Wednesday, March 16, 2005
Wednesday, March 09, 2005
William O. Beeman: George W. Bush - The 13th Shi'a Imam :: from www.uruknet.info :: news from occupied Iraq
William O. Beeman--George W. Bush - The 13th Shi'a Imam :: from www.uruknet.info :: news from occupied Iraq: "George W. Bush - The 13th Shi'a Imam
William O. Beeman, t r u t h o u t
Monday 07 March 2005
Iran's security chief, Hassan Rowhani proclaimed in October, 2004 that it was in Iran's best interest for George W. Bush to be re-elected over John Kerry. His comment left American commentators stunned in disbelief. However, it is now clear that Rowhani was right: the Bush administration has done more than any other American leader to advance the interests of Shi'a Islamic political leadership in Iran and indeed, in the rest of the Middle East. Some groups of religious supporters in Iran are beginning to call President Bush 'the 13th Imam,' an ironic reference to the 12 historical Imams sacred to the branch of Shi'ism dominant in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon.
President Bush's support for Shi'ism may be unintentional, to be sure, but there is no doubt about the effects of his administration's policies in boosting Shi'ite power throughout the region.
The Bush administration has lent massive help to the Iranian economy by allowing U.S. corporations to circumvent the Clinton-era economic sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic. While the Treasury Department cracks down on insignificant infractions of the trade sanctions, such as prohibiting U.S. publishers from providing editorial services to Iranian authors, and restricting scholarly groups from holding meetings in Iran, it overlooks large American corporations operating in Iran through dummy subsidiaries operating out of Canada, Europe and Dubai. Oil service companies, including Halliburton, continue to conduct business in Iran on a pre-revolutionary scale, while the shops and bazaars are awash in American goods.
Additionally, by failing to exercise any control whatever over rising oil prices, the U.S. government has created massive windfall profits for the Iranian government. In the late 1990's Iran's economy was in disastrous shape. With oil selling at well over $50 a barrel, Iran is awash in money again.
However, the greatest benefits have been political. Nothing has done more to increase the popularity of Iran's Shi'ite leaders than the Bush administration's attack on Iran's nuclear development. Tehran's leaders are highly unpopular with the majority of Iran's youthful population because of their social policies, but Iran's right to develop its own nuclear industry is the one point on which virtually all Iranians are agreed. This strong national feeling has boosted the credentials of the mullahs, and will likely rocket former clerical President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani back into the presidency.
In Iraq, of course, the desperation of the Bush administration to demonstrate America's ability to conduct elections in by January 30 was effectively utilized by the majority Shi'ite community-especially its astute leader, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The result is that the Shi'ites are likely to emerge as the dominant power in Iraq.
Pressure on other Middle East regional powers to "democratize" has resulted in the emergence of Shi'ite power in minority communities throughout the region. The United States encouraged Saudi Arabia to liberalize its governmental system to allow the election of local leaders. The chief beneficiaries were the Shi'ites in Saudi Arabia's oil-rich Eastern Province. Long disadvantaged and downtrodden by the conservative Wahhabi-dominated Saudi government, the Shi'ites now will have their own local officials, and real political power for the first time in the history of the State. Qatar has established a separate legal court for the Shi'ites, and the Sunni rulers of Bahrain are on tenterhooks worrying about how U.S. pressure will translate into increased power for their country's Shi'ite majority population.
President Bush's insistence that Syria evacuate its troops from Lebanon is a godsend to the Shi'ites there. Hezbullah, the Shi'ite movement established more than 20 years ago to combat oppression from Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims is now the strongest, most organized political party in Lebanon, with an effective military wing. U.S. actions in that nation will eventually lead to Shi'ite domination of Lebanon, after a likely revival of the civil war that Syrian occupation quelled.
Even the Syrians are benefiting from President Bush's politics. Bashar al-Assad, Syria's current leader from the Alawite branch of Shi'ism, is a weak leader, dominated by shadowy figures left over from his father's heavy-handed rule. American assaults on the Syrian government have accomplished the almost impossible task of increasing Assad's popularity and the credibility of his government.
As the Bush administration must surely know, Shi'ite politicians favor the incorporation of Islamic Shari'a law into the governmental structures of their nations whenever possible. The realization of the Republican vision of "democracy breaking out all over" will give these religious-oriented politicians the best chance to realize this vision in more than a thousand years. This will truly earn President Bush the title of one of the greatest promoters of Islamic rule in all of history - a fitting legacy for America's 43rd President.
--------
William O. Beeman is Professor of Anthropology and Director of Middle East Studies at Brown University. This year he is Visiting Professor of Cultural and Social Anthropology at Stanford University. His forthcoming book is The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs:" How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.
William O. Beeman, t r u t h o u t
Monday 07 March 2005
Iran's security chief, Hassan Rowhani proclaimed in October, 2004 that it was in Iran's best interest for George W. Bush to be re-elected over John Kerry. His comment left American commentators stunned in disbelief. However, it is now clear that Rowhani was right: the Bush administration has done more than any other American leader to advance the interests of Shi'a Islamic political leadership in Iran and indeed, in the rest of the Middle East. Some groups of religious supporters in Iran are beginning to call President Bush 'the 13th Imam,' an ironic reference to the 12 historical Imams sacred to the branch of Shi'ism dominant in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon.
President Bush's support for Shi'ism may be unintentional, to be sure, but there is no doubt about the effects of his administration's policies in boosting Shi'ite power throughout the region.
The Bush administration has lent massive help to the Iranian economy by allowing U.S. corporations to circumvent the Clinton-era economic sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic. While the Treasury Department cracks down on insignificant infractions of the trade sanctions, such as prohibiting U.S. publishers from providing editorial services to Iranian authors, and restricting scholarly groups from holding meetings in Iran, it overlooks large American corporations operating in Iran through dummy subsidiaries operating out of Canada, Europe and Dubai. Oil service companies, including Halliburton, continue to conduct business in Iran on a pre-revolutionary scale, while the shops and bazaars are awash in American goods.
Additionally, by failing to exercise any control whatever over rising oil prices, the U.S. government has created massive windfall profits for the Iranian government. In the late 1990's Iran's economy was in disastrous shape. With oil selling at well over $50 a barrel, Iran is awash in money again.
However, the greatest benefits have been political. Nothing has done more to increase the popularity of Iran's Shi'ite leaders than the Bush administration's attack on Iran's nuclear development. Tehran's leaders are highly unpopular with the majority of Iran's youthful population because of their social policies, but Iran's right to develop its own nuclear industry is the one point on which virtually all Iranians are agreed. This strong national feeling has boosted the credentials of the mullahs, and will likely rocket former clerical President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani back into the presidency.
In Iraq, of course, the desperation of the Bush administration to demonstrate America's ability to conduct elections in by January 30 was effectively utilized by the majority Shi'ite community-especially its astute leader, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The result is that the Shi'ites are likely to emerge as the dominant power in Iraq.
