He had been preparing a dissertation on combatant motives of the Mujahideen, a militant group in Afghanistan.
"The program has a real chance of reducing both the Afghan and American lives lost, as well as ensuring that the US/NATO/(International Security Assistance Force) strategy becomes better attuned to the population's concerns, views, criticisms and interests and better supports the Government of Afghanistan," Bhatia wrote about the Human Terrain System in November 2007.
The American Anthropological Association is now undertaking a much more sweeping revision to its ethics guidelines to be concluded in late 2010. Those revisions will have to tackle not only the question of the Human Terrain System program, but also a host of other issues revolving around the rising amount of proprietary research being conducted by anthropologists, Beeman said. Beeman participated in the last major revision to the anthropological association's code of ethics in the late nineties.
Beeman, a Middle East expert who has briefed both military personnel and policy makers, recalled being contacted by Army representatives for consultation before the invasion of Iraq. He said he told them the United States shouldn't do it.
"They say 'Well, that doesn't help us much because we're about to.' Then you say 'All right, look. I'll come and talk to you and I'll tell you why you shouldn't do it.' I can't refuse those sorts of invitations because it wouldn't be ethical," Beeman recounted. "We can't pass up those opportunities if we're serious academics."
The newest military program to draw on the expertise of social scientists in academia is the Minerva Initiative, a $50 million program announced by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in April. The initiative aims to channel military funds toward research on issues such as terrorist organization and ideologies, Chinese military technology and the strategic impact of cultural and religious change in the Islamic world. The first round of grants is expected to be announced this year.
"This is the first significant effort in 30 or 40 years to engage social sciences on a large scale by the Department of Defense," said Thomas Mahnken, a deputy assistant defense secretary for policy planning, according to a Washington Post article published Aug. 3.
"There was an effort during (the Vietnam era) that ended up being ill-conceived and burned bridges on both sides, and, unfortunately, these attitudes have persisted," Mahnken told the Post. "This effort is about rebuilding those bridges."
Like the Human Terrain System, the Minerva Initiative - named after the virgin Roman goddess of both wisdom and warriors - has sparked a new wave of controversy within the anthropological discipline.
In a guest editorial titled "Selling Ourselves?" featured in the most recent edition of the journal Anthropology Today, Professor of Anthropology Catherine Lutz argued that the program will distract the research of anthropologists, who should avoid military funding.
"(The Minerva Initiative) represents an important attempt to garner ideological acceptance among anthropologists for doing military research," Lutz wrote in the editorial. "This money could shape and distort our field in significant ways, as has happened with other disciplines that have been the recipients of Pentagon largesse."
The journal edition that featured the editorial was devoted to a discussion of a number of different ways in which anthropologists and the military have recently come into contact and often collaboration.
"The military as a funding source often portrays itself as an un-self-interested or a national interest centered organization, but in fact has institutional interests in getting certain kinds of research results," Lutz said.
Less concern in physical sciences
In contrast to anthropologists' sharp sensitivity to the ethical quandaries of military collaboration, researchers in other disciplines do not seem to have the same degree of concern. Beemen said that political scientists have a long tradition of collaborating in intelligence and security efforts. He added that political scientists frequently contest anthropologists' objections to such work - and even question their patriotism.
In the physical sciences, academics also seem to be more comfortable doing research with the military. This may be due to the generally detached and often exclusively financial relationship that most science researchers have with military agencies, as most military grants to universities are for elementary research that may or may not underpin future developments in military laboratories or in the private sector. On the other hand, it could be the result of the Department of Defense's strong - in certain fields almost ubiquitous - presence as a source of significant and reliable funding.
"The most successful groups in my area have military funding," said Pascal Van Hentenryck, a professor of computer science whose research focuses on optimization - a field he said the military had been funding for at least 60 years - which includes designing emergency response systems. He and other science researchers and administrators interviewed by The Herald all echoed the idea that at least in some fields, the military was a necessary source of funding for scientific research.
Public debates on the ethics of research in Van Hentenryck's field are not common, he said. But Van Hentenryck recalled ethical debates in computer science from his days as a graduate student, when he and his colleagues contemplated among themselves whether or not cooperative decisions to refrain from developing missile systems would halt their development.
Van Hentenryck said that his graduate students frequently raise the same questions, and that a responsive instructor should answer them.
He also stressed the fact that his research, like that of most other scientists, is useful in myriad fields, not just military matters, and that university researchers usually have little idea about how their ideas are eventually put into practice.
Vice President for Research Clyde Briant said that there is no ethical discourse about the sources of research funding at the university level, and that such debates would be personal ones among professors.
He said that professors at Brown tend to exhibit a high demand for knowledge about military funding opportunities, especially as other federal funding resources dry up.
Brown's principal criteria for accepting research funding are that research can be neither proprietary - there can be no restrictions on publication rights - nor classified, according to Briant.
Director of Government Affairs and Community Relations Tim Leshan lobbies on behalf of Brown with the Department of Defense to ensure that policy makers in Washington know about the University's research capabilities and that Brown professors are aware of the military funding available to them.
"While funding at the (National Institutes of Health) and the (National Science Foundation) has not kept up with inflation in the last five years," Leshan said, "Department of Defense research funding has grown."
Broad range of faculty stances
Alex Roehrkasse
Issue date: 11/10/08 Section: Campus News
A Human Terrain System soldier conducting interviews in Afghanistan. Brown professors have both participated in and criticized the program.
Media Credit: File Photo
A Human Terrain System soldier conducting interviews in Afghanistan. Brown professors have both participated in and criticized the program.
The question of the military's support for university research has been a sticking point in ethical discourse among academics at least since World War II. Then, researchers in the physical sciences engaged in intense debates over the ethical implications of their work in developing the atomic bomb.
Now, with the recent inception of a handful of new military programs for research funding and the growth of available military research money despite dwindling financial awards from other government agencies, the debate has once again flared up. As both participants in and critics of military-supported research programs, some Brown faculty have placed themselves at the center of this debate.
On the one hand, Professor of Anthropology Catherine Lutz has been an outspoken opponent of the military's efforts to draw from university expertise, having published extensively on the subject. On the other hand, former Watson Institute fellow Michael Bhatia '99, who was killed this May while participating in a military research program in Afghanistan, was a strong supporter of such efforts. Another perspective on the merits and pitfalls of such collaboration is held by Brown researchers in the physical sciences, who have been less present in public debates on the ethics of military work but have received approximately $8.6 million - six percent of Brown's research budget - in fiscal year 2008 from the Department of Defense, according to University records.
An anthropological quandary
The most noticeable upsurge in the discourse on the ethics of collaboration with the military has been among anthropologists. With two ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military has been exploring new ways to bring ethnographers into the fold of security research and operations.
As early as 2003, the Department of Defense began hiring anthropologists to find ways to ameliorate U.S. troops' unfamiliarity with Iraqi culture and society. With a substantial monetary infusion into the program in 2007, the Human Terrain System began to reach out more broadly to American academics willing to be embedded with combat troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Through the program, participating scholars who do research in these places have the opportunity to conduct their work with the protection of U.S. security forces. In exchange, these specialists help soldiers navigate unfamiliar and uncertain terrain, serving as linguistic and cultural liaisons.
"The use of social science is necessary to and legitimate in military operations," the program's Web site states.
The Human Terrain System program sparked an intense and ongoing debate within the anthropological discipline. Many anthropologists took issue with the dangers of sharing their specialized knowledge with an organization that could endanger the people they study.
"Anthropologists are in an absolutely unique position," said William Beeman, adjunct professor of anthropology. "We're the people who really know the situation on the ground. We know the languages. We know the culture. So you really walk a fine line deciding to what degree you're going to advise people."
Beeman said he has done extensive consulting with the Department of Defense and other government agencies, and called the idea that social science researchers can and should abstain completely from military work both "unreasonable" and "unethical."
Last year, the American Anthropological Association denounced the program on the grounds that researchers could not obtain informed consent from their subjects in a combat environment and could endanger them by providing information to the military. The association also formed a commission to reevaluate the ethics of anthropologists' engagement with the military and intelligence communities.
"We do not recommend non-engagement, but instead emphasize differences in kinds of engagement and accompanying ethical considerations," the commission said in its November 2007 report.
In September, the association approved amendments to its code of ethics.
"In relation with his or her own government, host governments, or sponsors of research, an anthropologist should be honest and candid. Anthropologists must not compromise their professional responsibilities and ethics and should not agree to conditions which inappropriately change the purpose, focus or intended outcomes of their research," the revision stated.
Brown faculty enter the debate
At Brown, debates about the Human Terrain System took a more solemn turn after Bhatia's death in May. Bhatia was a graduate student at Oxford in the department of politics and international relations. He had been preparing a dissertation on combatant motives of the Mujahideen, a militant group in Afghanistan.
"The program has a real chance of reducing both the Afghan and American lives lost, as well as ensuring that the US/NATO/(International Security Assistance Force) strategy becomes better attuned to the population's concerns, views, criticisms and interests and better supports the Government of Afghanistan," Bhatia wrote about the Human Terrain System in November 2007.
The American Anthropological Association is now undertaking a much more sweeping revision to its ethics guidelines to be concluded in late 2010. Those revisions will have to tackle not only the question of the Human Terrain System program, but also a host of other issues revolving around the rising amount of proprietary research being conducted by anthropologists, Beeman said. Beeman participated in the last major revision to the anthropological association's code of ethics in the late nineties.
Beeman, a Middle East expert who has briefed both military personnel and policy makers, recalled being contacted by Army representatives for consultation before the invasion of Iraq. He said he told them the United States shouldn't do it.
"They say 'Well, that doesn't help us much because we're about to.' Then you say 'All right, look. I'll come and talk to you and I'll tell you why you shouldn't do it.' I can't refuse those sorts of invitations because it wouldn't be ethical," Beeman recounted. "We can't pass up those opportunities if we're serious academics."
The newest military program to draw on the expertise of social scientists in academia is the Minerva Initiative, a $50 million program announced by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in April. The initiative aims to channel military funds toward research on issues such as terrorist organization and ideologies, Chinese military technology and the strategic impact of cultural and religious change in the Islamic world. The first round of grants is expected to be announced this year.
"This is the first significant effort in 30 or 40 years to engage social sciences on a large scale by the Department of Defense," said Thomas Mahnken, a deputy assistant defense secretary for policy planning, according to a Washington Post article published Aug. 3.
"There was an effort during (the Vietnam era) that ended up being ill-conceived and burned bridges on both sides, and, unfortunately, these attitudes have persisted," Mahnken told the Post. "This effort is about rebuilding those bridges."
Like the Human Terrain System, the Minerva Initiative - named after the virgin Roman goddess of both wisdom and warriors - has sparked a new wave of controversy within the anthropological discipline.
In a guest editorial titled "Selling Ourselves?" featured in the most recent edition of the journal Anthropology Today, Professor of Anthropology Catherine Lutz argued that the program will distract the research of anthropologists, who should avoid military funding.
"(The Minerva Initiative) represents an important attempt to garner ideological acceptance among anthropologists for doing military research," Lutz wrote in the editorial. "This money could shape and distort our field in significant ways, as has happened with other disciplines that have been the recipients of Pentagon largesse."
The journal edition that featured the editorial was devoted to a discussion of a number of different ways in which anthropologists and the military have recently come into contact and often collaboration.
"The military as a funding source often portrays itself as an un-self-interested or a national interest centered organization, but in fact has institutional interests in getting certain kinds of research results," Lutz said.
Less concern in physical sciences
In contrast to anthropologists' sharp sensitivity to the ethical quandaries of military collaboration, researchers in other disciplines do not seem to have the same degree of concern. Beemen said that political scientists have a long tradition of collaborating in intelligence and security efforts. He added that political scientists frequently contest anthropologists' objections to such work - and even question their patriotism.
In the physical sciences, academics also seem to be more comfortable doing research with the military. This may be due to the generally detached and often exclusively financial relationship that most science researchers have with military agencies, as most military grants to universities are for elementary research that may or may not underpin future developments in military laboratories or in the private sector. On the other hand, it could be the result of the Department of Defense's strong - in certain fields almost ubiquitous - presence as a source of significant and reliable funding.
"The most successful groups in my area have military funding," said Pascal Van Hentenryck, a professor of computer science whose research focuses on optimization - a field he said the military had been funding for at least 60 years - which includes designing emergency response systems. He and other science researchers and administrators interviewed by The Herald all echoed the idea that at least in some fields, the military was a necessary source of funding for scientific research.
Public debates on the ethics of research in Van Hentenryck's field are not common, he said. But Van Hentenryck recalled ethical debates in computer science from his days as a graduate student, when he and his colleagues contemplated among themselves whether or not cooperative decisions to refrain from developing missile systems would halt their development.
Van Hentenryck said that his graduate students frequently raise the same questions, and that a responsive instructor should answer them.
He also stressed the fact that his research, like that of most other scientists, is useful in myriad fields, not just military matters, and that university researchers usually have little idea about how their ideas are eventually put into practice.
Vice President for Research Clyde Briant said that there is no ethical discourse about the sources of research funding at the university level, and that such debates would be personal ones among professors.
He said that professors at Brown tend to exhibit a high demand for knowledge about military funding opportunities, especially as other federal funding resources dry up.
Brown's principal criteria for accepting research funding are that research can be neither proprietary - there can be no restrictions on publication rights - nor classified, according to Briant.
Director of Government Affairs and Community Relations Tim Leshan lobbies on behalf of Brown with the Department of Defense to ensure that policy makers in Washington know about the University's research capabilities and that Brown professors are aware of the military funding available to them.
"While funding at the (National Institutes of Health) and the (National Science Foundation) has not kept up with inflation in the last five years," Leshan said, "Department of Defense research funding has grown."
Tuesday, October 07, 2008
Former Officials Say Iran Helped on Al-Qaeda (AP)
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20081007/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_iran;_ylt=AiiymPbtqjCtDDCupADcFJ4LewgF#
Former officials say Iran helped on al-Qaida
By BARRY SCHWEID, AP Diplomatic Writer
Tuesday 7 October 2008, 6:23 PM ET
Commentary by William O. Beeman:
One of the ways that the Bush administration has tried to make a case for attacking Iran is to identify it as "the chief state sponsor of terrorism." As part of this campaign, the Bush administration has tried ruthlessly to tie Iran to the tragedy of September 11, 2001. One way is to claim that Iran is supporting Al-Qaeda. This makes no sense, since Al-Qaeda is dominated by extremist Salafi Muslims who, in their most severe pronouncements call for the killing of Shi'a Muslims as blasphemers. This article shows that the Bush accusations about the connections to Al-Qaeda are lies. Barry Schweid is a veteran AP reporter with impeccable credentials.
In an effort to help the United States counter al-Qaida after the 9/11 attack, Iran rounded up hundreds of Arabs who had crossed the border from Afghanistan, expelled many of them and made copies of nearly 300 of their passports, a former Bush administration official said Tuesday.
The copies were sent to Kofi Annan, the U.N. secretary-general, who passed them on to the United States, while U.S. interrogators were given a chance by Iran to question some of the detainees, Hillary Mann Leverett said in an Associated Press interview.
Leverett, who said she negotiated with Iran for the Bush administration in the 2001-3 period, said Iran sought a broader relationship with the United States. "They thought they had been helpful on al-Qaida, and they were," she said.
For one thing, she said, suspected al-Qaida operatives were not given sanctuary in Iran.
Some administration officials took the view, however, that Iran had not acknowledged all likely al-Qaida members nor provided access to them, Leverett said.
Many of the expelled Arabs were deported to Saudi Arabia and to other Arab and Muslim countries, even though Iran had poor relations with the Saudi monarchy and some other countries in the region, Leverett said.
James F. Dobbins, the Bush administration's chief negotiator on Afghanistan in late 2001, said that Iran was "comprehensively helpful" in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack in working to overthrow the Taliban and collaborating with the United States in installing the Karzai government in Kabul.
Iranian diplomats made clear at the time they were looking for broader cooperation with the United States, but the Bush administration was not interested, the author of "After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan," said in a separate interview.
The Bush administration has acknowledged contacts with Iran over the years even while denouncing Iran as part of an "axis of evil" and declining to consider a resumption of diplomatic relations.
"It isn't something that is talked about," Leverett said in describing Iran's role during a forum at the New America Foundation, a nonpartisan policy institute.
Leverett and her husband, Flynt Leverett, a former career CIA analyst and a former National Security Council official, jointly proposed the next U.S. president seek a "grand bargain" with Iran to settle all major outstanding differences.
"The next president needs to reorient U.S. policy toward Iran as fundamentally as President Nixon did with China in the 1970s," Flynt Leverett said.
Among the provisions: The United States would clarify that it is not seeking change in the nature of the Iranian regime but rather in its policies, while Iran would agree to "certain limits" on its nuclear program.
Iran considers most of its neighbors as enemies. Among its incentives for improving U.S. relations is that they feel that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia would be less provocative, the Leveretts said.
Former officials say Iran helped on al-Qaida
By BARRY SCHWEID, AP Diplomatic Writer
Tuesday 7 October 2008, 6:23 PM ET
Commentary by William O. Beeman:
One of the ways that the Bush administration has tried to make a case for attacking Iran is to identify it as "the chief state sponsor of terrorism." As part of this campaign, the Bush administration has tried ruthlessly to tie Iran to the tragedy of September 11, 2001. One way is to claim that Iran is supporting Al-Qaeda. This makes no sense, since Al-Qaeda is dominated by extremist Salafi Muslims who, in their most severe pronouncements call for the killing of Shi'a Muslims as blasphemers. This article shows that the Bush accusations about the connections to Al-Qaeda are lies. Barry Schweid is a veteran AP reporter with impeccable credentials.
In an effort to help the United States counter al-Qaida after the 9/11 attack, Iran rounded up hundreds of Arabs who had crossed the border from Afghanistan, expelled many of them and made copies of nearly 300 of their passports, a former Bush administration official said Tuesday.
The copies were sent to Kofi Annan, the U.N. secretary-general, who passed them on to the United States, while U.S. interrogators were given a chance by Iran to question some of the detainees, Hillary Mann Leverett said in an Associated Press interview.
Leverett, who said she negotiated with Iran for the Bush administration in the 2001-3 period, said Iran sought a broader relationship with the United States. "They thought they had been helpful on al-Qaida, and they were," she said.
For one thing, she said, suspected al-Qaida operatives were not given sanctuary in Iran.
Some administration officials took the view, however, that Iran had not acknowledged all likely al-Qaida members nor provided access to them, Leverett said.
Many of the expelled Arabs were deported to Saudi Arabia and to other Arab and Muslim countries, even though Iran had poor relations with the Saudi monarchy and some other countries in the region, Leverett said.
James F. Dobbins, the Bush administration's chief negotiator on Afghanistan in late 2001, said that Iran was "comprehensively helpful" in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack in working to overthrow the Taliban and collaborating with the United States in installing the Karzai government in Kabul.
Iranian diplomats made clear at the time they were looking for broader cooperation with the United States, but the Bush administration was not interested, the author of "After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan," said in a separate interview.
The Bush administration has acknowledged contacts with Iran over the years even while denouncing Iran as part of an "axis of evil" and declining to consider a resumption of diplomatic relations.
"It isn't something that is talked about," Leverett said in describing Iran's role during a forum at the New America Foundation, a nonpartisan policy institute.
Leverett and her husband, Flynt Leverett, a former career CIA analyst and a former National Security Council official, jointly proposed the next U.S. president seek a "grand bargain" with Iran to settle all major outstanding differences.
