Thursday, December 15, 2005

Does the Muslim Satan Carry a Pitchfork? - Has he got a tail? By Daniel�Engber from Slate

SLATE

Does the Muslim Satan Carry a Pitchfork?
Has he got a tail?

By Daniel Engber
Posted Wednesday, Dec. 14, 2005, at 6:38 PM ET


Five groups of Islamic militants spoke out against Iraq's parliamentary elections on Monday, calling them a "satanic project" that violates "the legitimate policy approved by God." For years, hard-liners in Iran and elsewhere in the Muslim world have called the United States "the Great Satan" and Israel "the Lesser Satan." What's the story with the Muslim Satan?

He's a lot like the Christian Satan. According to sacred Islamic texts, a supernatural being named Azazel was cast down to Earth for refusing to bow down to God's creation, Adam. Once demoted, Azazel—whose name then became Iblis—collaborated with a serpent (and in some stories, a peacock) to tempt Adam and Eve with forbidden fruit (or in some versions, wheat).

For the most part, the Quran uses two interchangeable names for this character. Iblis comes from the Greek diabolos and corresponds to the English "devil." The other name, Shaitan, comes from the same Hebrew root as the English "Satan." By the 10th century, the figure of Iblis had taken on special meaning for the Sufi mystics. According to Sufi tradition, Iblis refused to bow to Adam not because Iblis was arrogant (as the original story suggests), but because he was determinedly monotheistic—he refused to bow to anyone other than God.

While Iblis became a more complex character who represented (for the Sufis, at least) piety and sacrifice, Shaitan served as a more general embodiment of evil. Like the Christian Satan, Shaitan spends his time whispering naughty ideas and seducing people into sin. He also lords over the lesser forces of evil—especially his children, the shaitans. But he's not an all-powerful Antichrist who rules hell and battles God from a throne of fire. In some contexts, he's described not as a fallen angel but as the most powerful jinni, a form of lesser spirit.

What does he look like? Muslims don't have a clear iconography for Iblis, and there's no Shaitanic counterpart to the red-skinned, pitchfork-wielding demon of Christianity. During the hajj, Shaitan is represented by a featureless stone pillar or wall. Pilgrims "stone Satan" by throwing rocks at the wall.

In Iran, where the Ayatollah Khomeini first dubbed the United States "the Great Satan" in the late 1970s, the words might evoke the divs, or devils, of Persian mythology. These were often depicted as gnarly-looking creatures with horns, dark skin, and protruding teeth. (Ancient literature describes the invasion of Persia by a particularly nasty monster called the White Div.) Posters from the Iranian revolution sometimes depicted Jimmy Carter or Uncle Sam in a demonic guise. In this one, a figure representing Israel and America stands over the shah, who is intertwined with a serpent.


Explainer thanks Peter Awn of Columbia University, William Beeman of Brown University, and Gordon Newby of Emory University.


Daniel Engber is a regular contributor to Slate.

Monday, November 14, 2005

Iran's new leader fans the fires of revolution - Opinion - theage.com.au


Iran's new leader fans the fires of revolution - Opinion - theage.com.au

Iran's new leader fans the fires of revolution
November 14, 2005
Page 1 of 2 | Single page

Illustration: Dyson

Iranians, both moderates and mullahs, have reason to fear Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, writes William O. Beeman.

Those who hate the clerical establishment in Iran and wish it would disappear should be delighted with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Too late, the clerics have discovered that they have a tiger by the tail. Mr Ahmadinejad may be dedicated to their eradication.

The bad news for the West is that Mr Ahmadinejad's assault on the Iranian Government is an assault from the right. He has rejected both the reformist politics of President Khatami, and the establishment Islamic leadership of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Mr Ahmadinejad's election was the crowning success of Iran's own neoconservative movement, the Abadgaran-e Iran-e Islami (Developers of an Islamic Iran), or the Abadgaran for short.

The Abadgaran have been described as second-generation revolutionaries. They are people who participated in the Revolution of 1978-79, who have become disillusioned with the ruling clerical establishment in Tehran, and have been dedicated to re-establishing the ideals of the original revolution. In the past 26 years they have grown up and established themselves in positions of power everywhere.

They were the dominant political group in almost every major municipality in Iran before the election. Operating from the mosques, just as in the original revolution, they flew under the media radar, thus creating an illusion of surprise when Mr Ahmadinejad roared to victory on a populist platform promising economic reform and financial equality for Iran's poor.

Mr Ahmadinejad appeared benign enough in June. A pious, ruthlessly honest and modest civil engineer, he had done an excellent job as Tehran's mayor. However, he immediately sent shockwaves through the establishment by proposing ill-suited ideologues as ministers in his new Government, by his badly received appearance at the United Nations, by his fiery condemnation of the "Zionist regime" in Israel - an action that attracted international condemnation - and finally, by his recall of 40 moderate Iranian ambassadors.

His actions have caused consternation in segments of the Iranian public as well. On November 3, his Government introduced a scheme to provide shares of national industries to Iran's poor, allowing them 20 years to repay the cost of the equities. Rumours have flown that the next target is Iran's private industrial holdings. There is no opposition between Islam and capitalism, and Iran is ruthlessly capitalist.

Iranian owners of industry were not going to wait to find out whether the rumours were true. Reportedly more than $US200 billion ($A270 billion) in investment income has fled Iran for Dubai, where about 2000 new businesses have been established in the past four months. The capital flight was accelerated by Mr Ahmadinejad's remarks against Israel, after which the Tehran stock exchange plummeted to its lowest point in two years.

The irony for the establishment clerics was that no matter who won the election they were going to be in trouble, since all candidates but the one they had handpicked, former radio and television head Ali Larijani, opposed one or another aspect of their governance. Mr Larijani has now been reappointed as head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and chief negotiator for Iran's nuclear energy initiative with European powers and the United Nations.

His reassignment is indicative of the current state of affairs, as cracks begin to show in Iran's Islamic leadership. Confusion reigns as the establishment clerics try to contain Mr Ahmadinejad while presenting a smooth face to the world.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry as well as Ayatollah Khamenei tried to soften Mr Ahmadinejad's anti-Israel remarks and assure the world that Iran intended no violence against any other nation. Presidential runner-up Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who went back to his old job as head of Iran's intra-governmental Expediency Council, has quietly moved to relieve Mr Ahmadinejad of his foreign policy and diplomatic duties. However, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and other clerics rumoured to be rich and corrupt, are anathema to the Abadgaran that support Mr Ahmadinejad.

What is at stake is nothing less than the Islamic Republic itself if an internal feud breaks out.

The velayat-e-faqih - or rule of the chief jurisprudent - on which Iranian government is based, and through which Ayatollah Khamenei holds his authority, was established after the revolution. No senior Shiite cleric in the world agrees with it any longer.

If Mr Ahmadinejad is placed under too much pressure by the likes of Ayatollah Khamenei or Mr Rafsanjani, he may well have the political clout through his followers to force a reconsideration of the entire basis of Iranian government. There are many Iranians who would welcome such a move.

The Iranian Parliament is eager to overhaul the Iranian constitution, which gives control of government to the clerics, but they have been prevented from doing so by the powerful, indirectly chosen Council of Guardians. The result of constitutional revision might still be an Islamic Republic not to the taste of the Bush Administration, but it would end clerical rule in Iran. One thing is certain: change is inevitable in Iran. Moreover, President Ahmadinejad and the Abadgaran, if they achieve their aims, should not rest on their laurels.

The whirlwind he is setting in motion today is nothing compared to the tornado that will sweep into power in the next decade - the youth of Iran, who in five years will be the majority of voters.

None of them participated in the original Revolution, brought the Ayatollah Khomeini to power, or ratified the Islamic Republic.

William O. Beeman is professor of Middle East anthropology at Brown University in the US. He has conducted research in Iran for more than 30 years and is the author of The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.

Analysis: Chalabi returns; after fallout with U.S., former Iraqi exile plays all sides--Beeman

The Athens News (Athens, Ohio)

Analysis: Chalabi returns; after fallout with U.S., former Iraqi exile plays all sides
2005-11-14
By William O. Beeman
Pacific News Service


Like a bad penny, Ahmad Chalabi is again turning up, and miraculously the United States is set to back him as prime minister of Iraq in the upcoming Dec. 15 elections for the first "real" government in the country. His visit to Washington is scheduled for Nov. 7-12.

Never mind that Chalabi was convicted of embezzlement, that he was accused of misleading the United States on the issue of weapons of mass destruction prior to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, or that he guaranteed a loving welcome for U.S. troops from Iraqis, who he claimed would be grateful and ecstatic to be rid of Saddam Hussein. Never mind either that he was receiving $300,000 a month for some time to provide unspecified services for Viceroy Paul Bremer's interim government, or that he led the de-Baathification effort to purge Iraq of his political enemies.

Forget all that! Chalabi is the probable winner in the upcoming elections. That is all Washington needs to know, and if he was reliably in bed with the U.S. government once, the neocons know that he is likely to jump in once again if he comes to power, bringing with him control of Iraq's petroleum and sanctioning a permanent U.S. military presence.

Chalabi's family has a pedigree that goes back to the founding of the Iraqi state by the British in the 1920s. The Chalabis were the only Shia family to be represented in government cabinets during the Iraqi monarchy, which ended in the 1958 revolution that ushered in the age of military dictatorship culminating with Saddam Hussein. He believes that he has a presumptive right to rule, and is willing to stop at nothing to achieve his ambitions.

Since he was "ousted" from power by the Bremer administration, Chalabi re-invented himself as an anti-American Shiite adherent. He visited Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Najaf, and got himself on the Shiite religious party list to participate in the interim government. (Iraqis voted not for individuals, but for political parties.) When his party list captured a plurality in the election, he worked his way into being deputy minister of oil -- a powerful position that allowed him to secure a substantial income for himself running an oil-field security operation.

Now that the Iraqi constitution has been ratified, and election campaigns for a permanent government are underway, Chalabi has suddenly become friendly with the United States again. But he also has learned a lesson about Washington politics. After the Washington schedule was announced, he cleverly first paid an unannounced visit to Iran and held talks with newly elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Nov. 5. No mean politician, Chalabi clearly knows how to play enemies against each other. By talking with Ahmadinejad, he will guarantee that he will receive serious attention in Washington.

Besides, Chalabi still has friends in Washington. His Washington talks include a meeting with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Nov. 9.

Bush administration adviser Richard Pearle has supported him loyally throughout his exile from Washington's favor. He is still supported by historian Bernard Lewis. This week he will address the neoconservatives in their bastion of power, the American Enterprise Institute.

A look at his election campaign explains his appeal to Washington. His call for a "national unity government" pulls out all the stops. He appears in public flanked by two women also running on his ticket, but appearing in traditional all-encompassing chadors covering everything but their faces. His coalition consists of his own National Iraqi Congress, along with Kurdish and Turkomen groups. He publicly affirms his loyalty to Ayatollah al-Sistani, but he also includes a group that favors restoration of the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy, most likely in the person of Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan. A constitutional monarchy for Iraq would require another modification of the constitution, but it is a course favored by Bernard Lewis and former CIA Director James Woolsey, and many others in Washington, because it would cement an alliance between Iraq and Jordan, and draw Iraq out of the sphere of Iran.

At this juncture, it seems that Chalabi miraculously has no serious rivals for power. One other ticket headed by former U.S. appointed Prime Minister Ayad Allawi (a relative by marriage of Chalabi) is not likely to garner many votes. Other major tickets consist of a Kurdish party and a coalition of three Sunni Arab parties. Chances are good that Chalabi's ticket will win a roaring victory - and voila! He will be prime minister.

Washington is not going to stay mad at Chalabi if he brings stability to Iraq. The conflict there is a festering canker on the George W. Bush presidency. To have even a crook, a liar and a cheat in office will be welcome if it rescues America from the Iraqi quagmire. Copyright PNS

Editor's note: PNS contributor William O. Beeman is professor of Middle East Anthropology at Brown University. He has lived and worked in the Middle East for more than 30 years. His forthcoming book is "Iraq: State in Search of a Nation."