Pressure on other Middle East regional powers to "democratize" has resulted in the emergence of Shi'ite power in minority communities throughout the region. The United States encouraged Saudi Arabia to liberalize its governmental system to allow the election of local leaders. The chief beneficiaries were the Shi'ites in Saudi Arabia's oil-rich Eastern Province. Long disadvantaged and downtrodden by the conservative Wahhabi-dominated Saudi government, the Shi'ites now will have their own local officials, and real political power for the first time in the history of the State. Qatar has established a separate legal court for the Shi'ites, and the Sunni rulers of Bahrain are on tenterhooks worrying about how U.S. pressure will translate into increased power for their country's Shi'ite majority population.
President Bush's insistence that Syria evacuate its troops from Lebanon is a godsend to the Shi'ites there. Hezbullah, the Shi'ite movement established more than 20 years ago to combat oppression from Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims is now the strongest, most organized political party in Lebanon, with an effective military wing. U.S. actions in that nation will eventually lead to Shi'ite domination of Lebanon, after a likely revival of the civil war that Syrian occupation quelled.
Even the Syrians are benefiting from President Bush's politics. Bashar al-Assad, Syria's current leader from the Alawite branch of Shi'ism, is a weak leader, dominated by shadowy figures left over from his father's heavy-handed rule. American assaults on the Syrian government have accomplished the almost impossible task of increasing Assad's popularity and the credibility of his government.
As the Bush administration must surely know, Shi'ite politicians favor the incorporation of Islamic Shari'a law into the governmental structures of their nations whenever possible. The realization of the Republican vision of "democracy breaking out all over" will give these religious-oriented politicians the best chance to realize this vision in more than a thousand years. This will truly earn President Bush the title of one of the greatest promoters of Islamic rule in all of history - a fitting legacy for America's 43rd President.
--------
William O. Beeman is Professor of Anthropology and Director of Middle East Studies at Brown University. This year he is Visiting Professor of Cultural and Social Anthropology at Stanford University. His forthcoming book is The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs:" How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.
Sunday, March 06, 2005
Iran: Support of terrorism is less than it seems | The San Diego Union-Tribune
William O. Beeman--Iran: Support of terrorism is less than it seems | The San Diego Union-Tribune: "
Iran: Support of terrorism is less than it seems
By William O. Beeman
March 4, 2005
Of all the accusations leveled against Iran by the United States, the strongest, and least questioned, is the charge that Iran 'is the (world's) most active state sponsor of terrorism,' to quote the U.S. State Department. This claim is both inaccurate and overblown. If the United States ever hopes to influence Iran in other ways, such as persuading Tehran to modify its plans for the development of nuclear power, it must re-examine this long-held article of faith.
The United States government first began to identify Iran as a supporter of terrorist activities in 1984 under the Reagan administration. The accusations have grown more strident from year to year. On an annual basis, the State Department has repeated accusations that Iran has supported virtually every terrorist attack in the world.
This is an astonishing exaggeration. In fact, Iran cannot be linked to any direct attack on the United States since the 444-day hostage crisis, which ended in 1981. The assertions of Iran's continued support for terrorism are prime examples of truth by repetition, used commonly by many conservative commentators, and myriads of U.S. legislators and officials � including U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during her recent European tour.
Of all of these claims, one alone has some substance. Iranian support for the Lebanese Shiite organization Hezbollah is verifiable. However, the flat statement: 'Iran supports Hezbollah' is simplistic and misleading. It is important to understand the real nature of this support, and the extent to which Iran is actually able to influence the actions of this Shiite Lebanese group. Moreover, it is important to take into consideration the fact that Hezbollah is arguably no longer a terrorist organization, as it could be said to have been 25 years ago.
Iran had an undeniable interest in the fate of the large Shiite community in southern Lebanon following the Revolution of 1978-79. The Lebanese Shiites were under oppression from both Sunnis and Maronite Christians. Moreover, Sunni Palestinian refugees, settled in their midst, both served as a drain on weak local economic resources, and, because of their attacks on Israel, as magnets for violent Israeli retaliation in the region. The Shiites, who were attacked as much as the Palestinians, felt helpless and frustrated, and eventually fought back by forming Hezbollah.
The successful revolution in Iran was enormously inspirational to these Lebanese Shiites, and many Iranians, zealous and excited at their victory over the Pahlavi regime, were looking for ways to spread their revolution. Under these conditions, support for Hezbollah seemed to be virtuous aid for a hapless community of co-religionists under oppression, just as the Iranians had felt themselves to be before the Revolution.
The Iranian central government was weak and scattered after the Revolution. Semi-independent charitable organizations, called bonyads (literally, "foundations") sponsored by individual Shiite clerics began to help the fledgling Hezbollah organization get off the ground. There was little the Khomeini government could do to curtail these operations without endangering public support for the fledgling Republic, since internal power struggles were endemic.
Syria also had a strong role in the early establishment and sustenance of Hezbollah, and its role was far more practical and self-serving that Iran's. Indeed, Iranian ideologues could never have had entre to southern Lebanon without Syria's cooperation.
Now, after nearly two decades, the export of Iranian revolutionary ideology in this loose and uncontrolled manner may have succeeded too well. Hezbollah maintains a stronger commitment to the symbolic legacy of the Iranian Revolution than Iranians themselves. According to Hezbollah expert Daniel Byman, writing recently in Foreign Affairs, " ... (Iran) lacks the means to force a significant change in the (Hezbollah) movement and its goals. It has no real presence on the ground in Lebanon and a call to disarm or cease resistance would likely cause Hezbollah's leadership, or at least its most militant elements simply to sever ties with Tehran's leadership."
In short, although Iranian religionists were instrumental in aiding its establishment, Hezbollah has now taken on a life of its own. Even if all Iranian financial and logistic support were cut off, Hezbollah would not only continue, it would thrive. Put simply, Iran's support is not essential for Hezbollah to continue. Byman flatly states that if the United States is really serious about stopping Hezbollah, it would do better to attack Syria than Iran.
Hezbollah has achieved stability and respectability by becoming as much a social welfare and political organization as a militant resistance organization. According to international relations specialist Dwight J. Simpson, in 2004 it had 12 elected parliamentary members. Moreover many Hezbollah members hold elected positions within local governments. The group had by that time built five hospitals and is building more. It operated 25 primarily secular schools, and provided subsidies to shopkeepers. Its support came primarily from zakat – the charitable "tithe" required of all Muslims – not from Iran.
The Shiites, having seen their co-religionists in Iraq succeed in initial elections there in 2005 have hopes that they too will assume the power in Lebanon that accords with their status as the nation's largest community. As this happens, Hezbollah will fully cease to be a terrorist group and will gradually assume the role of a political organization. Its "terrorist" activities will be reframed as national defense, especially as they gain control of conventional military forces and weapons.
It should be clear to Americans that the Bush administration is stymied in its dealings with Tehran. The prospect of a direct attack on the Iran to bring about "regime change" is not a practical possibility. In part because of specious accusations such as "the most active state supporter of terrorism" charge, Tehran's leaders are all but deaf to American politicians. This standoff would begin to change if the United States would abandon this baseless rhetoric.