"The next president needs to reorient U.S. policy toward Iran as fundamentally as President Nixon did with China in the 1970s," Flynt Leverett said.
Among the provisions: The United States would clarify that it is not seeking change in the nature of the Iranian regime but rather in its policies, while Iran would agree to "certain limits" on its nuclear program.
Iran considers most of its neighbors as enemies. Among its incentives for improving U.S. relations is that they feel that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia would be less provocative, the Leveretts said.
Sunday, September 28, 2008
Tim Wise--This is your nation on White Privilege
This is Your Nation on White Privilege
Sep 13, 2008
By Tim Wise
Tim Wise's ZSpace Page / Zspace.
Commentary by William O. Beeman: The United States has made considerable progress in recent decades to combat racism, but latent racism is still rampant. (From his biography on his website): Author Tim Wise is the Director of the newly-formed Association for White Anti-Racist Education (AWARE) in Nashville, Tennessee. He lectures across the country about the need to combat institutional racism, gender bias, and the growing gap between rich and poor in the U.S. Wise has been called a "leftist extremist" by David Duke, "deceptively Aryan-looking" by a member of the Ku Klux Klan, and "the Uncle Tom of the white race," by right-wing author, Dinesh D` Souza. Whatever else can be said about him, his ability to make the right kind of enemies seems unquestioned.
For those who still can't grasp the concept of white privilege, or who are constantly looking for some easy-to-understand examples of it, perhaps this list will help.
White privilege is when you can get pregnant at seventeen like Bristol Palin and everyone is quick to insist that your life and that of your family is a personal matter, and that no one has a right to judge you or your parents, because "every family has challenges," even as black and Latino families with similar "challenges" are regularly typified as irresponsible, pathological and arbiters of social decay.
White privilege is when you can call yourself a "fuckin' redneck," like Bristol Palin's boyfriend does, and talk about how if anyone messes with you, you'll "kick their fuckin' ass," and talk about how you like to "shoot shit" for fun, and still be viewed as a responsible, all-American boy (and a great son-in-law to be) rather than a thug.
White privilege is when you can attend four different colleges in six years like Sarah Palin did (one of which you basically failed out of, then returned to after making up some coursework at a community college), and no one questions your intelligence or commitment to achievement, whereas a person of color who did this would be viewed as unfit for college, and probably someone who only got in in the first place because of affirmative action.
White privilege is when you can claim that being mayor of a town smaller than most medium-sized colleges, and then Governor of a state with about the same number of people as the lower fifth of the island of Manhattan, makes you ready to potentially be president, and people don't all piss on themselves with laughter, while being a black U.S.Senator, two-term state Senator, and constitutional law scholar, means you're "untested."
White privilege is being able to say that you support the words "under God" in the pledge of allegiance because "if it was good enough for the founding fathers, it's good enough for me," and not be immediately disqualified from holding office -- since, after all, the pledge was written in the late 1800s and the "under God" part wasn't added until the 1950s -- while believing that reading accused criminals and terrorists their rights (because, ya know, the Constitution, which you used to teach at a prestigious law school requires it), is a dangerous and silly idea only supported by mushy liberals.
White privilege is being able to be a gun enthusiast and not make people immediately scared of you.
White privilege is being able to have a husband who was a member of an extremist political party that wants your state to secede from the Union, and whose motto was "Alaska first," and no one questions your patriotism or that of your family, while if you're black and your spouse merely fails to come to a 9/11 memorial so she can be home with her kids on the first day of school, people immediately think she's being disrespectful.
White privilege is being able to make fun of community organizers and the work they do -- like, among other things, fight for the right of women to vote, or for civil rights, or the 8-hour workday, or an end to child labor -- and people think you're being pithy and tough, but if you merely question the experience of a small town mayor and 18-month governor with no foreign policy expertise beyond a class she took in college -- you're somehow being mean, or even sexist.
White privilege is being able to convince white women who don't even agree with you on any substantive issue to vote for you and your running mate anyway, because all of a sudden your presence on the ticket has inspired confidence in these same white women, and made them give your party a "second look."
White privilege is being able to fire people who didn't support your political campaigns and not be accused of abusing your power or being a typical politician who engages in favoritism, while being black and merely knowing some folks from the old-line political machines in Chicago means you must be corrupt.
White privilege is being able to attend churches over the years whose pastors say that people who voted for John Kerry or merely criticize George W. Bush are going to hell, and that the U.S. is an explicitly Christian nation and the job of Christians is to bring Christian theological principles into government, and who bring in speakers who say the conflict in the Middle East is God's punishment on Jews for rejecting Jesus, and everyone can still think you're just a good church-going Christian, but if you're black and friends with a black pastor who has noted (as have Colin Powell and the U.S. Department ofDefense) that terrorist attacks are often the result of U.S. foreign policy and who talks about the history of racism and its effect on black people, you're an extremist who probably hates America.
White privilege is not knowing what the Bush Doctrine is when asked by a reporter, and then people get angry at the reporter for asking you such a "trick question," while being black and merely refusing to give one-word answers to the queries of Bill O'Reilly means you're dodging the question, or trying to seem overly intellectual and nuanced.
White privilege is being able to claim your experience as a POW has anything at all to do with your fitness for president, while being black and experiencing racism is, as Sarah Palin has referred to it a "light" burden.
And finally, white privilege is the only thing that could possibly allow someone to become president when he has voted with George W. Bush 90 percent of the time, even as unemployment is skyrocketing, people are losing their homes, inflation is rising, and the U.S. is increasingly isolated from world opinion, just because white voters aren't sure about that whole "change" thing. Ya know, it's just too vague and ill-defined, unlike, say, four more years of the same, which is very concrete and certain.
White privilege is, in short, the problem.
Tim Wise, who lives in Tennessee, is the author of "White Like Me" (Soft Skull, 2005, revised 2008), and of "Speaking Treason Fluently", publishing this month, also by Soft Skull. For review copies or interview requests, please reply to publicity@softskull.com
Sep 13, 2008
By Tim Wise
Tim Wise's ZSpace Page / Zspace.
Commentary by William O. Beeman: The United States has made considerable progress in recent decades to combat racism, but latent racism is still rampant. (From his biography on his website): Author Tim Wise is the Director of the newly-formed Association for White Anti-Racist Education (AWARE) in Nashville, Tennessee. He lectures across the country about the need to combat institutional racism, gender bias, and the growing gap between rich and poor in the U.S. Wise has been called a "leftist extremist" by David Duke, "deceptively Aryan-looking" by a member of the Ku Klux Klan, and "the Uncle Tom of the white race," by right-wing author, Dinesh D` Souza. Whatever else can be said about him, his ability to make the right kind of enemies seems unquestioned.
For those who still can't grasp the concept of white privilege, or who are constantly looking for some easy-to-understand examples of it, perhaps this list will help.
White privilege is when you can get pregnant at seventeen like Bristol Palin and everyone is quick to insist that your life and that of your family is a personal matter, and that no one has a right to judge you or your parents, because "every family has challenges," even as black and Latino families with similar "challenges" are regularly typified as irresponsible, pathological and arbiters of social decay.
White privilege is when you can call yourself a "fuckin' redneck," like Bristol Palin's boyfriend does, and talk about how if anyone messes with you, you'll "kick their fuckin' ass," and talk about how you like to "shoot shit" for fun, and still be viewed as a responsible, all-American boy (and a great son-in-law to be) rather than a thug.
White privilege is when you can attend four different colleges in six years like Sarah Palin did (one of which you basically failed out of, then returned to after making up some coursework at a community college), and no one questions your intelligence or commitment to achievement, whereas a person of color who did this would be viewed as unfit for college, and probably someone who only got in in the first place because of affirmative action.
White privilege is when you can claim that being mayor of a town smaller than most medium-sized colleges, and then Governor of a state with about the same number of people as the lower fifth of the island of Manhattan, makes you ready to potentially be president, and people don't all piss on themselves with laughter, while being a black U.S.Senator, two-term state Senator, and constitutional law scholar, means you're "untested."
White privilege is being able to say that you support the words "under God" in the pledge of allegiance because "if it was good enough for the founding fathers, it's good enough for me," and not be immediately disqualified from holding office -- since, after all, the pledge was written in the late 1800s and the "under God" part wasn't added until the 1950s -- while believing that reading accused criminals and terrorists their rights (because, ya know, the Constitution, which you used to teach at a prestigious law school requires it), is a dangerous and silly idea only supported by mushy liberals.
White privilege is being able to be a gun enthusiast and not make people immediately scared of you.
White privilege is being able to have a husband who was a member of an extremist political party that wants your state to secede from the Union, and whose motto was "Alaska first," and no one questions your patriotism or that of your family, while if you're black and your spouse merely fails to come to a 9/11 memorial so she can be home with her kids on the first day of school, people immediately think she's being disrespectful.
White privilege is being able to make fun of community organizers and the work they do -- like, among other things, fight for the right of women to vote, or for civil rights, or the 8-hour workday, or an end to child labor -- and people think you're being pithy and tough, but if you merely question the experience of a small town mayor and 18-month governor with no foreign policy expertise beyond a class she took in college -- you're somehow being mean, or even sexist.
White privilege is being able to convince white women who don't even agree with you on any substantive issue to vote for you and your running mate anyway, because all of a sudden your presence on the ticket has inspired confidence in these same white women, and made them give your party a "second look."
White privilege is being able to fire people who didn't support your political campaigns and not be accused of abusing your power or being a typical politician who engages in favoritism, while being black and merely knowing some folks from the old-line political machines in Chicago means you must be corrupt.
White privilege is being able to attend churches over the years whose pastors say that people who voted for John Kerry or merely criticize George W. Bush are going to hell, and that the U.S. is an explicitly Christian nation and the job of Christians is to bring Christian theological principles into government, and who bring in speakers who say the conflict in the Middle East is God's punishment on Jews for rejecting Jesus, and everyone can still think you're just a good church-going Christian, but if you're black and friends with a black pastor who has noted (as have Colin Powell and the U.S. Department ofDefense) that terrorist attacks are often the result of U.S. foreign policy and who talks about the history of racism and its effect on black people, you're an extremist who probably hates America.
White privilege is not knowing what the Bush Doctrine is when asked by a reporter, and then people get angry at the reporter for asking you such a "trick question," while being black and merely refusing to give one-word answers to the queries of Bill O'Reilly means you're dodging the question, or trying to seem overly intellectual and nuanced.
White privilege is being able to claim your experience as a POW has anything at all to do with your fitness for president, while being black and experiencing racism is, as Sarah Palin has referred to it a "light" burden.
And finally, white privilege is the only thing that could possibly allow someone to become president when he has voted with George W. Bush 90 percent of the time, even as unemployment is skyrocketing, people are losing their homes, inflation is rising, and the U.S. is increasingly isolated from world opinion, just because white voters aren't sure about that whole "change" thing. Ya know, it's just too vague and ill-defined, unlike, say, four more years of the same, which is very concrete and certain.
White privilege is, in short, the problem.
Tim Wise, who lives in Tennessee, is the author of "White Like Me" (Soft Skull, 2005, revised 2008), and of "Speaking Treason Fluently", publishing this month, also by Soft Skull. For review copies or interview requests, please reply to publicity@softskull.com
Friday, September 19, 2008
Iran's Conundrum
MIDDLE EAST TIMES (Cairo)
Iran's Conundrum
By CESAR CHELALA
Published: September 19, 2008
Commentary by William O. Beeman: The world is caught in distress over economics, but the danger of an armed attack on Iran continues. As Cesar Celala accurately points out, Iran poses no real danger to either the United States or Israel, but is itself under siege. Unfortunately Iran has become the universal bogeyman for American politicians in this election year--a matter that favors political extremists such as the American Israel Political Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which is relentless in its call for action against Iran. The likely new Israeli prime minister, Tzipi Livni, is more moderate than her predecessors, having last year confided in private talks that Iran was not an existential danger to Israel. In the course of the campaign for leadership of the Kadima Party, she became more hawkish in her public statements. Iranian presidential elections take place in 2009. With the leaders of the United States, Iran and Israel changing, a new day could dawn on Middle East relations, if only the world can survive the Bush/Cheney presidency.
The pressures for both the U.S. and Israel to attack Iran's nuclear facilities have received an additional impetus from two recent House and Senate resolutions. According to William O. Beeman, professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, there is tremendous danger in two almost identical resolutions in the House and Senate calling upon U.S. President George W. Bush to "immediately and dramatically increase the economic, political and diplomatic pressure on Iran to verifiably suspend its nuclear enrichment activities."
While the House resolution calls for "stringent inspection requirements," the Senate resolution calls for an embargo of refined petroleum products to Iran, which lacks the facilities to process it itself. To achieve both goals would require a naval blockade, in itself an act of war. As Professor Beeman states, days before both resolution were introduced, the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) issued a memo outlining the measures that should be taken to increase pressure on Iran in a language that mirrors both resolutions.
Russian government sources acknowledge that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has already approved the sale of the S-300 surface-to-air missile system to Iran. This only adds fuel to an already dangerous situation, since these missiles could greatly improve Iranian defenses against air strikes aimed at the country's strategically important sites, including its nuclear facilities.
One of the main alleged reasons for attacking Iran is that it threatens Israel's survival. However, neither Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad nor Iran's leadership ignore that any Iranian attack on Israel would exact not only massive retaliation from Israel itself but also from the U.S. Such a massive counterattack would provoke huge losses in human lives and it would devastate Iran's infrastructure and its weapons' facilities, a fact that Iran's leaders cannot ignore. Are we to believe that their thinking is as sinister and irresponsible as to face those risks that threaten their country's own existence?
In addition, Thomas Fingar, a top U.S. government intelligence analyst, confirmed recently that Iran's work on the "weaponization portion" of its nuclear development program was in effect suspended in 2003, as indicated by the National Intelligence Estimate of November 2007.
As aggressive as President Ahmadinejad is in his pronouncements against Israel, he is not the deciding voice in Iran. Scott Ritter, the United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq has pointed out, "Ahmadinejad does not make foreign policy decisions on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is the sole purview of the 'Supreme Leader,' the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In 2003 Khamenei initiated a diplomatic outreach to the United States inclusive of an offer to recognize Israel's right to exist. This initiative was rejected by the United States."
Ahmadinejad's irresponsible personal statements are no justification for the tremendous consequences of an attack on Iran. After all, irresponsible statements are not the unique domain of Iranians. President Bush labeling Iran part of an "axis of evil" is just one of many ugly -- and unnecessary -- characterizations of that country. Almost no week passes by without some unwarranted threat to Iran from a U.S. politician.
Recently, Republican presidential candidate John McCain, when informed that U.S. exports to Iran had grown more than tenfold during President Bush's years in office, including $158 million worth of cigarettes, commented, "Maybe that's a way of killing them." Although he was quick to add that he was joking, this is not a comment one would expect from a presidential candidate at a time of high tensions with that country.
And Barack Obama, not to be upstaged by Senator McCain, recently declared when asked about Iran's possession of nuclear weapons, "It's sufficient to say I would not take military action off the table and that I will never hesitate to use our military force in order to protect the homeland and the United States' interests."
The U.S. claim that Iran is a danger to its security and to the security of the world doesn't hold under scrutiny. The Iranian government states that it is the U.S., not them, that has acted aggressively, and point not only to the U.S. supporting Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war but to the U.S. actions to subvert democracy in their country. In 1953, the CIA engineered a coup d'etat that overthrew the government of one of Iran's greatest leaders, Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, after he nationalized Iran's oil industry. As Ghasem Ebrahimian, an Iranian filmmaker told me recently in New York, "We Iranians are tired of war. We went through a terrible, unnecessary, wearing war with Iraq and the only thing we want is to live in peace with everybody."
Iran is now a country under siege, and it is reacting as such. It is surrounded by countries with nuclear weapons: Pakistan to the east, Russia to the north, Israel to the west and the U.S. in the Persian Gulf. This is not a situation that brings them a sense of security. The Bush administration has so far refused to offer Iran the possibility of improved relations or to provide that country with the security guarantees that Iran demands.
Although the initial talks with Iran intended to make Iran halt its nuclear program have ended in a stalemate, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said relations with the U.S. could be restored in the future. Rather than persisting on an antagonistic behavior, the U.S. should start to defuse tensions with that country, at a time when the world is desperate for peace and security.
--
Dr. Cesar Chelala, a co-winner of an Overseas Press Club of America award, is the foreign correspondent for Middle East Times International (Australia.)
Iran's Conundrum
By CESAR CHELALA
Published: September 19, 2008
Commentary by William O. Beeman: The world is caught in distress over economics, but the danger of an armed attack on Iran continues. As Cesar Celala accurately points out, Iran poses no real danger to either the United States or Israel, but is itself under siege. Unfortunately Iran has become the universal bogeyman for American politicians in this election year--a matter that favors political extremists such as the American Israel Political Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which is relentless in its call for action against Iran. The likely new Israeli prime minister, Tzipi Livni, is more moderate than her predecessors, having last year confided in private talks that Iran was not an existential danger to Israel. In the course of the campaign for leadership of the Kadima Party, she became more hawkish in her public statements. Iranian presidential elections take place in 2009. With the leaders of the United States, Iran and Israel changing, a new day could dawn on Middle East relations, if only the world can survive the Bush/Cheney presidency.
The pressures for both the U.S. and Israel to attack Iran's nuclear facilities have received an additional impetus from two recent House and Senate resolutions. According to William O. Beeman, professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, there is tremendous danger in two almost identical resolutions in the House and Senate calling upon U.S. President George W. Bush to "immediately and dramatically increase the economic, political and diplomatic pressure on Iran to verifiably suspend its nuclear enrichment activities."
While the House resolution calls for "stringent inspection requirements," the Senate resolution calls for an embargo of refined petroleum products to Iran, which lacks the facilities to process it itself. To achieve both goals would require a naval blockade, in itself an act of war. As Professor Beeman states, days before both resolution were introduced, the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) issued a memo outlining the measures that should be taken to increase pressure on Iran in a language that mirrors both resolutions.
Russian government sources acknowledge that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has already approved the sale of the S-300 surface-to-air missile system to Iran. This only adds fuel to an already dangerous situation, since these missiles could greatly improve Iranian defenses against air strikes aimed at the country's strategically important sites, including its nuclear facilities.
One of the main alleged reasons for attacking Iran is that it threatens Israel's survival. However, neither Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad nor Iran's leadership ignore that any Iranian attack on Israel would exact not only massive retaliation from Israel itself but also from the U.S. Such a massive counterattack would provoke huge losses in human lives and it would devastate Iran's infrastructure and its weapons' facilities, a fact that Iran's leaders cannot ignore. Are we to believe that their thinking is as sinister and irresponsible as to face those risks that threaten their country's own existence?
In addition, Thomas Fingar, a top U.S. government intelligence analyst, confirmed recently that Iran's work on the "weaponization portion" of its nuclear development program was in effect suspended in 2003, as indicated by the National Intelligence Estimate of November 2007.
As aggressive as President Ahmadinejad is in his pronouncements against Israel, he is not the deciding voice in Iran. Scott Ritter, the United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq has pointed out, "Ahmadinejad does not make foreign policy decisions on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is the sole purview of the 'Supreme Leader,' the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In 2003 Khamenei initiated a diplomatic outreach to the United States inclusive of an offer to recognize Israel's right to exist. This initiative was rejected by the United States."
