Email response from a University of Wisconsin professor:
Date: Tue, Mar 29, 2011 at 9:34 PM
Subject: Information concerning the confidentiality of your e-mail
As you may know, the Republican Party of Wisconsin has submitted an Open Records request for the e-mails of a faculty member after he presented scholarship critical of them. I do not know if that request will be granted. Because I have recently been at certain protests and have signed certain petitions (on my own time, not university time) that the Republican Party would also object to, I am informing all who e-mail me that I can not guarantee your confidentiality. My private e-mail is [redacted]. However, it is unclear whether I can guarantee confidentiality of my private e-mail if the content is deemed to be official university business, and I may not be able to discuss information protected by the federal educational privacy act. You can also call me at [redacted], but please note that voice messages are e-mailed to me. I apologize for the inconvenience and hope this situation resolves itself soon.
Tuesday, March 29, 2011
Friday, March 25, 2011
Netanyahu's Dangerous Posturing (Israel PM: Must be military option against Iran)
Prime minister Netanyahu's over-the-top call for Iran to be "stopped" like Gadhafi's regime in Libya reflects either his venality in promulgating a doomsday scenario, his active desire to utterly mislead the public through the false equation of the Gadhafi regime with the Iranian government, or his naivete in terms of strategy. Any of my freshman students knows that the two governments are utterly different in their history, their composition and their philosophy. What does the Prime Minister think that this rather ridiculous call to action is going to accomplish? It certainly is not going to persuade the Russians! And every military leader knows that a preemptive attack on Iran invites utter disaster for the region and the world. Additionally, unless one accepts the false assertion that Hamas and Hezbollah operate under the direct orders of Tehran, Iran hasn't actively threatened anyone. Nor is there any indication whatever that Iran "dreams of world supremacy" as Netanyahu asserts. This is just another foolish attempt to ratchet Iran up to the status of über-Bogeyman. Isn't it reasonable to expect that world leaders not indulge themselves in this kind of childish, irresponsible rhetoric?
Bill Beeman
University of Minnesota
Bill Beeman
University of Minnesota
usatoday.com
Israeli PM: Iran should be 'stopped' like Gadhafi
MARCH 24, 2011
MOSCOW (AP) — Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Thursday that Iran's government should be "stopped" like Gadhafi's regime in Libya.
Netanyahu said that Iran's nuclear and other ambitions pose an immediate threat to global security.
"This is a very belligerent Islamist regime that dreams of world supremacy, and it has to be stopped," he told the Vesti television channel. "If we have to tame Gadhafi, we have to stop the Tehran's regime in the same way."
Netanyahu arrived in Moscow Thursday, a day after Russian President Dmitry Medvedev welcomed his Palestinian counterpart Mahmoud Abbas. Observers believe their visits are aimed at overcoming the obstacles in the Palestinian-Israeli talks.
Russia is part of the so-called Quartet of Mideast peace brokers that also includes the United States, the European Union and the United Nations. The Quartet's principles include recognition of Israel, a renunciation of violence, and adherence to previous Palestinian agreements.
Monday, March 21, 2011
Justin Elliott--A history of Libya and blowback--Interview with William O. Beeman
MONDAY, MAR 21, 2011 13:32 ET
A history of Libya and blowback
AP/Langevin
Moammar Gadhafi and wreckage from Pan Am flight 103
A fact that hasn't gotten much attention since the Obama administration started its bombing campaign in Libya is that we've been here before. President Ronald Reagan launched a bombing raid on Libya in 1986, known as Operation El Dorado Canyon.
That was a very different era -- one in which Moammar Gadhafi was an active sponsor of terrorism and had been demonized in the U.S. for years. There are, however, interesting parallels to today. The Obama administration, for example, has warned in recent days that Gadhafi may try to hit back at the U.S. or Europe by sponsoring acts of terrorism. In the 1980s, Gadhafi did just that. Reagan's strike on Libya was one of the key events in the run-up to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.
The Lockerbie bombing killed 270 people. Among the many Americans killed was Matthew Gannon, a Beirut-based CIA officer. Libyan intelligence agent Abdelbaset al-Megrahi was ultimately convicted of masterminding the attack.