Beeman is professor of anthropology and director of Middle East Studies at Brown University and visiting professor of cultural and social anthropology at Stanford University. His coming book is "The Great Satan vs. The Mad Mullahs: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other." "
"
Iran: Support of terrorism is less than it seems
By William O. Beeman
March 4, 2005
Of all the accusations leveled against Iran by the United States, the strongest, and least questioned, is the charge that Iran 'is the (world's) most active state sponsor of terrorism,' to quote the U.S. State Department. This claim is both inaccurate and overblown. If the United States ever hopes to influence Iran in other ways, such as persuading Tehran to modify its plans for the development of nuclear power, it must re-examine this long-held article of faith.
The United States government first began to identify Iran as a supporter of terrorist activities in 1984 under the Reagan administration. The accusations have grown more strident from year to year. On an annual basis, the State Department has repeated accusations that Iran has supported virtually every terrorist attack in the world.
This is an astonishing exaggeration. In fact, Iran cannot be linked to any direct attack on the United States since the 444-day hostage crisis, which ended in 1981. The assertions of Iran's continued support for terrorism are prime examples of truth by repetition, used commonly by many conservative commentators, and myriads of U.S. legislators and officials � including U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during her recent European tour.
Of all of these claims, one alone has some substance. Iranian support for the Lebanese Shiite organization Hezbollah is verifiable. However, the flat statement: 'Iran supports Hezbollah' is simplistic and misleading. It is important to understand the real nature of this support, and the extent to which Iran is actually able to influence the actions of this Shiite Lebanese group. Moreover, it is important to take into consideration the fact that Hezbollah is arguably no longer a terrorist organization, as it could be said to have been 25 years ago.
Iran had an undeniable interest in the fate of the large Shiite community in southern Lebanon following the Revolution of 1978-79. The Lebanese Shiites were under oppression from both Sunnis and Maronite Christians. Moreover, Sunni Palestinian refugees, settled in their midst, both served as a drain on weak local economic resources, and, because of their attacks on Israel, as magnets for violent Israeli retaliation in the region. The Shiites, who were attacked as much as the Palestinians, felt helpless and frustrated, and eventually fought back by forming Hezbollah.
The successful revolution in Iran was enormously inspirational to these Lebanese Shiites, and many Iranians, zealous and excited at their victory over the Pahlavi regime, were looking for ways to spread their revolution. Under these conditions, support for Hezbollah seemed to be virtuous aid for a hapless community of co-religionists under oppression, just as the Iranians had felt themselves to be before the Revolution.
The Iranian central government was weak and scattered after the Revolution. Semi-independent charitable organizations, called bonyads (literally, "foundations") sponsored by individual Shiite clerics began to help the fledgling Hezbollah organization get off the ground. There was little the Khomeini government could do to curtail these operations without endangering public support for the fledgling Republic, since internal power struggles were endemic.
Syria also had a strong role in the early establishment and sustenance of Hezbollah, and its role was far more practical and self-serving that Iran's. Indeed, Iranian ideologues could never have had entre to southern Lebanon without Syria's cooperation.
Now, after nearly two decades, the export of Iranian revolutionary ideology in this loose and uncontrolled manner may have succeeded too well. Hezbollah maintains a stronger commitment to the symbolic legacy of the Iranian Revolution than Iranians themselves. According to Hezbollah expert Daniel Byman, writing recently in Foreign Affairs, " ... (Iran) lacks the means to force a significant change in the (Hezbollah) movement and its goals. It has no real presence on the ground in Lebanon and a call to disarm or cease resistance would likely cause Hezbollah's leadership, or at least its most militant elements simply to sever ties with Tehran's leadership."
In short, although Iranian religionists were instrumental in aiding its establishment, Hezbollah has now taken on a life of its own. Even if all Iranian financial and logistic support were cut off, Hezbollah would not only continue, it would thrive. Put simply, Iran's support is not essential for Hezbollah to continue. Byman flatly states that if the United States is really serious about stopping Hezbollah, it would do better to attack Syria than Iran.
Hezbollah has achieved stability and respectability by becoming as much a social welfare and political organization as a militant resistance organization. According to international relations specialist Dwight J. Simpson, in 2004 it had 12 elected parliamentary members. Moreover many Hezbollah members hold elected positions within local governments. The group had by that time built five hospitals and is building more. It operated 25 primarily secular schools, and provided subsidies to shopkeepers. Its support came primarily from zakat – the charitable "tithe" required of all Muslims – not from Iran.
The Shiites, having seen their co-religionists in Iraq succeed in initial elections there in 2005 have hopes that they too will assume the power in Lebanon that accords with their status as the nation's largest community. As this happens, Hezbollah will fully cease to be a terrorist group and will gradually assume the role of a political organization. Its "terrorist" activities will be reframed as national defense, especially as they gain control of conventional military forces and weapons.
It should be clear to Americans that the Bush administration is stymied in its dealings with Tehran. The prospect of a direct attack on the Iran to bring about "regime change" is not a practical possibility. In part because of specious accusations such as "the most active state supporter of terrorism" charge, Tehran's leaders are all but deaf to American politicians. This standoff would begin to change if the United States would abandon this baseless rhetoric.
Beeman is professor of anthropology and director of Middle East Studies at Brown University and visiting professor of cultural and social anthropology at Stanford University. His coming book is "The Great Satan vs. The Mad Mullahs: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other." "
"
Monday, February 28, 2005
t r u t h o u t - William O. Beeman | Iran's Support of Terrorism Is Less Than It Seems
t r u t h o u t - William O. Beeman | Iran's Support of Terrorism Is Less Than It Seems: " Iran's Support of Terrorism Is Less Than It Seems
By William O. Beeman
t r u t h o u t | Perspective
Monday 28 February 2005
Of all the accusations leveled against Iran by the United States, the strongest, and least questioned is the charge that Iran ' is the [world's] most active state sponsor of terrorism,' to quote the U.S. State Department. This claim is both inaccurate and overblown. If the United States ever hopes to influence Iran in other ways, such as persuading Tehran to modify its plans for the development of nuclear power, it must re-examine this long-held article of faith.
The United States government first began to identify Iran as a supporter of terrorist activities in 1984 under the Reagan administration. The accusations have grown more strident from year to year. On an annual basis the State Department has repeated accusations that Iran has supported virtually every terrorist attack in the world.
This is an astonishing exaggeration. In fact, Iran cannot be linked to any direct attack on the United States since the 444 day hostage crisis, which ended in 1981. The assertions of Iran's continued support for terrorism are prime examples of truth by repetition, used commonly by many conservative commentators, and myriads of U.S. legislators and officials-including U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during her recent European tour.
