With Each New Assessment, Iran's Nuclear Clock Is Reset Politics Plays a Role in How Intelligence Is Interpreted --(Jewish Daily Forward)

With Each New Assessment, Iran's Nuclear Clock Is Reset
Politics Plays a Role in How Intelligence Is Interpreted

By Gal Beckerman

Published August 19, 2009, issue of August 28, 2009.

Commentary by William O. Beeman: There is no evidence whatever that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. Yet American and Israeli politicians have continually made political hay by claiming that there is one, and that production of an Iranian nuclear bomb is "one year away." This has been going on every year since the early 1990's. Additionally, the Mujaheddin-e Khalk (MEK or MKO), a U.S.-certified terrorist group dedicated to the overthrow of Iran's government continues to curry favor with the west by supplying dubious information about Iran's nuclear intentions. This masquerade needs to be exposed. In the article below from the Jewish Daily Forward, Gal Beckerman points out the chicanery in these claims, and the venal motives of those who make them.

The senior Israeli official's tone was dire. In only a few years, the Iranians would be ready to launch a nuclear bomb. He minced no words. "If Iran is not interrupted in this program by some foreign power, it will have the device in more or less five years."

The year this apocalyptic prediction was made: 1995.

As we all know, Israel survived the year 2000. Iran did not get the bomb. And earlier this month, it was revealed that the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research's latest estimate has pushed that dreaded date back to 2013, when it posits that Iran will finally be able to produce highly enriched uranium, a key ingredient in any nuclear weapon.

Then again, the State Department could be as wrong as that Israeli official back in 1995. To listen to the drumbeat emanating from Tel Aviv, the Iranians are much, much closer. In March, Amos Yadlin, the head of Israeli military intelligence, announced that Iran had "crossed the technological threshold." In only a year, they would be equipped with what they need to build some kind of crude nuclear device.

It's hard to know how to make sense of all these divergent estimates. Though they have become more numerous and more conflicting since the beginning of this year, analyses of Iran's nuclear capabilities have always been a matter of broad interpretation. From the moment that Iran announced in the mid-1980s its intention to launch a nuclear program, intelligence agencies in Israel and the United States - which analysts agree both look at the same raw data - have set and reset the nuclear clock over and over again.

Israeli intelligence, in particular, has announced a "point of no return" almost every year, a continually unfulfilled prediction that some say erodes the credibility of its analysts.

What some see as the fine point of when exactly Iran gets the bomb is not inconsequential. The time frame for both diplomacy and a military response that would have serious ramifications hinge on this question. It is for this reason, a wide range of independent observers agree, that politics has played the most central role in how intelligence on Iran and its nuclear program is interpreted and packaged for the public.

"Clearly the fact that some of these assessments seem to change rather rapidly has fueled the suspicion that much of it is actually politically motivated," said Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council.

The problem, according to Parsi and others, is that the elements that make up any assessment of Iran's actual progress can be read differently.

From a technical standpoint, there are a series of steps on the path toward making a bomb, each of which can be interpreted as the menacing "threshold." Beginning with building large quantities of centrifuges to producing low-enriched uranium and then more highly enriched weapons-grade uranium to finally having a device to launch a bomb, the red lights could start flashing at any point.

By all accounts, Iran has managed to produce low-enriched uranium, possibly enough to make a crude bomb. Low-level enrichment for civilian nuclear uses is legal under international law. But based on its incomplete answers to the International Atomic Energy Agency, world leaders, neighboring countries and many security analysts are deeply concerned that this is not all Iran has in mind. The question of Iranian nuclear weapons development remains murky. According to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, Iran stopped all work on a nuclear weapons program in 2003. But this piece of intelligence is also disputed.

"This is one of these cases that where you stand determines to a large extent what is your assessment," said Shlomo Brom, a former Brigadier General in the Israeli Army and now senior research fellow and director of the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. "If you are at the possible receiving end of this thing - and that is the feeling of most Israelis - then you don't want to take chances. You look at the worst possible scenario. It's only if you're in an institute somewhere in the Western world then you can make sober analysis and make predictions based on the more probable assumptions."

Further underlining the degree to which politics plays a role in these predictions is the long history of unrealized Armageddon scenarios - and it is not Israeli intelligence alone that has sounded the alarms.

In 1992, Robert Gates, then director of the CIA, pointedly upended conventional thinking about Iran's nuclear progress when he gave a much shorter time span for attainment of the bomb. "Is it a problem today?" he asked at the time, "probably not. But three, four, five years from now it could be a serious problem."

Another rash of predictions arrived in 1995. When Israeli government officials were quoted in American newspapers talking about a five-year timeline, officials with the Clinton administration quickly countered with qualifications and their own counter predictions. The small conflict led to a meeting in Jerusalem between William Perry, the defense secretary and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. They emerged from their discussions to announce that they were in agreement - Iran would get the bomb in seven to 15 years (next year, that is, at the latest).

Much of the speculation about Iran throughout the 1990s had to do with the possibility that its nuclear program was being boosted with outside help, from Russian loose nukes to technical help from North Korea. At least one of these outside elements did evade American intelligence, the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan who is known to have aided the Iranians in advancing their program at least twice, in the late 1980s and mid 1990s.

This unknown variable of outside help also allowed for a wide range of timelines.

Throughout the last decade, the warnings have become more dire at the same time that it has become harder to see into what David Albright, a physicist who is president of the Institute for Science and International Security, called "the black box of Iran's decision making." This further unknown - what Iranian leaders intend - is one more fluid element that gives both the skeptics and alarmists an opportunity to project their own thinking and come up with independent predictions.

Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu, for one, views Iran's leadership as "a messianic apocalyptic cult" who will not be deterred by Israel's own nuclear weapons capability. "When the wide-eyed believer gets hold of the reins of power and the weapons of mass death, then the entire world should start worrying, and that is what is happening in Iran," he told the Atlantic's Jeffrey Goldberg in May.

In contrast, Anthony Cordesman, a widely respected Middle East strategic analyst who has worked for both Democratic and Republican administrations, and Abdullah Toukan, an adviser to the late King Hussein of Jordan, present an Iran that is a rational, if hostile, actor, influenced by concrete geopolitical perceptions of its own. These include "unfriendly neighbors surrounding them, including nuclear tipped Pakistan" just to Iran's east; the "grave threat to its security" that Iran sees in America's military presence in Iraq immediately to its west and the presence of the American Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf waters lapping its south, the two men wrote in a recent study. This is seen also in the context of what was, until recently, America's declared policy of "regime change," they note. Finally, say Cordesman and Toukan, Iran's fear of "Israeli intentions to destabilize Iran and attack its nuclear facilities," drive it to develop its capabilities all the more.

"The Israelis always like to posit that Iran is one year away," Albright said. "There is an honesty to these assessments because they do have technical analysts in Israel who are looking very closely. They could be talking about a certain number of centrifuges built, a certain type of covert facility, various other things, but it's always one year away."

Many American analysts think these Israeli nightmare scenarios are distracting from what might be the most plausible explanation of Iran's intentions.

Gary Sick served on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan and was the principal White House aide for Iran during the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis. He believes that Iran has been slowly engaged since the 1970s in building a peaceful civilian nuclear program that has what he called "surge capacity" of 18 months. That is the amount of time it would take for Iran to boost low-enriched uranium for power plants and other non-military uses to highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium and deploy this as an atomic bomb, Sick said.

According to Sick, this interpretation is shared by many other analysts and backed up by statements from those who began the program under the Shah in the 1970s. But others warn that Iran may be developing a nuclear weapon capability secretly that it could deploy much more quickly.

Either way would mean that Iran is seeking a kind of nuclear ambiguity. It wants to be threatening without actually publicly introducing another nuclear weapon into the Middle East - a clear turning point likely only to set off a race by its neighbors to obtain nuclear weapons of their own. It is a position not dissimilar from the one now held by Israel, which still does not publicly disclose that it has the bomb.

Asked why this more nuanced scenario - one that would do nothing to assuage or discredit Israeli fears - is not more widely discussed, Sick answered, "It doesn't sell newspapers."

Contact Gal Beckerman at beckerman@forward.com

The Nexus of Politics and Terror (Keith Olberman)

Last night (Friday, August 21, 2009) on his MSNBC program, Countdown, Keith Olberman re-ran his now famous video documentation of White House scandals and crises throughout the Bush administration, showing decisively that every time the President’s credibility was in question, the Bush admininistration immediately issued a phony or questionable terror alert. This is something every American of every political persuasion needs to see. It shows a truly venal and disingenuous administration willing to frighten an unsuspecting public with utterly false evidence of danger in order to boost its own political fortunes. That Tom Ridge should now verify what Olberman so clearly demonstrated is not surprising. We should be roundly ashamed as a nation that we allowed these monsters to hold sway over our sensibilities for so long. If there is “gut hatred” of Bush, it is well deserved. He violated us just as surely as Bernard Madoff violated his unsuspecting investors.