Ahmadinejad's irresponsible personal statements are no justification for the tremendous consequences of an attack on Iran. After all, irresponsible statements are not the unique domain of Iranians. President Bush labeling Iran part of an "axis of evil" is just one of many ugly -- and unnecessary -- characterizations of that country. Almost no week passes by without some unwarranted threat to Iran from a U.S. politician.
Recently, Republican presidential candidate John McCain, when informed that U.S. exports to Iran had grown more than tenfold during President Bush's years in office, including $158 million worth of cigarettes, commented, "Maybe that's a way of killing them." Although he was quick to add that he was joking, this is not a comment one would expect from a presidential candidate at a time of high tensions with that country.
And Barack Obama, not to be upstaged by Senator McCain, recently declared when asked about Iran's possession of nuclear weapons, "It's sufficient to say I would not take military action off the table and that I will never hesitate to use our military force in order to protect the homeland and the United States' interests."
The U.S. claim that Iran is a danger to its security and to the security of the world doesn't hold under scrutiny. The Iranian government states that it is the U.S., not them, that has acted aggressively, and point not only to the U.S. supporting Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war but to the U.S. actions to subvert democracy in their country. In 1953, the CIA engineered a coup d'etat that overthrew the government of one of Iran's greatest leaders, Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, after he nationalized Iran's oil industry. As Ghasem Ebrahimian, an Iranian filmmaker told me recently in New York, "We Iranians are tired of war. We went through a terrible, unnecessary, wearing war with Iraq and the only thing we want is to live in peace with everybody."
Iran is now a country under siege, and it is reacting as such. It is surrounded by countries with nuclear weapons: Pakistan to the east, Russia to the north, Israel to the west and the U.S. in the Persian Gulf. This is not a situation that brings them a sense of security. The Bush administration has so far refused to offer Iran the possibility of improved relations or to provide that country with the security guarantees that Iran demands.
Although the initial talks with Iran intended to make Iran halt its nuclear program have ended in a stalemate, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said relations with the U.S. could be restored in the future. Rather than persisting on an antagonistic behavior, the U.S. should start to defuse tensions with that country, at a time when the world is desperate for peace and security.
--
Dr. Cesar Chelala, a co-winner of an Overseas Press Club of America award, is the foreign correspondent for Middle East Times International (Australia.)
Monday, September 08, 2008
Congress is about to Pour Lighter Fluid on Iran--annotated and footnoted
Congress may Resolve America into a War with Iran
(Retitled: Congress is about to Pour Lighter Fluid on Iran)
Note: This article was published in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune on September 4, 2008. Documentation for the article was not published with the original article. I provide it here for readers who wish a more complete justification for the argument in the original article.
William O. Beeman
The U.S. Congress may inadvertently lay the foundations for war against Iran when it reconvenes in Washington in early September.
Two essentially identical non-binding resolutions, House Concurrent Resolution 362 and Senate Resolution 580 call upon President Bush to “immediately and dramatically increase the economic, political and diplomatic pressure on Iran to verifiably suspend its nuclear enrichment activities.”
The House Resolution has more than 200 co-sponsors, including Minnesota Representatives Bachman, Kline and Ramstad. The Senate Resolution has more than 30 co-sponsors, including both Minnesota Senators Coleman and Klobuchar.
The methods for increased pressure differ slightly in the two resolutions. The House Resolution calls for “stringent inspection requirements” of all goods entering or leaving Iran. The Senate Resolution does not call for the inspection of all goods, but joins the House resolution in calling for an embargo of refined petroleum products to Iran, which lacks the refining capacity to meet its need for gasoline. Achieving either goal would require a naval blockade—a de-facto act of war on the part of the United States, though paradoxically both resolutions explicitly exclude authorization for military action.
Other provisions call for an economic embargo of banking operations, with the House resolution adding a prohibition of international movement on the part of Iranian officials.
Both resolutions have begun to cause alarm throughout the United States, and have caused several Representatives to withdraw their co-sponsorship of the bill. Representative Robert Wexler (D-FL) summed up the concerns in an article for the Huffington Post, “It is clear that despite carefully worded language in H. Con. Res. 362 that ‘nothing in this resolution should be construed as an authorization of the use of force against Iran’ that many Americans across the country continue to express real concerns that sections of this resolution will be interpreted by President Bush as ‘a green light’ to use force against Iran.
Representative Barney Frank (D-MA), according to the Jewish Daily Forward offered a representative from the antiwar group Peace Action on July 5 an apology: “I regret the fact that I did not read this resolution more carefully.” He further told The Valley Advocate (Northampton, MA): ’ "I'm all for stricter sanctions against Iran, but the blockade part goes too far. I'm going to call the sponsors and tell them I'm changing my vote."
Both Wexler and Frank are are assuming some risk, because they are opposing the powerful American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which had a strong hand in the drafting of both resolutions. Just days before the resolutions were introduced in the House and the Senate AIPAC issued a memo outlining what should be done to put more pressure on Iran. The language of the memo mirrors the language of the resolutions . The introduction of the resolutions also conveniently coincided with AIPAC’s Annual Policy conference during which they had more than 7,000 people on the hill to lobby. Their top legislative priority was for co-sponsorship of the resolutions. AIPAC is careful to avoid direct calls for military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, but makes no secret that it would support such an action by the United States or Israel.
The most unfortunate aspect of the two resolutions is that they contain numerous outright falsehoods, misinformation and alarmist exaggeration about Iran and its nuclear development program. Of the 23 clauses in the Senate Resolution, only five present incontrovertible statements of fact . The many legislators who have signed on as co-sponsors, having subscribed to this false information, could be attacked by the Bush administration if they oppose a later request for military attack, as happened in the Iraq invasion.
Sadly, these resolutions make it clear that the battle to stop a war with Iran is not over.
William O. Beeman is Professor and Chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, and is President of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Assocation. He has lived and worked in the Middle East for more than 30 years. His most recent book is The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other. (Chicago, 2008).
Notes:
1. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-robert-wexler/iran-resolution-must-chan_b_111663.html
2. http://www.forward.com/articles/13763/
3. http://www.valleyadvocate.com/article.cfm?aid=7937
4. http://www.aipac.org/694.asp#12667
5. http://aipac.org/The_Issues/index_11793.asp, also http://www.aipac.org/Publications/AIPACAnalysesMemos/AIPAC_Memo_-_U.S._Must_Do_More_to_Prevent_a_Nuclear_Armed-Iran.pdf
6. See appendix 1 below
7. see appendix 2 below
Appendix 1
AIPAC Authorship of H. Con. Res 362 and Sen. Res. 580
AIPAC will say they do not write legislation, but just days before the resolutions were introduced, they issued a memo ( http://aipac.org/The_Issues/index_11793.asp) outlining what should be done to put more pressure on Iran (comparison below). The introduction of the resolutions also conveniently coincided with AIPAC’s Annual Policy conference during which they had 7,000+ people on the hill to lobby and their top legislative ask was for co-sponsorship of the resolutions (available on their website). In addition, the response from Gary Ackerman and Mike Pence to accusations on the blockade issue in a “Dear Colleague” letter were identical to AIPAC talking points posted on their website.
AIPAC has declared that they will use the votes on this resolution on their elections scorecard, which may be why so many members have signed onto it.
AIPAC memo
The United States should sanction the Central Bank of Iran for its involvement in the funding of terrorism and the financing of Iran's proliferation activities.
H.Con.Res 362/Senate Resolution 580
Congress urges the President, in the strongest of terms, to immediately use his existing authority to impose sanctions on - the Central Bank of Iran and any other Iranian bank engaged in proliferation activities or the support of terrorist groups;
AIPAC memo
The United States should impose sanctions on companies that have invested more than $20 million in Iran's energy sector in violation of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), originally passed in 1996.
H.Con.Res 362/Senate Resolution 580
Congress urges the President, in the strongest of terms, to immediately use his existing authority to impose sanctions on - energy companies that have invested $20,000,000 or more in the Iranian petroleum or natural gas sector in any given year since the enactment of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.
AIPAC memo
The United States also should use existing authority to sanction foreign entities that continue to do business with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ...
H.Con.Res 362/Senate Resolution 580
Congress urges the President, in the strongest of terms, to immediately use his existing authority to impose sanctions on - all companies which continue to do business with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
William O. Beeman
Appendix 2
Senate Resolution 580—Inaccuracies in the Document
Preambular Clauses
1. Wholly False
a. Iran had a covert nuclear program for 20 years (it was not covert, and was started by the United States 30 years ago)
b. The IAEA has confirmed Iranian covert nuclear activities. (The IAEA has cleared Iran of all required inspections, and affirmed Iran’s compliance)
c. Iran could have enough Highly Enriched Uranium to make a nuclear weapon by 2009. (The NIE did not say this, and Iran can not possibly have enough HEU by 2009 to make a weapon. Even if they did it would take years to actually develop such a weapon.
d. Iran has missiles that can reach parts of Europe. (Only true if you count Southern Russia as “part of Europe.” Iran has nothing that could reach Central or Western Europe.)
e. Iran has repeatedly called for the elimination of Israel. (No such calls have ever been issued. This is a blatant lie).
f. Iran has refused offers of negotiation (Iran has repeatedly stated its willingness to negotiate, provided there are no preconditions).
g. Developing weapons is outpacing economic sanctions (it is impossible to know what this means, and it is therefore false).
2. Arguable
a. Allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons is a grave threat to international security (only discussable if Iran is proven to have a weapons program. The statement applies to any non-nuclear weapons nation, not just Iran).
b. Allowing Iran to acquire a nuclear weapons capability will upset the balance of power in the Middle East (it is impossible to know what this means, unless the point is that the U.S. and Israel would no longer be completely dominant).
c. Iran could share its nuclear weapons capability with terrorists (So could Pakistan and India, and they already have proven weapons. Iran does not have a proven weapons program, and the capacity to develop such weapons is years away).
d. Iran having a nuclear weapon would undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime. (This goes without saying, but Iran does not have a proven weapons program. The United States failure to reduce its nuclear arsenal in direct violation of the NPT is far more dangerous.)
e. Arab states would follow suit if Iran had a weapon. (Actually, Arab states are far more likely to get weapons technology from Pakistan, especially now that Musharraf has resigned).
f. If Iran had weapons, nuclear proliferation would increase (assumes that Iran has a weapons program).
g. The government of Iran has advocated that the United States withdraw from the Middle East (as has every other state in the region except Israel).
h. Iran has used its banking system including the Central Bank of Iran to support its proliferation efforts (what proliferation efforts? Iran operates entirely legally under the NPT. The Iranian Central Bank is going to have something to do with all economic activity in Iran, since it regulates Iran’s currency)
i. The Treasury Department has designated 4 banks as proliferators. (Without proof or justification. This was a mere assertion of Treasury. The Treasury regularly violates its own laws regarding Iran, including illegal restrictions on artistic and scholarly exchange).
3. Legal Iranian Actions
a. Iran continues to expand the number of centrifuges (It is legal for them to do so—they would need 50,000 to have enough uranium to run a Light Water Reactor, which they don’t have. They have 6,000 at present, and those don’t work well).
b. Iran has 6,000 centrifuges (see above)
4. True statements
a. Iran is signatory to the NPT
b. Iran is bound to declare its nuclear activity to the IAEA (which it so far has done to the IAEA’s satisfaction)
c. The Security Council passed three binding resolutions calling for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment. (True, but the suspension of uranium enrichment was designated as a “confidence building” measure designed to assure that Iran was not building nuclear weapons in violation of Section IV of the NPT. The NIE in the United States declared that Iran has no weapons program, rendering the suspension of the legal enrichment of uranium unnecessary.
d. P5+1 nations have offered to negotiate with Iran (and Iran has agreed providing there are no preconditions)
e. Iran imports 40% of its refined petroleum products
Operative Clauses
1. Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability is a matter of high importance to U.S. security and must be dealt with urgently (this has been stated already by the executive branch. Getting Congress to agree to this is redundant, but it can be used by the executive to justify an attack at a later date).
2. Urges the president to impose sanctions (all these sanctions have already been enacted, or can be enacted without Congressional urging)
3. Urges the president to increase pressure on Iran (this is already being done with the exception of banning refined petroleum products imports to Iran—an absolutely impractical and inoperative measure).
4. Asserts that nothing in this resolution authorizes force against Iran (however, all of the false and misleading preambular clauses are a set up for later approaches to Congress for the use of force—a classic slippery slope).
-William O. Beeman
(Retitled: Congress is about to Pour Lighter Fluid on Iran)
Note: This article was published in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune on September 4, 2008. Documentation for the article was not published with the original article. I provide it here for readers who wish a more complete justification for the argument in the original article.
William O. Beeman
The U.S. Congress may inadvertently lay the foundations for war against Iran when it reconvenes in Washington in early September.
Two essentially identical non-binding resolutions, House Concurrent Resolution 362 and Senate Resolution 580 call upon President Bush to “immediately and dramatically increase the economic, political and diplomatic pressure on Iran to verifiably suspend its nuclear enrichment activities.”
The House Resolution has more than 200 co-sponsors, including Minnesota Representatives Bachman, Kline and Ramstad. The Senate Resolution has more than 30 co-sponsors, including both Minnesota Senators Coleman and Klobuchar.
The methods for increased pressure differ slightly in the two resolutions. The House Resolution calls for “stringent inspection requirements” of all goods entering or leaving Iran. The Senate Resolution does not call for the inspection of all goods, but joins the House resolution in calling for an embargo of refined petroleum products to Iran, which lacks the refining capacity to meet its need for gasoline. Achieving either goal would require a naval blockade—a de-facto act of war on the part of the United States, though paradoxically both resolutions explicitly exclude authorization for military action.
Other provisions call for an economic embargo of banking operations, with the House resolution adding a prohibition of international movement on the part of Iranian officials.
Both resolutions have begun to cause alarm throughout the United States, and have caused several Representatives to withdraw their co-sponsorship of the bill. Representative Robert Wexler (D-FL) summed up the concerns in an article for the Huffington Post, “It is clear that despite carefully worded language in H. Con. Res. 362 that ‘nothing in this resolution should be construed as an authorization of the use of force against Iran’ that many Americans across the country continue to express real concerns that sections of this resolution will be interpreted by President Bush as ‘a green light’ to use force against Iran.
Representative Barney Frank (D-MA), according to the Jewish Daily Forward offered a representative from the antiwar group Peace Action on July 5 an apology: “I regret the fact that I did not read this resolution more carefully.” He further told The Valley Advocate (Northampton, MA): ’ "I'm all for stricter sanctions against Iran, but the blockade part goes too far. I'm going to call the sponsors and tell them I'm changing my vote."
Both Wexler and Frank are are assuming some risk, because they are opposing the powerful American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which had a strong hand in the drafting of both resolutions. Just days before the resolutions were introduced in the House and the Senate AIPAC issued a memo outlining what should be done to put more pressure on Iran. The language of the memo mirrors the language of the resolutions . The introduction of the resolutions also conveniently coincided with AIPAC’s Annual Policy conference during which they had more than 7,000 people on the hill to lobby. Their top legislative priority was for co-sponsorship of the resolutions. AIPAC is careful to avoid direct calls for military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, but makes no secret that it would support such an action by the United States or Israel.
The most unfortunate aspect of the two resolutions is that they contain numerous outright falsehoods, misinformation and alarmist exaggeration about Iran and its nuclear development program. Of the 23 clauses in the Senate Resolution, only five present incontrovertible statements of fact . The many legislators who have signed on as co-sponsors, having subscribed to this false information, could be attacked by the Bush administration if they oppose a later request for military attack, as happened in the Iraq invasion.
Sadly, these resolutions make it clear that the battle to stop a war with Iran is not over.
William O. Beeman is Professor and Chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, and is President of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Assocation. He has lived and worked in the Middle East for more than 30 years. His most recent book is The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other. (Chicago, 2008).
Notes:
1. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-robert-wexler/iran-resolution-must-chan_b_111663.html
2. http://www.forward.com/articles/13763/
3. http://www.valleyadvocate.com/article.cfm?aid=7937
4. http://www.aipac.org/694.asp#12667
5. http://aipac.org/The_Issues/index_11793.asp, also http://www.aipac.org/Publications/AIPACAnalysesMemos/AIPAC_Memo_-_U.S._Must_Do_More_to_Prevent_a_Nuclear_Armed-Iran.pdf
6. See appendix 1 below
7. see appendix 2 below
Appendix 1
AIPAC Authorship of H. Con. Res 362 and Sen. Res. 580
AIPAC will say they do not write legislation, but just days before the resolutions were introduced, they issued a memo ( http://aipac.org/The_Issues/index_11793.asp) outlining what should be done to put more pressure on Iran (comparison below). The introduction of the resolutions also conveniently coincided with AIPAC’s Annual Policy conference during which they had 7,000+ people on the hill to lobby and their top legislative ask was for co-sponsorship of the resolutions (available on their website). In addition, the response from Gary Ackerman and Mike Pence to accusations on the blockade issue in a “Dear Colleague” letter were identical to AIPAC talking points posted on their website.
AIPAC has declared that they will use the votes on this resolution on their elections scorecard, which may be why so many members have signed onto it.
AIPAC memo
The United States should sanction the Central Bank of Iran for its involvement in the funding of terrorism and the financing of Iran's proliferation activities.
H.Con.Res 362/Senate Resolution 580
Congress urges the President, in the strongest of terms, to immediately use his existing authority to impose sanctions on - the Central Bank of Iran and any other Iranian bank engaged in proliferation activities or the support of terrorist groups;
AIPAC memo
The United States should impose sanctions on companies that have invested more than $20 million in Iran's energy sector in violation of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), originally passed in 1996.
H.Con.Res 362/Senate Resolution 580
Congress urges the President, in the strongest of terms, to immediately use his existing authority to impose sanctions on - energy companies that have invested $20,000,000 or more in the Iranian petroleum or natural gas sector in any given year since the enactment of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.
AIPAC memo
The United States also should use existing authority to sanction foreign entities that continue to do business with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ...
H.Con.Res 362/Senate Resolution 580
Congress urges the President, in the strongest of terms, to immediately use his existing authority to impose sanctions on - all companies which continue to do business with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
William O. Beeman
Appendix 2
Senate Resolution 580—Inaccuracies in the Document
Preambular Clauses
1. Wholly False
a. Iran had a covert nuclear program for 20 years (it was not covert, and was started by the United States 30 years ago)
b. The IAEA has confirmed Iranian covert nuclear activities. (The IAEA has cleared Iran of all required inspections, and affirmed Iran’s compliance)
c. Iran could have enough Highly Enriched Uranium to make a nuclear weapon by 2009. (The NIE did not say this, and Iran can not possibly have enough HEU by 2009 to make a weapon. Even if they did it would take years to actually develop such a weapon.
d. Iran has missiles that can reach parts of Europe. (Only true if you count Southern Russia as “part of Europe.” Iran has nothing that could reach Central or Western Europe.)
e. Iran has repeatedly called for the elimination of Israel. (No such calls have ever been issued. This is a blatant lie).
f. Iran has refused offers of negotiation (Iran has repeatedly stated its willingness to negotiate, provided there are no preconditions).
g. Developing weapons is outpacing economic sanctions (it is impossible to know what this means, and it is therefore false).