Of all of these claims, one alone has some substance. Iranian support for the Lebanese Shi'ite organization Hezbollah is verifiable. However, the flat statement: 'Iran supports Hezbollah' is simplistic and misleading. It is important to understand the real nature of this support, and the extent to which Iran is actually able to influence the actions of this Shi'it"
By William O. Beeman
t r u t h o u t | Perspective
Monday 28 February 2005
Of all the accusations leveled against Iran by the United States, the strongest, and least questioned is the charge that Iran ' is the [world's] most active state sponsor of terrorism,' to quote the U.S. State Department. This claim is both inaccurate and overblown. If the United States ever hopes to influence Iran in other ways, such as persuading Tehran to modify its plans for the development of nuclear power, it must re-examine this long-held article of faith.
The United States government first began to identify Iran as a supporter of terrorist activities in 1984 under the Reagan administration. The accusations have grown more strident from year to year. On an annual basis the State Department has repeated accusations that Iran has supported virtually every terrorist attack in the world.
This is an astonishing exaggeration. In fact, Iran cannot be linked to any direct attack on the United States since the 444 day hostage crisis, which ended in 1981. The assertions of Iran's continued support for terrorism are prime examples of truth by repetition, used commonly by many conservative commentators, and myriads of U.S. legislators and officials-including U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during her recent European tour.
Of all of these claims, one alone has some substance. Iranian support for the Lebanese Shi'ite organization Hezbollah is verifiable. However, the flat statement: 'Iran supports Hezbollah' is simplistic and misleading. It is important to understand the real nature of this support, and the extent to which Iran is actually able to influence the actions of this Shi'it"
Sunday, February 13, 2005
Pacific News Service > News > Is Iran Building Nukes? An Analysis (Part 1)
Pacific News Service > News > Is Iran Building Nukes? An Analysis (Part 1): "Is Iran Building Nukes? An Analysis (Part 1)
News Analysis, William O. Beeman and Thomas Stauffer,
Pacific News Service, Jun 26, 2003
Editor's Note: The Bush administration is turning up the heat on Iran over its alleged nuclear weapons program, but the authors say the evidence just isn't there. Part 1 of a two-part series.
President Bush declared on June 25 that 'we will not tolerate' a nuclear armed Iran. His words are empty. The physical evidence for a nuclear weapons program in Iran simply does not exist.
Iran is building a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plant in Bushehr with Russian help. The existence of the site is common knowledge. It has been under construction for more than three decades, since before the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979.
Two other nuclear research facilities, now under development, have come to light: a uranium enrichment plant in the city of Natanz and a deuterium ('heavy water') facility in the city of Arak. Neither is in operation. The only question of interest is whether these facilities offer a plausible route to the manufacture of plutonium-based nuclear bombs, and the short answer is: They do not.
The Bushehr plant is only part of the argument that Iran is embarked on a nuclear weapons program, but it is the part that can readily be analyzed. State Department accusations of dangerous Iranian intentions for the Natanz and Arak facilities are based on a patchwork of untestable, murky assertions from dubious sources, including the People's Mujahedeen (Mujahedeen-e Khalq, MEK or MKO), which the United States identifies as a terrorist organization. These sources assert that there are centrifuges for enriching uranium (a"
News Analysis, William O. Beeman and Thomas Stauffer,
Pacific News Service, Jun 26, 2003
Editor's Note: The Bush administration is turning up the heat on Iran over its alleged nuclear weapons program, but the authors say the evidence just isn't there. Part 1 of a two-part series.
President Bush declared on June 25 that 'we will not tolerate' a nuclear armed Iran. His words are empty. The physical evidence for a nuclear weapons program in Iran simply does not exist.
Iran is building a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plant in Bushehr with Russian help. The existence of the site is common knowledge. It has been under construction for more than three decades, since before the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979.
Two other nuclear research facilities, now under development, have come to light: a uranium enrichment plant in the city of Natanz and a deuterium ('heavy water') facility in the city of Arak. Neither is in operation. The only question of interest is whether these facilities offer a plausible route to the manufacture of plutonium-based nuclear bombs, and the short answer is: They do not.
The Bushehr plant is only part of the argument that Iran is embarked on a nuclear weapons program, but it is the part that can readily be analyzed. State Department accusations of dangerous Iranian intentions for the Natanz and Arak facilities are based on a patchwork of untestable, murky assertions from dubious sources, including the People's Mujahedeen (Mujahedeen-e Khalq, MEK or MKO), which the United States identifies as a terrorist organization. These sources assert that there are centrifuges for enriching uranium (a"
Pacific News Service > News > Is Iran Building Nukes? An Economic Analysis (Part 2)
Pacific News Service > News > Is Iran Building Nukes? An Economic Analysis (Part 2): "Printable Version Return to Normal Version | Send Page to Friend
Is Iran Building Nukes? An Economic Analysis (Part 2)
News Analysis, William O. Beeman and Thomas Stauffer,
Pacific News Service, Jun 27, 2003
The Bush administration argues that nuclear power generation makes no sense for an oil-rich country like Iran, implying that the country's power plants are for arms manufacture. The authors examine the facts. Part 2 of a two- part series.
The furor in Washington over possible nuclear weapons development in Iran is fueled in part because Bush administration officials claim that Iran doesn't need to generate nuclear power. They assert that Iran's nuclear energy program is unnecessary given its oil reserves. Therefore, officials say, its nuclear plants must exist for weapons production.
In fact, for Iran, generating nuclear power makes sense. Moreover, the plans to do this were started decades ago, and with American approval.
Ex-CIA director James Woolsey, in an interview on the PBS program Frontline on Feb. 23, claimed 'there is no underlying (reason) for one of the greatest oil producers in the world to need to get into the nuclear (energy) business.'
At first glance, such logic seems sound. Countries with vast oil reserves also have large reserves of natural gas sitting on top of those reserves. Some years ago, the natural gas was regularly burned off to get at the oil beneath. However, technological advances today make it feasible to use this gas for power generation.
Even so, nuclear power still makes sense in a country with vast amounts of natural gas, particularly given the unusual circumstances in the Iranian hydrocarbons in"
Is Iran Building Nukes? An Economic Analysis (Part 2)
News Analysis, William O. Beeman and Thomas Stauffer,
Pacific News Service, Jun 27, 2003
The Bush administration argues that nuclear power generation makes no sense for an oil-rich country like Iran, implying that the country's power plants are for arms manufacture. The authors examine the facts. Part 2 of a two- part series.
The furor in Washington over possible nuclear weapons development in Iran is fueled in part because Bush administration officials claim that Iran doesn't need to generate nuclear power. They assert that Iran's nuclear energy program is unnecessary given its oil reserves. Therefore, officials say, its nuclear plants must exist for weapons production.
In fact, for Iran, generating nuclear power makes sense. Moreover, the plans to do this were started decades ago, and with American approval.
Ex-CIA director James Woolsey, in an interview on the PBS program Frontline on Feb. 23, claimed 'there is no underlying (reason) for one of the greatest oil producers in the world to need to get into the nuclear (energy) business.'
At first glance, such logic seems sound. Countries with vast oil reserves also have large reserves of natural gas sitting on top of those reserves. Some years ago, the natural gas was regularly burned off to get at the oil beneath. However, technological advances today make it feasible to use this gas for power generation.