Go to: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3036677/ and select #3 The Nexus of Politics and Terror to see Olberman's devastating analysis, or view below:

Visit msnbc.com for Breaking News, World News, and News about the Economy

— William O. Beeman

William O. Beeman--The Propaganda Value of a Detained Journalist (New America Media)

The Propaganda Value of a Detained Journalist

New America Media, News Analysis,
William O. Beeman,
Posted: Aug 06, 2009

Editor’s Note: New America Media correspondent Shane Bauer is one of three Americans presumed to be detained by the Iranian government near the Iran-Iraq border last. Commentator William O. Beeman writes that their situation raises profound political questions.

“In the wrong place at the wrong time” is an apt description for three Americans currently being detained in Iran. They will likely be released, but not before Iranian authorities have wrung maximal publicity over their situation, painting them as Western intelligence operatives. The process could take months.

The timing for this event could not be more inopportune. Iran is on high emotional alert. It is flush with righteous indignation and paranoia vis-à-vis Western nations. It has undergone a contentious election where opponents of President Ahmadinejad were accused of collaboration with Western powers. Understanding the current state of mind in Iran is crucial to predicting the fate of the three travelers.

Certainly people all over the world in wilderness areas make inadvertent trips across international borders without incident. The Iraqi Kurdistan border, where journalists and adventurers Shane Bauer, Sara Shourd and Joshua Fattal entered Iran on July 31 is unmarked. The three seem to have been innocent, if a little naïve. They left an indisposed companion, Shon Meckfessel, and their belongings behind in their hotel room in the town of Sulaimaniyah. They reportedly had no extensive gear on their persons, suggesting they were on a short day trip.

However, the border itself is one of the prime difficulties in their case. Its remoteness has made it a prime area for illicit traffic in both directions. Smugglers operate freely across the border. Iranians escaping to the West have used it freely. More importantly, however, the United States and Israel have been suspected of infiltrating operatives into Iran through this area.

Iran has arrested a number of “suspicious” individuals over the past few years. They are universally accused of spying and of complicity in trying to foment a “velvet” revolution, similar to those underwritten by the Bush administration throughout the former Soviet Union. Celebrated incarcerations of individuals like Woodrow Wilson Center administrator Haleh Esfandiari, journalist Roxana Saberi and photojournalist Iason Athanasiadis (also known as Jason Fowdon) were also based on accusations of spying.

Predictably then, Bauer, Shourd and Fattal have also been labeled as spies. Past precedent in these earlier cases suggests what will occur for the detainees. First, they are likely to receive humane treatment. Being Americans they have attracted extensive international attention. Iranian officials have been careful to make sure that their international “guests” are treated well. Past detainees report that they were comfortably housed, well fed and allowed outside reading material and contacts.

Second, the Americans will likely be released, as others in their situation have been, after extensive investigation.

Third, they will be used to make political points by Iranian authorities—both for internal and for international consumption.

Iran will insist that their detention is legal, since every nation has the right to defend its borders. Even the most die-hard American opponents of Iranian policy will not be able to counter this assertion.

However, it is predictable that there will be accusations that the hikers never crossed the border, and that Iran grabbed them illegally. They may be labeled as “hostages” in the U.S. media.

Iran will also try to get the three detainees to admit and apologize for their actions, preferably on television. There will be attempts to make them admit that they were engaged in spying as a condition of their release. This will serve a number of purposes. First, it will bolster the image of “Iran under siege” from the West, shoring up the credentials of conservative leaders. Second, it will serve to taint the opposition to the current leadership. Attempts will be made to tie these three to presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi.

Iran may also try to use these three as bargaining chips in ongoing negotiations with the United States over a variety of matters of controversy including relief from economic sanctions and relaxation of criticism of Iran’s nuclear energy program.

Finally, Iranian authorities will likely pardon them, commute an imposed sentence, or allow them to leave the country on bail pending trial as a show of generosity.

The saddest part of cases like this is that the fact that the United States has no diplomatic relations with Iran makes negotiations next to impossible. Either Washington must rely on the Swiss embassy (which represents U.S. affairs in Tehran), or resort to public pleas and threats. This gives the United States very little leverage. Extraordinary measures, such as former President Bill Clinton’s trip to North Korea to secure the release of journalists Euna Lee and Laura Ling, would probably work with Iran, but would trigger huge, hostile reactions from the Republican Party who would claim that the Obama administration was unduly “dignifying” the Iranian regime.

One long-shot might be to appeal to Syria to intervene for the detainees' release. Shane Bauer had been reporting from Syria prior to this incident and had established his bona fides as a serious reporter there. Iran is not influenced by many outside nations, but they still retain close ties to Damascus. The United States has also been warming to Syria recently, so this mediation might conceivably help shorten the detention.

Sadly, we can foresee future incidents of this sort from time to time until U.S.-Iranian affairs stabilize. It is not necessary for the United States to approve of the actions of a nation like Iran to seek regularized diplomatic relations. This case proves clearly why the communication opened through stable diplomatic channels is so essential in today’s international community.

William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. He has conducted research in Iran for more than 40 years. His latest book is, 'The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other' (Chicago, 2008).

William O. Beeman--Iran's Current Turmoil Has Deep Roots (New America Media)

Iran’s Current Turmoil Has Deep Roots

New America Media, News Analysis, William O. Beeman, Posted: Jul 17, 2009 Review it on NewsTrust

The turbulent internal politics of Iran following the June 12 election have been most often portrayed as a clash between secularizing reform forces and entrenched religious forces. However, this is a mischaracterization. The controversy is fundamentally between two very old, very entrenched religious philosophies that have been debated for more than 300 years. It’s a debate at the heart of every major political uprising in the nation’s history from that time forward. Even if the present controversy is quelled, this debate will continue for the immediate future, likely resulting in a major governmental shift.

The fundamental debate is over the role of religion in the governance of the state. The Safavid Dynasty, founded in the 17th Century, marks the beginning of modern Iran. The Safavids were an Azerbaijani Turkish Shi’a Muslim religious order with strong ties to Sufi mysticism. They eventually conquered the Caucasus, Central Asia and Northern India.

From the very beginning the question of the role of religion in the state was a great issue. The Safavids established “Twelver” Shi’a Islam as the state religion, and from that time forward most of the institutions of modern Shi’ism were established. This included the doctrine that all Shi’a believers should choose a “person worthy of emulation” to serve as their spiritual guide. Eventually, these “Marjeh-ye Taqlid” were recognized as Grand Ayatollahs, renowned for their scholarship, which was established in a “thesis” that included their views of Islamic laws. They also believed that the Twelfth Imam after the Prophet Mohammad, called the “Mahdi,” had vanished in the Golden Mosque in Samarra and would eventually return at the end of time, with Jesus, to render the final judgment of humankind. The Mahdi remains for modern Shi’a believers the ultimate true authority.

The wisest religious scholars warned the Safavids that Islamic clerics should not get involved with government, lest they become corrupt. They pointed out that Islam says very little about statecraft or the formation of governmental institutions and that the compromises of politics are often incompatible with religious piety.

The Safavids didn’t listen. They became powerful and eventually did become corrupt, until they were weakened and conquered by forces from Afghanistan. Another Turkish Dynasty, the Qajars, arose in the 19th Century, with the same fundamental problems of reconciling religious institutions with the State. The Qajar shahs were often at odds with the clergy—particularly when they began to meet the economic and military challenges of Europe by selling “concessions” to Europeans for the exploitation of Iran’s natural resources and economic institutions. The result was an Islamic backlash with open rebellion against the state that launched the modern Islamic movement and led to Iran’s first constitution in 1905.

Toward the end of the Qajar period, prominent Islamic scholars Shaykh Fazollah Nuri and Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein Na’ini maintained opposite viewpoints about the role of clerics in government. As Iran scholar Abbas Milani pointed out in a July 15 article in The New Republic, Sheikh Nuri believed that, in the absence of the hidden Mahdi, religious clerics had ultimate authority in the modern state, and could veto legislation if it was not sufficiently Islamic.

Ayatollah Na’ini asserted that no human government could substitute for the true “Islamic government” to be established by the Mahdi at his return. In the interim, humans had to do the best they could. For Na’ini, this was a constitutional democracy in which, according to Milani, “The role of ayatollahs . . . would be to "advise" the rulers and ensure that laws inimical to sharia were not implemented. But it would not be to rule the country themselves.” Na’ini approved the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty, which ruled Iran until the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who lead the Islamic Revolution which deposed the shah, at first seemed to embrace Na’ini’s philosophy of clerical non-involvement. After the revolution succeeded, however, he reversed course, and embraced Nuri’s philosophy, to the consternation of the majority of the Grand Ayatollahs. The Iranian constitution, consequently, rests on the principle of the “Velayat-e Faqih,” or the “Regency of the Chief Jurisprudent,” in which a senior scholar is chosen as Regent for the absent Mahdi. This is Iran’s “Supreme Leader” today.

Clerics who opposed this doctrine at the time were stripped of their credentials, and some were placed under house arrest.

When Ayatollah Khomeini died, it was difficult to find a successor who would take on the role of Supreme Leader. Ali Khamene’i was finally chosen. He was not a cleric of the first rank, but he was quickly elevated to the rank of Ayatollah. His legitimacy was questioned from the moment he took office.

The controversy still rages. Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, one of the most conservative clerics in the holy shrine city of Qom, and spiritual advisor to President Ahmadinejad, is a supporter of the Nuri position. He has declared that elections are unnecessary now that proper Islamic rule is in place. He reportedly told election workers before the June 12 election that it would be permissible for them to fix the election to make sure that Ahmadinejad could continue in office to support religious rule.

