William O. Beeman Review of "Tehran Rising" by America Abroad Media (Truth Out)

Debunking the Top Seven Myths on Iran's Middle East Policies

by: William O. Beeman,

New America Media

This evening, I listened to the radio program Tehran Rising [5] produced by America Abroad—a program distributed by Public Radio International—and I must say that I was deeply disturbed by the way the program was framed. The program centers on "spreading Iranian influence" in the Middle East.


Frankly, it is somewhat fatuous to try to hang a story about change and unrest in the Middle East on the Iranian bogeyman. Haven't we had enough of this?
Since nations such as Lebanon, Bahrain and Iraq (all covered in the reporting for this piece) are hugely different in their internal and external dynamics, to make this a story about Iran really obscures any nuance whatsoever in the politics of the region, and implies that nothing would be happening if it weren't for Iranian machinations.


There are certainly a few people in Iran who would exult in this misperception, however, here are a few of the myths offered in the program which I would like to debunk.


Myth #1: A "cold war" between Iran and Saudi Arabia.


This is a completely fictional construction. Saudi Arabia has long been wary and disturbed by the Shi'a majority in Hasa, its eastern oil territory. This was true even under the Shah and long before. The fear of the uprising in Bahrain has little or nothing to do with confronting Iran--it is driven by fear that the Bahraini uprising will spread over the causeway to its own province.


Myth #2: Iran’s spurring on of the Bahrain uprising.


The implication in the program was that Iran is doing something to spur on the Bahrain uprising. The program’s own interviewee, Kristin Smith Diwan, denied this.
Moreover, I just participated in a seminar for the U.S. Central Command in Tampa. Two military intelligence agents --fluent in Arabic and Persian – and former students of Middle East experts Ray Motaheddeh and Juan Cole – flatly denied that there was any evidence that Iran had any agents on the ground in Bahrain, based on their own extensive investigations in February and March of this year.


Myth #3: The bulk of Lebanon’s Hezbollah funds come from Iran.


My position on Hezbollah and that of virtually every other observer of Hezbollah is that Iran has no effective control over Hezbollah's political actions today (as opposed to 30 years ago).


The program documented clearly the charitable actions carried out by Hezbollah that were supported by Iran. Iran never denied this. At the same time, the program clearly pointed out the correct statement that the bulk of Lebanon's redevelopment funds came from foreign remittances and from the Gulf States.


The program misleadingly implies that Hezbollah is not receiving funds from the same sources. In fact, the bulk of Hezbollah's funds come from those foreign sources, not from Iran.


Of course the Sunnis such as the one interviewed on the program are opposed to Iran, but look at the welcome President Ahmadinejad got from both Shi'as and Sunnis in his recent trip.


Myth #4: Iranian influence is negative or evil.


This implication that Iranian influence is somehow negative or evil as opposed to being just what nations do was prevalent in the program.


Turkey is trying to increase its influence in Central Asia, but no one complains about that. Iran is being squeezed economically and of course is trying to develop economic and political ties. It’s behaving as nations operate normally.


Myth #5: Iran is exploiting weak democracies.


Ash Jain, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and former State Department staff member, and all those at the WINEP are dedicated to propagandizing against Iran. The idea that Iran is "exploiting weak democracies" is rather silly. Iran can't exploit anyone unless they are able to promulgate messages and actions that are welcome to the populations of other nations.


In fact, Iran has made little or no headway in any predominately Sunni nation. Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment is quite right about the "self-limiting" nature of Iran's influence. Case in point: Tajikistan. Persian speaking, culturally Iranian, the Tajiks should be susceptible to Iranian influence. Instead, they are extremely wary of Iran because Iranians are Shi'a and Tajiks are Sunni.


Myth #6: Iran has “won” because Hamas has gained power.


Ash Jain of WINEP claims that Iran has "won" because Hamas has stabilized and become a force in the Middle East. For heaven's sake, one would think that the denizens of Hamas have no interest in their own affairs and future.


Does he think that Hamas lives only to fulfill some fantasy foreign policy influence on Iran's part?


Myth #7: All Shi’a leaders agree with Iran.


Let's be clear. No Shi'a religious leaders outside of Iran agree with Iran's form of government or want to emulate it. Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani of Iraq is flatly opposed to Iran's brand of clerical rule, and disagrees with the idea that the Iranian Revolution should be spread abroad. Not that there’s hope of that anyway.
Therefore, the flat answer to the question of Iranian influence is: Some in Iran would like to see Iran have greater influence in the region, but their "success" is largely a figment of the imagination of overwrought Westerners looking about for another "cold war" enemy, to echo the framework of this program.


Much of what is attributed to Iran in this radio program and elsewhere is actually the result of the natural dynamics of the individual communities of the region playing out their own local interests.