2. Arguable
a. Allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons is a grave threat to international security (only discussable if Iran is proven to have a weapons program. The statement applies to any non-nuclear weapons nation, not just Iran).
b. Allowing Iran to acquire a nuclear weapons capability will upset the balance of power in the Middle East (it is impossible to know what this means, unless the point is that the U.S. and Israel would no longer be completely dominant).
c. Iran could share its nuclear weapons capability with terrorists (So could Pakistan and India, and they already have proven weapons. Iran does not have a proven weapons program, and the capacity to develop such weapons is years away).
d. Iran having a nuclear weapon would undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime. (This goes without saying, but Iran does not have a proven weapons program. The United States failure to reduce its nuclear arsenal in direct violation of the NPT is far more dangerous.)
e. Arab states would follow suit if Iran had a weapon. (Actually, Arab states are far more likely to get weapons technology from Pakistan, especially now that Musharraf has resigned).
f. If Iran had weapons, nuclear proliferation would increase (assumes that Iran has a weapons program).
g. The government of Iran has advocated that the United States withdraw from the Middle East (as has every other state in the region except Israel).
h. Iran has used its banking system including the Central Bank of Iran to support its proliferation efforts (what proliferation efforts? Iran operates entirely legally under the NPT. The Iranian Central Bank is going to have something to do with all economic activity in Iran, since it regulates Iran’s currency)
i. The Treasury Department has designated 4 banks as proliferators. (Without proof or justification. This was a mere assertion of Treasury. The Treasury regularly violates its own laws regarding Iran, including illegal restrictions on artistic and scholarly exchange).
3. Legal Iranian Actions
a. Iran continues to expand the number of centrifuges (It is legal for them to do so—they would need 50,000 to have enough uranium to run a Light Water Reactor, which they don’t have. They have 6,000 at present, and those don’t work well).
b. Iran has 6,000 centrifuges (see above)
4. True statements
a. Iran is signatory to the NPT
b. Iran is bound to declare its nuclear activity to the IAEA (which it so far has done to the IAEA’s satisfaction)
c. The Security Council passed three binding resolutions calling for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment. (True, but the suspension of uranium enrichment was designated as a “confidence building” measure designed to assure that Iran was not building nuclear weapons in violation of Section IV of the NPT. The NIE in the United States declared that Iran has no weapons program, rendering the suspension of the legal enrichment of uranium unnecessary.
d. P5+1 nations have offered to negotiate with Iran (and Iran has agreed providing there are no preconditions)
e. Iran imports 40% of its refined petroleum products
Operative Clauses
1. Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability is a matter of high importance to U.S. security and must be dealt with urgently (this has been stated already by the executive branch. Getting Congress to agree to this is redundant, but it can be used by the executive to justify an attack at a later date).
2. Urges the president to impose sanctions (all these sanctions have already been enacted, or can be enacted without Congressional urging)
3. Urges the president to increase pressure on Iran (this is already being done with the exception of banning refined petroleum products imports to Iran—an absolutely impractical and inoperative measure).
4. Asserts that nothing in this resolution authorizes force against Iran (however, all of the false and misleading preambular clauses are a set up for later approaches to Congress for the use of force—a classic slippery slope).
-William O. Beeman
Wednesday, September 03, 2008
William O. Beeman--Congress is about to pour lighter fluid on Iran (Minneapolis Star-Tribune)
Congress is about to pour lighter fluid on Iran
There's a great deal of support for two resolutions that, if approved, would all but strike the match on war.
By WILLIAM O. BEEMAN
Last update: September 3, 2008 - 7:11 PM
Two essentially identical nonbinding resolutions call upon President Bush to "immediately and dramatically increase the economic, political and diplomatic pressure on Iran to verifiably suspend its nuclear enrichment activities."
The House resolution has more than 200 cosponsors, including Minnesota Reps. Michele Bachmann, John Kline and Jim Ramstad. The Senate resolution has more than 30 cosponsors, including both Minnesota senators, Norm Coleman and Amy Klobuchar.
The methods for increased pressure differ slightly in the two resolutions. The House resolution calls for "stringent inspection requirements" of all goods entering or leaving Iran. The Senate resolution does not call for the inspection of all goods but joins the House resolution in calling for an embargo of refined petroleum products to Iran, which lacks the refining capacity to meet its need for gasoline. Achieving either goal would require a naval blockade -- a de facto act of war on the part of the United States, though paradoxically both resolutions explicitly exclude authorization for military action.
Other provisions call for an economic embargo of banking operations, with the House resolution adding a prohibition of international movement on the part of Iranian officials.
Both resolutions have begun to cause alarm throughout the United States, and have caused several representatives to withdraw their cosponsorships. Rep. Robert Wexler, D-Fla., summed up the concerns in an article for the Huffington Post: "It is clear that despite carefully worded language in H. Con. Res. 362 that 'nothing in this resolution should be construed as an authorization of the use of force against Iran' that many Americans across the country continue to express real concerns that sections of this resolution will be interpreted by President Bush as 'a green light' to use force against Iran."
According to the Jewish Daily Forward, Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., offered an apology to a representative from the antiwar group Peace Action, saying, "I regret the fact that I did not read this resolution more carefully." He further told the Valley Advocate of Northampton, Mass., that he's "all for stricter sanctions against Iran, but the blockade part goes too far. I'm going to call the sponsors and tell them I'm changing my vote."
Both Wexler and Frank are assuming some risk, because they are opposing the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which had a strong hand in the drafting of both resolutions. Just days before the resolutions were introduced, AIPAC issued a memo outlining what should be done to put more pressure on Iran. The language of the memo mirrors the language of the resolutions. The introduction of the resolutions also conveniently coincided with AIPAC's annual policy conference during which it had more than 7,000 people on Capitol Hill to lobby. Its top legislative priority was for cosponsorship of the resolutions. AIPAC is careful to avoid direct calls for military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities but makes no secret that it would support such an action by the United States or Israel.
The most unfortunate aspect of the two resolutions is that they contain numerous outright falsehoods, misinformation and alarmist exaggeration about Iran and its nuclear development program. Of the 23 clauses in the Senate resolution, only five present incontrovertible statements of fact. The many legislators who have signed on as cosponsors, having subscribed to this false information, could be attacked by the Bush administration if they oppose a later request for military attack, as happened in the Iraq invasion.
Sadly, these resolutions make it clear that the battle to stop a war with Iran is not over.
William O. Beeman is a professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, and is president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association. He has lived and worked in the Middle East for more than 30 years. His most recent book is "The 'Great Satan' vs. the 'Mad Mullahs': How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other."
There's a great deal of support for two resolutions that, if approved, would all but strike the match on war.
By WILLIAM O. BEEMAN
Last update: September 3, 2008 - 7:11 PM
Two essentially identical nonbinding resolutions call upon President Bush to "immediately and dramatically increase the economic, political and diplomatic pressure on Iran to verifiably suspend its nuclear enrichment activities."
The House resolution has more than 200 cosponsors, including Minnesota Reps. Michele Bachmann, John Kline and Jim Ramstad. The Senate resolution has more than 30 cosponsors, including both Minnesota senators, Norm Coleman and Amy Klobuchar.
The methods for increased pressure differ slightly in the two resolutions. The House resolution calls for "stringent inspection requirements" of all goods entering or leaving Iran. The Senate resolution does not call for the inspection of all goods but joins the House resolution in calling for an embargo of refined petroleum products to Iran, which lacks the refining capacity to meet its need for gasoline. Achieving either goal would require a naval blockade -- a de facto act of war on the part of the United States, though paradoxically both resolutions explicitly exclude authorization for military action.
Other provisions call for an economic embargo of banking operations, with the House resolution adding a prohibition of international movement on the part of Iranian officials.
Both resolutions have begun to cause alarm throughout the United States, and have caused several representatives to withdraw their cosponsorships. Rep. Robert Wexler, D-Fla., summed up the concerns in an article for the Huffington Post: "It is clear that despite carefully worded language in H. Con. Res. 362 that 'nothing in this resolution should be construed as an authorization of the use of force against Iran' that many Americans across the country continue to express real concerns that sections of this resolution will be interpreted by President Bush as 'a green light' to use force against Iran."
According to the Jewish Daily Forward, Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., offered an apology to a representative from the antiwar group Peace Action, saying, "I regret the fact that I did not read this resolution more carefully." He further told the Valley Advocate of Northampton, Mass., that he's "all for stricter sanctions against Iran, but the blockade part goes too far. I'm going to call the sponsors and tell them I'm changing my vote."
Both Wexler and Frank are assuming some risk, because they are opposing the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which had a strong hand in the drafting of both resolutions. Just days before the resolutions were introduced, AIPAC issued a memo outlining what should be done to put more pressure on Iran. The language of the memo mirrors the language of the resolutions. The introduction of the resolutions also conveniently coincided with AIPAC's annual policy conference during which it had more than 7,000 people on Capitol Hill to lobby. Its top legislative priority was for cosponsorship of the resolutions. AIPAC is careful to avoid direct calls for military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities but makes no secret that it would support such an action by the United States or Israel.
The most unfortunate aspect of the two resolutions is that they contain numerous outright falsehoods, misinformation and alarmist exaggeration about Iran and its nuclear development program. Of the 23 clauses in the Senate resolution, only five present incontrovertible statements of fact. The many legislators who have signed on as cosponsors, having subscribed to this false information, could be attacked by the Bush administration if they oppose a later request for military attack, as happened in the Iraq invasion.
Sadly, these resolutions make it clear that the battle to stop a war with Iran is not over.
William O. Beeman is a professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, and is president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association. He has lived and worked in the Middle East for more than 30 years. His most recent book is "The 'Great Satan' vs. the 'Mad Mullahs': How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other."
Saturday, August 30, 2008
John McCain's Dangerous Choice
John McCain's Dangerous Choice
Commentary from William O. Beeman:
This comes from MoveOn.org, which has occasionally been seen as over the top in their public pronouncements as they have frequently in recent years allowed ideology and a certain tendency toward ridicule to trump factuality. I rarely forward anything from them. However, this profile of Republican Vice-Presidential nominee Sarah Palin is sober, factually correct, and very important. I hope that you will take it to heart and forward it widely.
______________________________________
Yesterday was John McCain's 72nd birthday. If elected, he'd be the oldest president ever inaugurated. And after months of slamming Barack Obama for "inexperience," here's who John McCain has chosen to be one heartbeat away from the presidency: a right-wing religious conservative with no foreign policy experience, who until recently was mayor of a town of 9,000 people.
Huh?
Who is Sarah Palin? Here's some basic background:
* She was elected Alaska's governor a little over a year and a half ago. Her previous office was mayor of Wasilla, a small town outside Anchorage. She has no foreign policy experience.1
* Palin is strongly anti-choice, opposing abortion even in the case of rape or incest.2
* She supported right-wing extremist Pat Buchanan for president in 2000. 3
* Palin thinks creationism should be taught in public schools.4
* She's doesn't think humans are the cause of climate change.5
* She's solidly in line with John McCain's "Big Oil first" energy policy. She's pushed hard for more oil drilling and says renewables won't be ready for years. She also sued the Bush administration for listing polar bears as an endangered species—she was worried it would interfere with more oil drilling in Alaska.6
* How closely did John McCain vet this choice? He met Sarah Palin once at a meeting. They spoke a second time, last Sunday, when he called her about being vice-president. Then he offered her the position.7
This is information the American people need to see. Please take a moment to forward this email to your friends and family.
We also asked Alaska MoveOn members what the rest of us should know about their governor. The response was striking. Here's a sample:
She is really just a mayor from a small town outside Anchorage who has been a governor for only 1.5 years, and has ZERO national and international experience. I shudder to think that she could be the person taking that 3AM call on the White House hotline, and the one who could potentially be charged with leading the US in the volatile international scene that exists today. —Rose M., Fairbanks, AK
She is VERY, VERY conservative, and far from perfect. She's a hunter and fisherwoman, but votes against the environment again and again. She ran on ethics reform, but is currently under investigation for several charges involving hiring and firing of state officials. She has NO experience beyond Alaska. —Christine B., Denali Park, AK
As an Alaskan and a feminist, I am beyond words at this announcement. Palin is not a feminist, and she is not the reformer she claims to be. —Karen L., Anchorage, AK
Alaskans, collectively, are just as stunned as the rest of the nation. She is doing well running our State, but is totally inexperienced on the national level, and very much unequipped to run the nation, if it came to that. She is as far right as one can get, which has already been communicated on the news. In our office of thirty employees (dems, republicans, and nonpartisans), not one person feels she is ready for the V.P. position.—Sherry C., Anchorage, AK
She's vehemently anti-choice and doesn't care about protecting our natural resources, even though she has worked as a fisherman. McCain chose her to pick up the Hillary voters, but Palin is no Hillary. —Marina L., Juneau, AK
I think she's far too inexperienced to be in this position. I'm all for a woman in the White House, but not one who hasn't done anything to deserve it. There are far many other women who have worked their way up and have much more experience that would have been better choices. This is a patronizing decision on John McCain's part- and insulting to females everywhere that he would assume he'll get our vote by putting "A Woman" in that position.—Jennifer M., Anchorage, AK
So Governor Palin is a staunch anti-choice religious conservative. She's a global warming denier who shares John McCain's commitment to Big Oil. And she's dramatically inexperienced.
In picking Sarah Palin, John McCain has made the religious right very happy. And he's made a very dangerous decision for our country.
In the next few days, many Americans will be wondering what McCain's vice-presidential choice means. Please pass this information along to your friends and family.
Sources:
1. "Sarah Palin," Wikipedia, Accessed August 29, 2008
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarah_Palin
2. "McCain Selects Anti-Choice Sarah Palin as Running Mate," NARAL Pro-Choice America, August 29, 2008
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=17515&id=13661-8549643-8A2lD.x&t=1
3. "Sarah Palin, Buchananite," The Nation, August 29, 2008
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=17736&id=13661-8549643-8A2lD.x&t=2
4. "'Creation science' enters the race," Anchorage Daily News, October 27, 2006
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=17737&id=13661-8549643-8A2lD.x&t=3
5. "Palin buys climate denial PR spin—ignores science," Huffington Post, August 29, 2008
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=17517&id=13661-8549643-8A2lD.x&t=4
6. "McCain VP Pick Completes Shift to Bush Energy Policy," Sierra Club, August 29, 2008
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=17518&id=13661-8549643-8A2lD.x&t=5
"Choice of Palin Promises Failed Energy Policies of the Past," League of Conservation Voters, August 29, 2008
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=17519&id=13661-8549643-8A2lD.x&t=6
"Protecting polar bears gets in way of drilling for oil, says governor," The Times of London, May 23, 2008
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=17520&id=13661-8549643-8A2lD.x&t=7
7 "McCain met Palin once before yesterday," MSNBC, August 29, 2008
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=21119&id=13661-8549643-8A2lD.x&t=8
Commentary from William O. Beeman:
This comes from MoveOn.org, which has occasionally been seen as over the top in their public pronouncements as they have frequently in recent years allowed ideology and a certain tendency toward ridicule to trump factuality. I rarely forward anything from them. However, this profile of Republican Vice-Presidential nominee Sarah Palin is sober, factually correct, and very important. I hope that you will take it to heart and forward it widely.
______________________________________
Yesterday was John McCain's 72nd birthday. If elected, he'd be the oldest president ever inaugurated. And after months of slamming Barack Obama for "inexperience," here's who John McCain has chosen to be one heartbeat away from the presidency: a right-wing religious conservative with no foreign policy experience, who until recently was mayor of a town of 9,000 people.
Huh?
Who is Sarah Palin? Here's some basic background:
* She was elected Alaska's governor a little over a year and a half ago. Her previous office was mayor of Wasilla, a small town outside Anchorage. She has no foreign policy experience.1
* Palin is strongly anti-choice, opposing abortion even in the case of rape or incest.2
* She supported right-wing extremist Pat Buchanan for president in 2000. 3
* Palin thinks creationism should be taught in public schools.4
* She's doesn't think humans are the cause of climate change.5
* She's solidly in line with John McCain's "Big Oil first" energy policy. She's pushed hard for more oil drilling and says renewables won't be ready for years. She also sued the Bush administration for listing polar bears as an endangered species—she was worried it would interfere with more oil drilling in Alaska.6
* How closely did John McCain vet this choice? He met Sarah Palin once at a meeting. They spoke a second time, last Sunday, when he called her about being vice-president. Then he offered her the position.7
This is information the American people need to see. Please take a moment to forward this email to your friends and family.
We also asked Alaska MoveOn members what the rest of us should know about their governor. The response was striking. Here's a sample:
She is really just a mayor from a small town outside Anchorage who has been a governor for only 1.5 years, and has ZERO national and international experience. I shudder to think that she could be the person taking that 3AM call on the White House hotline, and the one who could potentially be charged with leading the US in the volatile international scene that exists today. —Rose M., Fairbanks, AK
She is VERY, VERY conservative, and far from perfect. She's a hunter and fisherwoman, but votes against the environment again and again. She ran on ethics reform, but is currently under investigation for several charges involving hiring and firing of state officials. She has NO experience beyond Alaska. —Christine B., Denali Park, AK
As an Alaskan and a feminist, I am beyond words at this announcement. Palin is not a feminist, and she is not the reformer she claims to be. —Karen L., Anchorage, AK
Alaskans, collectively, are just as stunned as the rest of the nation. She is doing well running our State, but is totally inexperienced on the national level, and very much unequipped to run the nation, if it came to that. She is as far right as one can get, which has already been communicated on the news. In our office of thirty employees (dems, republicans, and nonpartisans), not one person feels she is ready for the V.P. position.—Sherry C., Anchorage, AK
She's vehemently anti-choice and doesn't care about protecting our natural resources, even though she has worked as a fisherman. McCain chose her to pick up the Hillary voters, but Palin is no Hillary. —Marina L., Juneau, AK
I think she's far too inexperienced to be in this position. I'm all for a woman in the White House, but not one who hasn't done anything to deserve it. There are far many other women who have worked their way up and have much more experience that would have been better choices. This is a patronizing decision on John McCain's part- and insulting to females everywhere that he would assume he'll get our vote by putting "A Woman" in that position.—Jennifer M., Anchorage, AK
So Governor Palin is a staunch anti-choice religious conservative. She's a global warming denier who shares John McCain's commitment to Big Oil. And she's dramatically inexperienced.
In picking Sarah Palin, John McCain has made the religious right very happy. And he's made a very dangerous decision for our country.
In the next few days, many Americans will be wondering what McCain's vice-presidential choice means. Please pass this information along to your friends and family.