Wednesday, November 09, 2005

Pacific News Service > News > Chalabi's Return -- After Fallout With U.S., Former Iraqi Exile Plays All Sides

http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=52075943cedbf2d83f3298b5c9cde0b5

Pacific News Service
Chalabi's Return -- After Fallout With U.S., Former Iraqi Exile Plays All Sides

Commentary, William O. Beeman,
New America Media, Nov 08, 2005

Editor's Note: Never mind that former Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi was convicted of embezzlement and mislead the U.S. about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The savvy politician has remade himself, still has significant support in Washington and may become Iraq's prime minister.

Like a bad penny, Ahmad Chalabi is again turning up, and miraculously the United States is set to back him as prime minister of Iraq in the upcoming Dec. 15 elections for the first "real" government in the country. His visit to Washington is scheduled for November 7-12.

Never mind that Chalabi was convicted of embezzlement, that he was accused of misleading the United States on the issue of weapons of mass destruction prior to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, or that he guaranteed a loving welcome for U.S. troops from Iraqis, who he claimed would be grateful and ecstatic to be rid of Saddam Hussein. Never mind either that he was receiving $300,000 a month for some time to provide unspecified services for Viceroy Paul Bremer's interim government, or that he led the de-Baathification effort to purge Iraq of his political enemies.

Forget all that! Chalabi is the probable winner in the upcoming elections. That is all Washington needs to know, and if he was reliably in bed with the U.S. government once, the neocons know that he is likely to jump in once again if he comes to power, bringing with him control of Iraq's petroleum and sanctioning a permanent U.S. military presence.

Chalabi's family has a pedigree that goes back to the founding of the Iraqi state by the British in the 1920s. The Chalabi's were the only Shia family to be represented in government cabinets during the Iraqi monarchy, which ended in the 1958 revolution that ushered in the age of military dictatorship culminating with Saddam Hussein. He believes that he has a presumptive right to rule, and is willing to stop at nothing to achieve his ambitions.

Since he was "ousted" from power by the Bremer administration, Chalabi re-invented himself as an anti-American Shiite adherent. He visited Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Najaf, and got himself on the Shiite religious party list to participate in the interim government. (Iraqis voted not for individuals, but for political parties.) When his party list captured a plurality in the election, he worked his way into being Deputy Minister of oil -- a powerful position that allowed him to secure a substantial income for himself running an oil-field security operation.

Now that the Iraqi constitution has been ratified, and election campaigns for a permanent government are underway, Chalabi has suddenly become friendly with the United States again. But he has also learned a lesson about Washington politics. After the Washington schedule was announced, he cleverly first paid an unannounced visit to Iran and held talks with newly elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Nov. 5. No mean politician, Chalabi clearly knows how to play enemies against each other. By talking with Ahmadinejad, he will guarantee that he will receive serious attention in Washington.

Besides, Chalabi still has friends in Washington. His Washington talks include a meeting with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Nov. 9.

Bush administration advisor Richard Pearle has supported him loyally throughout his exile from Washington's favor. He is still supported by historian Bernard Lewis. This week he will address the neoconservatives in their bastion of power, the American Enterprise Institute.

A look at his election campaign explains his appeal to Washington. His call for a "national unity government" pulls out all the stops. He appears in public flanked by two women also running on his ticket, but appearing in traditional all-encompassing chadors covering everything but their faces. His coalition consists of his own National Iraqi Congress, along with Kurdish and Turkomen groups. He publicly affirms his loyalty to Ayatollah al-Sistani, but he also includes a group that favors restoration of the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy, most likely in the person of Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan. A constitutional monarchy for Iraq would require another modification of the constitution, but it is a course favored by Bernard Lewis and former CIA Director James Woolsey, and many others in Washington, because it would cement an alliance between Iraq and Jordan, and draw Iraq out of the sphere of Iran.

At this juncture, it seems that Chalabi miraculously has no serious rivals for power. One other ticket headed by former U.S. appointed Prime Minister Ayad Allawi (a relative by marriage of Chalabi) is not likely to garner many votes. Other major tickets consist of a Kurdish party and a coalition of three Sunni Arab parties. Chances are good that Chalabi's ticket will win a roaring victory -- and voila! He will be prime minister.

Washington is not going to stay mad at Chalabi if he brings stability to Iraq. The conflict there is a festering canker on the George W. Bush presidency. To have even a crook, a liar and a cheat in office will be welcome if it rescues America from the Iraqi quagmire.

PNS contributor William O. Beeman is professor of Middle East Anthropology at Brown University. He has lived and worked in the Middle East for more than 30 years. His forthcoming book is "Iraq: State in Search of a Nation."


Monday, November 07, 2005

The Revolution Begins Anew in Iran: Ahmadinejad and the Abadgaran challenge the Mullahs

AGENCEGLOBAL.COM

The Revolution Begins Anew in Iran

William O. Beeman

Those who hate the clerical establishment in Iran and wish it would disappear should be delighted with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Too late, the clerics have discovered that they have a tiger by the tail. Mr. Ahmadinejad may be dedicated to their eradication.

The bad news for the West is that Mr. Ahmadinejad’s assault on the Iranian government is an assault from the right. He has rejected both the reformist politics of President Khatami, and the establishment Islamic leadership of  Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i.

Mr. Ahmadinejad’s election was the crowning success of  Iran’s own neoconservative movement, the Abadgaran-e Islami, (Islamic Developers) or the Abadgaran for short. The Abadgaran have been described as second-generation revolutionaries. They are people who participated in the Revolution of 1978-79, who have become disillusioned with the ruling clerical establishment in Tehran, and have been dedicated to re-establishing the ideals of the original revolution. In the past 26 years they have grown up and established themselves in positions of power everywhere. They were the dominant political group in almost every major municipality in Iran before the election. Operating from the mosques, just as in the original revolution, they flew under the media radar, thus creating an illusion of surprise when Mr. Ahmadinejad roared to victory on a populist platform promising economic reform and financial equity for Iran’s poor.

Mr. Ahmadinejad appeared benign enough in June. A pious, ruthlessly honest and modest civil engineer, he had done an excellent job as Tehran’s mayor. However, he immediately sent shockwaves through the establishment by proposing ill-suited ideologues as ministers in his new government, by his badly received appearance at the United Nations, by his fiery condemnation of the “Zionist regime” in Israel—an action that attracted international condemnation, and finally by his recall of 40 moderate Iranian ambassadors.

His actions have sent shockwaves through the Iranian public as well. On November 3, his government introduced a scheme to provide shares of national industries to Iran’s poor, allowing them 20 years to repay the cost of the equities. Rumors have flown that the next target is Iran’s private industrial holdings. There is no opposition between Islam and capitalism, and Iran is ruthlessly capitalist. Iranian owners of industry were not going to wait to find out whether the rumors were true. Reportedly more than 200 billion dollars in investment income have fled Iran for Dubai, where some 2000 new businesses have been established since summer. The capital flight was accelerated by Mr. Ahmadinejad’s remarks against Israel, after which the Tehran stock exchange plummeted to its lowest point in two years.

The irony for the establishment clerics was that no matter who had won the election, they were going to be in trouble—since all candidates but the one they had handpicked, former Radio and Television head Ali Larijani, opposed one or another aspect of their governance. Mr. Larijani has now been reappointed as head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and chief negotiator for Iran’s nuclear energy initiative with European powers and the United Nations.

Mr. Larijani’s reassignment is indicative of the current state of affairs as cracks begin to show in Iran’s Islamic leadership. Confusion reigns as the establishment clerics try to contain Mr. Ahmadinejad while presenting a smooth face to the world. The Iranian Foreign Ministry as well as Ayatollah Khamene’i tried to soften Mr. Ahmadinejad’s anti-Israel remarks and assure the world that Iran intended no violence against any other nation.  Presidential runner-up Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who went back to his old job as head of Iran’s intra-governmental Expediency Council, has quietly moved to relieve Mr. Ahmadinejad of his foreign policy and diplomatic duties. However, Ayatollah Hashemi-Rafasanjani, and other clerics rumored to be rich and corrupt, is anathema to the Abadgaran that support Mr. Ahmadinejad.

What is at stake is nothing less than the Islamic Republic itself if an internal feud breaks out. The Velayat-e Faqih—or rule of the chief jurisprudent, on which the Iranian government is based, and through which Ayatollah Khamene’i holds his authority, was established after the revolution. No senior Shi’a cleric in the world agrees with it any longer. If Mr. Ahmadinejad is placed under too much pressure by the likes of  Ayatollahs Khamene’i or Rafsanjani, he may well have the political clout through his followers to force a reconsideration of the entire base of the Iranian government. There are many, many Iranians who would welcome such a move. The Iranian Parliament is eager to overhaul the Iranian constitution, which gives control of government to the clerics, but they have been prevented from doing so by the powerful indirectly chosen Council of Guardians. The result of constitutional revision might still be an Islamic Republic not be to the taste of the Bush administration, but it would end clerical rule in Iran.

One thing is certain: change is inevitable in Iran. Moreover, President Ahmadinejad and the Abadgaran, if they achieve their aims, should not rest on their laurels. The whirlwind he is setting in motion today is nothing compared to the tornado that will sweep into power in the next decade—the youth of Iran, who in five years will be the majority of voters. None of them participated in the original Revolution, brought the Ayatollah Khomeini to power, or ratified the Islamic Republic.

William O. Beeman is Professor of Middle East Anthropology at Brown University. He has conducted research in Iran for more than 30 years. His latest book is The "Great Satan" vs. The "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other. (Praeger/Greenwood, 2005).

Monday, October 31, 2005

What's behind Iranian leader's anti-Israel rant | csmonitor.com

What's behind Iranian leader's anti-Israel rant
His zeal brings leverage at home - but not abroad.
By Dan Murphy | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

BAGHDAD - Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's comments last week that Israel should be "wiped off the map" stirred controversy across the globe.

The remarks were a slap in the face to European countries who have been more inclined than the US to give the Iranians a chance to convince the world that their nuclear program is peaceful and that they aren't a threat to their neighbors.

Yet it remains a fact of life in the Middle East that statements like Mr. Ahmadinejad's are wildly popular. This might seem odd, given the fact that many Middle Eastern states are closer to Israel than ever before. On Friday, for instance, Egypt announced the expansion of a program in which the US gives tariff breaks to local firms that do business with Israel.

But such improvements are mostly confined to the state-to-state level, and usually depend on the ability of nondemocratic governments like Egypt or Jordan to ignore popular distaste for Israel. In states like Iran - which has diplomatic relations with neither Israel nor the US - there are fewer perceived costs for such angry tub-thumping, at least for a man like Ahmadinejad.

So in the context of modern Iranian history, the fiery rhetoric of the populist leader at a "World Without Zionism" conference was hardly surprising. Ahmadinejad, whose supporters are drawn by the zeal with which he advocates both the anti-imperial claims and social justice goals of Iran's Islamic revolution, appears more interested in shoring up his credentials at home than appeasing the US or Israel.

"I don't think he understands that if he says something like this the world will hear him. I think he's still in mayor of Tehran mode,'' says William Beeman, an anthropology professor at Brown University and author of "The 'Great Satan' vs. The 'Mad Mullahs': How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other."

"He's definitely appealing to his base and his base are a group of people who are involved with a revolutionary rhetoric,'' says Mr. Beeman. Some 300 people turned up Sunday at the offices of the Headquarters for Commemorating Martyrs of the Global Islamic Movement to volunteer for suicide bomb missions against Israel, according to the Associated Press.

"Taking an anti-Israel position is certainly not going to hurt him in the public mind," says Gary Sick, an Iran expert at Columbia University. He likens Ahmadinejad's appeal to Iranian voters to the appeal of President Bush in the US - the projection of a plain speaking man who means and does what he says. "His attitude says that 'no one is going to shut me up' and probably goes down pretty well with [average people] in Tehran."

But "Death to Israel" cries from the top are seen as not serving Iran's interests anymore by much of the political elite and serve to further isolate the country.

Iran's supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamenei, distanced himself from the president's remarks. So did Iran's foreign ministry and the Iranian embassy in Russia, a potential key ally in any UN Security Council showdown over the country's nuclear program. By Sunday, Ahmadinejad appeared to backpedal.

He told the state news agency that political steps are the only ones that can solve the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. "The only logical solution ... is to hold free elections with the participation of Palestinians inside and outside the occupied territories, and a recognition of the nation's legitimacy,'' he said after meeting with Ayatollah Khamenei.