To learn more about the history of Operation El Dorado Canyon and Lockerbie, I spoke with William Beeman, a Middle East expert and anthropology professor at University of Minnesota. The text that follows has been edited for length and clarity.
Can you summarize the political context in the 1980s that led up to the American bombing in Libya in 1986?
Well, Col. Gadhafi was a very iconoclastic figure from the time he took power in 1969. He had been involved in supporting any number of terrorist organizations including the Irish Republican Army. In particular, he was very upset about the fact that anti-Gadhafi forces -- Libyan expatriates -- had been operating in Europe. In retaliation, he funded the IRA and he claimed that this was payback for the Europeans that were allegedly fostering opposition to his own government. Gadhafi also claimed to be sponsoring the Red Army Faction [in Germany] and was generally considered to be a terrible gadfly to Europeans and to the United States. He was quite equal opportunity; he also supported Idi Amin in Uganda, and he declared himself the king of kings of all of Africa. So the United States under Reagan declared Libya to be the chief state supporter of terrorism in the 1980s.
What prompted the American bombing in 1986?
The main thing that touched off the incident was the bombing of the La Belle nightclub in West Berlin in April 1986. There were a small number of people killed and a large number injured. The United States had an absolute smoking gun. The Libyan agents involved in the attack were operating out of East Germany. During the dregs of the Cold War, there was kind of a perfect storm -- East Germany and the communists were involved with the Libyans and they were bombing a nightclub in West Berlin. So the story was, "Evil Gadhafi and evil communists plot to bomb Westerners." Later on it turned out to be true that the Stasi had been involved, but we didn't know about this for a long time, until after the reunification of Germany. A week after the bombing, Reagan ordered the strike on Libya.
What happened in that strike?
In mid-April, U.S. jets attacked a number of sites in Libya including the presidential palace. The U.S. had planned a strike of this kind long before it actually took place, but it came as a big surprise for everybody. The Europeans actually resisted it. The U.S. was cooperating with Great Britain but France and Spain and Italy denied the U.S. overflight rights. So the U.S. started from Great Britain and flew down the coast and then through Gibraltar, which is British territory. They had to refuel in the air to make the flight. They dumped tens of tons of munitions on the airfield in Tripoli.
A dozen or so officers were killed in the raid but Gadhafi and his family escaped. The story is -- and we don't know this is true for sure -- that he was warned in advance by either the the prime minister of Malta or Prime Minister Craxi of Italy. After the raid, Gadhafi announced that he had won a military victory over the United States because they hadn't killed him. There were also a couple of Americans whose plane was shot down.
Didn't Gadhafi claim that his "adopted daughter" was killed in that attack?
That's right. She was called Hannah. But no one had ever heard of her. And every time the story was told about her, her age seemed to change -- from 12 months to 6 years, and various numbers in between. The fact that no one knew who she was and they couldn't get the facts straight about her existence really tells me that it may have been a fabricated story. There may have been somebody from the household killed and it may have been expeditious for Gadhafi to say, "This is my adopted daughter." It might have been a metaphorical relationship more than anything else.
So how did you get from the '86 attack to Lockerbie? Are the two events connected?
From the standpoint of the Libyans, the Lockerbie incident was retaliatory for the fact that the British had allowed the U.S. to fly this mission from Great Britain. A bomb was placed on the plane and it blew up in midair. There were 270 people killed. It was en route from Heathrow to the United States, so that was significant because the airstrikes in 1986 had been, in Gadhafi's view, a joint U.S.-British operation. But the Libyans denied for a long, long time that they had anything to do with the Lockerbie incident. A Libyan, Megrahi, was eventually convicted in Scottish court and was in jail for a long time. Now, just last month, the Libyan justice minister, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, claimed that Gadhafi had personally ordered the Lockerbie attack. But Mustafa Abdel-Jalil is now one of the leaders of the opposition, so maybe that claim is not so surprising.
The Obama administration has said it is now on alert for some kind of Gadhafi-sponsored terrorist attempt. Do you see that as plausible?