Ahmadinejad’s chief rival, Mir Hossein Mousavi, is no less pious, but he espouses the religious philosophy embodied in the writings of Ayatollah Na’ini—that a secular democracy should be the basic form of government for Iran, with religious scholars serving merely as advisors.

This is also the position favored by the most influential Grand Ayatollah in Iraq, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani of Najaf. Some of the most revered clerics in Iran have likewise denounced the election, thus tacitly revealing their opposition to the principle of the Supreme Leader.

The current attacks questioning the election are thus seen by both Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamene’i as attacks against the most fundamental principle of the current constitution of the Islamic Republic. If the reformers prevail, the constitution would likely be rewritten, and the office of Supreme Leader would be eliminated or greatly reduced in influence. This was threatening not only to the two top office holders, but to everyone else whose power depended on them, including the Revolutionary Guard, and the Basij militia forces, both of which were established to “guard the principles of the Revolution.”

Even if the current controversy dies down, and Ahmadinejad assumes a second presidential term, the crisis will continue. Supreme Leader Khamene’i has no obvious successor, and with the majority of Grand Ayatollahs opposing the very existence of the office, it is unclear who will be found to fill it.

William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota. He has conducted research on Iran for more than 30 years and lived through the Revolution of 1978-79. He is the author of The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.

William O. Beeman--Iran’s Ongoing Revolution - New America Media

Iran’s Ongoing Revolution - NAM

Iran’s Ongoing Revolution

New America Media, News analysis, William O. Beeman, Posted: Jun 26, 2009

Additional Commentary from William O. Beeman: I wrote the piece below on Tuesday, June 23. I now think that the prediction of the Iranian leadership's demise is somewhat precipitous. The Iranian government has launced an unprecedented crackdown on protestors of the election, which has quieted the protest. We learn from China and other places that such measures can definitely be effective in quelling resistance. (please see my earlier commments on this below). However, I stand by my feeling that the Iranian government has created a breach with its own citizens. Eventually, this event will live in memory, and will form the basis for govenmental change. I stand behind my characterization of the course of an ongoing resistance, and suggest that observers continue to note the culturally potent symbolic elements of resistance that characterize Iranian political, social and religious life. Today Roya Hakakian admonished all of us not to make predicting the Iranian Revolution our chief occupation. Prediction is hard, but it is a sure bet that change will come to Iran over the next 5-10 years--if the world will let Iranians do their own work and not interfere.


Iran’s most visible leaders, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Spiritual Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i are on the brink of losing their respective offices in the wake of the controversial presidential election in Iran June 12. It may not happen immediately, but it is a likely outcome over the long term.

Should this happen, many sectors of the American punditocracy will be thoroughly embarrassed. Having built these two figures up to mythic status, they will now have to face Iran as it really is, not as they would like to style it. It is, and has been for many years, not a calcified theocracy controlled by old mullahs. It is rather a nation on the brink of change as a new generation assumes power, and as the influence of women in the society rockets to the forefront.

Ayatollah Khamene’i has now been denounced by name in the streets — an unprecedented event. Furthermore, it is rumored that his rival, former President Ayatollah Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, head of the Expediency Council, which mediates between the powerful Guardian Council and the Iranian Parliament, and the Assembly of Experts, which oversees the authority of the Spiritual Leader, is lobbying the bodies he heads to replace the Spiritual Leader.

Mr. Ahmadinejad has been accused of rigging the election along with the son of Ayatollah Khamene’i, Mojtaba, and key members of the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij strike force. Statistical analyses of the official vote published in the Washington Post a few days after the election suggest that the numbers are artificial. Documents from the Ministry of the Interior showing the “real” vote tall--in which Mr. Moussavi was the clear winner--are in wide circulation.

However, it is now clear that the presidential election has become irrelevant in Iranian political life going forward. The Iranian president is relatively powerless in any case. What is more important is that the people feel that they have been violated by the power elite of the country and are now bent on changing the very foundation of their government.

If sea change is truly in the works in Iran, how will it proceed?

People can only imagine what they can imagine. In Iran today both the people and the establishment have only one model for social and governmental change, and that is the original Islamic revolution of 1978-79. Because both sides are working with the same vocabulary of symbolism, they are groping to command those potent images that will galvanize public support in their favor.

The master vocabulary of revolution in Iran is the historical martyrdom of Imam Hossein, grandson of the Prophet Mohammad, who was killed on the plains of Karbala in present day Iraq in 680. Imam Hossein is the central figure in Shi’a Islam, and his death is commemorated perpetually in Iranian life.

President Ahmadinejad’s chief rival, Mir Hossein Moussavi, co-opted the symbolism of the Karbala tragedy early on. For his campaign, he adopted the color green, the color most associated with Islam itself, with descendants of the Prophet, and with the martyrdom of Imam Hossein. After the election, he declared himself “ready for martyrdom,” and his supporters appeared in the streets shouting “Ya Hossein,” echoing the cries shouted by groups of mourners in the annual commemoration of Imam Hoseein’s death. As a religious cry, it could not be faulted by the police and security forces. They have also taken to shouting “Allahu Akbar—God is Great,” which is both a symbolic cry in favor of change, but also a subtle reminder that change--even revolutionary change--is always in the hands of God.

Not to be outdone, the clerical establishment countered the idea of martyrdom in the election with the Iranian soldier-martyrs of the Iran-Iraq war.

The original revolution fed on occasions for public assembly, notably the three-, seven-, and 40-day mourning ceremonies for the dead. This created a cycle of martyrdom as protesters against the Pahlavi government assembled, were killed by the Shah’s forces, and were in turn mourned in an ongoing fashion. The entire Revolution took more than a year to complete before the Shah finally gave up and left. The world can expect a long and drawn-out process of resistance in this action as well—a point made by Dr. Gary Sick of Columbia University in an article printed on The Daily Beast. Dr. Sick served as a military intelligence officer during the earlier Revolution

The original revolution was led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini from his exile in France. He used the technology of the day--long distance telephone and tape cassettes--to spread his revolutionary message.

In today’s resistance a remarkably appropriate figure may be poised to likewise lead from abroad--Nobel Prize Winner Shirin Ebadi who finds herself in Europe at this time. The technology of today--the Internet and the cell phone may be the organizing force that drives this current force for change.

Those who think that change will bring an end to Islamic influence in Iran are dead wrong. Neither side in the current conflict has denounced the Islamic Republic. However the current opposition wants to change the basis for Islamic government. At the core is the controversial doctrine of the Velayat-e Faqih, the Rule of the Chief Jurisprudent, in which the Spiritual Leader rules in place of the Hidden 12th Imam of Shi’a Islam, who has been in hiding since the 9th Century.

Only Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers supported this doctrine. All other Shi’a Grand Ayatollahs rejected it, or had serious reservations. Chief among the objectors today is Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who is Iranian, and serves as the chief religious authority in Najaf, Iraq. Ayatollah Sistani has more followers than any other Shi’a leader.

Ayatollah Rafsanjani would reportedly replace Ayatollah Khamene’i with a triumvirate of knowledgeable clerics, of which he might be one. There is currently no willing successor to Ayatollah Khamene’i, so this problem was going to have to be addressed in the future anyway.

It is likely that the Guardian Council, which vets political candidates and approves laws passed by parliament, would also have its powers curtailed.

Iran watchers are looking carefully to see how successful the opposition organization has become and whether it will be able to sustain itself and develop a potent ideology and leadership for the long haul. It will also be important to see how the cycle of demonstrations, strikes and confrontations plays itself out over time.

One thing is certain, change has once again begun in Iran, and however it plays out, it will leave the nation in a very different state than it is in today.

William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota. He has conducted research on Iran for more than 30 years, and lived through the Revolution of 1978-79. He is the author of "The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other."

The Iranian Turmoil--latest thinking--William O. Beeman

I recognize a real social movement when I see one, and the Iranian turmoil is likely to have long-term consequences. Eventually, I believe those agitating for governmental change are going to prevail and revise the constitution, but it will take better organization and a long time to come to fruition.

On the other hand, I recognize several things about the current regime:

1. Ahmadinejad's supporters, the Abadgaran, Isargaran, etc. had a large component of Iraq war veterans. They complained bitterly that they didn't get enough power when AN was elected, and he responded by giving many of them very important posts throughout his administration, where he had the authority. They are now dependent on his retaining is office for them to stay in power. I wrote about this in the last chapter of the Great Satan book. These folks are real power-mongers. They want to maintain their status at any cost.

2. As Neil MacFarquhar noted in today's NYT, Ayatollah Khamene'i also has a coterie of folks dependent on him. If he goes, so do they. Same deal, patron-client relations mean that they will fight fiercely to make sure he stays in his post. Thus for both AN and AK, they are shored up by people whose very lives and fortunes depend on their staying in office, and they will go to ruthless measures to see that this is accomplished.

3. The Iranian regime has saddled up to both China and Russia, and has seen how useful their models for government are--placate the people with electronic toys and slightly improved living conditions and crack down ruthlessly on dissent. I think this is what they have decided to do.