Even so, nuclear power still makes sense in a country with vast amounts of natural gas, particularly given the unusual circumstances in the Iranian hydrocarbons in"
Monday, February 07, 2005
Monday, January 31, 2005
How U.S. missteps may cloud Iraqi vote
San Jose Mercury News
How U.S. missteps may cloud Iraqi vote: "Posted on Sun, Jan. 23, 2005
San Jose Mercury News--Perspective Section P-1
Sunday, January 23, 2005
How U.S. missteps may cloud Iraqi vote
By William O. Beeman
The United States was determined from the outset to keep religious Shiites from power in Iraq. The administration's assumption is that governments based in Islamic law are dangerous to the United States and that Iran's religious rulers would gain more control of the region if their fellow Shiites took over in Baghdad.
Just one week before the scheduled Iraqi elections, the administration is just where it didn't want to be. There are two ``lists'' of candidates most likely to win the majority of Assembly seats in the upcoming elections -- and one of them consists of predominantly religious Shiites. The second list, also mostly Shiite, is openly secular and backed by the United States.
It is probably no surprise, then, that the United States has tried to help the secular slate to victory, including by facilitating up to a million Iraqis living outside the country -- a group perceived as more secular -- to vote. At the top of that slate is Ayad Allawi, the current prime minister. The U.S.-backed Allawi is a former Baathist who broke with Saddam Hussein and later was associated with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. If he continues in power, he almost certainly will favor a continued U.S. presence in Iraq.
Among the many unanswered questions in next Sunday's election -- beyond whether militant Sunnis will hopelessly disrupt the voting -- are whether U.S. support will help or hurt the Allawi slate and whether the United States will try to control the outcome of the election further.
Will the U.S. military, for instance, work hard to ensure calm in more secular Baghdad to let more voters get to the polls"
How U.S. missteps may cloud Iraqi vote: "Posted on Sun, Jan. 23, 2005
San Jose Mercury News--Perspective Section P-1
Sunday, January 23, 2005
How U.S. missteps may cloud Iraqi vote
By William O. Beeman
The United States was determined from the outset to keep religious Shiites from power in Iraq. The administration's assumption is that governments based in Islamic law are dangerous to the United States and that Iran's religious rulers would gain more control of the region if their fellow Shiites took over in Baghdad.
Just one week before the scheduled Iraqi elections, the administration is just where it didn't want to be. There are two ``lists'' of candidates most likely to win the majority of Assembly seats in the upcoming elections -- and one of them consists of predominantly religious Shiites. The second list, also mostly Shiite, is openly secular and backed by the United States.
It is probably no surprise, then, that the United States has tried to help the secular slate to victory, including by facilitating up to a million Iraqis living outside the country -- a group perceived as more secular -- to vote. At the top of that slate is Ayad Allawi, the current prime minister. The U.S.-backed Allawi is a former Baathist who broke with Saddam Hussein and later was associated with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. If he continues in power, he almost certainly will favor a continued U.S. presence in Iraq.
Among the many unanswered questions in next Sunday's election -- beyond whether militant Sunnis will hopelessly disrupt the voting -- are whether U.S. support will help or hurt the Allawi slate and whether the United States will try to control the outcome of the election further.
Will the U.S. military, for instance, work hard to ensure calm in more secular Baghdad to let more voters get to the polls"
Wednesday, January 12, 2005
Informed Comment
Informed Comment--Iraqi Electoral Lists, courtesy of Juan Cole
Juan Cole has kindly posted a translation of the Electoral Lists for the January 30 election in Iraq, courtesy of a "kind person in Baghdad." Cole's Blog--Informed Comment--is essential reading for anyone interested in Iraq, or on the Middle East in general. Profssor Cole has made enormous personal sacrifices to make his expertise available to the public to great, good effect.
Juan Cole has kindly posted a translation of the Electoral Lists for the January 30 election in Iraq, courtesy of a "kind person in Baghdad." Cole's Blog--Informed Comment--is essential reading for anyone interested in Iraq, or on the Middle East in general. Profssor Cole has made enormous personal sacrifices to make his expertise available to the public to great, good effect.
Tuesday, January 11, 2005
Shi'aphobia I: The Iran-Iraq Connection
"Shi'aphobia I: The Iran-Iraq Connection
by William O. BeemanReleased: 3 Jan 2005
As the Iraqi election begins to loom on the horizon, the world is witnessing a growing epidemic of Shi'aphobia -- fear of the Iraqi majority Shi'a community, and the role it might play in a future Iraqi state. These fears are overwrought.
The Sunni community is fearful because it realizes that it can not have a significant role in a future Iraq if the Shi'a population dominates by voting in a bloc, as seems almost inevitable.
The Kurds are afraid that a Shi'a dominated government will be unsympathetic to the continuation of their semi-autonomous state in northern Iraq.
The Bush administration and its neoconservative surrogates are the most frightened of all. They have convinced themselves that Shi'a victory in the election will result in the unambiguous failure of their Iraqi adventure. This will supposedly come about as the victorious Shi'a ally themselves with Iran and start taking orders from Tehran. They will supposedly then establish a religious dictatorship, persecute the Sunnis, overrun the Kurds, and kick the American military out of their land.
All of these scenarios are unwarranted-unless the attacks against the Shi'a become so acute that they touch off a cycle of revenge, and an eventual civil war.
The Sunnis are making the most dramatic physical attacks on the Shi'a. They started a year and a half ago on August 28, 2003 by assassinating Ayatollah Baqer al-Hakim -- significantly, in front of the shrine of Imam Ali, who was cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed, and the only Caliph of Islam to rule unambiguously over Shi'a and Sunni believers.
Recently, the attacks have continued to target Shi'a believers in Shi'a shrines in Karbala and Najaf, t"
by William O. BeemanReleased: 3 Jan 2005
As the Iraqi election begins to loom on the horizon, the world is witnessing a growing epidemic of Shi'aphobia -- fear of the Iraqi majority Shi'a community, and the role it might play in a future Iraqi state. These fears are overwrought.
The Sunni community is fearful because it realizes that it can not have a significant role in a future Iraq if the Shi'a population dominates by voting in a bloc, as seems almost inevitable.
The Kurds are afraid that a Shi'a dominated government will be unsympathetic to the continuation of their semi-autonomous state in northern Iraq.
The Bush administration and its neoconservative surrogates are the most frightened of all. They have convinced themselves that Shi'a victory in the election will result in the unambiguous failure of their Iraqi adventure. This will supposedly come about as the victorious Shi'a ally themselves with Iran and start taking orders from Tehran. They will supposedly then establish a religious dictatorship, persecute the Sunnis, overrun the Kurds, and kick the American military out of their land.
All of these scenarios are unwarranted-unless the attacks against the Shi'a become so acute that they touch off a cycle of revenge, and an eventual civil war.