To analysts, the episode is an accurate reflection of Ahmadinejad's distaste for Israel, but also represents on-the-job training for a man without a foreign policy background, full control of his own government, or much experience in the global spotlight.

A deeply pious man who seems committed to the ideals of Ayatollah Khomeini's 1979 revolution, Ahmadinejad is also a bit of an outsider to the political and clerical establishment in Tehran, a sort of Middle Eastern Hugo Chávez minus the full control to put his ideas into action.

"I think that it's due to Ahmadinejad's naiveté,'' says Beeman. "I don't think he expected it to be the firestorm that he touched off. This rhetoric is routinely used in various other places in Iran on public occasions and not noticed, because it isn't the president saying it."

Indeed, attacks on Zionism and Israel are daily staples of not just the Iranian press, but across the Muslim world. They're part of the backdrop to everything from democracy rallies in Egypt to Friday prayers in Indonesia and debates in Pakistan over whether it should accept emergency earthquake aid from Israel.

But while that rhetoric remains as common as ever, it's also true that some Muslim states are drawing closer to Israel. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has said recently that he wants to move his country closer to normalization with Israel, something he and other leaders feel has been made easier by Israel's Gaza withdrawal.

Egypt, the first Arab nation to make peace with Israel, distanced itself from the Iranian leader's comments. "Iran and Israel are two United Nations member states, and such a phenomenon (the disappearance of a member state) was never seen in history," Egypt's foreign minister told reporters. On Friday, the UN Security Council - including Algeria - condemned Ahmadinejad's remarks.

But just as the withdrawal from Gaza is only the first step on a path to peace for Israel and the Palestinians, so is it only a tentative first step that could change Muslim attitudes towards Israel. Unlikely to change overnight is the deep-set belief among many Muslims that Zionism relies on depriving Palestinians of their political rights.

Former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who criticized Ahmadinejad's comments, made this clear when he was also careful to denounce Israel. If "human rights are rights and oppression and aggression are wrong, then America and Europeans should accept the true human rights. The situation in Israel doesn't correspond to this," Rafsanjani said last week, as reported by the Iranian state news agency. "We don't have a problem with Judaism.... Our argument is with Zionism."

Full HTML version of this story which may include photos, graphics, and related links

Sunday, October 30, 2005

Presidents Ahmadinejad and Bush are a Lot Alike in Their Tactics (AgenceGlobal)

Presidents Ahmadinejad and Bush are a Lot Alike in their Tactics

William O. Beeman
AgenceGlobal


The President was demonstrably losing ground with his own people, and in particular with his own constituents. So when he made public pronouncements that pleased his hard-core supporters, he seemed to care little that the world outside his country rose in anger to denounce him.

This description applies equally to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran and President George W. Bush of the United States. These two implacable enemies are political brothers underneath the skin, and they are in remarkably similar political straits today.

Mr. Ahmadinejad’s troubles have been growing ever since his election last summer. He was not the first choice of the clerical establishment in Tehran in the Iranian presidential elections last summer. He raised uncomfortable questions about the clerics' commitment to the ideals of the Revolution of 1978-79. However, Ahmadinejad was propelled into office because he appealed to the Iranian public with revolutionary ideals concerning redistribution of income and attention to the needs of the lower economic sectors of the population. These economic issues had increasingly been ignored by the clerics, who had grown richer and richer to the chagrin of the Iranian man on the street.

But this didn’t help Mr. Ahmadinejad with the political leadership in Tehran. A civil engineer, Mr. Ahmadinejad was out of his depth as an international leader. Though sincere and pious, he came across as naïve and inexperienced in his public dealings. The Iranian parliament rejected four of his picks for his cabinet, and gave him a hard time on others. His appearance before the United Nations in September was widely viewed as a failure, not so much because of the two speeches he gave, but because of his inability to handle informal interactions and press conferences. His political rival for the presidency, Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who retained his post as head of the “Mediation Council” began to assume foreign relations responsibilities soon after Ahmadinejad’s return from New York.

However, Mr. Ahmadinejad was not without resources in protecting his presdency. The "Day of Jerusalem," traditionally the last Friday in Ramadan, the month of fasting in Islam, which fell on Oct. 28 this year is an opportune occasion to remind Muslims of the importance of this city, which is sacred to Islam as well as to Jews.

Mr. Ahmadinejad chose this occasion to play to his “base” by invoking another hallmark of the Revolution of 1978-79—opposition to Israel. He did this in a particularly effective way, by quoting the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini regarding the “Zionist regime,” which Khomeini had said should be “wiped off the map.”

So, Mr. Ahmadinejad did not, as was widely reported in the international press, personally call for Israel’s destruction, though he obviously agreed with that sentiment. However, more important for his political life, he reminded his core constituents that he was a true son of the Revolution of 1978-79. The ploy worked. He got a political boost for his efforts, and put his detractors in the Iranian government on the spot. They spent several days backpedaling, trying to soften the effect of Ahmadinejad’s remarks.

The international reaction to his remarks was explosive, with denunciations of the offensive remarks coming from every part of the world. (Never mind that the rhetoric about Israel is offensive blather and little else). However, the counter-reaction in Iran was equally explosive with loud and vocal street demonstrations. Although “rent a demonstration” is a common political tactic in Iran, the public reaction could not entirely be explained by mere bribery; many Iranians were genuinely furious at the international reaction to Ahmadinejad’s remarks.

One might think that Mr. Ahmadinejad had learned his political tactics at the feet of George W. Bush. For President Bush as well, “All politics is local.” President Bush frequently makes remarks out of ineptitude and naïveté that infuriate the international community, and when the world reacts with disapproval, he merely makes jingoistic statements to his “base” and regains his “political capital.”

Americans need to understand that political capital is a concept that knows no particular boundaries. Mr. Ahmadinejad’s rapid loss of political ground may well be made up by this kind of appeal to his populist base. We can expect similar behavior from President Bush as he tries to recover from the disasters of the past several weeks—the scandalous government responses to natural disasters on the Gulf coast, the abortive nomination of Harriet Miers to the supreme court, and the slowly growing anger of American citizens as they realize that they were royally duped into supporting a war without end in the Iraqi quagmire.

Indeed, President Bush has already started. His weekly radio address on October 29 said nothing about any of the disasters facing his administration that have appalled the American electorate, and for which they are demanding answers. His speech was pure jingoistic invective: a bathetic justification of the American presence in Iraq and an attack on Islamic forces “with their twisted perversion of the Muslim faith” that oppose the West.

___________________________________________
William O. Beeman is Professor of Middle East Anthropology at Brown University. He is the author of The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other, published in September, 2005.

Thursday, October 27, 2005

Ahmadinejad's Harsh Words Pose No Danger to Israel

President Ahmadinejad uses harsh words, but Iran still holds no danger for Israel

William O. Beeman


Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has once again caused a planetary stir with rhetoric that has been reported as calling for Israel—to be precise, Mr. Ahmadinejad used the words “Zionist regime”—to be “wiped off the map” at a youth seminar in Tehran.


Mr. Ahmadinejad’s pronouncement was both naive and unwise when measured in terms of international politics. However, it is something quite different than the open threat it was portrayed to be in the international press. Moreover, the statement does nothing to increase any actual danger to Israel, despite the extreme reaction shown around the world.

Americans, Israelis and Europeans should take a deep breath and examine both the statement and Mr. Ahmadinejad’s position as Iran’s president. Once the complete context of these remarks is understood, the pronouncement can be seen for the puffery it is.

Westerners must understand that Mr. Ahmadinejad was not the first choice of the clerical establishment in Tehran in the Iranian Presidential Elections last summer. He raised uncomfortable questions about the clerics’ commitment to the ideals of the Revolution of 1978-79. Mr. Ahmadinejad was in step with the Iranian public with regard to the Revolutionary ideals concerning redistribution of income and attention to the needs of the lower economic sectors of the population, ("all politics is local"). These economic issues had increasingly been ignored by the clerics, who grew richer and richer to the chagrin of the Iranian man on the street. This is what propelled him into office.

Since then he has had an unusual amount of trouble establishing his credibility in government. Four of his choices for ministerial positions were rejected outright by the Iranian majles (parliament), and many of his other choices have been accepted over widespread criticism. Though personally religiously conservative, he has not been able to turn back the reformist trend that started with the election of President Mohammad Khatami.

So Mr. Ahmadinejad seems to have turned back to the populist base that elected him with another hoary old bit of revolutionary rhetoric—attacking the “Zionist regime.” He may have been expressing a personal conviction regarding Israel, but the international press did not report one important fact. His pronouncement was not his own. He was repeating the words of Ayatollah Khomeini from the time of the Revolution. Of course his agreement with them was implied. What was far more important than the condemnation of Israel was the fact that Mr. Ahmadinejad was tying himself specifically to the politics of 30 years ago. The statement was moreover made not out of the blue, but on an opportune occasion—the “Day of Jerusalem”—traditionally the last Friday in Ramazan, the month of fasting in Islam, which falls on Friday, October 28 this year.

It is not inconsequential that Mr. Ahmadinejad’s statement is also is an indirect attack on the United States. This undoubtedly underscores Iran's ongoing unhappiness with U.S. and Israeli-led attacks on its nuclear energy development program, the one thing about which the Iranian people approve of their government's conduct.

The United States wasted no time capitalizing on Ahmadinejad's remarks in a kind of international “gotcha” moment. By tying them immediately to the nuclear development issue, the United States and Israel reinforced the widespread myth that Iran plans to drop an atomic bomb on Tel Aviv.

Contextualization aside, Mr. Ahmadinejad has miscalculated his own public support base. His rhetoric on Israel is both out of step with general public sensibility in Iran, and is seen precisely for what it is--empty posturing. Iran has little or no ability to affect the Israeli-Palestinian question directly, is not going to attack Israel itself, and is also not likely to sway other states in the region to change their current policies of increasing accommodation to the realities in the Israeli-Palestinian issue. His remarks have not pleased Iran’s mullahs either, though they do not dare repudiate them. Rumblings in Tehran about Mr. Ahmadinejad’s poor reception at the United Nations in September, and now the international brouhaha over this statement indicate that the clerical establishment wants to keep him on a short leash in the future. The United States must surely know this, but Washington is unable to refrain from rising to the bait.

It is also important to note that if these statements had not been made by an Iranian official, they might have been condemned, but they would not have gotten the extreme media attention that Mr. Ahmadinejad has received. It is notable that the former Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohammad expressed sentiments similar to those of Mr. Ahmadinejad in 2003 just before he stepped down from office (“Jews rule the world by proxy”) and his anti-Semitic remarks barely made a blip on the media radar.

__________________________
William O. Beeman is Professor Middle East Anthropology at Brown University, and author of The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other (Praeger).

Monday, October 17, 2005

Iraq in the Balance

ITPBusiness.net {Print: Iraq in the balance}

Sunday, 16 October, 2005
Iraq in the balance
by Massoud A. Derhally (massoud.derhally@itp.com)
The prospects of a HARMONIOUSand stable Iraq seem all the more elusive as the October 15 deadline for a referendum on the country’s constitution closes in. As Arabian Business went to press, the situation in the war-torn country appeared hazy. Various segments of the Iraq leadership from the Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish communities were once again wedged in negotiations — as they were in the run up to the January elections and the initial negotiations that led to a draft constitution earlier this year. Each hopes that they will secure a strong and a favourable outcome for their own people.

The underlying cause of the fissure remains the issue of federalism and what seems to be an inclination by the Shiites and Kurds — at least in Sunni eyes — towards regional autonomy in southern and northern Iraq. There is also, of course, the prickly issue of Islam being a primary source of legislation, which has sparked concerns among women and Iraqis vying for a secular state.

Realising that, the current insurgency, largely comprised of disenchanted Sunnis, has been emboldened by the prospect of protracted negotiations. The US occupying forces, therefore, launched an all out assault on them and increased security throughout the country.

Saddam Hussein’s regime cruelly repressed the country’s Shiites — which account for 60% of the Iraq’s population — and mercilessly killed thousands of Kurds in the 1980s with mustard gas. The demise of the Baathist regime has also ignited an unquenchable thirst among the Kurds, which account for 25% of the country’s population, for the realisation of their independence — a fundamental point they seek to have cemented in a new constitution. But the newly found freedom has also accentuated the fervour of Shiites who want religion to be the source upon which the constitution is based.