Sources:
1. "Sarah Palin," Wikipedia, Accessed August 29, 2008
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarah_Palin
2. "McCain Selects Anti-Choice Sarah Palin as Running Mate," NARAL Pro-Choice America, August 29, 2008
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=17515&id=13661-8549643-8A2lD.x&t=1
3. "Sarah Palin, Buchananite," The Nation, August 29, 2008
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=17736&id=13661-8549643-8A2lD.x&t=2
4. "'Creation science' enters the race," Anchorage Daily News, October 27, 2006
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=17737&id=13661-8549643-8A2lD.x&t=3
5. "Palin buys climate denial PR spin—ignores science," Huffington Post, August 29, 2008
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=17517&id=13661-8549643-8A2lD.x&t=4
6. "McCain VP Pick Completes Shift to Bush Energy Policy," Sierra Club, August 29, 2008
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=17518&id=13661-8549643-8A2lD.x&t=5
"Choice of Palin Promises Failed Energy Policies of the Past," League of Conservation Voters, August 29, 2008
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=17519&id=13661-8549643-8A2lD.x&t=6
"Protecting polar bears gets in way of drilling for oil, says governor," The Times of London, May 23, 2008
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=17520&id=13661-8549643-8A2lD.x&t=7
7 "McCain met Palin once before yesterday," MSNBC, August 29, 2008
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=21119&id=13661-8549643-8A2lD.x&t=8
Jim Lobe--Iran Could Reap Benefits of U.S.-Russian Tensions
August 28
Iran Could Reap Benefits of U.S.-Russian Tensions
Analysis by Jim Lobe*
Commentary by William O. Beeman:
The controversy over Russian actions in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia has placed Iran in a stronger position. Certainly Russia is not going to support the idea that an attack against Iran could be launched by the United States or Israel from anywhere in the Caucasus, and Russian cooperation for more sanctions against Iran are also unlikely unless the United States cuts a very serious bargain with Moscow. For example, sacrificing Georgian President Saakashvili for Russian cooperation on tough actions against Iran. In light of this, and their historical experience dealing with Russia for more than 200 years, Iranians area also distrustful of Moscow and its intensions. The long term benefit for Iran may be a relaxation of pressure on its nuclear program, but the short term benefit is that Iran now has an increased market for its natural gas, which it is ready to sell to Europeans. If Moscow gets testy, and the BTC Pipeline remains closed, Europeans will soften on Iranian sanctions. Dick Cheney is traveling to the Caucasus in the next week to make sure that U.S. and Israeli military operations to threaten Iran are still in place, but the world can see that U.S. foreign and military policy in this region is crumbling. Jim Lobe's excellent analysis fills in the details below.
WASHINGTON, Aug 27 (IPS) - Iran could emerge as a big winner, at least in the short term, from the rapidly escalating tensions between the United States and Russia over Moscow's intervention in Georgia, according to analysts here.
Whatever waning chances remained of a U.S. military attack on Iran before President George W. Bush leaves office next January have all but vanished, given the still-uncertain outcome of the Georgia crisis, according to most of these observers.
Similarly, the likelihood that Moscow will cooperate with U.S. and European efforts to impose additional sanctions on Tehran through the U.N. Security Council, where Russia holds a veto, for not complying with the Council's demands to halt its uranium enrichment programme has been sharply reduced.
Not only has Washington's confrontation with its old superpower rival displaced Tehran at the top of the administration's and U.S. media foreign policy agenda, but Tehran's geo-political leverage -- both as a potential partner for the West in containing Russia and as a potential ally of Moscow's in warding off western pressure -- has also risen sharply as an incidental result of the crisis.
"When the U.S. invaded Iraq, it didn't do so to improve Iran's power position in the region, but that was the result," noted Gary Sick, an Iran expert at Columbia University who served on the National Security Council staff of former Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan. "That wasn't the purpose of the Russian invasion of Georgia either, but it, too, may be the result."
So far, Tehran's response to the Georgia crisis has been measured. Despite calls by some right-wing voices to side with Moscow, according to Farideh Farhi, an Iran expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars here, the government, including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has expressed disapproval of the Russian action, particularly its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia.
"The reason is on grounds of principle -- if Iran is going to start supporting the secession of territories that are unhappy with the central government, then Iran itself has some similar issues with ethnic dissatisfaction," Farhi, who also teaches at the University of Hawaii, told IPS.
In addition, she said, most of Tehran's foreign policy establishment "don't view Russia as a reliable partner. They understand that Russia may support Iran on the nuclear file depending on its own security or policy interests, but Russia has also been quite clever in using Iran as a bargaining chip in terms of its relationship with the United States."
"The Iranians are being very clever here; they're not likely to rush to Russia's defence unless Russia comes to them and ask for their help, and then they can ask for something in return," Farhi added.
The latter may include anything from the accelerated completion of the long-delayed Bushehr nuclear plant, to providing advanced anti-aircraft systems (something that Tehran's ally Syria has already asked Moscow to provide in the wake of Damascus' public support for the Russian intervention), to full membership in the Sino-Russian-sponsored Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a defence group that is coincidentally holding its annual summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, this week.
Teheran's leverage is not just confined to its status, along with Turkey's, as the most powerful nation in a strategically critical neighbourhood inhabited by relatively weak U.S.-backed buffer states like Georgia. During the Cold War and until the 1979 Revolution, after all, Iran served as Washington's most important bulwark against Soviet influence in the Gulf.
It also derives from its being a major oil and gas producer that could also play a much more important role as a transshipment point for Central Asian and Caspian energy resources bound for Europe, whose growing dependence on Russia for its energy supplies looks more risky than ever. This is particularly so in the wake of Moscow's demonstration that it can easily reach -- and disrupt, if it wishes -- the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, the only pipeline that transports oil from the Caspian to the West without transiting either Russia or Iran.
"Oil and gas companies now must factor in a new level of uncertainty," according to Jay Stanley at Kent Moors, an expert on energy finance who writes for 'Caspian Investor'. "...Georgia is now unstable and that increases the risk of transporting hydrocarbons across it."
"If the BTC and Georgia won't be a reliable source of energy, then Iran will absolutely step up to the plate," according to Prof. William Beeman, an Iran expert at the University of Minnesota. "'You want gas? We'll sell you gas' will likely be their position," he added, noting that Switzerland signed a 25-year, 42-billion-dollar gas supply and pipeline deal with Tehran last March over strong U.S. objections. "I think the Swiss are a very good bellwether for the rest of Europe on this."
While Iran has alienated some major European energy companies -- most recently France's Total -- by demanding tough terms, it might "see the present crisis as an opportunity to go back to European colleagues and say, 'Let's take another look at this,"' said Sick. "It gives them some more leverage by going to the West and saying 'You're shooting yourselves in the foot here. When are you going to come to your senses?"'
That argument naturally becomes more compelling as tensions between Russia and the West continue to escalate and could affect internal Bush cabinet-level deliberations on whether to act on a State Department recommendation to seek Iranian approval for opening an interests section in Tehran. Such a move, at the present juncture, would likely be seen as a major move on geo-strategic chessboard. Despite reports earlier this month that Bush had approved the recommendation, the issue appears to be unresolved.
Still, some experts say Iran's advantage could be short-lived. With a Russian veto over new Iran sanctions all but assured, Washington could decide to drop the U.N. route and try to impose a "coalition-of-the-willing" sanctions regime with its allies, according to Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC).
Michael Klare, author of "Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy", told IPS he believes that Russia's unilateral resort to military action against Georgia may actually embolden Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, the leader of the administration's hawks who travels next week to Georgia and Azerbaijan.
"The question is whether Bush and Cheney will feel empowered to behave in a more belligerent fashion or not," he said.
*Jim Lobe's blog on U.S. foreign policy, and particularly the neo-conservative influence in the Bush administration, can be read at http://www.ips.org/blog/jimlobe/.
(END/2008)
Iran Could Reap Benefits of U.S.-Russian Tensions
Analysis by Jim Lobe*
Commentary by William O. Beeman:
The controversy over Russian actions in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia has placed Iran in a stronger position. Certainly Russia is not going to support the idea that an attack against Iran could be launched by the United States or Israel from anywhere in the Caucasus, and Russian cooperation for more sanctions against Iran are also unlikely unless the United States cuts a very serious bargain with Moscow. For example, sacrificing Georgian President Saakashvili for Russian cooperation on tough actions against Iran. In light of this, and their historical experience dealing with Russia for more than 200 years, Iranians area also distrustful of Moscow and its intensions. The long term benefit for Iran may be a relaxation of pressure on its nuclear program, but the short term benefit is that Iran now has an increased market for its natural gas, which it is ready to sell to Europeans. If Moscow gets testy, and the BTC Pipeline remains closed, Europeans will soften on Iranian sanctions. Dick Cheney is traveling to the Caucasus in the next week to make sure that U.S. and Israeli military operations to threaten Iran are still in place, but the world can see that U.S. foreign and military policy in this region is crumbling. Jim Lobe's excellent analysis fills in the details below.
WASHINGTON, Aug 27 (IPS) - Iran could emerge as a big winner, at least in the short term, from the rapidly escalating tensions between the United States and Russia over Moscow's intervention in Georgia, according to analysts here.
Whatever waning chances remained of a U.S. military attack on Iran before President George W. Bush leaves office next January have all but vanished, given the still-uncertain outcome of the Georgia crisis, according to most of these observers.
Similarly, the likelihood that Moscow will cooperate with U.S. and European efforts to impose additional sanctions on Tehran through the U.N. Security Council, where Russia holds a veto, for not complying with the Council's demands to halt its uranium enrichment programme has been sharply reduced.
Not only has Washington's confrontation with its old superpower rival displaced Tehran at the top of the administration's and U.S. media foreign policy agenda, but Tehran's geo-political leverage -- both as a potential partner for the West in containing Russia and as a potential ally of Moscow's in warding off western pressure -- has also risen sharply as an incidental result of the crisis.
"When the U.S. invaded Iraq, it didn't do so to improve Iran's power position in the region, but that was the result," noted Gary Sick, an Iran expert at Columbia University who served on the National Security Council staff of former Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan. "That wasn't the purpose of the Russian invasion of Georgia either, but it, too, may be the result."
So far, Tehran's response to the Georgia crisis has been measured. Despite calls by some right-wing voices to side with Moscow, according to Farideh Farhi, an Iran expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars here, the government, including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has expressed disapproval of the Russian action, particularly its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia.
"The reason is on grounds of principle -- if Iran is going to start supporting the secession of territories that are unhappy with the central government, then Iran itself has some similar issues with ethnic dissatisfaction," Farhi, who also teaches at the University of Hawaii, told IPS.
In addition, she said, most of Tehran's foreign policy establishment "don't view Russia as a reliable partner. They understand that Russia may support Iran on the nuclear file depending on its own security or policy interests, but Russia has also been quite clever in using Iran as a bargaining chip in terms of its relationship with the United States."
"The Iranians are being very clever here; they're not likely to rush to Russia's defence unless Russia comes to them and ask for their help, and then they can ask for something in return," Farhi added.
The latter may include anything from the accelerated completion of the long-delayed Bushehr nuclear plant, to providing advanced anti-aircraft systems (something that Tehran's ally Syria has already asked Moscow to provide in the wake of Damascus' public support for the Russian intervention), to full membership in the Sino-Russian-sponsored Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a defence group that is coincidentally holding its annual summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, this week.
Teheran's leverage is not just confined to its status, along with Turkey's, as the most powerful nation in a strategically critical neighbourhood inhabited by relatively weak U.S.-backed buffer states like Georgia. During the Cold War and until the 1979 Revolution, after all, Iran served as Washington's most important bulwark against Soviet influence in the Gulf.
It also derives from its being a major oil and gas producer that could also play a much more important role as a transshipment point for Central Asian and Caspian energy resources bound for Europe, whose growing dependence on Russia for its energy supplies looks more risky than ever. This is particularly so in the wake of Moscow's demonstration that it can easily reach -- and disrupt, if it wishes -- the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, the only pipeline that transports oil from the Caspian to the West without transiting either Russia or Iran.
"Oil and gas companies now must factor in a new level of uncertainty," according to Jay Stanley at Kent Moors, an expert on energy finance who writes for 'Caspian Investor'. "...Georgia is now unstable and that increases the risk of transporting hydrocarbons across it."
"If the BTC and Georgia won't be a reliable source of energy, then Iran will absolutely step up to the plate," according to Prof. William Beeman, an Iran expert at the University of Minnesota. "'You want gas? We'll sell you gas' will likely be their position," he added, noting that Switzerland signed a 25-year, 42-billion-dollar gas supply and pipeline deal with Tehran last March over strong U.S. objections. "I think the Swiss are a very good bellwether for the rest of Europe on this."
While Iran has alienated some major European energy companies -- most recently France's Total -- by demanding tough terms, it might "see the present crisis as an opportunity to go back to European colleagues and say, 'Let's take another look at this,"' said Sick. "It gives them some more leverage by going to the West and saying 'You're shooting yourselves in the foot here. When are you going to come to your senses?"'
That argument naturally becomes more compelling as tensions between Russia and the West continue to escalate and could affect internal Bush cabinet-level deliberations on whether to act on a State Department recommendation to seek Iranian approval for opening an interests section in Tehran. Such a move, at the present juncture, would likely be seen as a major move on geo-strategic chessboard. Despite reports earlier this month that Bush had approved the recommendation, the issue appears to be unresolved.
Still, some experts say Iran's advantage could be short-lived. With a Russian veto over new Iran sanctions all but assured, Washington could decide to drop the U.N. route and try to impose a "coalition-of-the-willing" sanctions regime with its allies, according to Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC).
Michael Klare, author of "Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy", told IPS he believes that Russia's unilateral resort to military action against Georgia may actually embolden Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, the leader of the administration's hawks who travels next week to Georgia and Azerbaijan.
"The question is whether Bush and Cheney will feel empowered to behave in a more belligerent fashion or not," he said.
*Jim Lobe's blog on U.S. foreign policy, and particularly the neo-conservative influence in the Bush administration, can be read at http://www.ips.org/blog/jimlobe/.
(END/2008)
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Gareth Porter--Bush Covered up Musharraf Ties with Al-Qaeda, Khan (Anti-war.com)
August 20, 2008
Bush Covered Up Musharraf Ties With al-Qaeda, Khan
by Gareth Porter
Commentary by William O. Beeman:
The United States Government and President Pervez Musharraf appear to have had a common interest in no doing anyting to curtail Al-Qaeda or finding Osama bin Laden. For President Bush, the continued presence of bin Laden assured that the "Global War on Terror" for which the Pentagon has been issuing war medals for the last years, would continue unabated, justifying every form of destruction of human rights and American civil liberties. For Musharraf, the fact that bin Laden was never found allowed him to milk the United States for billions of dollars of military and civilian aid, something that continues to the present day. Gareth Porter now shows us that the Bush administration was completely aware of Musharraf's ties to the Taliban and al-Qaeda and just didn't bother to tell Congress or the American public. What is astonishing is that the Bush administration seems to have made no plans for Musharraf's departure. Two warring political factions are left to wrangle over power in Islamabad, while the fate of Pakistan's nuclear bombs remains uncertain. This is about the worst political muddle perpetrated by the Bush administration since the illegal invasion of Iraq.
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's resignation Monday brings to an end an extraordinarily close relationship between Musharraf and the George W. Bush administration, in which Musharraf was lavished with political and economic benefits from the United States despite policies that were in sharp conflict with U.S. security interests.
It is well known that Bush repeatedly praised Musharraf as the most loyal ally of the United States against terrorism, even though the Pakistani military was deeply compromised by its relationship with the Taliban and Pakistani Islamic militants.
What has not been reported is that the Bush administration covered up the Musharraf regime's involvement in the activities of the A.Q. Khan nuclear technology export program and its deals with al-Qaeda's Pakistani tribal allies.
The problem faced by the Bush administration when it came into office was that the Pakistani military, over which Musharraf presided, was the real terrorist nexus with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. As Bruce Riedel, National Security Council (NSC) senior director for South Asia in the Bill Clinton administration, who stayed on the NSC staff under the Bush administration, observed in an interview with this writer last September, al-Qaeda "was a creation of the jihadist culture of the Pakistani army."
If there was a state sponsor of al-Qaeda, Riedel said, it was the Pakistani military, acting through its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate.
Vice President Dick Cheney and the neoconservative-dominated Bush Pentagon were aware of the intimate relationship between Musharraf's regime and both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. But al-Qaeda was not a high priority for the Bush administration.
After 9/11, the White House created the political myth that Musharraf, faced with a clear choice, had "joined the free world in fighting the terrorists." But as Asia expert Selig S. Harrison has pointed out, on Sept. 19, 2001, just six days after he had supposedly agreed to U.S. demands for cooperation against the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda, Musharraf gave a televised speech in Urdu in which he declared, "We are trying our best to come out of this critical situation without any damage to Afghanistan and the Taliban."
In his memoirs, published in 2006, Musharraf revealed the seven specific demands he had been given and claimed that he had refused both "blanket overflight and landing rights" and the use of Pakistan's naval ports and air bases to conduct anti-terrorism operations.
Musharraf also famously wrote that, immediately after 9/11, Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage had threatened to bomb Pakistan "back to the stone age" if Musharraf didn't side with the United States against bin Laden and his Afghan hosts. But Armitage categorically denied to this writer, through his assistant, Kara Bue, that he had made any threat whatsoever, let alone a threat to retaliate militarily against Pakistan.
For the next few years, Musharraf played a complicated game. The CIA was allowed to operate in Pakistan's border provinces to pursue al-Qaeda operatives, but only as long as they had ISI units accompanying them. That restricted their ability to gather intelligence in the northwest frontier. At the same time, ISI was allowing Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders to operate freely in the tribal areas and even in Karachi.
The Bush administration also gave Musharraf and the military regime a free ride on the A.Q. Khan network's selling of nuclear technology to Libya and Iran, even though there was plenty of evidence that the generals had been fully aware of and supported Khan's activities.
Journalists Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins wrote in their book The Nuclear Jihadist that one retired general who had worked with Khan told them there was no question that Khan had acted with the full knowledge of the military leadership. "Of course the military knew," the general said. "They helped him."
But the Bush administration chose to help Musharraf cover up that inconvenient fact. According to CIA Director George Tenet's memoirs, in September 2003, he confronted Musharraf with the evidence the CIA had gathered on Khan's operation and made it clear he was expected to end its operations and arrest Khan.
The following January and early February, Khan's house arrest, public confession of guilt and pardon by Musharraf was accompanied by an extraordinary series of statements by high-ranking Bush administration officials exonerating Musharraf and the military of any involvement in Khan's activities.
That whole scenario had been "carefully orchestrated with Musharraf," Larry Wilkerson, then a State Department official but later Colin Powell's chief of staff, told IPS in an interview last year. The deal that had been made did not require Musharraf to allow U.S. officials to interrogate Khan.
But the Bush administration apparently conveyed to the Pakistani military after that episode that it now expected the Musharraf regime to deliver high-ranking al-Qaeda officials – and to do so at a particularly advantageous moment for the administration. The New Republic magazine reported July 15, 2004, that a White House aide had told the visiting head of ISI, Ehsan ul-Haq, that "it would be best if the arrest or killing of any HVT [high value target] were announced on 26, 27, or 28 July." Those were the last three days of the Democratic National Convention.
The military source added, "If we don't find these guys by the election, they are going to stick the whole nuclear mess up our a**hole."
Just hours before Democratic candidate John Kerry's acceptance speech, Pakistan announced the capture of an alleged al-Qaeda leader.
Meanwhile, Musharraf was making a political pact with a five-party Islamic alliance in 2004 to ensure victory in state elections in the two border provinces where Islamic extremist influence was strongest. This explicit political accommodation, followed by a military withdrawal from South Waziristan, gave the pro-Taliban forces allied with al-Qaeda in the region a free hand to recruit and train militants for war in Afghanistan.
Yet another deal with the Islamic extremists in 2006 strengthened the pro-Taliban forces even further.
But Bush chose to reward Musharraf by designating Pakistan a "Major Non-NATO Ally" in 2004 and by agreeing to sell the Pakistani Air Force 36 advanced F-16 fighter planes. Prior to that, Pakistan had been denied U.S. military technology for a decade.
In July 2007, a National Intelligence Estimate concluded that al-Qaeda's new "safe haven" was in Pakistan's tribal areas and that the terrorist organization had reconstituted its "homeland attack capability" there. That estimate ended the fiction that the Musharraf regime was firmly committed to combating al-Qaeda in Pakistan.
Had the Bush administration accurately portrayed Musharraf's policies rather than hiding them, it would not have avoided the al-Qaeda safe haven there. But it would have facilitated a more realistic debate about the real options available for U.S. policy.