Well, it's possible. But it's interesting that most of the Libyan delegations outside of Libya have now denounced the Gadhafi government. Clearly any groups that are loyal to Gadhafi outside of Libya cannot operate under the cover of the Communist state anymore. The United States more or less absolved Gadhafi during the Bush administration. We restored diplomatic relations in 2004. And just before the presidential election in 2008, the U.S. had a comprehensive Libyan claim settlement. The Libyans agreed to compensate the Lockerbie victims and the victims of the Germany bombing in 1986. And the U.S. more or less said, "We're going to wipe the slate clean."
The "coalition" has no clothes - Libya - Salon.com
The "coalition" has no clothes - Libya - Salon.com
Sunday, Mar 20, 2011 12:10 ET
Note from William O. Beeman: The idea that the attack on Libya was the result of a coalition, and not a United States unitary action is utterly absurd on the face of it. This article from Salon by Justin Elliott points this up very clearly, with explicit documentation. If Colonel Qaddafi prevails, he will be able to say, as he did in 1986 when a Ronald Reagan-ordered attack on him failed, "Qaddafi has beaten the United States."
Sunday, Mar 20, 2011 12:10 ET
Note from William O. Beeman: The idea that the attack on Libya was the result of a coalition, and not a United States unitary action is utterly absurd on the face of it. This article from Salon by Justin Elliott points this up very clearly, with explicit documentation. If Colonel Qaddafi prevails, he will be able to say, as he did in 1986 when a Ronald Reagan-ordered attack on him failed, "Qaddafi has beaten the United States."
The "coalition" has no clothes
AP/Remy de la Mauviniere
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is welcomed by French President Nicolas Sarkozy for a crisis summit on Libya, at the Elysee palace in Paris, Saturday, March, 19, 2011.
An emphatic part of the White House messaging about the bombing in Libya is that the operation is truly international in character.
But it's quickly becoming clear that the bombing campaign -- at least so far -- is almost entirely an American operation, albeit one that has been packaged to give it an international look. It's a dissonance that brings back memories of George W. Bush's much-mocked "coalition of the willing."
The rhetoric from the administration has consistently referred to the U.S. playing a "support" role in a large coalition. As Hillary Clinton said yesterday in France, referring to the Security Council resolution that authorizes protection of civilians in Libya: "So let me be very clear about the position of the United States: We will support an international coalition as it takes all necessary measures to enforce the terms of Resolution 1973."
President Obama, in what was obviously a carefully choreographed move, did not himself announce the beginning of the bombing. Indeed, when the news was announced by French President Nicholas Sarkozy, Obama was on an uncanceled trip to Brazil.
Obama's brief statement from Brasilia referred to a "broad coalition" that "brings together many of our European and Arab partners." He said he had authorized "military action in Libya in support of an international effort." Obama used the words "international" and "coalition" a total of ten times in a statement that lasted just three minutes.
The grandstanding was left to Sarkozy, who had ordered French planes to make the first flights over Libya -- before U.S. aircraft got involved. "Along with our Arab, European and North American partners, France has decided to play its part before history," he said.
But strikes by over 100 American cruise missiles quickly followed the French action, and early Sunday morning a slew of American planes -- including B2s, F-15s, F-16s, Navy EA-18G electronic warfare planes and Marine attack jets, according to the AP -- bombed Libya. It's not clear whether any Arab nations -- some of which supported the Security council resolution -- have contributed military support at this point.
None of this to say that the international political support for the Libya intervention is not significant. But NBC Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszewski today knocked down the talk that what is going on militarily is a "huge coalition effort." Here's what he said in a remarkable segment this morning:
"Despite the White House attempts to make this look like it's a huge coalition effort -- obviously it required coalition political support -- but for now the U.S. military is not only in the lead but conducting almost all military operations, with only minor participation from the French, as you mentioned, even British fighters over night. There's a U.S. commander. And even this morning I talked to senior military officials, when I asked them how soon will the U.S. turn over the command to the coalition -- and the indication is the U.S. military is in no hurry to do that."