4. Russia and China have a very important stake in keeping things as they are. They have good energy and trade deals with Iran, and these relations are a counter to the United States and Europe. I would not be surprised if they have a heavy hand in this. There are confusing reports of soldiers who don't speak Persian breaking heads in Tehran and elsewhere.

William O. Beeman

The Crisis in Iran Is Just Beginning - The Daily Beast

The Crisis in Iran Is Just Beginning - The Daily Beast


The Crisis in Iran Is Just Beginning
by Gary Sick
June 22, 2009 | 11:28pm
AP Photo Gary Sick, the key White House official during the 1979 hostage crisis, says this revolution may be more of a marathon than a sprint, with no clear winner or loser. The watchwords for Obama: Do no harm.

Commentary by William O. Beeman: Gary Sick's analysis below reflects both wisdom and experience. Having personally lived through the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 I can verify what he says about the long-term nature of social change. His statement that Iranians prefer chess to football is only partially true. They like football a lot, but only as punctuation for the greater long game. It is also important to note that this was predictable. I have been writing for a number of years that a generational turnover was about to happen in Iran that would precipitate social change. Added to this is the extraordinary rise of female power in Iran. Added to this is the fact that there is no clear successor to Ayatollah Khamene'i. The core principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the "velayat-e faqih" or "regency of the chief jurisprudent," where the chief religious figure of the nation rules in place of the "hidden" 12th Imam of Shi'ism, is under fire. Only Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers subscribed to this principle. The other Grand Ayatollahs of the Shi'a world were opposed, claiming that clerical participation in politics would lead to corruption. Well, the corruption is now palpable and real, and exposed for all to see. The Iranian Presidency is now a side issue in the greater game of control of the nation.

____________________
As I set forth on a long vacation trip, here are a few observations about the situation in Iran based on my own experience of watching the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis from the White House 30 years ago.

Don’t expect that this will be resolved cleanly with a win or loss in short period of time. The Iranian revolution, which is usually regarded as one of the most accelerated overthrows of a well-entrenched power structure in history, started in about January 1978, and the shah departed in January 1979. During that period, there were long pauses and periods of quiescence that could lead one to believe that the revolt had subsided. This is not a sprint; it is a marathon. Endurance is at least as important as speed.

The Iranians prefer chess to football, and a “win” may involve a negotiated solution in which everyone saves face.
There may not be a clear winner or loser. Iranians are clever and wily politicians. They prefer chess to football, and a “win” may involve a negotiated solution in which everyone saves face. The current leadership has chosen, probably unwisely, to make this a test of strength, but if they conclude that it is a no-win situation, they could settle for a compromise. The shape of a compromise is impossible to guess at this point, but it would probably involve significant concessions concealed behind a great public show of unity.

Leadership is the key. Ayatollah Khamenei, the rahbar or leader, has chosen—again probably unwisely—to get out in front as the spokesman of the regime. Unlike his predecessor, the father of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini, he has openly taken sides with one faction over another. He is clearly speaking for the ultraconservative leaders of the Revolutionary Guards and their equally reactionary clerical supporters, who fear any possible threat to their dominant power. Curiously, President Ahmadinejad has largely vanished from sight, which adds to the impression that he is more of a pawn than a prime mover in this affair.

On the other side is Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, the erstwhile colleague and now principal antagonist of the rahbar. He has chosen, as he usually does, to stay behind the scenes as a master strategist, leaving the public field to Mir Hossein Mousavi and the other disappointed candidates and their followers.

The irony of two former colleagues now competing for power over the expiring corpse of the Islamic republic that they created with such grandiose expectations is lost on no one. The important subtext, however, is that these two understand very well what they are doing. They know how a revolt can be turned into a revolution. They also know they have everything to lose. The shared consciousness of high stakes has until now prevented an all-out political confrontation between rival factions in the elite. That may help explain why the rahbar and the Revolutionary Guards were so reckless in their insolent contempt of the reformers and the public. They may have believed that no one would dare take it to this level.

Now that it has arrived at this point, both protagonists are faced with decisions of unprecedented gravity. There has been nothing like this in the 30-year history of the Islamic republic, and today there is no Khomeini father figure to moderate and mediate among the warring factions. They must improvise in conditions of severe uncertainty. If anyone tells you that they know how this will turn out, treat their words with the same regard you would have for any fortune teller peering into a crystal ball.

For the United States, the watchwords should be: Do no harm. The situation in Iran is being exploited for short-term domestic political purposes by those who have been looking for an opening to attack the Obama administration. Wouldn’t it feel good to give full-throated expression to American opposition to the existing power structure in Iran? Perhaps so—but it could also be a fatal blow to the demonstrators risking their lives on the streets of Tehran and it could scotch any chance of eventual negotiations with whatever government emerges from this trial by fire.

The crisis in Iran is an Iranian crisis and it can only be resolved by the Iranian people and their leaders. There is no need to conceal our belief in freedom of speech and assembly and our support for the resolution of political disputes without bloodshed. But we should not be stampeded by domestic political concerns into pretending that our intervention in this crisis could be anything but pernicious.

Can President Obama play chess as well as he plays basketball?

Gary Sick served on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan. He was the principal White House aide for Iran during the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis and is the author of two books on U.S.-Iranian relations. Mr. Sick has a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University, where he is senior research scholar, adjunct professor of international affairs and former director of the Middle East Institute (2000-2003).

William O. Beeman--IT'S THE AFTERMATH OF THE IRANIAN ELECTION THAT COUNTS (New America Media)

Note: The article below has been modified from the original.

IT'S THE AFTERMATH OF THE IRANIAN ELECTION THAT COUNTS


New America Media, News Analysis, William O. Beeman, Posted: Jun 18, 2009

The Iranian presidential election is over, and while the world focuses on
whether President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was reelected fairly, or whether his
rival Mir Hussein Moussavi was the winner, the most serious issue for Iran
and the rest of the world is the role of the Iranian government in
conducting the election.

Government officials made many mistakes both before and after the election
that will cost them their public support. Erosion of public confidence in
the government -- already shaky before the election -- will lead to
instability, and instability in Iran means instability throughout the
region.

The most significant mistake was to unilaterally and uncritically back the
highly controversial President Ahmadinejad. He had significant support in
rural areas and among pensioners and some members of the traditional
classes, as well as the more fervently conservative sectors of the military.
But even clerical leaders expressed wariness with his grandstanding
extremist rhetoric, and his short-term giveaway economic policies that
ignored the need for infrastructure and new employment. The middle and upper
classes viewed with dismay the erosion in civil liberties under his
administration, and cringed at his millenarian personal beliefs.

If Mr. Moussavi prevailed, relatively little would have changed in Iran, but
the establishment would have retained some thread of contact with his
supporters. The establishment powers needed much more wiggle room in this
controversial election.

It may well be that Ahmadinejad actually won the election. He garnered about
the same percentage of votes, approximately 62 percent, as he had in the
runoff election in 2005. However, the way in which his victory was presented
to the public showed absolute disdain for both the Iranian people and the
electoral process. One wonders what official decided to announce that he had
won before the prescribed three-day waiting period had expired.

It made the world wonder how such a declaration was logistically possible
given the number of votes that had to be counted by hand.

Then President Ahmadinejad himself showed a cocky disdain for those who
questioned the election, likening them to disgruntled soccer fans, and
referring to them as "dust." The large-scale street protests were met with
force, and the government tried to crack down, unsuccessfully, on
transmission of information about the civil unrest.

One could see the fabric of Iran ripping and tearing with Ahmadinejad's
words and the government's subsequent deeds.

Authority in Iran depends on the existence of a social contract between
subordinate and super-ordinate powers. The super-ordinate figures are
paradoxically the most fragile in their position. They must attend to the
needs of subordinates, or risk being toppled from power -- or at the very
least undermined. Every Iranian working in a bureaucratic office knows that
the bad boss is eventually done in by his employees who lose things,
misroute files, and steal -- or in extreme cases, launch embarrassing
protests. Then they claim their subordinate status as an excuse.

In this regard, the Iranian government conduct vis-a-vis the protestors and
street demonstrators in the wake of the elections is the telling event. By
sanctioning the beating of women and young people, house arrests and
crackdowns, the authorities in Iran essentially are breaking their contract
with the people. Social order begins to fray. Ayatollah Khamene'i must
re-establish his credentials with the public if he hopes to keep the power
structure intact, and it may now be too late.

This was the lesson Ayatollah Khomeini was able to teach the nation when the
authority of his religious-based movement was challenged by other actors in
the revolution of 1978-79. He co-opted and outflanked his enemies by
adopting their radical agenda and garnering the support of the public.

As Iranian analysts have been pointing out for years, demography is playing
a huge role in this social drama. The majority of the voting population
(even with an arbitrary raising of the voting age to 18 to curtail youth
power) was bound to tip the scales in this or the next election. The tip
appears to have happened sooner than later. The power of women has also
grown to be enormous and they are very angry.

It is also telling that those being affected by the government's
heavy-handed treatment are a broad spectrum of the population, just as in
the original revolution of 1978-79. The restrictions on the foreign press
are also significant.

Who knows why the Iranian government acted in this reckless manner?