The Sunnis are making the most dramatic physical attacks on the Shi'a. They started a year and a half ago on August 28, 2003 by assassinating Ayatollah Baqer al-Hakim -- significantly, in front of the shrine of Imam Ali, who was cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed, and the only Caliph of Islam to rule unambiguously over Shi'a and Sunni believers.
Recently, the attacks have continued to target Shi'a believers in Shi'a shrines in Karbala and Najaf, t"
The Daily Star - Opinion Articles - Najaf's growing influence is a key to Iranian moderation
The Daily Star - Opinion Articles - Najaf's growing influence is a key to Iranian moderation: "Najaf's growing influence is a key to Iranian moderation
By William O. Beeman
Tuesday, January 04, 2005
As the Iraqi election looms at the end of this month, the world is witnessing a growing epidemic of Shiite-phobia - fear of the Iraqi majority Shiite community and the role it might play in a future Iraqi state. These fears are overwrought.
The Sunni community is fearful because it realizes that it cannot have a significant role in a future Iraq if the Shiites dominate by voting in a bloc, as seems almost inevitable. The Kurds are afraid that a Shiite-dominated government will be unsympathetic to the continuation of their semi-autonomous entity in northern Iraq.
However, it is the Bush administration and its neoconservative members who are the most frightened of all. They have convinced themselves that a Shiite victory in the election will result in the unambiguous failure of their Iraqi adventure. This will supposedly come about because the victorious Shiites will ally themselves with Iran and start taking orders from Tehran. They will supposedly then establish a religious dictatorship, persecute the Sunnis, overrun the Kurds, and kick the American military out of their land.
All of these catastrophe scenarios are unwarranted - unless the attacks against the Shiites become so acute that they touch off a cycle of revenge, and an eventual civil war.
The Sunnis are mounting the most dramatic physical attacks on the Shiites. They started a year and a half ago on August 28, 2003, by assassinating the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqer al-Hakim - significantly, in front of the shrine of Imam Ali, who was cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Mo"
By William O. Beeman
Tuesday, January 04, 2005
As the Iraqi election looms at the end of this month, the world is witnessing a growing epidemic of Shiite-phobia - fear of the Iraqi majority Shiite community and the role it might play in a future Iraqi state. These fears are overwrought.
The Sunni community is fearful because it realizes that it cannot have a significant role in a future Iraq if the Shiites dominate by voting in a bloc, as seems almost inevitable. The Kurds are afraid that a Shiite-dominated government will be unsympathetic to the continuation of their semi-autonomous entity in northern Iraq.
However, it is the Bush administration and its neoconservative members who are the most frightened of all. They have convinced themselves that a Shiite victory in the election will result in the unambiguous failure of their Iraqi adventure. This will supposedly come about because the victorious Shiites will ally themselves with Iran and start taking orders from Tehran. They will supposedly then establish a religious dictatorship, persecute the Sunnis, overrun the Kurds, and kick the American military out of their land.
All of these catastrophe scenarios are unwarranted - unless the attacks against the Shiites become so acute that they touch off a cycle of revenge, and an eventual civil war.
The Sunnis are mounting the most dramatic physical attacks on the Shiites. They started a year and a half ago on August 28, 2003, by assassinating the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqer al-Hakim - significantly, in front of the shrine of Imam Ali, who was cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Mo"
Attacking Ayatollah Khamene'i: a Dangerous Misunderstanding
Shi'aphobia II--Attacking Ayatollah Khamene'i: a Dangerous Misunderstanding: "Shi'aphobia II--Attacking Ayatollah Khamene'i: a Dangerous Misunderstanding
William O. Beeman and Donald Weadon
The United States government is unable to abandon an obsessive view that the Iranian government is working to destroy the success of the U.S. Occupation of Iraq. The Administration and its neoconservative surrogates fear a Shi'a victory in upcoming Iraqi elections. They also cling to the false assumption that the Iraqi Shi'a are being supported by the Iranian state, and derive all of their power from Tehran. This view has generated many bizarre suggestions for action which, being misguided and counterproductive, should be abandoned.
Rather than attack the Iraqi Shi'a directly-an action that even the most ham-fisted policy wonk can see as disastrous - the Administration, a stampeded Congress and neoconservative conflict enthusiasts have chosen to attack Iran. The accepted theory seems to be that if Iran is destroyed, the power of the Iraqi Shi'a will atrophy.
The ongoing squabble over Iranian nuclear development is a transparent ploy to give the United States a plausible excuse for launching a widely-discussed military enterprise. The probability of such an attack is now so high that the debates in Washington revolve around how to do the deed, rather than if. Rumors of a signed Presidential Directive for covert and military action abound.
One perscription for constructive action short of military attack was recently forwarded by The Committee on the Present Danger, a neoconservative group 'Dedicated to Winning the War on Terrorism' and to that end, dedicated to regime change in Iran. Their paper, 'Iran-A New Approach,' was published on"
William O. Beeman and Donald Weadon
The United States government is unable to abandon an obsessive view that the Iranian government is working to destroy the success of the U.S. Occupation of Iraq. The Administration and its neoconservative surrogates fear a Shi'a victory in upcoming Iraqi elections. They also cling to the false assumption that the Iraqi Shi'a are being supported by the Iranian state, and derive all of their power from Tehran. This view has generated many bizarre suggestions for action which, being misguided and counterproductive, should be abandoned.
Rather than attack the Iraqi Shi'a directly-an action that even the most ham-fisted policy wonk can see as disastrous - the Administration, a stampeded Congress and neoconservative conflict enthusiasts have chosen to attack Iran. The accepted theory seems to be that if Iran is destroyed, the power of the Iraqi Shi'a will atrophy.
The ongoing squabble over Iranian nuclear development is a transparent ploy to give the United States a plausible excuse for launching a widely-discussed military enterprise. The probability of such an attack is now so high that the debates in Washington revolve around how to do the deed, rather than if. Rumors of a signed Presidential Directive for covert and military action abound.
One perscription for constructive action short of military attack was recently forwarded by The Committee on the Present Danger, a neoconservative group 'Dedicated to Winning the War on Terrorism' and to that end, dedicated to regime change in Iran. Their paper, 'Iran-A New Approach,' was published on"
Agence Global - Article
Agence Global - Article: "Cowards and Bullies�The American Election Dilemma
by William O. BeemanReleased: 26 Oct 2004
Why is the American presidential election of 2004 so difficult? The answer may lie in an understanding of American culture. In many elections voters are faced with choosing the lesser of two evils. In this election, they are choosing the lesser of two fears.
In her classic work on American Culture, And Keep Your Powder Dry, anthropologist Margaret Mead explained America�s two great fears in pursuing power in the world: The fear of being a coward and the fear of being a bully. This year�s presidential race seems to be driven by precisely those fears.
According to Mead, Americans hate both characterizations. Americans tell their children that they must never be a coward--failing to defend self, family and loved ones. Yet, having attained power, they must never use it to become a bully--coercing and intimidating others.
Mead was writing during World War II, but her observations are eerily accurate for America�s presidential elections in 2004.