“Unquestionably it is the issue of federalism. I think this has always been the biggest problem. People got [excited] about it — in particular, the issue of Islam and whether it had a definite or indefinite article. It was always clear that we were talking about a federal system, in which how issues such as the role of Islam in political and social life will be very much dependent on what will be the arrangements for decentralising power in Iraq,” says Neil Partrick of the Economist Intelligence Unit.

Federalism, in particular, has emerged as the key issue, because it permits Kurds to effectively run a secular system and allows the Shiites to discuss how issues of religious law will apply to civil life within their areas.

“Federalism is the key issue because it is the one that most concerns the Sunnis. That is not necessarily the primary concern of Shiites and Kurds. But it is the concern of those who thought the constitution might be a way of tying in the Sunnis and taking some of the heat out of the insurgency,” explains Partrick.

Before the draft constitution was finalised, Abdel Aziz Al Hakim of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq laid out an objective of a separate Shiite state. This compounded the concerns of the Sunnis, says Partrick. “In theory, there is no limit to the number of provinces that can form a very independent or highly autonomous region within Iraq, which has aggravated the concerns that the constitution can be a stepping-stone towards a break-up of the country.”

To some extent, Sunnis have accepted that there will be a highly independent entity called Kurdistan, but the idea that the Shiites are inclined to break away from Iraq themselves has caused real worries. “The constitution allows that as a possibility and it's aggravated the fears that the Sunnis have about whether this constitution can be another step on the road towards weakening the entity formally known as Iraq,” explains Partrick.

Creating a viable framework for the country doesn’t appear to be any easier today — even if there is a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum, as is widely expected to be the case. The prospect of failure though, as illuminated by Amre Moussa, the secretary general of the Arab League in the advent of his visit to Iraq, is civil war. Such an eventuality would almost certainly have reverberations throughout the wider Middle East.

This is a view that was echoed by a recent report from the International Crisis Group, which said “the only hope left is for the US to make a last-ditch effort to broker a true compromise that addresses core Sunni Arab concerns without crossing Shiite or Kurdish red lines.”

The ICG emphasised that the eventual constitution should, at a minimum, ensure that no more than four governorates could become a region through fusion, to assuage Sunni Arab fears of a Shiite super region in the south — and that Iraqis should not be excluded from public office or managerial positions on the basis of mere membership of the Baath party.

If “the constitution is adopted on 15 October and a government is elected by 15 December without a strong political agreement underpinning its legitimacy, descent into civil war and disintegration, with mass expulsions in areas of mixed population, could well become a reality,” the ICG report said.

As was the case in the run up to drafting of the constitution in August, Washington’s ambassador in Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad and other US officials have tried to shore up support for the referendum in Iraq, by pressuring or coercing the country’s neighbouring countries into supporting the political process.

Arab support has largely been lacking and it remains to be seen whether Washington's pressure will have an impact on the country's future political landscape — given that the majority view in the region is that Iraq is a country in a state of disintegration and there will be a weak central government.

“The United States has a strong interest in seeing the constitution — any constitution — ratified, and will do anything within its power to see that happen," says William Beeman, a professor at Brown University. “This has nothing to do with the welfare of the Iraqi people — it is for the benefit of [US president] George W. Bush, who is in trouble at home.”

Gregory Gause of the University of Vermont agrees. “I think that American diplomacy is all about getting the constitution approved. I think that the constitution, as it is written, will bring about a very decentralised, weak Iraqi regime with de facto Kurdish independence and, perhaps, a similar regional government in the south. But right now, Washington is focused on getting it approved,” he says.

US pressure to amend the constitution — which hopes that the referendum on the charter would placate the Sunnis — did score some success on October 5 when parliament voted to modify a clause that would have allowed the constitution to pass despite opposition. The constitution will not pass if two thirds of the voters in at least three of the country’s 18 provinces vote against it on October 15.

“Heavy US involvement in the drafting of the constitution also will allow the document’s critics to charge that the constitution is not really a completely ‘Iraqi’ document,” cautions Wayne White, the former Deputy Director of US State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s Office of Analysis for Near East and principal Iraq analyst.

“The ratification of the document would fuel even more Sunni Arab discontent, anger, and perceptions of increased disenfranchisement. Senior US Administration and military officials keep repeating that the interest on the part of Sunni Arabs in the referendum demonstrates that they want to become part of the political process, but, in reality, most Sunni Arabs are only interested in trying to veto the constitution in order to torpedo what they view as an emerging Shiite and Kurdish-dominated political order,” adds White.

Juan Cole, professor of history at the University of Michigan, believes that rifts in the country remain pronounced and that efforts to assuage Sunni fears go beyond an amendment. “I think a lot of the animosity grew up in the Saddam period. It has been exacerbated by the American tendency to ‘balance’ things ethnically, but even more by the deliberate strategy of the Sunni Arab guerrillas to attack Shiites,” says Cole, adding, “There needs to be an amnesty for the Baathists and they need to be given back their jobs. There needs to be some sort of gesture to the Sunnis about sharing petroleum resources.”

De-Baathification and the disbanding of the army, overseen by Paul Bremer, America’s vice consult at the outset of the occupation, at the nudging of Ahmad Chalabi, made it much more difficult for political groups that cut across the sectarian divide to gain support.

To the University of Vermont's Gause the best case scenario would be “if the Sunni Arabs vote heavily in the referendum and then participate in the parliamentary elections. [Then], we might get an Iraqi assembly that is more representative and could take another crack at the constitution.”

But getting the Sunnis on board is not the only problem.

Many observers say the present legislation will erode women’s rights. Fears that women, who make up around 60% of the country’s population, will be severely affected, have led many women activists to take to the streets, and call for equal rights and that 40% of the new legislature be reserved for women.

In its present form, the constitution is unclear about what the operation of the principal of Islam as a basic source of legislation means. It “isn’t clear whether we are talking about a new definition of Islamic codes or whether we are talking about very local interpretation,” says Partrick of the EIU. “Because we are talking about federalism, it does mean we are talking about provinces, which form an autonomous region and then these issues of the role of women and religion will very much be defined in practice on the ground,” adds Partrick.

This means that the legal situation in terms of rights may look very different if one lives in Baghdad, which is exempt from any ideas of a separate region, or if one lives in Kurdistan.

What is likely to happen on October 15 is that a great number of Sunnis will boycott or vote no in the referendum. This is markedly different from the election process in January, in which the majority of Sunnis opted to boycott the elections. Still, in all likelihood the referendum will produce a ‘yes' vote and will as a result encourage Sunnis that have shunned the political process in the belief that they could not influence the outcome, to take part in the December elections.

It “won't undermine the process by which others in the Sunni Arab community will want to use December as the chance to still try and make further changes in the constitution and in the direction of the system,” says Partrick. “This is not a recipe for peace and stability but at the same time it means we are not inextricably moving towards civil conflict and the collapse of a political process. When we get to the end of the year and the December elections there will be a lot of pressures on the Sunnis taking part in the system.”



Sunday, October 16, 2005

The Text of the Iraqi Constitution

Text of Iraq's Draft Constitution
New York Times
October 15, 2005


October 15, 2005
Text of Iraq's Draft Constitution
By THE NEW YORK TIMES
The text of the draft constitution was translated from Arabic by the U.N.
Office for Constitutional Support and edited by staff members from the
Baghdad bureau of The New York Times.

The consitution addresses some of the major conflicts between the Sunnis,
Shiites and Kurds, but still leaves much to be resolved. Noah Feldman, a
law professor at New York University and an adviser in the writing of the
transitional law now in effect in Iraq, explains below some of the
critical passages.

THE PREAMBLE

In the name of God, the most merciful, the most compassionate.

We have honored the sons of Adam

We are the people of the land between two rivers, the homeland of the
apostles and prophets, abode of the virtuous imams, pioneers of
civilization, crafters of writing and cradle of numeration. Upon our land
the first law made by man was passed, the most ancient just pact for
homelands policy was inscribed, and upon our soil, companions of the
Prophet and saints prayed, philosophers and scientists theorized and
writers and poets excelled.

Acknowledging God's right over us, and in fulfillment of the call of our
homeland and citizens, and in response to the call of our religious and
national leaderships and the determination of our great (religious)
authorities and of our leaders and reformers, and in the midst of an
international support from our friends and those who love us, marched for
the first time in our history toward the ballot boxes by the millions, men
and women, young and old, on the 30th of January, 2005, invoking the pains
of sectarian oppression sufferings inflicted by the autocratic clique and
inspired by the tragedies of Iraq's martyrs, Shiite and Sunni, Arabs and
Kurds and Turkmen and from all the other components of the people and
recollecting the darkness of the ravage of the holy cities and the South
in the Sha'abaniyya uprising and burnt by the flames of grief of the mass
graves, the marshes, Dujail and others and articulating the sufferings of
racial oppression in the massacres of Halabja, Barzan, Anfal and the Fayli
Kurds and inspired by the ordeals of the Turkmen in Bashir and as is the
case in the remaining areas of Iraq where the people of the west suffered
from the assassinations of their leaders, symbols and elderly and from the
displacement of their skilled individuals and from the drying out of their
cultural and intellectual wells, so we sought hand-in-hand and
shoulder-to-shoulder to create our new Iraq, the Iraq of the future free
from sectarianism, racism, locality complex, discrimination and exclusion.

Accusations of being infidels, and terrorism did not stop us from marching
forward to build a nation of law. Sectarianism and racism have not stopped
us from marching together to strengthen our national unity, and to follow
the path of peaceful transfer of power and adopt the course of the just
distribution of resources and providing equal opportunity for all.

We the people of Iraq who have just risen from our stumble, and who are
looking with confidence to the future through a republican, federal,
democratic, pluralistic system, have resolved with the determination of
our men, women, the elderly and youth, to respect the rules of law, to
establish justice and equality to cast aside the politics of aggression,
and to tend to the concerns of women and their rights, and to the elderly
and their concerns, and to children and their affairs and to spread a
culture of diversity and defusing terrorism.

We the people of Iraq of all components and shades have taken upon
ourselves to decide freely and with our choice to unite our future and to
take lessons from yesterday for tomorrow, to draft, through the values and
ideals of the heavenly messages and the findings of science and man's
civilization, this lasting constitution. The adherence to this
constitution preserves for Iraq its free union, its people, its land and
its sovereignty.

SECTION ONE: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Article 1:

The Republic of Iraq is an independent sovereign state. Its system of
government is republican, representative (Parliamentary), democratic and
federal.

Article 2:

First: Islam is the official religion of the State and it is a fundamental
source of legislation:

A. No law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be
established.

B. No law that contradicts the principles of democracy may be established.

C. No law that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in
this constitution may be established.

[MR. FELDMAN: This passage tries to balance Islam and democracy by putting
them on an even footing. It all but guarantees future debate about what
are that the fixed rules of Islam or the principles of democracy.]

Second: This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority
of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights of all
individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice such as
Christians, Yazedis, and Mandi Sabeans.

Article 3:

Iraq is a country of many nationalities, religions and sects, and is a
part of the Islamic world, is a founding and active member of the Arab
League, and is committed to its covenant.

Article 4:

First: The Arabic language and Kurdish language are the two official
languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their
mother tongue, such as Turkmen, Syriac and Armenian, in government
educational institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in
any other language in private educational institutions, is guaranteed.

Second: The scope of the term official language and the means of applying
the provisions of this article shall be defined by law which shall
include:

A. Publication of the official gazette, in the two languages;

B. Speech, conversation and expression in official settings, such as the
Council of Representatives, the Council of Ministers, courts, and official
conferences, in either of the two languages;

C. Recognition and publication of the official documents and
correspondences in the two languages;

D. Opening schools that teach the two languages, in accordance with the
educational guidelines;

E. Use of both languages in any settings enjoined by the principle of
equality such as bank notes, passports and stamps.

Third: The federal institutions and agencies in the Kurdistan region shall
use both languages.

Fourth: The Turkmen language and Syriac language are two other official
languages in the administrative units in which they represent density of
population.

Fifth: Each region or governorate may adopt any other local language as an
additional official language if the majority of its population so decide
in a general referendum.