(Inter Press Service)
Bush Covered Up Musharraf Ties With al-Qaeda, Khan
by Gareth Porter
Commentary by William O. Beeman:
The United States Government and President Pervez Musharraf appear to have had a common interest in no doing anyting to curtail Al-Qaeda or finding Osama bin Laden. For President Bush, the continued presence of bin Laden assured that the "Global War on Terror" for which the Pentagon has been issuing war medals for the last years, would continue unabated, justifying every form of destruction of human rights and American civil liberties. For Musharraf, the fact that bin Laden was never found allowed him to milk the United States for billions of dollars of military and civilian aid, something that continues to the present day. Gareth Porter now shows us that the Bush administration was completely aware of Musharraf's ties to the Taliban and al-Qaeda and just didn't bother to tell Congress or the American public. What is astonishing is that the Bush administration seems to have made no plans for Musharraf's departure. Two warring political factions are left to wrangle over power in Islamabad, while the fate of Pakistan's nuclear bombs remains uncertain. This is about the worst political muddle perpetrated by the Bush administration since the illegal invasion of Iraq.
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's resignation Monday brings to an end an extraordinarily close relationship between Musharraf and the George W. Bush administration, in which Musharraf was lavished with political and economic benefits from the United States despite policies that were in sharp conflict with U.S. security interests.
It is well known that Bush repeatedly praised Musharraf as the most loyal ally of the United States against terrorism, even though the Pakistani military was deeply compromised by its relationship with the Taliban and Pakistani Islamic militants.
What has not been reported is that the Bush administration covered up the Musharraf regime's involvement in the activities of the A.Q. Khan nuclear technology export program and its deals with al-Qaeda's Pakistani tribal allies.
The problem faced by the Bush administration when it came into office was that the Pakistani military, over which Musharraf presided, was the real terrorist nexus with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. As Bruce Riedel, National Security Council (NSC) senior director for South Asia in the Bill Clinton administration, who stayed on the NSC staff under the Bush administration, observed in an interview with this writer last September, al-Qaeda "was a creation of the jihadist culture of the Pakistani army."
If there was a state sponsor of al-Qaeda, Riedel said, it was the Pakistani military, acting through its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate.
Vice President Dick Cheney and the neoconservative-dominated Bush Pentagon were aware of the intimate relationship between Musharraf's regime and both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. But al-Qaeda was not a high priority for the Bush administration.
After 9/11, the White House created the political myth that Musharraf, faced with a clear choice, had "joined the free world in fighting the terrorists." But as Asia expert Selig S. Harrison has pointed out, on Sept. 19, 2001, just six days after he had supposedly agreed to U.S. demands for cooperation against the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda, Musharraf gave a televised speech in Urdu in which he declared, "We are trying our best to come out of this critical situation without any damage to Afghanistan and the Taliban."
In his memoirs, published in 2006, Musharraf revealed the seven specific demands he had been given and claimed that he had refused both "blanket overflight and landing rights" and the use of Pakistan's naval ports and air bases to conduct anti-terrorism operations.
Musharraf also famously wrote that, immediately after 9/11, Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage had threatened to bomb Pakistan "back to the stone age" if Musharraf didn't side with the United States against bin Laden and his Afghan hosts. But Armitage categorically denied to this writer, through his assistant, Kara Bue, that he had made any threat whatsoever, let alone a threat to retaliate militarily against Pakistan.
For the next few years, Musharraf played a complicated game. The CIA was allowed to operate in Pakistan's border provinces to pursue al-Qaeda operatives, but only as long as they had ISI units accompanying them. That restricted their ability to gather intelligence in the northwest frontier. At the same time, ISI was allowing Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders to operate freely in the tribal areas and even in Karachi.
The Bush administration also gave Musharraf and the military regime a free ride on the A.Q. Khan network's selling of nuclear technology to Libya and Iran, even though there was plenty of evidence that the generals had been fully aware of and supported Khan's activities.
Journalists Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins wrote in their book The Nuclear Jihadist that one retired general who had worked with Khan told them there was no question that Khan had acted with the full knowledge of the military leadership. "Of course the military knew," the general said. "They helped him."
But the Bush administration chose to help Musharraf cover up that inconvenient fact. According to CIA Director George Tenet's memoirs, in September 2003, he confronted Musharraf with the evidence the CIA had gathered on Khan's operation and made it clear he was expected to end its operations and arrest Khan.
The following January and early February, Khan's house arrest, public confession of guilt and pardon by Musharraf was accompanied by an extraordinary series of statements by high-ranking Bush administration officials exonerating Musharraf and the military of any involvement in Khan's activities.
That whole scenario had been "carefully orchestrated with Musharraf," Larry Wilkerson, then a State Department official but later Colin Powell's chief of staff, told IPS in an interview last year. The deal that had been made did not require Musharraf to allow U.S. officials to interrogate Khan.
But the Bush administration apparently conveyed to the Pakistani military after that episode that it now expected the Musharraf regime to deliver high-ranking al-Qaeda officials – and to do so at a particularly advantageous moment for the administration. The New Republic magazine reported July 15, 2004, that a White House aide had told the visiting head of ISI, Ehsan ul-Haq, that "it would be best if the arrest or killing of any HVT [high value target] were announced on 26, 27, or 28 July." Those were the last three days of the Democratic National Convention.
The military source added, "If we don't find these guys by the election, they are going to stick the whole nuclear mess up our a**hole."
Just hours before Democratic candidate John Kerry's acceptance speech, Pakistan announced the capture of an alleged al-Qaeda leader.
Meanwhile, Musharraf was making a political pact with a five-party Islamic alliance in 2004 to ensure victory in state elections in the two border provinces where Islamic extremist influence was strongest. This explicit political accommodation, followed by a military withdrawal from South Waziristan, gave the pro-Taliban forces allied with al-Qaeda in the region a free hand to recruit and train militants for war in Afghanistan.
Yet another deal with the Islamic extremists in 2006 strengthened the pro-Taliban forces even further.
But Bush chose to reward Musharraf by designating Pakistan a "Major Non-NATO Ally" in 2004 and by agreeing to sell the Pakistani Air Force 36 advanced F-16 fighter planes. Prior to that, Pakistan had been denied U.S. military technology for a decade.
In July 2007, a National Intelligence Estimate concluded that al-Qaeda's new "safe haven" was in Pakistan's tribal areas and that the terrorist organization had reconstituted its "homeland attack capability" there. That estimate ended the fiction that the Musharraf regime was firmly committed to combating al-Qaeda in Pakistan.
Had the Bush administration accurately portrayed Musharraf's policies rather than hiding them, it would not have avoided the al-Qaeda safe haven there. But it would have facilitated a more realistic debate about the real options available for U.S. policy.
(Inter Press Service)
Monday, August 18, 2008
William O. Beeman--Big Three Block Iran Attack (Foreign Policy in Focus)
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5472
Big Three Block Iran Attack
William O. Beeman | August 18, 2008
Editor: John Feffer
Foreign Policy In Focus
www.fpif.org
The United States is in a huge foreign policy muddle in the Middle East. It wants to dominate and control Iran but requires the support of the world community to accomplish its aims. Diplomacy and sanctions require only a low level of support. On the other hand, to launch a military attack or green-light one by Israel, the United States needs far more backing.
This support does not appear to exist, and recent U.S. foreign policy actions are eroding that support even further. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported on August 13 that the United States refused to give the go-ahead to Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities in talks between Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak. Could it be that the Bush administration finally knows when it is licked?
Israeli officials acknowledge that it would be difficult to launch such an attack without approval from Russia, China, and India, something that the United States would have to lobby those nations to achieve. The chances at present are extremely slim that any of the three will acquiesce.
U.S. condemnation of Russia’s military action to defend the breakaway region of South Ossetia, combined with the determination of the Bush administration to install missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, virtually guarantee that Russia will not do anything to help the United States foment more violence in its neighborhood.
Beijing owns much of the U.S. debt, continues to be one of Tehran’s largest trade partners, and is not about to be dictated to by Washington. India has defied the United States by entering into a pipeline deal with Iran. Exhaustive three-year nuclear treaty negotiations between the United States and India are utterly stalled. If the treaty is not presented to Congress in September, it will be dead.
Russia and China have repeatedly said that they see no nuclear weapons danger in Iran. Besides the tension over the pending treaty with the United States, India has little to say, since it is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, as Iran is. The skepticism of these nations is yet another reason why support for an Iranian attack is evaporating.
So the Bush administration is hoisted with its own petard. Whatever the more hawkish denizens of Washington want to do to Iran, they are not going to get the international support necessary for their desired action.
The most obvious alternative for the United States is to engage with Iran diplomatically. This is particularly difficult for the Bush administration because of its carefully burnished tough-guy approach. When Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William J. Burns merely appeared at the negotiating table with European Union members and Iran for the first time, the right-wing media reaction was swift and vitriolic. Critics on the right, , including two editorials in one week on the conservative Wall Street Journal editorial page, accused the Bush administration of “capitulation” to Iran.
Nevertheless international conditions with Russian, China and India may force expansion of this diplomatic approach, regardless of right-wing reaction.
The irony is that talking to Iran could be easy if the Bush administration would just relax. All the Iranians want for real talks to begin is to be treated as equals at the negotiating table, and to start the talks with no pre-conditions. This, too, is what Russia, India, and China want – not only for Iran, but for themselves as well.
The Bush crowd, however, is determined to patronize and insult everyone. During the current conflict in Georgia, Washington has implied that Russia is “not yet” part of the international community. The Bush administration coerced and threatened India over its nuclear program and the oil pipeline deal with Iran. China has been treated somewhat more gently, but the Chinese, too, chafe at criticisms of their environmental record, politics toward Tibet, and international dealings in the Sudan and elsewhere, which they see as hypocritical and intrusive.
When it comes to Iran, all three countries have signaled that they’ve had enough of Washington’s bullying. If however, the United States decides to treat Iran with mutual respect at the negotiating table, it might discover not only a way out of the impasse in the Middle East but improved relations with other key countries around the world.
Foreign Policy In Focus contributor William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. He is president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association and the author, most recently, of The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.
Big Three Block Iran Attack
William O. Beeman | August 18, 2008
Editor: John Feffer
Foreign Policy In Focus
www.fpif.org
The United States is in a huge foreign policy muddle in the Middle East. It wants to dominate and control Iran but requires the support of the world community to accomplish its aims. Diplomacy and sanctions require only a low level of support. On the other hand, to launch a military attack or green-light one by Israel, the United States needs far more backing.
This support does not appear to exist, and recent U.S. foreign policy actions are eroding that support even further. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported on August 13 that the United States refused to give the go-ahead to Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities in talks between Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak. Could it be that the Bush administration finally knows when it is licked?
Israeli officials acknowledge that it would be difficult to launch such an attack without approval from Russia, China, and India, something that the United States would have to lobby those nations to achieve. The chances at present are extremely slim that any of the three will acquiesce.
U.S. condemnation of Russia’s military action to defend the breakaway region of South Ossetia, combined with the determination of the Bush administration to install missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, virtually guarantee that Russia will not do anything to help the United States foment more violence in its neighborhood.
Beijing owns much of the U.S. debt, continues to be one of Tehran’s largest trade partners, and is not about to be dictated to by Washington. India has defied the United States by entering into a pipeline deal with Iran. Exhaustive three-year nuclear treaty negotiations between the United States and India are utterly stalled. If the treaty is not presented to Congress in September, it will be dead.
Russia and China have repeatedly said that they see no nuclear weapons danger in Iran. Besides the tension over the pending treaty with the United States, India has little to say, since it is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, as Iran is. The skepticism of these nations is yet another reason why support for an Iranian attack is evaporating.
So the Bush administration is hoisted with its own petard. Whatever the more hawkish denizens of Washington want to do to Iran, they are not going to get the international support necessary for their desired action.
The most obvious alternative for the United States is to engage with Iran diplomatically. This is particularly difficult for the Bush administration because of its carefully burnished tough-guy approach. When Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William J. Burns merely appeared at the negotiating table with European Union members and Iran for the first time, the right-wing media reaction was swift and vitriolic. Critics on the right, , including two editorials in one week on the conservative Wall Street Journal editorial page, accused the Bush administration of “capitulation” to Iran.
Nevertheless international conditions with Russian, China and India may force expansion of this diplomatic approach, regardless of right-wing reaction.
The irony is that talking to Iran could be easy if the Bush administration would just relax. All the Iranians want for real talks to begin is to be treated as equals at the negotiating table, and to start the talks with no pre-conditions. This, too, is what Russia, India, and China want – not only for Iran, but for themselves as well.
The Bush crowd, however, is determined to patronize and insult everyone. During the current conflict in Georgia, Washington has implied that Russia is “not yet” part of the international community. The Bush administration coerced and threatened India over its nuclear program and the oil pipeline deal with Iran. China has been treated somewhat more gently, but the Chinese, too, chafe at criticisms of their environmental record, politics toward Tibet, and international dealings in the Sudan and elsewhere, which they see as hypocritical and intrusive.
When it comes to Iran, all three countries have signaled that they’ve had enough of Washington’s bullying. If however, the United States decides to treat Iran with mutual respect at the negotiating table, it might discover not only a way out of the impasse in the Middle East but improved relations with other key countries around the world.
Foreign Policy In Focus contributor William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. He is president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association and the author, most recently, of The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.
Friday, August 15, 2008
Petropolitics at heart of Russia-Georgia clash | csmonitor.com
Petropolitics at heart of Russia-Georgia clash | csmonitor.com
Commentary by William O. Beeman:
The clash between Russia and Georgia is not the simple black-and-white conflict over "democracy" and "sovereignty" portrayed by the Bush administration. The United States is just as complicit in this conflict as any of the other parties. The U.S. is trying to establish outposts in the Caucasus that will allow American (and Israeli) interests to be promulgated in the entire region. Seventy percent of the national budget of Georgia is spent on defense, despite widespread poverty in that nation. President Saakashvili is an American trained lawyer (Columbia and George Washington) who just happened to give up his law firm job in the U.S. to lead a Revolution in Georgia that allowed the U.S. and Israel free access to the state, and the U.S. and British Petroleum to run a pipeline through the country that would bypass both Iranian and Russian supply lines to the world.
Petropolitics at heart of Russia-Georgia clash
Oil-pipeline routes, market leverage make struggle a 'battle for energy.'
By David R. Francis
from the August 18, 2008 edition
In both geopolitical and economic terms, the United States appears a loser in the Russia-Georgia conflict.
If the pipeline crossing Georgia, bringing approximately a million barrels of Caspian oil a day to the West, remains shut down for much longer, it could result in higher oil prices.
"We could see $4 a gallon gasoline again," warns Edward Yardeni, an American consulting economist.
The 1,100-mile Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline provides only about 1 percent of the global demand for oil. But, as Prof. Michael Klare of Amherst College notes: "There's not a lot of spare [crude oil] capacity" in the world.
In the long-running struggle for control of Caspian oil and gas and influence in the ex-Soviet states of that region, the clash has been a blow to US clout.
"The Russians come out of this as winning this round," says Professor Klare. "They are the power brokers in this part of the world…. But there will be more skirmishes to come."
Klare, author of "Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy," sees the conflict as "not a battle for democracy," as portrayed by Washington. "It was a battle for energy," he says.
Oil reserves underneath the Caspian Sea are believed to be huge, perhaps as much as 200 billion barrels. That compares with the estimated 260 billion barrels in Saudi Arabia.
In his State of the Union Address in 1980, President Jimmy Carter proclaimed what has become known as the "Carter doctrine." It stated that the US would use military force if necessary to defend its national interest in the Persian Gulf region. Carter saw the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at that time as "a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil."
President Clinton, as Klare sees it, expanded the Carter doctrine "more or less" to include Caspian oil. The BTC pipeline, taking crude from Azerbaijan through Georgia to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, where it is loaded on tankers for the international market, was "Clinton's brainchild," says Klare.
President Bush has heated up what Klare regards as a struggle over vital resources, rather than a throwback to the cold-war era or classic balance-of-power politics. In that struggle, the US helped Mikheil Saakashvili win the presidency in Georgia after its 2003 "Rose Revolution" and helped build up and train Georgia's armed forces. When the American-educated Saakashvili attempted to show his mettle and restore the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia's control, the Russians took the opportunity to show who is boss.
Klare worries that an American military adviser might be hit inadvertently by a Russian bomb, raising US-Russia tensions further.
"Throughout the Caucasus, the US has been striving to establish pro-American governments for strategic reasons," says William Beeman, chair of the anthropology department at the University of Minnesota. One reason aside from Caspian oil, Professor Beeman suspects, is to provide a staging area for possible attacks on such perceived enemies as Iran and Syria.
The $4 billion BTC pipeline, managed by and 30 percent owned by British Petroleum, was routed through Georgia to avoid sending Caspian oil through Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, or Russia. A 10-mile pipeline could have connected Caspian oil to the well-developed Iranian pipeline system. Beeman charges that millions in government bribes changed hands to place the pipeline in its tortuous route.
Georgian authorities charged Russia with trying to bomb the pipeline last Tuesday, a pipeline that had been buried deep in a trench for the sake of security. BP stated it was unaware of such bombings. In any case, the BTC flow of oil – about $1 billion worth every 10 days – had already been stopped by an earlier fire at a facility in Turkey. Kurdish rebels, known as the PKK, claimed the fire was their responsibility.
There have been plans to take the same Georgia route for a Caspian natural-gas pipeline ending in Europe. Klare considers the Russian action as partially a warning that this is not a good idea. Such a pipeline would offer serious competition to Gazprom, the giant Russian oil-and-gas conglomerate. Russia supplies one-quarter of the oil and half the natural gas consumed in Europe, and the revenue is seen as key to Russian prosperity. The European Union has been keen on the Georgia plan as a way to gain bargaining power and reduce the risk of supply cutoffs.
But the Russia-Georgia war may have reduced the prospects for such a gas pipeline getting financing and European backing.
"I wouldn't hold my breath," says Klare. He advocates that the US, EU, Russia, and the Caspian states develop a comprehensive regional energy plan for Caspian oil and gas.
www.csmonitor.com | Copyright © 2008 The Christian Science Monitor. All rights reserved.
Commentary by William O. Beeman:
The clash between Russia and Georgia is not the simple black-and-white conflict over "democracy" and "sovereignty" portrayed by the Bush administration. The United States is just as complicit in this conflict as any of the other parties. The U.S. is trying to establish outposts in the Caucasus that will allow American (and Israeli) interests to be promulgated in the entire region. Seventy percent of the national budget of Georgia is spent on defense, despite widespread poverty in that nation. President Saakashvili is an American trained lawyer (Columbia and George Washington) who just happened to give up his law firm job in the U.S. to lead a Revolution in Georgia that allowed the U.S. and Israel free access to the state, and the U.S. and British Petroleum to run a pipeline through the country that would bypass both Iranian and Russian supply lines to the world.
Petropolitics at heart of Russia-Georgia clash
Oil-pipeline routes, market leverage make struggle a 'battle for energy.'
By David R. Francis
from the August 18, 2008 edition
In both geopolitical and economic terms, the United States appears a loser in the Russia-Georgia conflict.
If the pipeline crossing Georgia, bringing approximately a million barrels of Caspian oil a day to the West, remains shut down for much longer, it could result in higher oil prices.
"We could see $4 a gallon gasoline again," warns Edward Yardeni, an American consulting economist.
The 1,100-mile Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline provides only about 1 percent of the global demand for oil. But, as Prof. Michael Klare of Amherst College notes: "There's not a lot of spare [crude oil] capacity" in the world.