Those who fear that the United States is seen as a bully in the world oppose President George W. Bush, who embodies the essence of bully-dom both in his tough talk and his pre-emptive military aggression. His colleagues in the White House: Rumsfeld, Cheney and Ashcroft become, with him, a �gang of four,� running roughshod over both the U.S. domestic population and the people of Afghanistan and Iraq. This group takes as the Machiavellian dictum �it is safer to be feared than to be loved when one of the two must be lacking.� In their actions they fulfill the worst stereotype of the hated schoolyard aggressor.
Those who fear that the United States will be seen as a coward oppose Senator John Kerry. They see consultation, coalition bu"
by William O. BeemanReleased: 26 Oct 2004
Why is the American presidential election of 2004 so difficult? The answer may lie in an understanding of American culture. In many elections voters are faced with choosing the lesser of two evils. In this election, they are choosing the lesser of two fears.
In her classic work on American Culture, And Keep Your Powder Dry, anthropologist Margaret Mead explained America�s two great fears in pursuing power in the world: The fear of being a coward and the fear of being a bully. This year�s presidential race seems to be driven by precisely those fears.
According to Mead, Americans hate both characterizations. Americans tell their children that they must never be a coward--failing to defend self, family and loved ones. Yet, having attained power, they must never use it to become a bully--coercing and intimidating others.
Mead was writing during World War II, but her observations are eerily accurate for America�s presidential elections in 2004.
Those who fear that the United States is seen as a bully in the world oppose President George W. Bush, who embodies the essence of bully-dom both in his tough talk and his pre-emptive military aggression. His colleagues in the White House: Rumsfeld, Cheney and Ashcroft become, with him, a �gang of four,� running roughshod over both the U.S. domestic population and the people of Afghanistan and Iraq. This group takes as the Machiavellian dictum �it is safer to be feared than to be loved when one of the two must be lacking.� In their actions they fulfill the worst stereotype of the hated schoolyard aggressor.
Those who fear that the United States will be seen as a coward oppose Senator John Kerry. They see consultation, coalition bu"
Agence Global - Article
Agence Global - Article: "Good News from Tajikistan
by William O. BeemanReleased: 13 Aug 2004
Most Americans would have a hard time identifying Tajikistan on a map, but this small Central Asian nation is a ray of hope in a troubled region. With a rising economy and increasing personal freedom, there is genuine good news here. Tajik citizens, who have suffered greatly in the past, are cautious, however. They wonder if the positive developments will last, and hint that there may be a dark side to the current improvements in their lives.
A review of the recent history of Tajikistan reveals a grim litany of social, political and environmental problems that justify a cautious look at the changes taking place in Tajikistan. Concerns about political corruption, media censorship, drug trade and its accompanying HIV/AIDS afflictions, water pollution, and economic desperation are endemic to this region of the world, and Tajikistan has more than its share of these problems.
But I have been working in Tajikistan for the past seven years, and having spent a month this summer visiting every region of the country, I can state unequivocally that life has been visibly improving from year to year with a big spurt in the last year. Civil liberties have increased significantly since the debilitating civil wars of the mid 1990�s. Food is abundant, and construction is active everywhere. The cities are looking very spiffy, and the countryside is green and lush. Internet cafes -- the modernization symbol of choice these days -- are abundant, even in smaller towns.
Tajikistan has always had extensive natural resources. The dramatically beautiful Fan and Pamir mountain ranges are the sources of water for abundant hydroelectric electricity. Although the amount of arable land is small, it is highly fertile. Agricultural production has increased"
by William O. BeemanReleased: 13 Aug 2004
Most Americans would have a hard time identifying Tajikistan on a map, but this small Central Asian nation is a ray of hope in a troubled region. With a rising economy and increasing personal freedom, there is genuine good news here. Tajik citizens, who have suffered greatly in the past, are cautious, however. They wonder if the positive developments will last, and hint that there may be a dark side to the current improvements in their lives.
A review of the recent history of Tajikistan reveals a grim litany of social, political and environmental problems that justify a cautious look at the changes taking place in Tajikistan. Concerns about political corruption, media censorship, drug trade and its accompanying HIV/AIDS afflictions, water pollution, and economic desperation are endemic to this region of the world, and Tajikistan has more than its share of these problems.
But I have been working in Tajikistan for the past seven years, and having spent a month this summer visiting every region of the country, I can state unequivocally that life has been visibly improving from year to year with a big spurt in the last year. Civil liberties have increased significantly since the debilitating civil wars of the mid 1990�s. Food is abundant, and construction is active everywhere. The cities are looking very spiffy, and the countryside is green and lush. Internet cafes -- the modernization symbol of choice these days -- are abundant, even in smaller towns.
Tajikistan has always had extensive natural resources. The dramatically beautiful Fan and Pamir mountain ranges are the sources of water for abundant hydroelectric electricity. Although the amount of arable land is small, it is highly fertile. Agricultural production has increased"
Agence Global - Article
Agence Global - Article: "Blaming Iran for Everything (Again)
by William O. BeemanReleased: 21 Jul 2004
The Bush administration is now perpetually under fire for the debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also faces criticism for its failings in preparing for and reacting to the tragedy of September 11, 2001. Consequently it has adopted an old, tried and true ploy of muddying the waters to deflect negative press: Blame Iran for everything.
On July 17, President Bush stated that although the Central Intelligence Agency had found 'no direct connection between Iran and the attacks of Sept.11,' nevertheless, he said, 'We will continue to look and see if the Iranians were involved.' What is he referring to? Some of the September 11 hijackers may have been allowed to travel through Iran in 1991 without having their passports stamped. This trivial event, if it happened at all, took place a decade before the tragedy itself. Moreover, it predates the earliest known Al-Qaeda planning concerning the September 11 plot.
And accusations against Iran do not stop with September 11. Resident analysts at the neo-conservative, right-wing American Enterprise Institute and other similar bodies have tried to blame Iran for the faulty intelligence presented to justify the Iraq war by the Bush administration. The scenario is this: Iran wanted the United States to remove its old enemy, Saddam Hussein. Iranian intelligence therefore worked through the Defense Department�s now-discredited leader-in-waiting, Ahmad Chalabi, to provide false information to U.S. officials about weapons of mass destruction.
Iran has also been accused of supporting Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his al-Mahdi Army in their opposition to the U.S. occupation. The accusation came from neo-conservative pundit, Michael Rubin, who until recently was an advisor to"
by William O. BeemanReleased: 21 Jul 2004
The Bush administration is now perpetually under fire for the debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also faces criticism for its failings in preparing for and reacting to the tragedy of September 11, 2001. Consequently it has adopted an old, tried and true ploy of muddying the waters to deflect negative press: Blame Iran for everything.