Certainly paranoia about Western interference in Iranian internal affairs
has been growing in Iran in recent years. CIA and Mossad operatives are
known to be operating in Iran. "Color" revolutions in the former Soviet
Union supported by the United States increased this anxiety. When
Ahmadinejad's chief opponent, Mir Hossein Moussavi, appeared with a "green"
color theme, this may have set off alarms and lack of caution.

The next 10 days will be very significant to see how this series of events
plays out. The large difference between 1978-79 and today is the extremely
complex power structures ensconced in the Iranian constitution. Toppling a
single figure or small group of figures will not automatically result in
governmental change, despite the loss of the public contract with authority.
Time will certainly tell.

-----------------------

William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology
at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. He has lived and worked in Iran
for more than 30 years. His most recent book is "The 'Great Satan' vs. the
'Mad Mullahs': How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other,"
(University of Chicago Press, 2008).

Beeman--Elections and Governmental Structure in Iran

In 2005, I wrote an article for the Brown Journal of World Affairs laying out the structure of Iranian government and election procedures that are followed in Iran. The article has proved to be very popular and sturdy, and was incorporated into my book, The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other (Greenwood Press, 2005; 2nd Edition, University of Chicago Press, 2008). The article can be found here:

http://www.bjwa.org/article.php?id=NYybYi5qit7Wdt5H9f79JylSLrCi7itJgdAJcms5

The article is in PDF format, and you may have to register with the Brown Journal of World Affairs before you can access it. It will explain in brief how Iranian governmental bodies are elected or selected, and how elections proceed.

The election this Friday, June 12, which pits front-runners Mir-Hossein Mousavi and existing president Ahmadinejad is especially interesting because a near majority of eligible voters are young people who do not remember the revolution of 1978-79.

Turnout will be essential in this election, and the participation of women absolutely crucial to victory for any candidate. The election was advanced by one year, presumably because of dissatisfaction with President Ahmadinejad.

Have We Already Lost Iran? Flint Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett [New York Times]

The New York Times

May 24, 2009
Op-Ed Contributors
Have We Already Lost Iran?
By FLYNT LEVERETT and HILLARY MANN LEVERETT

Washington

Commentary by William O. Beeman:
The ducks at AIPAC, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) are pecking the Obama administration to death on Iran. Dennis Ross, in particular, as outlined in the article below, is a fifth-column neoconservative connected with WINEP who is trying to make sure that negotiation with Iran fails in anticipation of an eventual military attack on the Islamic Republic. ("We tried everything, and so now we have to bomb them"). Americans should understand that the little rat terriers at these institutions are obsessed with Iran, and will not give up their monomaniacal inability to support any rapprochement between Iran and the West. As long as we have such people in positions of power, the Middle East region will continue to be an unstable and dangerous place.

PRESIDENT OBAMA’S Iran policy has, in all likelihood, already failed. On its present course, the White House’s approach will not stop Tehran’s development of a nuclear fuel program — or, as Iran’s successful test of a medium-range, solid-fuel missile last week underscored, military capacities of other sorts. It will also not provide an alternative to continued antagonism between the United States and Iran — a posture that for 30 years has proved increasingly damaging to the interests of the United States and its allies in the Middle East.

This judgment may seem both premature and overly severe. We do not make it happily. We voted for Barack Obama in 2008, and we still want him to succeed in reversing the deterioration in America’s strategic position. But we also believe that successful diplomacy with Iran is essential to that end. Unless President Obama and his national security team take a fundamentally different approach to Tehran, they will not achieve a breakthrough.

This is a genuine shame, for President Obama had the potential to do so much better for America’s position in the Middle East. In his greeting to “the people and leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran” on the Persian New Year in March, Mr. Obama included language meant to assuage Iranian skepticism about America’s willingness to end efforts to topple the regime and pursue comprehensive diplomacy.

Iranian diplomats have told us that the president’s professed willingness to deal with Iran on the “basis of mutual interest” in an atmosphere of “mutual respect” was particularly well received in Tehran. They say that the quick response of the nation’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — which included the unprecedented statement that “should you change, our behavior will change, too” — was a sincere signal of Iran’s openness to substantive diplomatic proposals from the new American administration.

Unfortunately, Mr. Obama is backing away from the bold steps required to achieve strategic, Nixon-to-China-type rapprochement with Tehran. Administration officials have professed disappointment that Iranian leaders have not responded more warmly to Mr. Obama’s rhetoric. Many say that the detention of the Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi (who was released this month) and Ayatollah Khamenei’s claim last week that America is “fomenting terrorism” inside Iran show that trying to engage Tehran is a fool’s errand.

But this ignores the real reason Iranian leaders have not responded to the new president more enthusiastically: the Obama administration has done nothing to cancel or repudiate an ostensibly covert but well-publicized program, begun in President George W. Bush’s second term, to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to destabilize the Islamic Republic. Under these circumstances, the Iranian government — regardless of who wins the presidential elections on June 12 — will continue to suspect that American intentions toward the Islamic Republic remain, ultimately, hostile.

In this context, the Saberi case should be interpreted not as the work of unspecified “hard-liners” in Tehran out to destroy prospects for improved relations with Washington, but rather as part of the Iranian leadership’s misguided but fundamentally defensive reaction to an American government campaign to bring about regime change. Similarly, Ayatollah Khamenei’s charge that “money, arms and organizations are being used by the Americans directly across our western border to fight the Islamic Republic’s system” reflects legitimate concern about American intentions. Mr. Obama has reinforced this concern by refusing to pursue an American-Iranian “grand bargain” — a comprehensive framework for resolving major bilateral differences and fundamentally realigning relations.

More broadly, President Obama has made several policy and personnel decisions that have undermined the promise of his encouraging rhetoric about Iran. On the personnel front, the problem begins at the top, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. As a presidential candidate, then-Senator Clinton ran well to the right of Mr. Obama on Iran, even saying she would “totally obliterate” Iran if it attacked Israel. Since becoming secretary of state, Clinton has told a number of allies in Europe and the Persian Gulf that she is skeptical that diplomacy with Iran will prove fruitful and testified to Congress that negotiations are primarily useful to garner support for “crippling” multilateral sanctions against Iran.

First of all, this posture is feckless, as Secretary Clinton does not have broad international support for sanctions that would come anywhere close to being crippling. More significantly, this posture is cynically counterproductive, for it eviscerates the credibility of any American diplomatic overtures in the eyes of Iranian leaders across the Islamic Republic’s political spectrum.

Even more disturbing is President Obama’s willingness to have Dennis Ross become the point person for Iran policy at the State Department. Mr. Ross has long been an advocate of what he describes as an “engagement with pressure” strategy toward Tehran, meaning that the United States should project a willingness to negotiate with Iran largely to elicit broader regional and international support for intensifying economic pressure on the Islamic Republic.

In conversations with Mr. Ross before Mr. Obama’s election, we asked him if he really believed that engage-with-pressure would bring concessions from Iran. He forthrightly acknowledged that this was unlikely. Why, then, was he advocating a diplomatic course that, in his judgment, would probably fail? Because, he told us, if Iran continued to expand its nuclear fuel program, at some point in the next couple of years President Bush’s successor would need to order military strikes against Iranian nuclear targets. Citing past “diplomacy” would be necessary for that president to claim any military action was legitimate.

Iranian officials are fully aware of Mr. Ross’s views — and are increasingly suspicious that he is determined that the Obama administration make, as one senior Iranian diplomat said to us, “an offer we can’t accept,” simply to gain international support for coercive action.

Understandably, given that much of Mr. Obama’s national security team doesn’t share his vision of rapprochement with Iran, America’s overall policy is incoherent. For example, while the administration recently completed a much-ballyhooed review of Iran policy, it has made no changes in its approach to the nuclear issue. Administration officials argue, with what seem to be straight faces, that the Iranian leadership should be impressed simply because American representatives will now show up for any nuclear negotiations with Iran that might take place.

Similarly, some officials suggest that the administration might be prepared to accept limited uranium enrichment on Iranian soil as part of a settlement — effectively asking to be given “credit” merely for acknowledging a well-established reality. Based on our own experience negotiating with Iranians, and our frequent discussions with Iranian diplomats and political figures since leaving the government, we think that it will take a lot more to persuade Tehran of America’s new seriousness.

Tehran will certainly not be persuaded of American seriousness if Washington acquiesces to Israeli insistence on a deadline for successful American engagement with Iran. Although the White House spokesman, Robert Gibbs, had told reporters that no such deadline would be imposed, President Obama himself said, after his meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, that he wants to see “progress” in nuclear negotiations before the end of the year. He also endorsed the creation of a high-level Israeli-American working group to identify more coercive options if Iran does not meet American conditions for limiting its nuclear activities.

More specifically, Secretary Clinton and Mr. Ross have been pushing the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany to intensify multilateral sanctions against Iran if Tehran has not agreed to limit the expansion of its nuclear-fuel cycle program by the time the United Nations General Assembly convenes in New York at the end of September.

This diplomatic approach is guaranteed to fail. Having a deadline for successful negotiations will undercut the perceived credibility of American diplomacy in Tehran and serve only to prepare the way for more coercive measures. Mr. Obama’s justification for a deadline — that previous American-Iranian negotiations produced “a lot of talk but not always action and follow-through” — is incorrect as far as Iranian behavior was concerned. For example, during talks over Afghanistan after 9/11 in which one of us (Hillary) took part, Tehran deported hundreds of Qaeda and Taliban operatives who had sought sanctuary in Iran, and also helped establish the new Afghan government. It was Washington, not Tehran, that arbitrarily ended these productive talks.