Article 5: The law is sovereign. The people are the source of authorities
and its legitimacy, which the people shall exercise in a direct general
secret ballot and through their constitutional institutions.

Article 6:

Transfer of authority shall be made peacefully through democratic means as
stipulated in this Constitution.

Article 7:

First: No entity or program, under any name, may adopt racism, terrorism,
the calling of others infidels, ethnic cleansing, or incite, facilitate,
glorify, promote, or justify thereto, especially the Saddamist Baath in
Iraq and its symbols, regardless of the name that it adopts. This may not
be part of the political pluralism in Iraq. This will be organized by law.

Second: The State shall undertake combating terrorism in all its forms,
and shall work to protect its territories from being a base or pathway or
field for terrorist activities.

Article 8:

Iraq shall observe the principles of a good neighborliness, adhere to the
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states,
endeavor to settle disputes by peaceful means, establish relations on the
basis of mutual interests and reciprocity, and respect its international
obligations.

Article 9:

First:

A. The Iraqi Armed Forces and Security Services will be composed of the
components of the Iraqi people with due consideration given to its balance
and its similarity without discrimination or exclusion and shall be
subject to the control of the civilian authority. The Iraqi Armed Forces
shall defend Iraq and shall not be used as an instrument of oppression
against the Iraqi people, shall not interfere in the political affairs and
shall have no role in the transfer of authority.

B. The formation of military militia outside the framework of the armed
forces is prohibited.

C. The Iraqi Armed Forces and its personnel, including military personnel
working at the Ministry of Defense or any subordinate departments or
organizations, may not stand for election to political office, campaign
for candidates, or participate in other activities prohibited by the
Ministry of Defense regulations. This ban encompasses the activities of
the personnel mentioned above acting in their personal or official
capacities. Nothing in this Article shall infringe upon the right of these
personnel to cast their vote in the elections.

D. The Iraqi National Intelligence Service shall collect information,
assess threats to national security, and advise the Iraqi government. This
service shall be under civilian control and shall be subject to
legislative oversight and shall operate in accordance with the law and
pursuant to the recognized principles of human rights.

E. The Iraqi Government shall respect and implement Iraq's international
obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development,
non-production, and non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,
and shall prohibit associated equipment, materiel, technologies, and
delivery systems for use in the development, manufacture, production, and
use of such weapons.

Second: National service will be stipulated by law.

Article 10:

The holy shrines and religious places in Iraq are religious and cultural
entities. The State is committed to confirming and safeguarding their
sanctity, and guaranteeing the free practice of rituals in them.

Article 11:

Baghdad is the capital of the Republic of Iraq.

Article 12:

First: The flag, national anthem, and emblem of Iraq shall be fixed by law
in a way that represents the components of the Iraqi people.

Second: A law shall regulate the decorations, official holidays, religious
and national occasions and the Hijri and Gregorian calendar.

Article 13:

First: This constitution is the sublime and supreme law in Iraq and shall
be binding in all parts of Iraq without exception.

Second: No law shall be enacted that contradicts this constitution. Any
text in any regional constitutions or any other legal text that
contradicts it is deemed void.

SECTION TWO: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES

CHAPTER ONE: RIGHTS

FIRST: Civil and Political Rights

Article 14:

Iraqis are equal before the law without discrimination based on gender,
race, ethnicity, origin, color, religion, creed, belief or opinion, or
economic and social status.

Article 15:

Every individual has the right to enjoy life, security and liberty.
Deprivation or restriction of these rights is prohibited except in
accordance with the law and based on a decision issued by a competent
judicial authority.

Article 16:

Equal opportunities are guaranteed for all Iraqis. The state guarantees
the taking of the necessary measures to achieve such equal opportunities.

Article 17:

First: Every individual shall have the right to personal privacy, so long
it does not contradict the rights of others and public morals.

Second: The sanctity of homes is inviolable and homes may not be entered,
searched, or put in danger, except by a judicial decision, and in
accordance with the law.

Article 18:

First: An Iraqi is any person born to an Iraqi father or mother.

Second: Iraqi nationality is the right of every Iraqi and shall be the
basis of his citizenship.

Third:

A. An Iraqi citizen by birth may not have his nationality withdrawn for
any reason. Any person who had his nationality withdrawn shall have the
right to reclaim it, and this will be stipulated by law.

B. The Iraqi nationality shall be withdrawn from the naturalized in the
cases stipulated by law.

Fourth: An Iraqi may have multiple nationalities. Everyone who assumes a
senior, security sovereign position must abandon any other acquired
nationality. This will be organized by law.

Fifth: Iraqi citizenship shall not be granted for the purposes of the
policy of settling people that cause an imbalance in the population
composition of Iraq.

Sixth: A law shall regulate the provisions of nationality. The competent
courts shall consider the suits resulting from it.

Article 19:

First: The judiciary is independent and no power is above the judiciary
except the law.

Second: There is no crime or punishment except by a stipulation. The
punishment shall only be for an act that the law considers a crime when
perpetrated. A harsher sentence than the applicable sentence at the time
of the offense may not be imposed.

Third: Litigation shall be a safeguarded and guaranteed right for all.

Fourth: The right to a defense shall be sacred and guaranteed in all
phases of investigation and trial.

Fifth: The accused is innocent until proven guilty in a fair legal trial.
The accused may not be tried on the same crime for a second time after
acquittal unless new evidence is produced.

Sixth: Every person has the right to be treated with justice in judicial
and administrative proceedings.

Seventh: The proceedings of a trial are public unless the court decides to
make it secret.

Eighth: Punishment is personal.

Ninth: A law does not have a retroactive effect unless the law stipulates
otherwise. This exclusion shall not include laws relating to taxes and
fees.

Tenth: Criminal law does not have a retroactive effect, unless it is to
the benefit of the accused.

Eleventh: The court shall delegate a lawyer at the expense of the state
for an accused of a felony or misdemeanor who does not have a defense
lawyer.

Twelfth:

A. (Unlawful) detention is prohibited.

B. Detention or arrest is prohibited in places not designed for it,
pursuant to prison regulations covered by health and social care and
subject to the scrutiny of the law.

Thirteenth: The preliminary investigative documents must be submitted to
the competent judge in a period not to exceed 24 hours from the time of
the arrest of the accused. It may be extended only once and for the same
period.

Article 20:

The citizens, men and women, have the right to participate in public
affairs and to enjoy political rights including the right to vote, to
elect and to nominate.

Article 21:

First: No Iraqi shall be surrendered to foreign entities and authorities.

Second: A law shall regulate the right of political asylum to Iraq. No
political refugee shall be surrendered to a foreign entity or returned
forcibly to the country from which he fled.

Third: No political asylum shall be granted to a person accused of
committing international or terrorist crimes or any person who inflicted
damage on Iraq.

SECOND: Economic, social and cultural liberties

Article 22:

First: Work is a right for all Iraqis so as to guarantee them a decent
living.

Second: The law regulates the relationship between employees and employers
on economic basis and with regard to the foundations of social justice.

Third: The State guarantees the right of forming and joining professional
associations and unions. This will be organized by law.

Article 23:

First: Personal property is protected. The proprietor shall have the right
to benefit from, exploit and utilize personal property within the limits
of the law.

Second: No property may be taken away except for the purposes of public
benefit in return for just compensation. This will be organized by law.

Third:

A. Every Iraqi has the right to own property throughout Iraq. No others
may possess immovable assets, except as exempted by law.

B. Owning property for the purposes of population change shall be
prohibited.

Article 24:

The State guarantees freedom of movement of Iraqi manpower, goods and
capitals between regions and province. This will be organized by law.

Article 25:

The State guarantees the reform of the Iraqi economy in accordance with
modern economic principles to insure the full investment of its resources,
diversification of its sources and the encouragement and the development
of the private sector.

Article 26:

The state guarantees the encouragement of investments in the various
sectors. This will be organized by law.

Article 27:

First: Public property is sacrosanct, and its protection is the duty of
each citizen.

Second: The provisions related to the protection of State properties and
its management and the conditions for its disposal and the limits under
which none of these properties can be relinquished shall all be regulated
by law.

Article 28:

First: No taxes or fines may be imposed, amended, exempted or pardoned
from, except in accordance with law.

Second: Low wage earners shall be exempted from taxes in a manner that
ensures the upholding of the minimum wage required for survival. This will
be organized by law.

Article 29:

First:

A. The family is the foundation of society; the State preserves its entity
and its religious, moral and patriotic values.

B. The State guarantees the protection of motherhood, childhood and old
age and shall care for children and youth and provides them with the
appropriate conditions to further their talents and abilities.

Second: Children have right over their parents in regard to upbringing,
care and education. Parents shall have right over their children in regard
to respect and care especially in times of need, disability and old age.

Third: Economic exploitation of children shall be completely prohibited.
The State shall take the necessary measures to protect them.

Fourth: All forms of violence and abuse in the family, school and society
shall be prohibited.

Article 30:

First: The state guarantee to the individual and the family -- especially
children and women -- social and health security and the basic
requirements for leading a free and dignified life. The state also ensures
the above a suitable income and appropriate housing.

Second: The State guarantees the social and health security to Iraqis in
cases of old age, sickness, employment disability, homelessness, orphanage
or unemployment, and shall work to protect them from ignorance, fear and
poverty. The State shall provide them housing and special programs of care
and rehabilitation. This will be organized by law.

Article 31:

First: Every citizen has the right to health care. The state takes care of
public health and provide the means of prevention and treatment by
building different types of hospitals and medical institutions.

Second: Individuals and institutions may build hospitals or clinics or
places for treatment with the supervision of the state and this shall be
regulated by law.

Article 32:

The State cares for the handicapped and those with special needs and
ensure their rehabilitation in order to reintegrate them into society.
This shall be regulated by law.

Article 33:

First: Every individual has the right to live in a safe environment.

Second: The State undertakes the protection and preservation of the
environment and biological diversity.

Article 34:

First: Education is a fundamental factor in the progress of society and is
a right guaranteed by the state. Primary education is mandatory and the
state guarantees to eradicate illiteracy.

Second: Free education is a right for all Iraqis in all its stages.

Third: The State encourages scientific research for peaceful purposes that
serve man and supports excellence, creativity, invention and the different
aspects of ingenuity.

Fourth: Private and public education is guaranteed. This shall be
regulated by law.

CHAPTER TWO: LIBERTIES

Article 35:

First:

A. The liberty and dignity of man are safeguarded.

B. No person may be kept in custody or interrogated except in the context
of a judicial decision.

C. All forms of psychological and physical torture and inhumane treatment
shall be prohibited. Any confession coerced by force, threat, or torture
shall not be relied on. The victim shall have the right to compensation in
accordance with the law for material and moral damages incurred.

Second: The State guarantees the protection of the individual from
intellectual, political and religious coercion.

Third: Compulsory service (unpaid labor), serfdom, slave trade (slavery),
trafficking of women and children, and the sex trade is prohibited.

Article 36:

The state guarantees in a way that does not violate public order and
morality:

A. Freedom of expression, through all means.

B. Freedom of press, printing, advertisement, media and publication.

C. Freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration. This shall be regulated
by law.

Article 37:

First: The freedom of forming and of joining associations and political
parties is guaranteed. This will be organized by law.

Second: It is prohibited to force any person to join any party, society or
political entity or force him to continue his membership in it.

Article 38:

The freedom of communication, and mail, telegraphic, electronic, and
telephonic correspondence, and other correspondence shall be guaranteed
and may not be monitored, wiretapped or disclosed except for legal and
security necessity and by a judicial decision.

Article 39:

Iraqis are free in their adherence to their personal status according to
their religion, sect, belief and choice, and that will be organized by
law.

[MR. FELDMAN: In the middle of a progressive bill of rights, this
provision is interpreted by some to apply Shariah, or Islamic law, to
family issues. In fact, the legislature and courts will have to work out
what to do if a couiple do not agree if Shariah should be applied to their
marriage.]

Article 40:

Each individual has freedom of thought, conscience and belief.

Article 41:

First: The followers of all religions and sects are free in the:

A. Practice of religious rites, including the Husseini ceremonies (Shiite
religious ceremonies)

B. Management of the endowments, its affairs and its religious
institutions. The law shall regulate this.

Second: The state guarantees freedom of worship and the protection of the
places of worship.