In the long-running struggle for control of Caspian oil and gas and influence in the ex-Soviet states of that region, the clash has been a blow to US clout.
"The Russians come out of this as winning this round," says Professor Klare. "They are the power brokers in this part of the world…. But there will be more skirmishes to come."
Klare, author of "Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy," sees the conflict as "not a battle for democracy," as portrayed by Washington. "It was a battle for energy," he says.
Oil reserves underneath the Caspian Sea are believed to be huge, perhaps as much as 200 billion barrels. That compares with the estimated 260 billion barrels in Saudi Arabia.
In his State of the Union Address in 1980, President Jimmy Carter proclaimed what has become known as the "Carter doctrine." It stated that the US would use military force if necessary to defend its national interest in the Persian Gulf region. Carter saw the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at that time as "a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil."
President Clinton, as Klare sees it, expanded the Carter doctrine "more or less" to include Caspian oil. The BTC pipeline, taking crude from Azerbaijan through Georgia to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, where it is loaded on tankers for the international market, was "Clinton's brainchild," says Klare.
President Bush has heated up what Klare regards as a struggle over vital resources, rather than a throwback to the cold-war era or classic balance-of-power politics. In that struggle, the US helped Mikheil Saakashvili win the presidency in Georgia after its 2003 "Rose Revolution" and helped build up and train Georgia's armed forces. When the American-educated Saakashvili attempted to show his mettle and restore the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia's control, the Russians took the opportunity to show who is boss.
Klare worries that an American military adviser might be hit inadvertently by a Russian bomb, raising US-Russia tensions further.
"Throughout the Caucasus, the US has been striving to establish pro-American governments for strategic reasons," says William Beeman, chair of the anthropology department at the University of Minnesota. One reason aside from Caspian oil, Professor Beeman suspects, is to provide a staging area for possible attacks on such perceived enemies as Iran and Syria.
The $4 billion BTC pipeline, managed by and 30 percent owned by British Petroleum, was routed through Georgia to avoid sending Caspian oil through Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, or Russia. A 10-mile pipeline could have connected Caspian oil to the well-developed Iranian pipeline system. Beeman charges that millions in government bribes changed hands to place the pipeline in its tortuous route.
Georgian authorities charged Russia with trying to bomb the pipeline last Tuesday, a pipeline that had been buried deep in a trench for the sake of security. BP stated it was unaware of such bombings. In any case, the BTC flow of oil – about $1 billion worth every 10 days – had already been stopped by an earlier fire at a facility in Turkey. Kurdish rebels, known as the PKK, claimed the fire was their responsibility.
There have been plans to take the same Georgia route for a Caspian natural-gas pipeline ending in Europe. Klare considers the Russian action as partially a warning that this is not a good idea. Such a pipeline would offer serious competition to Gazprom, the giant Russian oil-and-gas conglomerate. Russia supplies one-quarter of the oil and half the natural gas consumed in Europe, and the revenue is seen as key to Russian prosperity. The European Union has been keen on the Georgia plan as a way to gain bargaining power and reduce the risk of supply cutoffs.
But the Russia-Georgia war may have reduced the prospects for such a gas pipeline getting financing and European backing.
"I wouldn't hold my breath," says Klare. He advocates that the US, EU, Russia, and the Caspian states develop a comprehensive regional energy plan for Caspian oil and gas.
www.csmonitor.com | Copyright © 2008 The Christian Science Monitor. All rights reserved.
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
William O. Beeman--Chickens Come Home to Roost in Georgia - NAM
Chickens Come Home to Roost in Georgia - NAM
Chickens Come Home to Roost in Georgia
New America Media, News Analysis, William O. Beeman, Posted: Aug 12, 2008
Editor's Note: The Bush Administration's push for access to oil from the Caspian Sea and it's desire to isolate Iran precipitated the Russian invasion of Georgia. William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology at the University of Minnesota. He has lived and worked in the Middle East region for more than 30 years.
No one should be surprised that U.S. interference in the Caucasus has led to the Russian invasion of South Ossetia. By mixing into the volatile politics of the Caucasus, and trying to recruit the governments there to become American "plumbers" for a variety of purposes, the United States has only drawn Russian fire.
The Caucasus was one of the last territories added to the Russian Empire in the 19th century. It was captured from the Qajar Empire of Iran. The Caucasians never were fully incorporated into Greater Russia, and maintained a fierce cultural separatism. Georgia in particular was proudly nationalistic, with a distinctive language, cuisine, literary tradition and writing system.
It is arguable that had Josef Stalin not been Georgian, the Caucasian region might never have been part of the Soviet Union. Georgia chafed under Soviet rule, and the wily Soviets enlisted other Caucasian minorities to keep the peace in the region, including the Ossetians. However, Stalinist nationalities philosophy made sure that no one ethnic group ever became too strong. One way to do this was to draw borders in such a way that groups would be split by administrative boundaries. The division between North and South Ossetia was one of these divisions.
The fall of the Soviet Union created three new independent nations in the Caucasus: Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Almost immediately the ethnic enclaves in all of these nations began to fulminate for territorial reunification with their co-ethnic populations in other nations. These included South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Nakhchivan in Armenia, which is mostly Azerbaijani; and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, which is mostly Armenian.
Enter the United States. U.S. interests in this region were vastly different than that of the people of the region, or of Russia. The United States wanted access to Caspian Sea oil, and it wanted to contain Iran. The Caucasian nations were ideal for both purposes. The United States blasted ahead with no regard for the historical tensions in the region.
Therefore the United States blindly pursued a steady policy of propping up the dictatorial regimes of the region. Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are among the most corrupt nations on earth, and it was easy to buy a government. The price for this support was unquestioning alliance with the United States and its regional policies.
Access to Caspian oil was one burning policy goal of all administrations since 1990. The easy route for transport of petroleum products from the region would be through Iran's well developed pipeline system. Literally just a few miles of pipeline would connect the Azerbaijani oil fields to the Iranian system. However, Washington was ready to do almost anything to avoid providing any economic benefit to Iran. Hence, working with U.S. petroleum producers, they constructed a difficult and tortuous pipeline across Azerbaijan and Georgia, to emerge in Turkey for shipping to the world. Many millions in government bribes changed hands to make this happen.
As Iran became a target of the George W. Bush administration, having friendly powers in the Caucasus became a priority for the Washington establishment. The Velvet Revolution in Georgia was aided by the United States. In Azerbaijan, the United States virtually installed the current president, Ilham Aliyev, son of the previous president for life, Heydar Aliyev. The election itself was highly controversial. Heydar Aliyev was in Cleveland, Ohio for medical treatment, and was rumored to have died four months before his son was elected. The United States government was reportedly involved in the cover-up, and supported Ilham's election despite mass protests among Azerbaijani citizens.
President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia has close ties to the United States, having graduated with law degrees from Columbia and George Washington Universities. He was the leader of the Rose Revolution in 2003, which ousted President Eduard Shevardnadze, former Soviet foreign minister, and striking a blow for Georgian independence. Elected president in 2004, he also greatly improved ties with Israel, and received an honorary doctorate from Haifa University, and has allowed Israeli intelligence to operate in Georgia. All of this endeared him to the Bush administration.
The United States tried to engineer the entrance of Georgia into NATO in April, 2008, but was surprised when 10 NATO members vetoed the proposal. Russia viewed this as a hostile act on the part of the United States.
President Saakashvili's presidency has not stopped continual ethnic violence from breakaway regions in his country. The South Ossetia conflict is only one of the latest, but it was different in that it serves as a smokescreen for Russian attacks on Saakashvili's government.
If Saakashvili should be ousted from office, a major U.S. and Israeli outpost would be lost. The fate of the oil pipeline would be in danger, and pressure on Iran would lessen considerably. All of these outcomes are seen as disastrous for the Bush administration. Thus all of the high-minded rhetoric about Georgian sovereignty coming out of Washington is ultimately cynical. If U.S. interests were not at stake, no one would care.
Chickens Come Home to Roost in Georgia
New America Media, News Analysis, William O. Beeman, Posted: Aug 12, 2008
Editor's Note: The Bush Administration's push for access to oil from the Caspian Sea and it's desire to isolate Iran precipitated the Russian invasion of Georgia. William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology at the University of Minnesota. He has lived and worked in the Middle East region for more than 30 years.
No one should be surprised that U.S. interference in the Caucasus has led to the Russian invasion of South Ossetia. By mixing into the volatile politics of the Caucasus, and trying to recruit the governments there to become American "plumbers" for a variety of purposes, the United States has only drawn Russian fire.
The Caucasus was one of the last territories added to the Russian Empire in the 19th century. It was captured from the Qajar Empire of Iran. The Caucasians never were fully incorporated into Greater Russia, and maintained a fierce cultural separatism. Georgia in particular was proudly nationalistic, with a distinctive language, cuisine, literary tradition and writing system.
It is arguable that had Josef Stalin not been Georgian, the Caucasian region might never have been part of the Soviet Union. Georgia chafed under Soviet rule, and the wily Soviets enlisted other Caucasian minorities to keep the peace in the region, including the Ossetians. However, Stalinist nationalities philosophy made sure that no one ethnic group ever became too strong. One way to do this was to draw borders in such a way that groups would be split by administrative boundaries. The division between North and South Ossetia was one of these divisions.
The fall of the Soviet Union created three new independent nations in the Caucasus: Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Almost immediately the ethnic enclaves in all of these nations began to fulminate for territorial reunification with their co-ethnic populations in other nations. These included South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Nakhchivan in Armenia, which is mostly Azerbaijani; and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, which is mostly Armenian.
Enter the United States. U.S. interests in this region were vastly different than that of the people of the region, or of Russia. The United States wanted access to Caspian Sea oil, and it wanted to contain Iran. The Caucasian nations were ideal for both purposes. The United States blasted ahead with no regard for the historical tensions in the region.
Therefore the United States blindly pursued a steady policy of propping up the dictatorial regimes of the region. Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are among the most corrupt nations on earth, and it was easy to buy a government. The price for this support was unquestioning alliance with the United States and its regional policies.
Access to Caspian oil was one burning policy goal of all administrations since 1990. The easy route for transport of petroleum products from the region would be through Iran's well developed pipeline system. Literally just a few miles of pipeline would connect the Azerbaijani oil fields to the Iranian system. However, Washington was ready to do almost anything to avoid providing any economic benefit to Iran. Hence, working with U.S. petroleum producers, they constructed a difficult and tortuous pipeline across Azerbaijan and Georgia, to emerge in Turkey for shipping to the world. Many millions in government bribes changed hands to make this happen.
As Iran became a target of the George W. Bush administration, having friendly powers in the Caucasus became a priority for the Washington establishment. The Velvet Revolution in Georgia was aided by the United States. In Azerbaijan, the United States virtually installed the current president, Ilham Aliyev, son of the previous president for life, Heydar Aliyev. The election itself was highly controversial. Heydar Aliyev was in Cleveland, Ohio for medical treatment, and was rumored to have died four months before his son was elected. The United States government was reportedly involved in the cover-up, and supported Ilham's election despite mass protests among Azerbaijani citizens.
President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia has close ties to the United States, having graduated with law degrees from Columbia and George Washington Universities. He was the leader of the Rose Revolution in 2003, which ousted President Eduard Shevardnadze, former Soviet foreign minister, and striking a blow for Georgian independence. Elected president in 2004, he also greatly improved ties with Israel, and received an honorary doctorate from Haifa University, and has allowed Israeli intelligence to operate in Georgia. All of this endeared him to the Bush administration.
The United States tried to engineer the entrance of Georgia into NATO in April, 2008, but was surprised when 10 NATO members vetoed the proposal. Russia viewed this as a hostile act on the part of the United States.
President Saakashvili's presidency has not stopped continual ethnic violence from breakaway regions in his country. The South Ossetia conflict is only one of the latest, but it was different in that it serves as a smokescreen for Russian attacks on Saakashvili's government.
If Saakashvili should be ousted from office, a major U.S. and Israeli outpost would be lost. The fate of the oil pipeline would be in danger, and pressure on Iran would lessen considerably. All of these outcomes are seen as disastrous for the Bush administration. Thus all of the high-minded rhetoric about Georgian sovereignty coming out of Washington is ultimately cynical. If U.S. interests were not at stake, no one would care.
Wednesday, August 06, 2008
William O. Beeman --The Iranian Chess Game Continues (Foreign Policy in Focus)
The Iranian Chess Game Continues
August 6, 2008
Foreign Policy In Focus
www.fpif.org
Diplomacy between Iran and the United States has entered the opening gambit stage and Iran appears to be winning at this point.
The game began on July 19, when Iranian nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili met with European negotiators with an American diplomat, Under Secretary of State William J. Burns, present for the first time at such a meeting since the Iranian hostage crisis.
The presence of William J. Burns riled many anti-Iranian forces resulting in a flurry of pronouncements and articles about American "capitulation" to Iran. The recriminations continued. Even now, on August 5, former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton, a notorious anti-Iran detractor, wrote a fulminating article in the Wall Street Journal entitled "While Diplomats Dither, Iran Builds Nukes."
The Bush administration clearly found itself in a difficult situation, needing to placate hawks like Bolton and Vice-President Dick Cheney while seeming to allow diplomacy to have a chance, so they made the talks not about substance, but about power – which side could compel the other to toe the line.
So the Bush administration started with a big lie. At the time of the July meeting the press and the State Department announced that Iran had a two-week deadline to respond to the European proposals, (the exact details of which remain secret, but which are presumed to include an extensive basket of technology, economic, and trade incentives).
There was no such deadline. It appears to have been a fiction. However, this falsehood gave Washington and the press the opportunity on August 2 to announce that Iran had "rejected" the deadline. The New York Times went so far as to call it an "informal deadline," a head-scratching concept.
Iranian Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki was reported by Agence France Press to have said, "The language of deadline-setting is not understandable to us. We gave them our response within a month as we said we would, now they have to reply to us."
Even the State Department itself had to back down from the fictional deadline. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack threatened further sanctions if Iran did not respond on Wednesday, July 30. But he had changed his tune on Saturday, August 2, the putative deadline. "I didn't count the days. It's coming up soon," he said. And when asked when Washington would pull incentives off the table designed to persuade Iran to abandon its uranium enrichment program, said "there is no indication of that.
So little happened at the July 19 meeting, it could hardly be called a diplomatic encounter. In fact, Iran has been pursuing a productive diplomatic course. Rather than responding to deadlines and ultimatums, Iran has steadily put forward proposals for resolving its differences with the European and American governments over its nuclear energy program. It is clear that Iran will not give up its "inalienable right" to peaceful development of nuclear energy, as enshrined in Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which it (but not India, Pakistan or Israel) is a signatory. It seeks other means, short of suspending uranium enrichment, to assure the world that it has no active nuclear weapons program.
Iran's proposal for negotiations presented to the European Nations is titled "The Modality For Comprehensive Negotiations" and sets out three stages of proceedings:
Preliminary Talks. Overall determination of the negotiating timetable.
Start of Talks. Actions against Iran would be suspended and common ground matters would be discussed.
Negotiations. Actual negotiating stage which the Iranians envision should last two months, but could be extended by mutual consent.
Iran does not agree in this document to suspend uranium enrichment. The document states in the negotiation stage that determinations regarding Iran's compliance with the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty would be "concluded in the UNSC [United Nations Security Council] and fully and completely returned to the Agency [The International Atomic Energy Agency]."
This is a reasonable blueprint for forward negotiations, and it represents a real diplomatic effort on Iran’s part. By contrast, the United States seems to have acted with a combination of bluff and muscle, and has gotten nowhere for their efforts.
This has not stopped the United States and its European allies for calling on August 4 for more sanctions based on Iran's violation of the "informal deadline." This is an astonishing exercise in diplomatic audacity – calling for punishment where there could be no violation, there being no mutual agreement of the conditions under which actions would be declared a violation. Unfortunately, the political climate against Iran being what it is, such an unwarranted bellicose move will likely go unquestioned.
Except by Iran.
Iran had its own gambits in mind to retain control of the process. After the accusations and the threats by the European and U.S. consortium, they countered with a grim reminder that they could close the Strait of Hormuz, through which two-thirds of OPEC crude oil passes. They tested some new conventional missiles. Then they announced that they would indeed answer the European proposals – but in their own time and on their own timetable, according to their own agenda. They were clearly working through their own negotiation plan step by step, catching the United States off guard, and throwing everyone in Washington off their game, leaving them to continue their slow burn.
The question is whether, out of frustration or pique, the impatient Washington detractors will upset the table.
Foreign Policy In Focus contributor William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. He is president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association and the author, most recently, of The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.
August 6, 2008
Foreign Policy In Focus
www.fpif.org
Diplomacy between Iran and the United States has entered the opening gambit stage and Iran appears to be winning at this point.
The game began on July 19, when Iranian nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili met with European negotiators with an American diplomat, Under Secretary of State William J. Burns, present for the first time at such a meeting since the Iranian hostage crisis.
The presence of William J. Burns riled many anti-Iranian forces resulting in a flurry of pronouncements and articles about American "capitulation" to Iran. The recriminations continued. Even now, on August 5, former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton, a notorious anti-Iran detractor, wrote a fulminating article in the Wall Street Journal entitled "While Diplomats Dither, Iran Builds Nukes."
The Bush administration clearly found itself in a difficult situation, needing to placate hawks like Bolton and Vice-President Dick Cheney while seeming to allow diplomacy to have a chance, so they made the talks not about substance, but about power – which side could compel the other to toe the line.
So the Bush administration started with a big lie. At the time of the July meeting the press and the State Department announced that Iran had a two-week deadline to respond to the European proposals, (the exact details of which remain secret, but which are presumed to include an extensive basket of technology, economic, and trade incentives).
There was no such deadline. It appears to have been a fiction. However, this falsehood gave Washington and the press the opportunity on August 2 to announce that Iran had "rejected" the deadline. The New York Times went so far as to call it an "informal deadline," a head-scratching concept.
Iranian Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki was reported by Agence France Press to have said, "The language of deadline-setting is not understandable to us. We gave them our response within a month as we said we would, now they have to reply to us."
Even the State Department itself had to back down from the fictional deadline. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack threatened further sanctions if Iran did not respond on Wednesday, July 30. But he had changed his tune on Saturday, August 2, the putative deadline. "I didn't count the days. It's coming up soon," he said. And when asked when Washington would pull incentives off the table designed to persuade Iran to abandon its uranium enrichment program, said "there is no indication of that.
So little happened at the July 19 meeting, it could hardly be called a diplomatic encounter. In fact, Iran has been pursuing a productive diplomatic course. Rather than responding to deadlines and ultimatums, Iran has steadily put forward proposals for resolving its differences with the European and American governments over its nuclear energy program. It is clear that Iran will not give up its "inalienable right" to peaceful development of nuclear energy, as enshrined in Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which it (but not India, Pakistan or Israel) is a signatory. It seeks other means, short of suspending uranium enrichment, to assure the world that it has no active nuclear weapons program.
Iran's proposal for negotiations presented to the European Nations is titled "The Modality For Comprehensive Negotiations" and sets out three stages of proceedings:
Preliminary Talks. Overall determination of the negotiating timetable.
Start of Talks. Actions against Iran would be suspended and common ground matters would be discussed.
Negotiations. Actual negotiating stage which the Iranians envision should last two months, but could be extended by mutual consent.