Beyond the nuclear issue, the administration’s approach to Iran degenerates into an only slightly prettified version of George W. Bush’s approach — that is, an effort to contain a perceived Iranian threat without actually trying to resolve underlying political conflicts. Obama administration officials are buying into a Bush-era delusion: that concern about a rising Iranian threat could unite Israel and moderate Arab states in a grand alliance under Washington’s leadership.

President Obama and his team should not be excused for their failure to learn the lessons of recent history in the Middle East — that the prospect of strategic cooperation with Israel is profoundly unpopular with Arab publics and that even moderate Arab regimes cannot sustain such cooperation. The notion of an Israeli-moderate Arab coalition united to contain Iran is not only delusional, it would leave the Palestinian and Syrian-Lebanese tracks of the Arab-Israeli conflict unresolved and prospects for their resolution in free fall. These tracks cannot be resolved without meaningful American interaction with Iran and its regional allies, Hamas and Hezbollah.

Why has President Obama put himself in a position from which he cannot deliver on his own professed interest in improving relations with the Islamic Republic? Some diplomatic veterans who have spoken with him have told us that the president said that he did not realize, when he came to office, how “hard” the Iran problem would be. But what is hard about the Iran problem is not periodic inflammatory statements from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or episodes like Ms. Saberi’s detention. What is really hard is that getting America’s Iran policy “right” would require a president to take positions that some allies and domestic constituencies won’t like.

To fix our Iran policy, the president would have to commit not to use force to change the borders or the form of government of the Islamic Republic. He would also have to accept that Iran will continue enriching uranium, and that the only realistic potential resolution to the nuclear issue would leave Iran in effect like Japan — a nation with an increasingly sophisticated nuclear fuel-cycle program that is carefully safeguarded to manage proliferation risks. Additionally, the president would have to accept that Iran’s relationships with Hamas and Hezbollah will continue, and be willing to work with Tehran to integrate these groups into lasting settlements of the Middle East’s core political conflicts.

It was not easy for President Richard Nixon to discard a quarter-century of failed policy toward the People’s Republic of China and to reorient America’s posture toward Beijing in ways that have served America’s interests extremely well for more than 30 years. That took strategic vision, political ruthlessness and personal determination. We hope that President Obama — contrary to his record so far — will soon begin to demonstrate those same qualities in forging a new approach toward Iran.

Flynt Leverett directs the New America Foundation’s geopolitics of energy initiative and teaches at Penn State’s School of International Affairs. Hillary Mann Leverett is the president of a political risk consultancy. Both are former National Security Council staff members.

Zakaria--Everything you know about Iran is Wrong (Newsweek)

They May Not Want The Bomb

And other unexpected truths.

NEWSWEEK
May 23, 2009

By Fareed Zakaria

Comment by William O. Beeman:
Fareed Zakaria verifies what Iranian experts have been saying for years about Iran--that it is not a theocracy, that it is not a dictatorship in the conventional sense of the term, that Iranians do not have a nuclear weapons program, that Iranian elections are not unfair, that Iranian women are not hopelessly repressed. It is frustrating that unquestioned experts on Iran could have been shouting these truths for years with no effect. Let us hope that a media star like Zakaria can make a dent in the baseless AIPAC-inspired attacks on Iran, and that a saner policy toward the Islamic Republic will emerge in the Obama administration

Everything you know about Iran is wrong, or at least more complicated than you think. Take the bomb. The regime wants to be a nuclear power but could well be happy with a peaceful civilian program (which could make the challenge it poses more complex). What's the evidence? Well, over the last five years, senior Iranian officials at every level have repeatedly asserted that they do not intend to build nuclear weapons. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has quoted the regime's founding father, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who asserted that such weapons were "un-Islamic." The country's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a fatwa in 2004 describing the use of nuclear weapons as immoral. In a subsequent sermon, he declared that "developing, producing or stockpiling nuclear weapons is forbidden under Islam." Last year Khamenei reiterated all these points after meeting with the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei. Now, of course, they could all be lying. But it seems odd for a regime that derives its legitimacy from its fidelity to Islam to declare constantly that these weapons are un-Islamic if it intends to develop them. It would be far shrewder to stop reminding people of Khomeini's statements and stop issuing new fatwas against nukes.

Following a civilian nuclear strategy has big benefits. The country would remain within international law, simply asserting its rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a position that has much support across the world. That would make comprehensive sanctions against Iran impossible. And if Tehran's aim is to expand its regional influence, it doesn't need a bomb to do so. Simply having a clear "breakout" capacity—the ability to weaponize within a few months—would allow it to operate with much greater latitude and impunity in the Middle East and Central Asia.

Iranians aren't suicidal. In an interview last week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the Iranian regime as "a messianic, apocalyptic cult." In fact, Iran has tended to behave in a shrewd, calculating manner, advancing its interests when possible, retreating when necessary. The Iranians allied with the United States and against the Taliban in 2001, assisting in the creation of the Karzai government. They worked against the United States in Iraq, where they feared the creation of a pro-U.S. puppet on their border. Earlier this year, during the Gaza war, Israel warned Hizbullah not to launch rockets against it, and there is much evidence that Iran played a role in reining in their proxies. Iran's ruling elite is obsessed with gathering wealth and maintaining power. The argument made by those—including many Israelis for coercive sanctions against Iran is that many in the regime have been squirreling away money into bank accounts in Dubai and Switzerland for their children and grandchildren. These are not actions associated with people who believe that the world is going to end soon.
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One of Netanyahu's advisers said of Iran, "Think Amalek." The Bible says that the Amalekites were dedicated enemies of the Jewish people. In 1 Samuel 15, God says, "Go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass." Now, were the president of Iran and his advisers to have cited a religious text that gave divine sanction for the annihilation of an entire race, they would be called, well, messianic.

Iran isn't a dictatorship. It is certainly not a democracy. The regime jails opponents, closes down magazines and tolerates few challenges to its authority. But neither is it a monolithic dictatorship. It might be best described as an oligarchy, with considerable debate and dissent within the elites. Even the so-called Supreme Leader has a constituency, the Assembly of Experts, who selected him and whom he has to keep happy. Ahmadinejad is widely seen as the "mad mullah" who runs the country, but he is not the unquestioned chief executive and is actually a thorn in the side of the clerical establishment. He is a layman with no family connections to major ayatollahs—which makes him a rare figure in the ruling class. He was not initially the favored candidate of the Supreme Leader in the 2005 election. Even now the mullahs clearly dislike him, and he, in turn, does things deliberately designed to undermine their authority. Iran might be ready to deal. We can't know if a deal is possible since we've never tried to negotiate one, not directly. While the regime appears united in its belief that Iran has the right to a civilian nuclear program—a position with broad popular support—some leaders seem sensitive to the costs of the current approach. It is conceivable that these "moderates" would appreciate the potential benefits of limiting their nuclear program, including trade, technology and recognition by the United States. The Iranians insist they must be able to enrich uranium on their own soil. One proposal is for this to take place in Iran but only under the control of an international consortium. It's not a perfect solution because the Iranians could—if they were very creative and dedicated—cheat. But neither is it perfect from the Iranian point of view because it would effectively mean a permanent inspections regime in their country. But both sides might get enough of what they consider crucial for it to work. Why not try this before launching the next Mideast war?

© 2009

William O. Beeman--Roxana Saberi’s Release Bodes Well for U.S.-Iran Relations (New America Media)

Roxana Saberi’s Release Bodes Well for U.S.-Iran Relations

New America Media, Commentary, William O. Beeman, Posted: May 11, 2009

Roxana Saberi, the 32-year-old Iranian-American journalist convicted of espionage in Iran has been released to her family, and will soon return to the United States.

While her international community of family, colleagues and friends can rejoice in her release, it was predictable from the moment of her arrest, based on the history of such events in Iran in the past.

Although no one will know for sure exactly how events proceeded against her, it is possible to speculate how Saberi’s arraignment and trial developed.

The espionage charges against Saberi were utterly unfounded. They were likely the result of an escalation within the Iranian judicial system as official after official tried to cover their tracks for a series of abortive attempts to charge her with a crime.

She was first detained for the relatively minor offense of having purchased a bottle of wine. Since religious minorities in Iran are allowed to manufacture, sell and consume alcohol, the country is awash in liquor. It is easily obtainable by everyone—even government officials. Most likely the arresting official did not know that Saberi was an American passport holder born in the United States, and was probably chagrined to discover that this case was likely to create international brouhaha.

A more serious charge was then sought to justify the first arrest. The discovery that her press credentials had expired some months earlier provided that opportunity. Saberi had continued to file stories for a number of American news outlets, reportedly because officials assured her that the expiration of her press pass was inconsequential. Since she could demonstrate that Iranian officials had allowed her to continue writing, this charge would also not hold water.