Article 42:

First: Each Iraqi enjoys the right of free movement, travel, and residence
inside and outside Iraq.

Second: No Iraqi may be exiled, displaced or deprived from returning to
the homeland.

Article 43:

First: The State shall seek to strengthen the role of civil society
institutions, to support, develop and preserve its independence in a way
that is consistent with peaceful means to achieve its legitimate goals.
This will be organized by law.

Second: The State shall seek the advancement of the Iraqi clans and tribes
and shall attend to their affairs in a manner that is consistent with
religion and the law and upholds its noble human values in a way that
contributes to the development of society. The State shall prohibit the
tribal traditions that are in contradiction with human rights.

Article 44:

There may not be a restriction or limit on the practice of any rights or
liberties stipulated in this constitution, except by law or on the basis
of it, and insofar as that limitation or restriction does not violate the
essence of the right or freedom.

SECTION THREE: FEDERAL POWERS

Article 45:

The federal powers shall consist of the legislative, the executive and the
judicial powers. They exercise their specializations and tasks on the
basis of the principle of separation of powers.

CHAPTER ONE: THE LEGISLATIVE POWER:

Article 46:

The federal legislative power shall consist of the Council of
Representatives and the Federation Council.

FIRST: The Council of Representatives

Article 47:

First: The Council of Representatives shall consist of a number of
members, at a ratio of one representative per 100,000 Iraqi persons
representing the entire Iraqi people. They shall be elected through a
direct secret general ballot. The representation of all components of the
people in it shall be upheld.

Second: A candidate to the Council of Representatives must be a fully
eligible Iraqi.

Third: A law shall regulate the requirements for the candidate, the voter
and all that is connected with the elections.

Fourth: The elections law aims to achieve a percentage of women
representation not less than one-quarter of the Council of Representatives
members.

Fifth: The Council of Representatives shall promulgate a law dealing with
the replacement of its members on resignation, dismissal or death.

Sixth: No member of the Council of Representatives shall be allowed to
hold any other official position or work.

Article 48:

Each member of the Council of Representatives must take the following
constitutional oath before the Council prior to assuming his duties:

(I swear by God the Almighty to carry out my legal tasks and
responsibilities devotedly and honestly and preserve the independence and
sovereignty of Iraq, and safeguard the interests of its people, and watch
over the safety of its land, skies, waters, resources and federal
democratic system, and I shall endeavor to protect public and private
liberties, the independence of the judiciary and adhere to the
applications of the legislation neutrally and faithfully. God is my
witness).

Article 49:

The Council of Representatives shall set its bylaws to regulate its work.

Article 50:

First: The Council of Representatives shall decide by a two-thirds
majority, the membership authenticity of its members within 30 days from
the date of filing an objection.

Second: The decision of the Council of Representatives may be appealed
before the Supreme Federal Court within thirty days from the date of its
issuance.

Article 51:

First: Sessions of the Council of Representatives shall be public unless
it deems them otherwise.

Second: Minutes of the sessions shall be published in means regarded
appropriate by the Council.

Article 52:

The President of the Republic shall call upon the Council of
Representatives to convene by a presidential decree within 15 days from
the date of the ratification of the general elections results. Its eldest
member shall chair the first session to elect the president of the Council
and his two deputies. This period may not be extended by more than the
aforementioned one.

Article 53:

The Council of Representatives shall elect in its first session its
president, then his first deputy and second deputy, by an absolute
majority of the total number of the Council members by direct secret
ballot.

Article 54:

First: The electoral term of the Council of Representatives shall be
limited to four calendar years, starting with its first session and ending
with the conclusion of the fourth year.

Second: The new Council of Representatives shall be elected 45 days before
the conclusion of the previous electoral term.

Article 55:

The Council of Representatives shall have one annual term with two
legislative sessions lasting eight months. The bylaw shall define the
method of convention. The session in which the general budget is being
presented shall not end until its approval.

Article 56:

First: The President of the Republic or the Prime Minister or the
President of the Council of Representatives or fifty members of the
Council of Representatives may call the Council to an extraordinary
session. The session shall be restricted to the topics that necessitated
the request.

Second: The President of the Republic, or the Prime Minister or the
President of the Council or 50 members of the Council of Representatives,
may ask for an extension of the legislative session of the Council of
representatives for no more than 30 days in order to complete the tasks
that required the extension.

Article 57:

First:

A. The Council of Representatives quorum shall be fulfilled by an absolute
majority of its members.

B. Decisions in the sessions of the Council of Representatives shall be
made by a simple majority after quorum is fulfilled, unless stipulated
otherwise.

Second:

A. Bills shall be presented by the President of the Republic and the Prime
Minister.

B. Proposed laws shall be presented by ten members of the Council of
Representatives or by one of its specialized committees.

Article 58:

The Council of Representatives specializes in the following:

First: Enacting federal laws.

Second: Monitoring the performance of the executive authority.

Third: Elect the President of the Republic.

Fourth: A law shall regulate the ratification of international treaties
and agreements by a two thirds majority of the members of the Council of
Representatives.

Fifth: To approve the appointment of the following:

A. The President and members of the Federal Court of Cassation, Chief
Public Prosecutor and the President of Judicial Oversight Commission based
on a proposal from the Higher Juridical Council, by an absolute majority.

B. Ambassadors and those with special grades based on a proposal from the
Cabinet.

C. The Iraqi Army Chief of Staff, his assistants and those of the rank of
division commanders and above and the director of the intelligence service
based on a proposal from the Cabinet.

Sixth:

A. Question the President of the Republic based on a justifiable petition
by an absolute majority of the Council of Representatives members.

B. Relieve the President of the Republic by an absolute majority of the
Council of Representatives members after being convicted by the Supreme
Federal Court in one of the following cases:

1- Perjury of the constitutional oath.

2- Violating the Constitution.

3- High treason.

Seventh:

A. The Council of Representatives member may direct questions to the Prime
Minister and the Ministers on any subject within their specialty and they
may answer the members' questions. The Member who has asked the question
solely has the right to comment on the answer.

B. At least 25 members of the Council of representatives may table a
general issue for discussion to obtain clarity on the policy and the
performance of the Cabinet or one of the Ministries. It must be submitted
to the President of the Council of Representatives, and the Prime Minister
or the Ministers shall specify a date to come before the Council of
Representatives to discuss it.

C. A Council of Representatives member with the agreement of 25 members
may direct a question to the Prime Minister or the Ministers to call them
to account on the issues within their authority. The discussion on the
question shall begin at least seven days after submitting the question.

Eighth:

A. The Council of Representatives may withdraw confidence from one of the
Ministers by an absolute majority and he is considered resigned from the
date of the decision of confidence withdrawal. The issue of no confidence
in the Minister may be tabled only on that Minister's wish or on a signed
request of 50 members after an inquiry discussion directed at him. The
Council of Representatives shall not issue its decision regarding the
request except after at least seven days of its submission.

B.

1- The President of the Republic may submit a request to the Council of
Representatives to withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister.

2- The Council of Representatives may withdraw confidence from the Prime
Minister based on the request of one-fifth (1/5) of its members. This
request may be submitted only after a question has been put to the Prime
Minister and after at least seven days from submitting the request.

3- The Council of Representatives shall decide to withdraw confidence from
the Prime Minister by an absolute majority of its members.

C. The Government is considered resigned in case of withdrawal of
confidence from the Prime Minister.

D. In case of a vote of withdrawal of confidence in the Cabinet as a
whole, the Prime Minister and the Ministers continue in their positions to
run everyday business for a period not to exceed thirty days until a new
cabinet is formed in accordance with the provisions of article 73 of this
constitution.

E. The Council of Representatives may interrogate independent commission
heads in accordance with the same procedures as for the ministers and may
dismiss them by an absolute majority.

Ninth:

A. To consent to the declaration of war and the state of emergency by a
two-thirds majority based on a joint request from the President of the
Republic and the Prime Minister.

B. The period of the state emergency shall be limited to 30 days,
extendable after approval each time.

C. The Prime Minister shall be authorized with the necessary powers that
enable him to manage the affairs of the country within the period of the
state of emergency and war. A law shall regulate these powers that do not
contradict the constitution.

D. The Prime Minister shall present to the Council of Representatives the
measures taken and the results within the period of declaration of war and
within 15 days of the end of the state of emergency.

Article 59:

First: The Council of Ministers shall submit the draft general budget bill
and the closing account to the Council of Representatives for approval.

Second: The Council of Representatives may conduct transfers between the
sections and chapters of the general budget and reduce the total of its
sums, and it may suggest to the Cabinet to increase the total expenses,
when necessary.

Article 60:

First: A law shall regulate the rights and privileges of the speaker of
the Council of Representatives, his two deputies and the members of
Council of Representatives.

Second:

A. Each member of the Council of Representatives shall enjoy immunity for
statements made while the Council is in session, and the member may not be
prosecuted before the courts for such.

B. A Council of Representatives member may not be placed under arrest
during the legislative term of the Council of Representatives, unless the
member is accused of a felony and the Council of Representatives members
consent by an absolute majority to lift his immunity or if caught in
flagrante delicto (the act) in the commission of a felony.

C. A Council of Representatives member may not be arrested after the
legislative term of the Council of Representatives, unless the member is
accused of a felony and with the consent of the speaker of the Council of
Representatives to lift his immunity or if he is caught in flagrante
delicto in the commission of a felony.

Article 61:

First: The Council of Representatives may dissolve itself with the consent
of the absolute majority of its members, upon the request of one-third of
its members or upon the request of the Prime Minister and the consent of
the President of the Republic. The Council may not be dissolved during the
period in which the Prime Minister is being questioned.

Second: Upon the dissolution of the Council of Representatives, the
President of the Republic shall call for general elections in the country
within a period not to exceed 60 days from the date of its dissolution.
The Cabinet in this case is considered resigned and continues to run
everyday business.

SECOND: The Federation Council

Article 62:

A legislative council shall be established named the ''Federation
Council'' to include representatives from the regions and the province
that are not organized in a region. A law, enacted by a two-third majority
of the members of the Council of representatives, shall regulate the
Federation Council formation, its membership conditions and its
specializations and all that is connected with it.

CHAPTER TWO: THE EXECUTIVE POWER

Article 63:

The Federal Executive Power shall consist of the President of the Republic
and the Council of Ministers and shall exercise its powers in accordance
with the constitution and the law.

FIRST: The President of the Republic

Article 64:

The President of the Republic is the Head of the State and a symbol of the
unity of the country and represents the sovereignty of the country. He
safeguards the commitment to the Constitution and the preservation of
Iraq's independence, sovereignty, unity, the security of its territories
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

Article 65:

A nominee to the Presidency must meet the following conditions:

A. Must be an Iraqi by birth, born to Iraqi parents.

B. Must be fully eligible and be at least 40 years old.

C. Must be of good reputation and political experience, and known for his
integrity, righteousness, fairness and loyalty to the homeland.

D. Must not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Article 66:

First: A law shall regulate the nomination to the post of the President of
the Republic.

Second: A law shall regulate the nomination of one deputy or more for the
President of the Republic.

Article 67:

First: The Council of Representatives shall elect, from among the
nominees, the President of the Republic by a two-thirds majority of its
members.

Second: If any of the candidates does not receive the required majority
vote then the two candidates who received the highest number of votes
shall compete and the one who receives the highest number of votes in the
second election shall be declared as President.

Article 68:

The President shall take the Constitutional Oath before the Council of
Representatives in the form stipulated in Article 48 of the Constitution.

Article 69:

First: The President of the Republic's term in office shall be limited to
four years and may be elected for a second time and no more.

Second:

A. The term of the President of the Republic shall finish at the end of
the Council of Representatives' term.

B. The President of the Republic will continue to exercise his functions
until the elections for the Council of Representatives is completed and
until it meets. The new President shall then be elected within 30 days of
its first meeting.

C. If the position of president of the republic is vacant, for whatever
reason, a new president will be elected in order to fill the vacancy for
the remaining period of that president's term.

Article 70:

The President of the Republic shall assume the following powers:

A. To issue a special pardon on the recommendation of the Prime Minister,
except for anything concerning private claim and for those who have been
convicted of committing international crimes, terrorism, and financial and
administrative corruption.

B. To ratify international treaties and agreements after the approval by
the Council of Representatives. Such international treaties and agreements
are considered ratified after 15 days from the date of receipt.