The fact that some in Iran may be cheerleading from the sidelines doesn't mean that Iran is in control. Nor does it mean that what Iran is doing is any different than any other nation in the world trying to create favorable relations for itself.


William O. Beeman is Professor and Chair of Anthropology and specialist in Middle East Studies at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis-St. Paul Minnesota, formerly of Brown University.

William O. Beeman Review of "Tehran Rising" by America Abroad Media

I listened to the radio program Tehran Rising produced by America Abroad--a
program distributed by Public Radio International
<http://www.americaabroadmedia.org/programs/view/id/157>
this evening and I must say that I was deeply disturbed by the way the piece was framed.
The program centers on "spreading Iranian influence" in the Middle East.

Frankly it is somewhat fatuous to try to hang a story about
change and unrest in the Middle East on the Iranian bogeyman. Haven't we
had enough of this? Since nations such as Lebanon, Bahrain and Iraq, all
covered in the reporting for this piece,  are hugely different in their internal
and external dynamics, to make this a story about Iran really obscures any
nuance whatever in the politics of the region, and implies that nothing would
be happening if it weren't for Iranian machinations. There are certainly a few
people in Iran who would exult in this misperception--giving Iran far more.
Interested people should listen to the program or read the transcript themselves.
However, here are some of my objections:

1. The piece posits a "cold war" between Iran and  Saudi Arabia. This is a complete 
fictional construction. Saudi Arabia has long been wary and disturbed by 
the Shi'a majority in the Hasa, its eastern oil territory. This was true 
even under the Shah and long before. The fear of the uprising in Bahrain 
has little or nothing to do with confronting Iran--it is driven by fear 
that the Bahraini uprising will spread over the causeway to its own 
province.

2. The implication that Iran is doing something to spur on the Bahrain 
uprising. Your own interviewee, Kristin Smith Diwan, denied this. 
Moreover, I just participated in a seminar for the U.S. Central Command 
in Tampa. Two Military Intelligence agents--fluent in Arabic and 
Persian--former students of Ray Motaheddeh and Juan Cole--flatly denied 
that there was any evidence that Iran had any agents on the ground in 
Bahrain, based on their own extensive investigations in February and March.

3. Hezbullah--I think you know not only my position on Hezbullah but 
that of virtually every other observer of Hezbullah, and that is that 
iran has no effective control over Hezbullah's political actions today 
(as opposed to 30 years ago). You documented clearly the charitable 
actions carried out by Hezbullah that were  supported by Iran. Iran 
never denied this. At the same time, the program clearly pointed out the 
correct statement that the bulk of Lebanon's redevelopment funds came 
from foreign remittances and from the Gulf States. The program 
misleadingly implies that Hezbullah is not receiving funds from the same 
sources. In fact the bulk of Hezbullah's funds come from those sources, 
not from Iran. Of course the Sunni's such as the one interviewed on the 
program are opposed to Iran, but look at the welcome President 
Ahmadinejad got from BOTH Shi'as and Sunnis in his recent trip.

4. The implication that Iranian influence is negative or evil as opposed 
to being just what nations do. Turkey is trying to increase its 
influence in Central Asia, but no one complains about that. Iran is 
being squeezed economically and of course is trying to develop economic 
and political ties.

5. Ash Jain and all those at WINEP are dedicated to propagandizing 
against Iran. The idea that Iran is "exploiting weak democracies" is 
rather silly. Iran can't exploit anyone unless they are able to 
promulgate messages and actions that are welcome to the populations of 
other nations. In fact, Iran has made little or no headway in any 
predominately Sunni nation. Karim Sajjadpour is quite right about the 
"self-limiting" nature of Iran's influence. Case in point: Tajikistan. 
Persian speaking, culturally Iranian, the Tajiks should be susceptible 
to Iranian influence. They are extremely wary of Iran because Iranians 
are Shi'a and Tajiks are Sunni.

5. Ash Jain claims that Iran has "won" because Hamas has stabilized and 
become a force in the Middle East. For heaven's sake, one would think 
that the denizens of Hamas have no interest in their own affairs and 
future. Does he think that Hamas lives only to fulfill some fantasy 
foreign policy influence on Iran's part?

6. Let's be clear. No Shi'a religious leaders outside of Iran 
agree with Iran's form of government or want 
to emulate it. Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani is flatly opposed to Iran's 
brand of clerical rule, and disagrees with the idea that the Iranian 
Revolution should be spread abroad--a vain hope anyway.

7. Therefore the flat answer to the question of Iranian influence is: 
Some in Iran would like to see Iran have greater influence in the 
region, but their "success" is largely a figment of the imagination of 
overwrought Westerners looking about for another "cold war" enemy, to 
echo the framework of this program." Much of what is attributed to Iran 
here is the result of the natural dynamics of the individual communities 
of the region playing out their own local interests. The fact that some 
in Iran may be cheerleading from the sidelines doesn't mean that Iran is 
in control. Nor does it mean that what Iran is doing is any different 
than any other nation in the world trying to create favorable relations 
for itself.