Finally, the serious charge of espionage was lodged. As foolish and unsubstantiated as this charge was, it was plausible in Iran. Rumors that American CIA operatives were active in Iran were widely promulgated in Iran. These suspicions were reinforced through extensive documentation found in New York Times reporter James Risen’s 2006 book “State of War.” Additionally, on April 4, the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz confirmed an earlier rumor that an Iranian nuclear scientist had been assassinated by the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad, inside Iran.

Iran experienced one horrendous situation involving a foreigner arrested for spying in Iran in 2003. Canadian-Iranian Zahra Kazemi was raped, beaten and tortured to death (although Iranian authorities claimed she died of a stroke) for allegedly having photographed prohibited parts of Evin Prison, where she was later incarcerated. Her death caused an international uproar. The Iranian government, clearly badly burned by the Kazemi case has since been careful to make sure that her situation is not repeated.

Foreigners -- dual nationals -- accused of espionage have been held for a time, usually in conspicuously humane circumstances, while the government wrings as much publicity out of the event as possible for a domestic and regional audience. The accused prisoners are then released in a show of clemency.

This was the case with Haleh Esfandiari, director of the Middle East program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Ms. Efandiari was visiting her 90-year-old mother in 2006 when she was arrested. It is likely that her connection to Lee Hamilton, director of the Wilson Center, made her an object of suspicion. Hamilton had long connections to the CIA and to groups promoting democratic revolutions in places like Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.

Kian Tajbakhsh was arrested at about the same time on the same charges. Tajbakhsh worked for George Soros’ Open Society Institute. Soros had also been active in the same “revolutions” in the region.

Both Esfandiari and Tajbakhsh were held under relatively humane circumstances and released some months later.

The Iranian presidential election next month was also a likely reason for a quick dispensation of Saberi’s case. Iran would like the world to focus on the election, and not on an ongoing saga of an international journalist in their prison system.

In the Saberi case, Iran actually did itself some good. It showed that it had a functioning judicial system—however imperfect—with an appeals process that eventually yielded the correct result.

The Obama administration, by engaging in diplomacy and sober statements of concern regarding Saberi, not only aided the process of her release, but likely set the stage for further improved relations between the United States and Iran. We now have a situation where Iran undertook an action of which the United States disapproved. The United States expressed itself in a non-hostile manner, and the Iranian government responded with a positive redress of that action. This bodes well for future U.S.-Iranian relations. It is only regrettable that this had to come at the price of Saberi’s unjust incarceration.

William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology at the University of Minnesota. He is past president of the Middle East section of the American Anthropological Association. He has lived and worked in Iran for more than 30 years. His most recent book is The “’Great Satan’ vs. the ‘Mad Mullahs’: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other” (University of Chicago Press, 2008).

Lecturer Beeman dicusses U.S.-Iranian relations (Wheaton Wire)

Lecturer Beeman dicusses U.S.-Iranian relations

By: Elspeth Lodge '10

Posted: 4/29/09
The United States and Iran have been 'ghahr' with each other for approximately 30 years now: while the two countries do not diplomatically talk to each other, they have not exactly broken off their relationship. "We keep sticking needles in each other from afar," confides William Beeman, Middle East Studies Specialist and Professor and Chair of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities.

There is a need for "someone to force the relationship back together," due to the U.S. not understanding Iranian's cultural differences from the United States.

Beeman gave his lecture titled "Learning to Live with Iran: How Cultural Awareness Can Improve U.S.-Iranian Relations" to a full crowd. He meant to impart an understanding of Iran's cultural mechanisms, which are very foreign to the American sensibility.

"The people who want to create change in Iran have got to deal with this," says Beeman. "It is true that the United States and Iran have cultural conceptions of each other that sometimes get in the way of understanding each other. As an anthropologist I am especially aware of cultural differences."

"Iranians, like all humans have the same basic wants and desires in life. There is no 'Iranian mind' any more than there is an 'Arab mind' to site the egregious and misleading title of Raphael Patai's thoroughly discredited book of three decades ago."

Beeman uses a PowerPoint presentation to discuss a myriad of culture oriented topics including. but not limited to, patterns of interaction, complexity in Iranian interaction, independent symbiosis in Iranian hierarchy, and dimensions of different social status. And, of course, he discusses Iranian linguistics. "I'm a linguist, I can't resist," he says.

One example of a cultural misunderstanding of Iran is how political structures function and the basic schema of Iranian government, which according to Beeman, is "a very complex structure." It is designed to keep one group of people in power for a very long period of time; terms of political office are staggered. In effect no group is completely out of power at one time.

An example of one misunderstanding of government is something so simple as how the Iranian president functions. While in the U.S. the executive branch has a great deal of power, in Iran the president has very little power in any arena. He has no control over military, foreign affairs, or the infamous Iranian nuclear program.

Beeman also covers political strategies and factions and the emerging factors, such as media, which are effecting the government. He imparts that the Internet is alive and well in Iran, saying "every candidate has a blog." Beeman also cites that women are becoming more involved, as evident by the fact that more woman than ever are attending universities and literacy rates have increased. There is also an emerging youth population which will soon have a major impact on the balance of the political system.

There are many polarities between the U.S. and Iranian culture. While Iran recognizes hierarchy, the U.S. suppresses hierarchy. While Iran makes distinctions between the private and public political spheres, people in the U.S. try to conflate the private and public spheres of politics. Iranian culture values personalism in public business -- family and personal ties are essential. Contrastingly the U.S. culture denies personalism.

"It is only with the Obama administration that we are starting to see a thaw. I am hoping that with the Obama administration [Iran and the U.S.] will have a greater understanding of each other," says Beeman. © Copyright 2009 Wheaton Wire

Minneapolis Star-Tribune: Editorial: Step up push for Saberi's release

Editorial: Step up push for Saberi's release

Senior statesman could help secure journalist's freedom.


The news about North Dakota journalist Roxana Saberi is increasingly grim. First arrested in Iran, ostensibly for buying wine, the 31-year-old journalist is now held in a notorious Iranian prison on espionage charges. Her quickie trial on Monday played out behind closed doors. A military tribunal is now secretly weighing her fate.

Still, there's reason to be optimistic about the scholar/beauty queen's prospects. Experts point out that others jailed in Iran under similar circumstances were released relatively quickly. And while Iran remains a nation of hardline theology, it is increasingly aware of its worldwide reputation and diplomacy's opportunities. There are more advantages than disadvantages for this status-conscious nation to let Saberi go. The thousands of supporters who have rallied on Facebook and elsewhere shouldn't lose hope because there's more work to do on her behalf.

Although the espionage charge may give some pause, here's some perspective. State Department officials, as well as North Dakota Sen. Kent Conrad and U.S. Rep. Earl Pomeroy, have bluntly dismissed the allegations. Iran has offered up zero evidence, and the fact that her trial was done in a day suggests to University of Minnesota expert William Beeman that officials didn't have much on her.

Beeman, chair of the Department of Anthropology, is an author and linguist who has worked in Iran for the past 30 years. He believes there's strong precedent for Saberi's release. In 2006 and 2007, several scholars and journalists with dual Iranian-American citizenship like Saberi's were imprisoned in Iran on antigovernment activity charges. Three were released after several months. Beeman said Saberi's situation seems similar, and he's hopeful that Iranians will realize that they've made a point with her arrest -- that foreigners must respect their laws -- and then let her go.

Iran has also previously capitalized on its ability to generate international goodwill by releasing high-profile prisoners. In spring 2007, it allowed 15 British soldiers and marines to return home as an "Easter present" to the British people. Now's an excellent time for a similar gesture. Clemency for Saberi would only improve Iran's global stature. It would also be a welcome gesture to a powerful, popular new American president as both nations move toward more rationale relations.

Thanks to the Internet, this newspaper is read far beyond Minnesota. Comments from Iranian U.N. ministry officials suggest they've seen previous Saberi editorials. It bears repeating their message: The push for Saberi's release will continue. The Council on Foreign Relations this week offered up an excellent idea: enlisting a senior statesman whom Iranians would respect. CFR Iranian expert Elliot Abrams said Minnesota is home to just such a world figure. His name? Walter Mondale.

Mondale was traveling this week and couldn't be reached. But organizations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists and the Society of Professional Journalists would do well to ask for his help. Every avenue that can help bring Saberi home must be explored.

_____________________

CHANCE FOR RELEASE

"My feeling is that she will be released and I hope I'm right. I think there's been enough international attention to this; it gives the Iranians a chance to show that they are civilized and extend clemency to people.''

William Beeman, chair of the University of Minnesota Department of Anthropology and author of "'The Great Satan' vs. the 'Mad Mullahs': How the U.S. and Iran Demonize Each Other.''

Expert on Iran says clemency possible for Saberi; ND congressional delegation reacts with dismay to conviction

Published April 18 2009

Expert on Iran says clemency possible for Saberi;

ND congressional delegation reacts with dismay to conviction

FARGO – An expert on Iran said today that given the harsh sentence American journalist Roxana Saberi received, it’s possible the Iranian government may grant clemency as an act of generosity.

By: Sherri Richards, INFORUM

FARGO – An expert on Iran said today that given the harsh sentence American journalist Roxana Saberi received, it’s possible the Iranian government may grant clemency as an act of generosity.