C. To ratify and issue the laws enacted by the Council of Representatives.
Such laws are considered ratified after 15 days from the date of receipt.

D. To call the elected Council of Representatives to convene during a
period not to exceed 15 days from the date of approval of the election
results and in the other cases stipulated in the Constitution.

E. To award medals and decorations on the recommendation of the Prime
Minister in accordance with the law.

F. To accredit Ambassadors.

G. To issue Presidential decrees.

H. Ratify death sentences issued by the competent courts.

I. Perform the duty of the Higher Command of the armed forces for
ceremonial and honorary purposes.

J. Exercise any other presidential powers stipulated in this Constitution.

Article 71:

A law shall fix the salary and the allowances of the President of the
Republic.

Article 72:

First: The President of the Republic shall have the right to submit his
resignation in writing to the Speaker of the Council of Representatives,
and is considered effective after seven days from the date of its
submission to the Council of Representatives.

Second: The ''Vice'' President shall assume the office of the President in
case of his absence.

Third: The Vice President shall assume the duties of the President of the
Republic or in the event of the post of the President becomes vacant for
any reason whatsoever. The Council of Representatives must elect a new
President within a period not to exceed 30 days from the date of the
vacancy.

Fourth: In the case the post of the President of the Republic becomes
vacant, the Speaker of the Council of Representatives shall replace the
President of the Republic in case he does not have a Vice President, on
the condition that a new President is elected during a period not to
exceed thirty days from the date of the vacancy and in accordance with the
provisions of this Constitution.

justice in appropriating funds to the governments of the regions and
province that are not organized in a region in accordance with the
established percentages.

SECOND: Council of Ministers

Article 73:

First: The President of the Republic shall name the nominee of the Council
of Representatives bloc with the largest number to form the Cabinet within
15 days from the date of the election of the president of the republic.

Second: The Prime Minister-designate shall undertake the naming of the
members of his Cabinet within a period not to exceed 30 days from the date
of his designation.

Third: In case the Prime Minister-designate fails to form the cabinet
during the period specified in clause ''Second,'' the President of the
Republic shall name a new nominee for the post of Prime Minister within
fifteen days.

Fourth: The Prime Minister-designate shall present the names of his
Cabinet members and the ministerial program to the Council of
Representatives. He is deemed to have gained its confidence upon the
approval, by an absolute majority of the Council of Representatives, of
the individual Ministers and the ministerial program.

Fifth: The President of the Republic shall name another nominee to form
the cabinet within 15 days in case the Cabinet did not gain the
confidence.

Article 74:

First: The conditions for assuming the post of the Prime Minister shall be
the same as those for the President of the Republic, provided that he is
at least 35 years old and has a college degree or its equivalent.

Second: The conditions for assuming the post of Minister shall be the same
as those for members of the Council of Representatives provided that he
holds a college degree or its equivalent.

Article 75:

The Prime Minister is the direct executive authority responsible for the
general policy of the State and the commander in chief of the armed
forces. He directs the Council of Ministers, and presides over its
meetings and has the right to dismiss the Ministers on the consent of the
Council of Representatives.

Article 76:

The Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet shall take the
Constitutional Oath before the Council of Representatives in the form
stipulated in Article 48 of the Constitution.

Article 77:

The Cabinet shall exercise the following powers:

First: Plan and execute the general policy and the general plans of the
State and oversee the work of the ministries and departments not
associated with a ministry.

Second: To propose bills.

Third: To issue rules, instructions and decisions for the purpose of
implementing the law.

Fourth: To prepare the draft of the general budget, the closing account,
and the development plans.

Fifth: To recommend to the Council of Representatives to approve the
appointment of under secretaries, ambassadors, State senior officials,
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and his assistants, Division Commanders
or higher, Director of the National Intelligence Service, and heads of
security institutions.

Sixth: To negotiate and sign international agreements and treaties or
designate any person to do so.

Article 78:

First: The President of the Republic shall take up the office of the Prime
Minister in the event the post becomes vacant for any reason whatsoever.

Second: The President must designate another nominee to form the cabinet
within a period not to exceed 15 days in accordance with the provisions of
article 73 of this Constitution.

Article 79:

A law shall regulate the salaries and allowances of the Prime Minister and
Ministers, and anyone of their grade.

Article 80:

The responsibility of the Prime Minister and the Ministers before the
Council of Representatives is of a joint and personal nature.

Article 81:

First: A law shall regulate the work of the security institutions and the
National Intelligence Service and shall define its duties and authorities.
It shall operate in accordance with the principles of human rights and be
subject to the oversight of the Council of Representatives.

Second: The National Intelligence Service shall be attached to the
Cabinet.

Article 82:

The Council of Ministers shall establish internal bylaws to organize the
work therein.

Article 83:

A law shall regulate the formation of ministries, their tasks, their
responsibilities and the authorities of the minister.

CHAPTER THREE: THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

Article 84:

The Judicial authority is independent. The courts, in their various types
and classes, shall assume this authority and issue decisions in accordance
with the law.

Article 85:

Judges are independent and there is no authority over them except that of
the law. No authority shall have the right to interfere in the Judiciary
and the affairs of Justice.

Article 86:

The Federal Judicial Authority is comprised of the Higher Juridical
Council, Supreme Federal Court, Federal Court of Cassation, Public
Prosecution Department, Judiciary Oversight Commission and other federal
courts that are regulated in accordance with the law.

FIRST: Higher Juridical Council

Article 87:

The Higher Juridical Council shall oversee the affairs of the Judicial
Committees. The law shall specify the method of its establishment, its
authorities, and the rules of its operation.

Article 88:

The Higher Juridical Council shall exercise the following authorities:

First: To manage the affairs of the Judiciary and supervise the Federal
Judiciary.

Second: To nominate the Chief Justice and members of the Federal Court of
Cassation, the Chief Public Prosecutor, the Chief Justice of the Judiciary
Oversight Commission and present them to the Council of Representatives to
approve their appointment.

Third: To propose the draft of the annual budget of the Federal Judiciary
Authority and present it to the Council of Representatives for approval.

SECOND: Supreme Federal Court

Article 89:

First: The Supreme Federal Court is an independent judicial body,
financially and administratively.

Second: The Supreme Federal Court will be made up of number of judges, and
experts in Shariah (Islamic) and law, whose number and manner of selection
will be defined by a law that should be passed by two-thirds of the
parliament members.

[MR. FELDMAN: The Supreme Federal Court will decide the difficult
questions about federalism, who owns the oil and how democracy and Islam
should be balanced. The drafters punted when they declined to state how
the judges would be selected. But they id say that some will be experts in
religious law, so Shiite clerics, and probably some Sunni ones, will play
a crucial role.]

Article 90:

The Supreme Federal Court shall have jurisdiction over the following:

First: Oversight of the constitutionality of laws and regulations in
effect.

Second: Interpretation of the provisions of the constitution.

Third: Settle matters that arise from the application of the federal laws,
decisions, regulations, instructions, and procedures issued by the federal
authority. The law shall guarantee the right of each of the Cabinet, the
concerned individuals and others of direct contest with the Court.

Fourth: Settle disputes that arise between the federal government and the
governments of the regions and province, municipalities, and local
administrations.

Fifth: Settle disputes that arise between the governments of the regions
and governments of the province.

Sixth: Settle accusations directed against the President, the Prime
Minister and the Ministers. That shall be regulated by law.

Seventh: Ratify the final results of the general elections for membership
in the Council of Representatives.

Eight:

A. Settle competency dispute between the Federal Judiciary and the
judicial institutions of the regions and province that are not organized
in a region.

B. Settle competency dispute between judicial institutions of the regions
or province that are not organized in a region.

Article 91:

Decisions of the Supreme Federal Court are final and binding for all
authorities.

THIRD: General Provisions

Article 92:

Special or exceptional courts may not be established.

Article 93:

The law shall regulate the establishment of courts, their types, classes
and jurisdiction and the method of appointing and the terms of service of
judges, public prosecutors, their discipline and their retirement.

Article 94:

Judges may not be removed except in cases specified by law; such law will
determine the particular provisions related to them and shall regulate
their disciplinary measures.

Article 95:

A judge or public prosecutor may not:

First: Combine a position in the judiciary, and a position in the
legislature and executive or any other employment.

Second: Joining any party or political organization or perform any
political activity.

Article 96:

A law shall regulate military judiciary and shall specify the jurisdiction
of military courts, which will be limited to crimes of military nature
that occur by members of the armed forces, security forces and within the
limits stipulated by law.

Article 97:

It is prohibited to stipulate in law the immunization from appeal of any
administrative work or decision.

Article 98:

It is permitted to regulate in a law the establishment of a State Council
specialized in the functions of administrative judiciary, interpretation,
drafting, and the State and various public institutions representation
before the judicial bodies except those exempted by law.

CHAPTER FOUR: INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS

Article 99:

The High Commission for Human Rights, Independent Electoral High
Commission and Commission on Public Integrity are independent commissions,
which shall be subject to monitoring by the Council of Representatives. A
law shall regulate their functions.

Article 100:

First: The Central Bank of Iraq, Board of Supreme Audit, Communication and
Media Commission, and the Endowment Commissions are financially and
administratively independent institutions. A law shall regulate the work
of each of these institutions.

Second: The Central Bank of Iraq is responsible before the Council of
Representatives. The Board of Supreme Audit and the Communication and
Media Commission shall be attached to the Council of Representatives.

Third: The Endowment Commissions shall be attached to the Council of
Ministers.

Article 101:

A commission named Foundation of Martyrs shall be established and attached
to the Council of Ministers. Its functions and competencies shall be
regulated by law.

Article 102:

A public commission shall be established to guarantee the rights of the
regions and province that are not organized in a region in fair
participation in managing the various state federal institutions,
missions, fellowships, delegations, and regional and international
conferences. The Commission shall be comprised of representatives of the
federal government, and representatives of the regions and province that
are not organized in a region and shall be regulated by a law.

Article 103:

A public commission shall be established by a law to audit and appropriate
federal revenues. The commission shall be comprised of federal government
experts and representatives and experts and representatives from the
regions and province and shall assume the following responsibilities:

First: Ensure the fair distribution of grants, aid, and international
loans pursuant to the entitlement of the regions and province that are not
organized in a region.

Second: Ensure the ideal use and division of the federal financial
resources.

Third: Guarantee transparency and justice in appropriating funds to the
governments of the regions and province that are not organized in a region
in accordance with the established percentages.

Article 104:

A council named the Federal Public Service Council shall be established
and shall regulate the affairs of the federal public service, including
the appointment and promotion. A law shall regulate its formations and
competencies.

Article 105:

Other independent commissions may be established according to need and
necessity by a law.

SECTION FOUR: POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Article 106:

The federal authorities shall preserve the unity, integrity, independence,
sovereignty of Iraq, and its federal democratic system.

Article 107:

The federal government shall have exclusive authorities in the following
matters:

First: Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation;
negotiating, signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements;
negotiating, signing and ratifying debt policies and formulating foreign
sovereign economic and trade policy;

Second: Formulating and executing national security policy, including
creating and managing armed forces to secure the protection, and to
guarantee the security of Iraq's borders and to defend Iraq;

Third: Formulating fiscal and customs policy, issuing currency, regulating
commercial policy across regional and governorate boundaries in Iraq;
drawing up the national budget of the State; formulating monetary policy,
and establishing and administering a central bank;

Fourth: Regulating standards, weights and measures;

Fifth: Regulating the issues of citizenship, naturalization, residency and
the right to apply for political asylum.

Sixth: Regulating telecommunications and mail policy.

Seventh: To draw up the general and investment budget bill.

Eighth: Plan policies relating to water sources from outside Iraq, and
guarantee the rate of water flow to Iraq and its fair distribution, in
accordance with international laws and norms.

Ninth: General population statistics and census.

Article 108:

Oil and gas are the ownership of all the people of Iraq in all the regions
and province.

Article 109:

First: The federal government will administer oil and gas extrated from
current fields in cooperation with the governments of the producing
regions and provinces on condition that the revenues will be distributed
fairly in a manner compatible with the demographical distribution all over
the country.