On July 17, President Bush stated that although the Central Intelligence Agency had found 'no direct connection between Iran and the attacks of Sept.11,' nevertheless, he said, 'We will continue to look and see if the Iranians were involved.' What is he referring to? Some of the September 11 hijackers may have been allowed to travel through Iran in 1991 without having their passports stamped. This trivial event, if it happened at all, took place a decade before the tragedy itself. Moreover, it predates the earliest known Al-Qaeda planning concerning the September 11 plot.
And accusations against Iran do not stop with September 11. Resident analysts at the neo-conservative, right-wing American Enterprise Institute and other similar bodies have tried to blame Iran for the faulty intelligence presented to justify the Iraq war by the Bush administration. The scenario is this: Iran wanted the United States to remove its old enemy, Saddam Hussein. Iranian intelligence therefore worked through the Defense Department�s now-discredited leader-in-waiting, Ahmad Chalabi, to provide false information to U.S. officials about weapons of mass destruction.
Iran has also been accused of supporting Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his al-Mahdi Army in their opposition to the U.S. occupation. The accusation came from neo-conservative pundit, Michael Rubin, who until recently was an advisor to"
Agence Global - Article
Agence Global - Article: "The Kurds are Betrayed �Again
by William O. BeemanReleased: 10 Jun 2004
'The Kurds have no friends,' is a bitter Kurdish proverb stemming from centuries of mistreatment at the hands of outside powers. In the Iraqi settlement agreement, pushed through the United Nations Security Council by the United States, the Bush administration has now proven the truth of the Kurdish proverb once more. Only this time, this American mistake may launch the long-feared Iraqi civil war.
The U. N. settlement agreement, Resolution 1546 (2004), endorses the timetable for the political transition leading to a constitutionally elected government by 31 December 2005, as well as the convening of a national conference. However, the resolution makes no mention of Kurdish independence or even autonomy, thus cheating the Kurds of the homeland for which they have longed for centuries.
It further tells the Kurds that they will never be able to be selected as President or Prime Minister of the country. In the interim government Kurds were indeed represented, but the highest echelons of power eluded them. The best they could do was Vice-president (Roj Nuri Shawis), Deputy Prime Minister for national security (Barham Saleh) and perhaps most important, Foreign Minister (Hoshyar Zebari). Barham Saleh in particular will be under a great deal of pressure from his own community as a result of the U. N. resolution, since he has been heavily backed by the United States.
This is not the first time the Kurds have been sacrificed to expediency. Articles 62 to 65 of the Treaty of S�vres, signed on 10 August 1920 between Ottoman Empire and the Allied powers (including the United States), provided for the formation of an autonomous Kurdish administration out of the Southeast Provinces of Turkey. The Kurds of northern Ir"
by William O. BeemanReleased: 10 Jun 2004
'The Kurds have no friends,' is a bitter Kurdish proverb stemming from centuries of mistreatment at the hands of outside powers. In the Iraqi settlement agreement, pushed through the United Nations Security Council by the United States, the Bush administration has now proven the truth of the Kurdish proverb once more. Only this time, this American mistake may launch the long-feared Iraqi civil war.
The U. N. settlement agreement, Resolution 1546 (2004), endorses the timetable for the political transition leading to a constitutionally elected government by 31 December 2005, as well as the convening of a national conference. However, the resolution makes no mention of Kurdish independence or even autonomy, thus cheating the Kurds of the homeland for which they have longed for centuries.
It further tells the Kurds that they will never be able to be selected as President or Prime Minister of the country. In the interim government Kurds were indeed represented, but the highest echelons of power eluded them. The best they could do was Vice-president (Roj Nuri Shawis), Deputy Prime Minister for national security (Barham Saleh) and perhaps most important, Foreign Minister (Hoshyar Zebari). Barham Saleh in particular will be under a great deal of pressure from his own community as a result of the U. N. resolution, since he has been heavily backed by the United States.
This is not the first time the Kurds have been sacrificed to expediency. Articles 62 to 65 of the Treaty of S�vres, signed on 10 August 1920 between Ottoman Empire and the Allied powers (including the United States), provided for the formation of an autonomous Kurdish administration out of the Southeast Provinces of Turkey. The Kurds of northern Ir"
Agence Global - Article
Agence Global - Article: "Prime-Minister Iyad Allawi Guarantees Chalabi's Power
by William O. BeemanReleased: 29 May 2004
The choice of Iyad Allawi as prime-minister designate of Iraq further cements Ahmad Chalabi�s hold on power, virtually guaranteeing that he and his family will be the rulers of Iraq in the future. A look at the post-June 30 government reveals that virtually all of the players are from the Chalabi extended family.
Iyad Allawi is related to Ahmad Chalabi by blood and marriage, and in Middle Eastern terms, is part of his extended family. Though somewhat distantly related by American standards, Allawi and Chalabi would be expected to be in close contact in the tightly knit, almost corporate kinship networks of the Middle East.
Ahmad Chalabi has been the Iraqi leader of choice by Donald Rumsfeld and the American Department of Defense since long before the invasion of Iraq. In him they felt they had a reliable �plumber� who could represent American interests. Since he would be beholden to the United States for his office, he would �cooperate� with the United States in military, political and economic matters. Chalabi was somewhat discredited in recent weeks for having misled the United States concerning the presence of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq, and for his undisguised ambitions for power. Supporting a surrogate for himself from his own family was diabolically clever on his part, allowing him to bide his time until after the American presidential election, when he could emerge to assume a clear leadership position.
Although Ahmad Chalabi was not present for the vote on Iyad Allawi, his representative cast a positive vote. It is notable that in choosing Allawi, the council also acceded to Ahmad Chalabi�s wish that they not choose the neutral, 80-year-old Sunni, Adnan Pachachi, former Iraqi "
by William O. BeemanReleased: 29 May 2004
The choice of Iyad Allawi as prime-minister designate of Iraq further cements Ahmad Chalabi�s hold on power, virtually guaranteeing that he and his family will be the rulers of Iraq in the future. A look at the post-June 30 government reveals that virtually all of the players are from the Chalabi extended family.
Iyad Allawi is related to Ahmad Chalabi by blood and marriage, and in Middle Eastern terms, is part of his extended family. Though somewhat distantly related by American standards, Allawi and Chalabi would be expected to be in close contact in the tightly knit, almost corporate kinship networks of the Middle East.
Ahmad Chalabi has been the Iraqi leader of choice by Donald Rumsfeld and the American Department of Defense since long before the invasion of Iraq. In him they felt they had a reliable �plumber� who could represent American interests. Since he would be beholden to the United States for his office, he would �cooperate� with the United States in military, political and economic matters. Chalabi was somewhat discredited in recent weeks for having misled the United States concerning the presence of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq, and for his undisguised ambitions for power. Supporting a surrogate for himself from his own family was diabolically clever on his part, allowing him to bide his time until after the American presidential election, when he could emerge to assume a clear leadership position.
Although Ahmad Chalabi was not present for the vote on Iyad Allawi, his representative cast a positive vote. It is notable that in choosing Allawi, the council also acceded to Ahmad Chalabi�s wish that they not choose the neutral, 80-year-old Sunni, Adnan Pachachi, former Iraqi "
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