“That’s something that’s not unknown,” said William O. Beeman, an anthropology professor at the University of Minnesota who has studied Iran for 30 years.

“Put someone in dire straits and then grant them clemency, and the person is grateful,” Beeman said today.

North Dakota’s congressional delegation reacted with dismay to news of Saberi’s conviction in an Iranian court.

In separate statements, they said they would continue to work with the U.S. State Department to bring Saberi home.

Fargo native Saberi, 31, has been jailed in Iran since late January. Authorities originally said she was being held for working without press credentials. She was later charged with espionage, and a trial was held in Iranian court Monday behind closed doors.

Her attorney said today she had been convicted and sentenced to eight years in prison.

Sen. Byron Dorgan called the verdict a “shocking miscarriage of justice.”

“The Iranian government has held a secret trial, will not make public any evidence, and sentenced an American citizen to eight years in prison for a crime she didn’t commit,” Dorgan said in his statement. “I call on the Iranian government to show compassion and release Roxana Saberi and allow her to leave Iran and come home to the United States.”

Sen. Kent Conrad called the ruling “preposterous,” and said that, “Iran is doing enormous damage to their creditability on the world stage with behavior like this.”

Rep. Earl Pomeroy described Saberi as a “fine young woman of intelligence and integrity,” and hoped she would be allowed to return to the United States as a humanitarian consideration.

Beeman said it’s possible Saberi will not be immediately incarcerated, released on bail, and be allowed to leave the country.

“I think that we’re not completely without hope in this situation,” Beeman said.

He said the harsh rhetoric against the Iranian system that the sentence will spur is going to be counterproductive, and that Saberi’s situation is an opportunity to continue toward better relations between the U.S. and Iran.

He hopes Saberi will not be incarcerated, for any amount of time.

“I think everyone, internationally and those people looking at this case in Iran, knows the charges are groundless. This (incarceration) would really set back U.S.-Iranian relations,” he said.

Her parents, who traveled to Iran from their home in Fargo in a bid to help win their daughter's release, could not be reached for comment today.

William O. Beeman--A New Era in U.S.-Iranian Relations? [Foreign Policy in Focus]

http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5867
Foreign Policy in Focus

A New Era in U.S.-Iranian Relations?

William O. Beeman | February 12, 2009

Editor: John Feffer

Foreign Policy In Focus www.fpif.org



Iran is in the middle of celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Iranian revolution that ousted Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and with him, the extraordinary influence the United States had on Iranian life. According to many right-wing pundits, the revolution was the start of an era of hostility between the United States and the Muslim world — an era that they see as still underway.

President Barack Obama, however, has inaugurated a new rhetoric on Iran. The United States doesn't assume an automatically hostile posture toward Iran or the Muslim world but will base its actions and reactions on deeds rather than perceptions of ideology. That Obama's mere willingness to talk to Iran comes across as earth-shattering in some quarters reveals the depths of our past mutual hostility.

After the Revolution

The Iranian Revolution wasn't anti-American, but an anti-colonial revolution directed at all outside control of Iranian affairs. Americans forget one of the great slogans of the revolution: "Neither East nor West." The United States unfortunately inherited the mantle of Great Britain and Russia, who oppressed the Iranian state for more than 150 years before Ayatollah Khomeini began to rail against the Shah. Iran was just as upset with those powers as with the United States, and still remains distrustful of all European influence in its affairs.

Even after 1979, Iran sought not simply to oppose the United States, but rather to chart its own course as a regional power, an industrial leader, an economic force in the region, and a diplomatic broker for its neighbors. Although its revolutionary ideals drove many of its early policies — such as the founding support for Hezbollah in Lebanon — these ideals soon proved to have little currency in an Islamic world that viewed the Iranian Shi'a with suspicion.

The original revolutionary ideals, initially hailed throughout the Islamic world, now have little practical force, and Iran has changed in turn. Today Iran's politics are less ideological and religious than practical. It has good diplomatic relations with all of its neighbors, and despite the fiery pronouncements of its largely powerless president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, operates with caution in the region. It no longer has any effective control over Hezbollah and never had much direct influence over Hamas or other regional oppositionist groups.

Better Weather Ahead?

There are now many possibilities for building ties with the United States if Americans can only wake up to them. The United States has common cause with Iran on many fronts. In political terms, the United States and Iran both oppose Islamic extremists like al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Despite attempts by the Bush administration to tie Iran to these groups to frighten the American public, Iranians oppose these extremist groups because the latter utterly reject Shi'ism — even to the point of sanctioning the murder of Shi'a believers, such as the Hazara minority in Afghanistan.

Like the United States, Iran favors stability in the region. Contrary to the Bush-era accusations, Tehran's leaders aren't pleased with the militarism of individuals like Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq, and have worked to quiet his opposition groups in Iraq in the name of a more comprehensive stability for the Shi'a community, which will eventually rule Iraq. Tehran's leaders also want stability in Afghanistan. Iran hosts millions of Afghan refugees. It would like most of them to go home, and that can't happen until Afghanistan is quiet once again.

Other areas of potential cooperation include prevention of drug trafficking, environmental protection, health care, trade stabilization, and international transport. Iran also has a strong stake in culture and tourism. The whole world travels to Iran to see the astonishing historical and archaeological sites — except for Americans.

It's no paradox that Iranians love Americans and American culture. Iranians prioritize independence and nationalist sentiment over opposition to the West. As long as the United States doesn't try to dominate Iran, treating the Islamic Republic with "mutual respect" (to quote Obama), Iranians have no problem with Washington. Iran's youthful population now has a majority of citizens who have no experience of the original revolution, or remembrance of Ayatollah Khomeini or other revolutionary leaders.

Washington won't likely offer Iran congratulations on the anniversary of its revolution. But stopping the U.S. invective will be congratulations enough. It's time to realize that a generation has passed since the hostile U.S. reception of the revolution. With a new generation comes a new opportunity. With luck we'll see the mood of Washington change. It was always permissible to denigrate Iran in American politics. A good first step toward a "breakthrough with Iran" would be for the Obama administration to declare such cheap political rhetoric no longer acceptable.

Foreign Policy In Focus contributor William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. He is president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association and the author, most recently, of The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.

US professor William O. Beeman: Obama transition team has no expertise on Iran [IRNA]

US professor William O. Beeman: Obama transition team has no expertise on Iran

New York, Feb 11, IRNA -- William O. Beeman, Professor and Chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota said that Obama transition team has no expertise on Iran, but, the fact that President Obama called for dialog with Iranians was a huge development.

He said that in a new American administration it takes some time to confirm new officials, and to get the new organization in place. Also, right now the priority of this administration has been on domestic economic matters.

Q. In the past three weeks, the new US Administration has just made a series of statements, threats, judgments …etc on Iran. Do you see a resolve on part of the US to have direct dialogue with Iran?

A. It is too soon to tell what precise actions the Obama administration will be taking with regard to Iran. In a new American administration it takes some time to confirm new officials, and to get the new organization in place. Also, right now the priority of this administration has been on domestic economic matters. Nevertheless, there is reason for caution. The Obama transition team has almost no expertise on Iran. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) is a prominent neoconservative organization supported by AIPAC. Former Ambassador Dennis Ross is an important member of this and several other anti-Iranian groups. The White House has said that he will be “special envoy” to Iran. This is a mistake, in my opinion. Moreover, the influence of WINEP should be severely curtailed if relations with Iran are to be improved. WINEP favors military action against Iran, and has been instrumental in spreading false information about Iran’s nuclear program.

Q. Aside from sugar coating the same nature of rhetoric that we’d heard from previous administration, is there any move or gesture by this administration that proves such tendency?

A. It is important to remember that attacking Iran has been a common political activity for both Democrats and Republicans. The American public now believes that Iran is a danger to the United States thanks to consistent negative publicity on Iran. So, any administration official that expresses any kind of sympathy toward Iran is going to be in a dangerous political position. For this reason we should expect the Obama administration to go VERY SLOWLY in approaching Iran. The mere fact that President Obama called for dialog with Iranians was a huge development, and it created a lot of criticism for him.

Q. In your view how is Obama going to be able to create stability in the Middle East using Iran’s assistance as it is in the view of some analysts.

A. I am not sure that the Obama administration appreciates how much help Iran can be in stabilizing the region. Iran can help in Iraq, Afghanistan and in the Gulf region. Iran has no control over Hezbollah or Hamas, but they can be used as intermediaries for these groups. The sooner the United States sees Iran as a partner and not an enemy, the sooner progress will be made toward peace in the region.

Q. Some share the view that Israel is extremely worried about the improvement in US Iran relationship and by creating obstacles is trying to prevent such improvements. Do you agree with that view?

A. Israel has ALWAYS been worried whenever Iran and the United States seem to become friendly. Whenever talks start, Israelis put out report, directly and through organizations like WINEP and AIPAC, about Iran supporting terrorism, attacking Americans in Iraq or elsewhere, or developing some non-existent weapon. Israel will DEFINITELY try hard to sabotage any rapprochement between Iran and the United States. This is absolutely certain. I only hope that the Obama administration and more sober foreign policy specialists can help expose these tricks. Mostly it is important to get to the American public to tell them that these accusations are not real, that they are designed to torpedo movement toward normal relations.

End News / IRNA / News Code 350244