[MR. FELDMAN: This is both trickiest and most important provision. Revenue
from existing oil fileds is to be distributed across the country by
population, but what does it mean for the federal government to do so
"with" the regional governments? And what about future wells not covered
by the word "current"?]

Second: The federal government with the producing regional and governorate
governments shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to
develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit
to the Iraqi people using the most advanced techniques of the market
principles and encourages investment.

Article 110:

The following competencies shall be shared between the federal authorities
and regional authorities:

First: To administer customs in coordination with the governments of the
regions and province that are not organized in a region. This will be
organized by law.

Second: To regulate the main sources of electric energy and its
distribution.

Third: To formulate the environmental policy to ensure the protection of
the environment from pollution and to preserve its cleanness in
cooperation with the regions and province that are not organized in a
region.

Fourth: To formulate the development and general planning policies.

Fifth: To formulate the public health policy in cooperation with the
regions and province that are not organized in a region.

Sixth: To formulate the public educational and instructional policy in
consultation with the regions and province that are not organized in a
region.

Seventh: To formulate and organize the main internal water sources policy
in a way that guarantees fair distribution. This will be organized by law.

Article 111:

All powers not stipulated in the exclusive authorities of the federal
government shall be the powers of the regions and province that are not
organized in a region. The priority goes to the regional law in case of
conflict between other powers shared between the federal government and
regional governments.

SECTION FIVE: POWERS OF THE REGIONS

CHAPTER ONE: REGIONS

Article 112:

The federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a decentralized
capital, regions and province, and local administrations.

Article 113:

First: This Constitution shall approbate the region of Kurdistan and its
existing regional and federal authorities, at the time this constitution
comes into force.

Second: This Constitution shall approbate new regions established in
accordance with its provisions.

Article 114:

The Council of Representatives shall enact, in a period not to exceed six
months from the date of its first session, a law that defines the
executive procedures to form regions, by a simple majority.

Article 115:

One province or more have the right to form a region, based on a request
for a referendum, which can be submitted in one of two methods:

A. A request by a third of the members of each of the provincial councils
in the provinces that desire to form a region.

B. A request by one-tenth of the voters in each of the provinces that
desire to form a region.

[MR. FELDMAN: Iraq's provinces can be united to form "regions" like the
Kurdish one in the north. Regions will have control over nearly all
aspects of day-to-day life. Whether Shiite provinces form their own
mega-region may determine whether Iraq holds together as a nation. Many
Sunnis obkected to this provision.]

Article 116:

The region shall adopt a constitution that defines the structure of the
regional government, its authorities and the mechanisms of exercising
these authorities provided that it does not contradict with this
Constitution.

Article 117:

First: The regional authorities shall have the right to exercise
executive, legislative, and judicial authority in accordance with this
constitution, except for those powers stipulated in the exclusive powers
of the federal government.

Second: In case of a contradiction between regional and national
legislation in respect to a matter outside the exclusive powers of the
federal government, the regional authority shall have the right to amend
the application of the national legislation within that region.

Third: Regions and province shall be allocated an equitable share of the
national revenues sufficient to discharge its responsibilities and duties,
but having regard to its resources, needs and the percentage of its
population.

Fourth: The regions and province shall establish offices in the embassies
and diplomatic missions, in order to follow up cultural, social and
developmental affairs.

Fifth: The Regional Government shall be responsible for all the
administrative requirements of the region, particularly the establishment
and organization of the internal security forces for the region such as
police, security forces and guards of the region.

CHAPTER TWO: province THAT ARE NOT INCORPORATED INTO A REGION

Article 118:

First: The province shall be made up of number of districts, sub-districts
and villages.

Second: province that are not incorporated in a region shall be granted
broad administrative and financial authorities to enable it to manage its
affairs in accordance with the principle of decentralized administration.
This will be organized by law.

Third: The governor, who is elected by the Governorate Council, is the
highest executive official in the governorate to practice his powers
authorized by the council.

Fourth: A law shall regulate the election of the Governorate Council, the
governor and their powers.

Fifth: The governorate council shall not be subject to the control or
supervision of any ministry or any institution not linked to a ministry.
The governorate council shall have an independent finance.

Article 119:

Powers exercised by the federal government can be delegated to the
province or vice versa, with the consent of both governments and shall be
regulated by law.

CHAPTER THREE: THE CAPITAL

Article 120:

First: Baghdad with its municipal borders is the capital of the Republic
of Iraq and shall constitute, with its administrative borders, the
governorate of Baghdad.

Second: A law shall regulate the status of the capital.

Third: The capital may not merge with a region.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS

Article 121:

This Constitution shall guarantee the administrative, political, cultural
and educational rights for the various nationalities, such as Turkmen,
Caldeans, Assyrians and all other components. This will be organized by
law.

SECTION SIX: FINAL AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER ONE: FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 122:

First: The President of the Republic and the Council of the Ministers
collectively or one-fifth (1/5) of the Council of Representatives members
may propose to amend the Constitution.

Second: The fundamental principles mentioned in Section One and the rights
and liberties mentioned in Section Two of the Constitution may not be
amended except after two successive electoral terms, with the approval of
two-thirds of the Council of Representatives members, and the approval of
the people in a general referendum and the ratification of the President
of the Republic within seven days.

Third: Other Articles not stipulated in clause ''Second'' of this Article
may not be amended, except with the approval of two-thirds of the Council
of Representatives members and with the approval of the people in a
general referendum and the ratification of the President of the Republic
within seven days.

Fourth: Articles of the constitution may not be amended if such amendment
takes away from the powers of the regions that are not within the
exclusive powers of the federal authorities except by the consent of the
legislative authority of the concerned region and the approval of the
majority of its citizens in a general referendum.

Fifth:

A. The amendment is considered ratified by the President of the Republic
after the expiration of the period stipulated in clauses ''Second'' and
''Third'' of this Article in case he does not ratify it.

B. An amendment shall enter into force on the date of its publication in
the Official Gazette.

Article 123:

The President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, members of the Council
of Ministers, the Speaker of the Council of Representatives, his two
Deputies and members of the Council of Representatives, members of the
Judicial Authority and people of the special grades may not use their
influence to buy or rent any of the State properties, or to rent or sell
any of their assets to the State, or to sue the State for it or to
conclude a contract with the State under the pretense of being building
contractors, suppliers or concessionaires.

Article 124:

The laws and judicial judgments shall be issued in the name of the people.

Article 125:

Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall take effect on
the date of its publication, unless stipulated otherwise.

Article 126:

Existing laws shall remain in force, unless annulled or amended in
accordance with the provisions of this constitution.

Article 127:

Every referendum mentioned in this constitution is valid with the approval
of a simple majority of the voters unless otherwise stipulated.

CHAPTER TWO: TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Article 128:

First: The State guarantee care for political prisoners and victims of the
oppressive practices of the defunct dictatorial regime.

Second: The State guarantees compensation to the families of the martyrs
and those injured due to terrorist acts.

Third: A law shall regulate matters mentioned in clauses ''First'' and
''Second'' of this Article.

Article 129:

The Council of Representatives shall adopt in its first session the bylaws
of the Transitional National Assembly until it adopts its own bylaws.

Article 130:

The Iraq High Criminal Court shall continue its duties as an independent
judicial body, in examining the crimes of the defunct dictatorial regime
and its symbols. The Council of Representatives shall have the right to
dissolve by law the Iraqi High Criminal Court after the completion of its
work.

Article 131:<


First: The National Assembly will form a parliamentary committee from its
members to oversee and review the executive activities of the Supreme
De-Baathification Commission and state agencies to guarantee justice,
objectivity and transparency.<


MR. FELDMAN: This change, made this week, created legislative oversight of
the de-Baathification commission, which some Sunnis say has gone too far.]

Second: The Council of Representatives shall have the right to dissolve
this Commission after the completion of its function by absolute majority.

Third: The nominee to the Position of the President of the Republic, the
Prime Minister and the members of the Ministers Council, the Speaker and
the members of the Council of Representatives, the President and members
of the Federation Council, the corresponding positions in the regions,
members of the Judicial committees and other positions included in the
De-Ba'athification pursuant to the law may not be subject to
De-Baathification judgments.

Fourth: The conditions stated in clause ''Third'' of this article shall
remain in force unless the commission provided for in clause ''First'' of
this article is dissolved.

Article 132:

First: The Property Claims Commission shall continue its functions as an
independent commission in coordination with the Judicial authority and the
Executive institutions in accordance with the law. The Property Claims
Commission shall be attached to the Council of Representatives.

Second: The Council of Representatives shall have the right to dissolve
the Commission by a two-thirds majority vote of its members.

Article 133:

Application of the provisions of the articles related to the Federation
Council, wherever it may be cited in this Constitution, shall be postponed
until the Council of Representatives issues a decision by a two-thirds
majority vote in its second electoral term that is held after this
Constitution comes into force.

Article 134:

First: The expression ''the Presidency Council'' shall replace the
expression ''the President of the Republic'' wherever it is mentioned in
this Constitution. The provisions related to the President of the Republic
shall be reactivated one successive term after this Constitution comes
into force.

Second:

A. The Council of Representatives shall elect the President of the State
and two Vice Presidents who shall form a Council called ''the Presidency
Council,'' which shall be elected by one list and with a two-thirds
majority.

B. The provisions to remove the President of the Republic present in this
constitution shall apply to the President and members of the Presidency
Council.

C. The Council of Representatives may remove a member of the Presidency
Council with a three-fourths majority of its members for reasons of
incompetence and dishonesty.

D. In the event of a vacant seat in the Presidency Council, the Council of
Representatives shall elect a replacement by a two-thirds majority vote of
its members.

Third: The members of the Presidency Council shall be subject to the same
conditions as members of the Council of Representatives and must also:

A. Have completed forty years of age.

B. Enjoy good reputation, integrity and uprightness.

C. Have quit the defunct Party ten years prior to its fall, in case he was
a member of the dissolved Baath Party.

D. Have not participated in suppressing the 1991 uprising and the Anfal
campaign. He must not have committed a crime against the Iraqi people.

Fourth: The Presidency Council shall issue its decisions unanimously and a
member may delegate his place to any of the other members.

Fifth:

A. Legislation and decisions enacted by the Council of representatives
shall be forwarded to the Presidency Council to approve it unanimously and
to issue it within ten days from the date of delivery to the Presidency
Council, except the stipulations of Articles (114) and (115) that pertain
to the formation of regions.

B. In the event the Presidency Council does not approve, legislation and
decisions shall be sent back to the Council of Representatives to
re-examine the disputed issues and to vote on by the majority of its
members and then shall be sent for the second time to the Presidency
Council for approval.

C. In the event the Presidency Council does not approve the legislation
and decisions for the second time within ten days of receipt, the
legislation and decisions are sent back to the Council of Representatives
who have the right to adopt it by a three-fifths non-appealable majority
vote and shall be considered ratified.

Sixth: The Presidency Council shall practice the powers of the President
of the Republic stipulated in this Constitution.

Article 135:

The Prime Minister shall have two deputies in the first electoral cycle.

Article 136:

First: The Executive Authority shall undertake the necessary steps to
complete the implementation of the requirements of all subparagraphs of
Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law.

Second: The responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi
Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional
Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority
elected in accordance with this constitution, provided that it completes
(normalization and census and concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and
other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens), in a
period not to exceed (the 31st of December 2007).

At the start of its functioning, the National Assembly shall form a
committee from its members, which will be representative of the main
components of Iraqi society. Its goal will be to make recommendations in a
periods not to exceed four months for necesary amendments that can be made
to the Constitution.

[MR. FELDMAN: This concesion made to Sunnis this week creates an expedited
process for amending the constitution. The change swayed some Sunni
politiicans to support the constitution, but whether it will sway Sunni
voters is unknown.]

Article 137:

Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall remain in
force, and decisions issued by the government of the region of Kurdistan -
including court decisions and agreements - shall be considered valid
unless it is amended or annulled pursuant to the laws of the region of
Kurdistan by the competent entity in the region, provided that they do not
contradict with the constitution.

Article 138:

The Transitional Administrative Law and its Annex shall be annulled on the
seating of the new government, except for the stipulation of Article 53(A)
and Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law.

Article 139:

This Constitution shall come into force after the approval of the people
thereon in a general referendum, its publication in the Official Gazette
and the seating of the government that is formed pursuant to this
constitution.