Iran does not agree in this document to suspend uranium enrichment. The document states in the negotiation stage that determinations regarding Iran's compliance with the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty would be "concluded in the UNSC [United Nations Security Council] and fully and completely returned to the Agency [The International Atomic Energy Agency]."
This is a reasonable blueprint for forward negotiations, and it represents a real diplomatic effort on Iran’s part. By contrast, the United States seems to have acted with a combination of bluff and muscle, and has gotten nowhere for their efforts.
This has not stopped the United States and its European allies for calling on August 4 for more sanctions based on Iran's violation of the "informal deadline." This is an astonishing exercise in diplomatic audacity – calling for punishment where there could be no violation, there being no mutual agreement of the conditions under which actions would be declared a violation. Unfortunately, the political climate against Iran being what it is, such an unwarranted bellicose move will likely go unquestioned.
Except by Iran.
Iran had its own gambits in mind to retain control of the process. After the accusations and the threats by the European and U.S. consortium, they countered with a grim reminder that they could close the Strait of Hormuz, through which two-thirds of OPEC crude oil passes. They tested some new conventional missiles. Then they announced that they would indeed answer the European proposals – but in their own time and on their own timetable, according to their own agenda. They were clearly working through their own negotiation plan step by step, catching the United States off guard, and throwing everyone in Washington off their game, leaving them to continue their slow burn.
The question is whether, out of frustration or pique, the impatient Washington detractors will upset the table.
Foreign Policy In Focus contributor William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. He is president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association and the author, most recently, of The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.
Tuesday, August 05, 2008
Ebneyousef--Attacking Iran: Probable Economic Consequences (Middle East Economic Survey)
Middle East Economic Survey
VOL. LI
No 31
04-Aug-2008
Comment by William O. Beeman
Elements of the Bush administration evidently think that attacking Iran would be cost-free, as they did with Iraq. Hosseein Ebneyousef, an oil expert tells the sobering truth.
Bill Beeman
University of Minnesota
IRAN
Attacking Iran: Probable Economic Consequences
By Hossein Ebneyousef
The following article was written for MEES by Mr Ebneyousef. Since 1988 he has been the President of Washington-based International Petroleum Enterprises, having previously worked for ARCO for 14 years (e-mail Ebneyousef@AOL.com).
Considering the already overstretched US military assets, its engagement in two major and costly theaters of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, deteriorating security conditions in Pakistan and Lebanon and Iran’s apparently softer approach on the nuclear issue, I am not sure that a military attack on Iran is imminent (that is, if one attributes a minimal level of rationality to the decision makers). Even an effective military blockade of Iran, which is an act of war in any case, does not seem feasible in light of Iran’s size, strategic location and lengthy maritime and land borders. Here, I would like to address the global economic impact of such potential actions, as it would likely be much more drastic and long lasting than has so far been explained.
Despite the existence at the time of more than 4.4mn b/d of spare oil production capacity worldwide, the limited nature of the reduction in the total oil output of the exporting countries, and the short duration of the implemented policy, the 1973 Arab oil embargo was a turning point for the oil and natural gas business. Oil prices never retreated to the pre-crisis level but kept going up by more than 400% into the next energy shock, which took place six years later. Notably, global oil output during the same time frame increased by more than 22% – even the Gulf producers raised their output by more than 20%. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect substantially higher oil prices for a longer period of time as a result of introducing any additional threat of a military attack.
Inflicting damages to oil facilities – intentionally or otherwise – can and will reduce production capacity. With today’s high cost of materials and services and severe manpower shortage, repairs would prove to be highly costly and time consuming. A similar but more manageable condition existed during the Iran-Iraq War and the subsequent reconstruction era in both countries. Thus, actual military operations have the potential to raise oil prices even further and for yet longer periods of time. The same is also true for post-natural disaster recoveries. For instance, the 2005 hurricane damage in the US Gulf coast is not yet fully repaired three years later, and its impact is still reflected in the current production figures.
Military conflicts have the tendency of spreading beyond their intended scopes, and could be devastating particularly in a region that houses close to two-thirds of the global oil reserves, with the probability of driving oil prices to even higher levels for a longer time interval and causing more ‘collateral damage’.
Unlike in the 1970s or the 1980s:
The industry now has very little spare oil production capacity left anywhere in the world;
Resource nationalism is on the rise;
Economic sanctions have eliminated up to 5mn b/d of oil production capacity from the market;
Strategic stocks have grown at a lower rate relative to the growth of global oil consumption; and
There are higher oil prices and high uncertainty over future prices, forcing refiners to minimize the size of their commercial stocks.
In short, at present the oil industry’s support systems are very limited and incapable of modifying the current and future risks. Therefore, I hope authorities realize the seriousness of the issue at hand and the potential disastrous consequences of making a wrong move at this crucial juncture. Runaway oil prices have the potential to force the Western economies, particularly that of the US which is already weakened by the housing crises and the declining dollar value, into a collapse.
VOL. LI
No 31
04-Aug-2008
Comment by William O. Beeman
Elements of the Bush administration evidently think that attacking Iran would be cost-free, as they did with Iraq. Hosseein Ebneyousef, an oil expert tells the sobering truth.
Bill Beeman
University of Minnesota
IRAN
Attacking Iran: Probable Economic Consequences
By Hossein Ebneyousef
The following article was written for MEES by Mr Ebneyousef. Since 1988 he has been the President of Washington-based International Petroleum Enterprises, having previously worked for ARCO for 14 years (e-mail Ebneyousef@AOL.com).
Considering the already overstretched US military assets, its engagement in two major and costly theaters of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, deteriorating security conditions in Pakistan and Lebanon and Iran’s apparently softer approach on the nuclear issue, I am not sure that a military attack on Iran is imminent (that is, if one attributes a minimal level of rationality to the decision makers). Even an effective military blockade of Iran, which is an act of war in any case, does not seem feasible in light of Iran’s size, strategic location and lengthy maritime and land borders. Here, I would like to address the global economic impact of such potential actions, as it would likely be much more drastic and long lasting than has so far been explained.
Despite the existence at the time of more than 4.4mn b/d of spare oil production capacity worldwide, the limited nature of the reduction in the total oil output of the exporting countries, and the short duration of the implemented policy, the 1973 Arab oil embargo was a turning point for the oil and natural gas business. Oil prices never retreated to the pre-crisis level but kept going up by more than 400% into the next energy shock, which took place six years later. Notably, global oil output during the same time frame increased by more than 22% – even the Gulf producers raised their output by more than 20%. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect substantially higher oil prices for a longer period of time as a result of introducing any additional threat of a military attack.
Inflicting damages to oil facilities – intentionally or otherwise – can and will reduce production capacity. With today’s high cost of materials and services and severe manpower shortage, repairs would prove to be highly costly and time consuming. A similar but more manageable condition existed during the Iran-Iraq War and the subsequent reconstruction era in both countries. Thus, actual military operations have the potential to raise oil prices even further and for yet longer periods of time. The same is also true for post-natural disaster recoveries. For instance, the 2005 hurricane damage in the US Gulf coast is not yet fully repaired three years later, and its impact is still reflected in the current production figures.
Military conflicts have the tendency of spreading beyond their intended scopes, and could be devastating particularly in a region that houses close to two-thirds of the global oil reserves, with the probability of driving oil prices to even higher levels for a longer time interval and causing more ‘collateral damage’.
Unlike in the 1970s or the 1980s:
The industry now has very little spare oil production capacity left anywhere in the world;
Resource nationalism is on the rise;
Economic sanctions have eliminated up to 5mn b/d of oil production capacity from the market;
Strategic stocks have grown at a lower rate relative to the growth of global oil consumption; and
There are higher oil prices and high uncertainty over future prices, forcing refiners to minimize the size of their commercial stocks.
In short, at present the oil industry’s support systems are very limited and incapable of modifying the current and future risks. Therefore, I hope authorities realize the seriousness of the issue at hand and the potential disastrous consequences of making a wrong move at this crucial juncture. Runaway oil prices have the potential to force the Western economies, particularly that of the US which is already weakened by the housing crises and the declining dollar value, into a collapse.
John Bolton continues disinformation on Iranian nuclear program
Commentary from William O. Beeman:
It is astonishing that the Wall Street Journal continues to give Ambassador
John Bolton a standing platform to spread disinformation about the Iranian
nuclear program in the article below. He presents the misleading information currently being
promulgated by the American Enterprise institute and the Wasington
Institute for Near East Policy that the difference between Low Enriched
Uranium and High Enriched Uranium is trivial. This presupposes that Iran
actually has the reliable equipment to produce the High Enriched Uranium,
or the wherewithal to weaponize that material, which it does not, as Dr.
Behrad Nakhai, a real nuclear scientist, and I pointed out in an article on
July 16
.
Mr. Bolton writes: "every indication is that Iran is dispersing its nuclear
facilities to unknown locations . . ." What is the "every indication" that
he talks about. This is is some kind of fantasy on his part, because there
is no proof of this whatever. Finally, we have more alarmism about Iran's
conventional weapons, none of which can now deliver a nuclear weapon. Of
course, Mr. Bolton is not above simply asserting that Syria and the
Palestinians are so crazed and cowed by Iran that they would launch an
attack on Israel from their own territory, as if they were servile minions
of Tehran with martyr-like unconcern for the safety of their own people and
nations. Dr. Nakhai and I also pointed out in our article that Iran would
have to test a bomb before it used one, and this could never go undetected.
Iran is years away from anything resembling Mr. Bolton's apocalyptic
vision.
Bill Beeman
University of Minnesota
President, Middle East Section, American Anthropological Association.
August 5, 2008
While Diplomats Dither, Iran Builds Nukes
By JOHN R. BOLTON
August 5, 2008; Page A19
This weekend, yet another "deadline" passed for Iran to indicate it was seriously ready to discuss ending its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Like so many other deadlines during these five years of European-led negotiations, this one died quietly, with Brussels diplomats saying that no one seriously expected any real work on a Saturday.
The fact that the Europeans are right -- this latest deadline is not fundamentally big news -- is precisely the problem with their negotiations, and the Bush administration's acquiescence in that effort.
The rationality of continued Western negotiations with Iran depends critically on two assumptions: that Iran is far enough away from having deliverable nuclear weapons that we don't incur excessive risks by talking; and that by talking we don't materially impede the option to use military force. Implicit in the latter case is the further assumption that the military option is static -- that it remains equally viable a year from now as it is today.
Neither assumption is correct. Can we believe that if diplomacy fails we can still take military action "in time" to prevent Iranian nuclear weapons? "Just in time" nonproliferation assumes a level of intelligence certainty concerning Iran's nuclear program that recent history should manifestly caution us against.
Every day that goes by allows Iran to increase the threat it poses, and the viability of the military option steadily declines over time. There are a number of reasons why this is so.
First, while the European-led negotiations proceed, Iran continues both to convert uranium from a solid (uranium oxide, U3O8, also called yellowcake) to a gas (uranium hexafluoride, UF6) at its uranium conversion facility at Isfahan. Although it is a purely chemical procedure, conversion is technologically complex and poses health and safety risks.
As Isfahan's continuing operations increase both Iran's UF6 inventory and its technical expertise, however, the impact of destroying the facility diminishes. Iran is building a stockpile of UF6 that it can subsequently enrich even while it reconstructs Isfahan after an attack, or builds a new conversion facility elsewhere.
Second, delay permits Iran to increase its stock of low-enriched uranium (LEU) -- that is, UF6 gas in which the U235 isotope concentration (the form of uranium critical to nuclear reactions either in reactors or weapons) is raised from its natural level of 0.7% to between 3% and 5%.
As its LEU stockpile increases, so too does Tehran's capacity to take the next step, and enrich it to weapons-grade concentrations of over 90% U235 (highly-enriched uranium, or HEU). Some unfamiliar with nuclear matters characterize the difference in LEU-HEU concentration levels as huge. The truth is far different. Enriching natural uranium by centrifuges to LEU consumes approximately 70% of the work and time required to enrich it to HEU.
Accordingly, destroying Iran's enrichment facility at Natanz does not eliminate its existing enriched uranium (LEU), which the IAEA estimated in May 2008 to be approximately half what is needed for one nuclear weapon. Iran is thus more than two-thirds of the way to weapons-grade uranium with each kilogram of uranium it enriches to LEU levels. Moreover, as the LEU inventory grows, so too does the risk of a military strike hitting one or more UF6 storage tanks, releasing potentially substantial amounts of radioactive gas into the atmosphere.
Third, although we cannot know for sure, every indication is that Iran is dispersing its nuclear facilities to unknown locations, "hardening" against air strikes the ones we already know about, and preparing more deeply buried facilities in known locations for future operations. That means that the prospects for success against, say, the enrichment facilities at Natanz are being reduced.
Fourth, Iran is clearly increasing its defensive capabilities by purchasing Russian S-300 antiaircraft systems (also known as the SA-20) directly or through Belarus. In late July, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and his spokesman contradicted Israeli contentions that the new antiaircraft systems would be operational this year. Assuming the Pentagon is correct, its own assessment on timing simply enhances the argument for Israel striking sooner rather than later.
Fifth, Iran continues to increase the offensive capabilities of surrogates like Syria and Hezbollah, both of which now have missile capabilities that can reach across Israel, as well as threaten U.S. troops and other U.S. friends and allies in the region. It may well be Syria and Hezbollah that retaliate initially after an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, thus making further strikes against Iran more problematic, at least in the short run.
Iran is pursuing two goals simultaneously, both of which it is comfortably close to achieving. The first -- to possess all the capabilities necessary for a deliverable nuclear weapon -- is now almost certainly impossible to stop diplomatically. Thus, Iran's second objective becomes critical: to make the risks of a military strike against its program too high, and to make the likelihood of success in fracturing the program too low. Time favors Iran in achieving these goals. U.S. and European diplomats should consider this while waiting by the telephone for Iran to call.
Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations" (Simon & Schuster, 2007).
It is astonishing that the Wall Street Journal continues to give Ambassador
John Bolton a standing platform to spread disinformation about the Iranian
nuclear program in the article below. He presents the misleading information currently being
promulgated by the American Enterprise institute and the Wasington
Institute for Near East Policy that the difference between Low Enriched
Uranium and High Enriched Uranium is trivial. This presupposes that Iran
actually has the reliable equipment to produce the High Enriched Uranium,
or the wherewithal to weaponize that material, which it does not, as Dr.
Behrad Nakhai, a real nuclear scientist, and I pointed out in an article on
July 16
Mr. Bolton writes: "every indication is that Iran is dispersing its nuclear
facilities to unknown locations . . ." What is the "every indication" that
he talks about. This is is some kind of fantasy on his part, because there
is no proof of this whatever. Finally, we have more alarmism about Iran's
conventional weapons, none of which can now deliver a nuclear weapon. Of
course, Mr. Bolton is not above simply asserting that Syria and the
Palestinians are so crazed and cowed by Iran that they would launch an
attack on Israel from their own territory, as if they were servile minions
of Tehran with martyr-like unconcern for the safety of their own people and
nations. Dr. Nakhai and I also pointed out in our article that Iran would
have to test a bomb before it used one, and this could never go undetected.
Iran is years away from anything resembling Mr. Bolton's apocalyptic
vision.
Bill Beeman
University of Minnesota
President, Middle East Section, American Anthropological Association.
August 5, 2008
While Diplomats Dither, Iran Builds Nukes
By JOHN R. BOLTON
August 5, 2008; Page A19
This weekend, yet another "deadline" passed for Iran to indicate it was seriously ready to discuss ending its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Like so many other deadlines during these five years of European-led negotiations, this one died quietly, with Brussels diplomats saying that no one seriously expected any real work on a Saturday.
The fact that the Europeans are right -- this latest deadline is not fundamentally big news -- is precisely the problem with their negotiations, and the Bush administration's acquiescence in that effort.
The rationality of continued Western negotiations with Iran depends critically on two assumptions: that Iran is far enough away from having deliverable nuclear weapons that we don't incur excessive risks by talking; and that by talking we don't materially impede the option to use military force. Implicit in the latter case is the further assumption that the military option is static -- that it remains equally viable a year from now as it is today.
Neither assumption is correct. Can we believe that if diplomacy fails we can still take military action "in time" to prevent Iranian nuclear weapons? "Just in time" nonproliferation assumes a level of intelligence certainty concerning Iran's nuclear program that recent history should manifestly caution us against.
Every day that goes by allows Iran to increase the threat it poses, and the viability of the military option steadily declines over time. There are a number of reasons why this is so.
First, while the European-led negotiations proceed, Iran continues both to convert uranium from a solid (uranium oxide, U3O8, also called yellowcake) to a gas (uranium hexafluoride, UF6) at its uranium conversion facility at Isfahan. Although it is a purely chemical procedure, conversion is technologically complex and poses health and safety risks.
As Isfahan's continuing operations increase both Iran's UF6 inventory and its technical expertise, however, the impact of destroying the facility diminishes. Iran is building a stockpile of UF6 that it can subsequently enrich even while it reconstructs Isfahan after an attack, or builds a new conversion facility elsewhere.
Second, delay permits Iran to increase its stock of low-enriched uranium (LEU) -- that is, UF6 gas in which the U235 isotope concentration (the form of uranium critical to nuclear reactions either in reactors or weapons) is raised from its natural level of 0.7% to between 3% and 5%.
As its LEU stockpile increases, so too does Tehran's capacity to take the next step, and enrich it to weapons-grade concentrations of over 90% U235 (highly-enriched uranium, or HEU). Some unfamiliar with nuclear matters characterize the difference in LEU-HEU concentration levels as huge. The truth is far different. Enriching natural uranium by centrifuges to LEU consumes approximately 70% of the work and time required to enrich it to HEU.
Accordingly, destroying Iran's enrichment facility at Natanz does not eliminate its existing enriched uranium (LEU), which the IAEA estimated in May 2008 to be approximately half what is needed for one nuclear weapon. Iran is thus more than two-thirds of the way to weapons-grade uranium with each kilogram of uranium it enriches to LEU levels. Moreover, as the LEU inventory grows, so too does the risk of a military strike hitting one or more UF6 storage tanks, releasing potentially substantial amounts of radioactive gas into the atmosphere.
Third, although we cannot know for sure, every indication is that Iran is dispersing its nuclear facilities to unknown locations, "hardening" against air strikes the ones we already know about, and preparing more deeply buried facilities in known locations for future operations. That means that the prospects for success against, say, the enrichment facilities at Natanz are being reduced.
Fourth, Iran is clearly increasing its defensive capabilities by purchasing Russian S-300 antiaircraft systems (also known as the SA-20) directly or through Belarus. In late July, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and his spokesman contradicted Israeli contentions that the new antiaircraft systems would be operational this year. Assuming the Pentagon is correct, its own assessment on timing simply enhances the argument for Israel striking sooner rather than later.
Fifth, Iran continues to increase the offensive capabilities of surrogates like Syria and Hezbollah, both of which now have missile capabilities that can reach across Israel, as well as threaten U.S. troops and other U.S. friends and allies in the region. It may well be Syria and Hezbollah that retaliate initially after an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, thus making further strikes against Iran more problematic, at least in the short run.
Iran is pursuing two goals simultaneously, both of which it is comfortably close to achieving. The first -- to possess all the capabilities necessary for a deliverable nuclear weapon -- is now almost certainly impossible to stop diplomatically. Thus, Iran's second objective becomes critical: to make the risks of a military strike against its program too high, and to make the likelihood of success in fracturing the program too low. Time favors Iran in achieving these goals. U.S. and European diplomats should consider this while waiting by the telephone for Iran to call.
Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations" (Simon & Schuster, 2007).