Best,

Bill Beeman
University of Minnesota

 

William O. Beeman--We Killed Osama bin Laden, Now Let’s Kill the Myth - New America Media

We Killed Osama bin Laden, Now Let’s Kill the Myth - New America Media

New America Media,

Commentary, William O. Beeman, Posted: May 03, 2011

The United States is jubilant over the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. However, it will be some time before history catches up with the mythology that arose around him and the al-Qaeda organization in the past 10 years. Osama bin Laden at the end was far from the looming powerful figure he was made out to be. He had outlived his usefulness both as a bogeyman for the West, and as an Islamic responder to the neo-colonialist forces his organization purported to confront.

The principal myth surrounding bin Laden was that his brand of religion represented a mainstream streak of something identified variously as “jihadism” or, in more genteel rhetoric, “political Islam.” This was far from the truth. No doubt, bin Laden justified his actions with questionable theology and bogus fatwas, but his organization’s actions represented an extremist view of religiously justified political action that was embraced by only a fraction of the Islamic world.

Second, bin Laden was seen as promulgating the United States as al-Qaeda’s principal target—a mythology that was certainly reinforced by the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Actually, the target of bin Laden and the al-Qaeda forces for which he served as leader was the Saudi Arabian Royal Family. He turned to this mission after the Soviet Union was expelled from Afghanistan. Bin Laden viewed the Saudi Royal Family as having defiled the Arabian Peninsula—the Holy Land where the major religious shrines of Islam are located. Not only were the lives of the Saudi rulers seen as venal, they allowed the United States and other nations to establish military operations on Saudi soil. The United States became the target of al-Qaeda when they set up operations to protect and support the Saudi Royal Family.

Third, bin Laden was promoted by the Bush administration as the mastermind of a gigantic apocalyptic global organization under his control. They built the search for him into the Global War on Terror—for which they actually issued GWOT medals. This was a gigantic exaggeration that was largely accepted by the American public without question.

Fourth, exaggerating bin Laden’s powers also served disparate dissident groups in the Islamic world. After the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, bin Laden’s organization had enormous cachet among political resistance groups—many of whom predated the rise of bin Laden and al-Qaeda by decades. These smaller groups, with their own local grievances against repressive rulers, quickly “branded” themselves with the epithet “al-Qaeda.” It was a franchise operation that gave many small groups from the Philippines to Morocco instant attention and credibility. In fact, bin Laden never had direct control over these groups. They would occasionally come to him directly or indirectly for blessings of their actions, and he would routinely “approve.” This served everyone’s purpose—making bin Laden’s al-Qaeda seem more powerful than it was, and giving the local groups credibility. We now know that over 10 years, bin Laden’s organization had dwindled precipitously. In fact, its numbers were in the low hundreds in the Afghan-Pakistan theater in the end.
Fifth, bin Laden was presented by the United States—particularly the Bush administration—as impossibly clever, wily and able to evade U.S. military operations. This mythology was promulgated by Pakistan as well. In fact, bin Laden was an incredibly useful symbolic bogeyman. His mere existence justified the United States’ presence in Afghanistan, as well as billions of dollars spent supporting the Pakistan military regime without complaint from the American public. It is already apparent that the Pakistanis—and likely some Americans—knew very well where he was. He was not hiding out in a cave somewhere; he was 35 miles from Islamabad in a stable compound in a luxury neighborhood.
Finally, bin Laden has been portrayed with the power to reach beyond the grave. Virtually, the instant that his death was announced, global speculation about “sleeper cells” and attacks by “bin Laden’s followers” filled the airwaves. In fact, no one has ever identified these organizations. This is part of the continued mythology of a unified Islamic global movement organized to confront Western civilization. Such a movement never existed, though there are certainly individuals in both the West and the Islamic world who find it politically useful to promulgate such a fabrication.

As we have seen in the past few months, the dominant focus for political action in the Middle East and elsewhere is not religious-based. Movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain and even Jordan are based in the principle of secular representative government free of Western political and economic control, channeled through repressive rulers. Even in Iran, dissidents seek to lessen the influence of religious doctrinaire control as their political system moves inexorably toward secular rule.

The mythic ideology of Islamic confrontation with the West, inherent in the bin Laden myth, should die with him. Americans, rather than celebrating a triumph over Islam, should instead be looking forward to a new era of cooperation with the progressive peoples throughout the region, who, with bin Laden’s death, have now begun to have the false accusation of Islamic extremism lifted from their shoulders.

William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology, University of Minnesota, Minn. He has lived and worked in the Middle East for more than 30 years, and is past president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association.