Watch:
Visit msnbc.com for breaking news, world news, and news about the economy
Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, this morning delivered a very different message than Miklaszewski's reporting suggests. Mullen insisted in a Sunday show interview that while the U.S. is "leading it now, we're looking to hand off that leadership in the next few days." It will be interesting to see if that happens.
Sunday, March 20, 2011
Libya's Opposition Leadership Comes into Focus | STRATFOR
Libya's Opposition Leadership Comes into Focus | STRATFOR
March 20, 2011
Note from William O. Beeman: STRATFOR is a semi-reliable source prone to leaps of conjecture and frequent inaccuracy. However, this is the most detailed account I have seen of the organization of the opposition forces in Libya. Given the dearth of information about the opposition and the uncertainty of the outcome in Libya, the account here is worth paying attention to. I caution readers not to accept this account uncritically.
Libya has descended to a situation tantamount to civil war, with forces loyal to Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi in the west pitted against rebels from the east. One of the biggest problems faced by Western governments has been identifying exactly who the rebels are. Many of them, including former Libyan Justice Minister Mustafa Abdel-Jalil and former Interior Minister Gen. Abdel Fattah Younis, defected early on from the Gadhafi regime and represent part of the leadership of the National Transitional Council, which lobbied Western governments for support soon after its formation. Challenges posed by geography and lack of military capabilities remain, however, meaning that even with the aid of foreign airstrikes against Gadhafi’s forces, the rebel council will struggle to achieve its stated goal of militarily toppling Gadhafi and unifying the country under its leadership.
Editor’s note:This analysis was originally published March 8 but has been significantly updated with current, accurate information.
The structure through which the Libyan opposition is represented is the National Transitional Council. The first man to announce its creation was former Libyan Justice Minister Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, who defected from the government Feb. 21 and declared the establishment of a “transitional government” Feb. 26. At the time, Abdel-Jalil claimed that it would give way to national elections within three months, though this was clearly never a realistic goal.
One day after Abdel-Jalil’s announcement, a Benghazi-based lawyer named Abdel-Hafidh Ghoga held a news conference to refute his claims. Ghoga pronounced himself to be the spokesman of the new council and denied that it resembled a transitional government, adding that even if it did, Abdel-Jalil would not be in charge. Ghoga derided the former justice minister as being more influential in the eastern Libyan city of Al Bayda than in Benghazi, which is the heart of the rebel movement.
The personality clash between Abdel-Jalil and Ghoga continued on for most of the next week, as each man portended to be running a council that spoke for the eastern rebel movement in its entirety. It was significant only insofar as it provided just a glimpse of the sort of internal rivalries that exist in eastern Libya, known historically as Cyrenaica. Though Cyrenaica has a distinct identity from the western Libyan region historically referred to as Tripolitania, that does not mean that it is completely unified. This will be a problem moving ahead for the coalition carrying out the bombing campaign of Libya, as tribal and personal rivalries in the east will compound with a simple lack of familiarity with who the rebels really are.
The National Transitional Council officially came into being March 6, and — for the moment, at least — has settled the personal and regional rivalry between Abdel-Jalil and Ghoga, with the former named the council’s head and the latter its spokesman. Despite the drama that preceded the formal establishment of the council, all members of the opposition have always been unified on a series of goals: They want to mount an armed offensive against the government-controlled areas in the west; they want to overthrow Gadhafi; they seek to unify the country with Tripoli as its capital; and they do not want foreign boots on Libyan soil. The unity of the rebels, in short, is based upon a common desire to oust the longtime Libyan leader.
The transitional council asserts that it derives its legitimacy from the series of city councils that have been running the affairs of the east since the February uprising that turned all of eastern Libya into rebel-held territory. This council is, in essence, a conglomeration of localized units of makeshift self-governance. And while it may be centered in the east, the rebel council has also gone out of its way to assert that all Libyans who are opposed to Gadhafi’s rule are a part of the movement. This is not a secessionist struggle. A military stalemate with Gadhafi that would lead to the establishment of two Libyas would not represent an outright success for the rebels, even though it would be preferential to outright defeat. Though it has only released the names of nine of its reported 31 members for security reasons, the National Transitional Council has claimed that it has members in several cities that lie beyond the rebel-held territory in the east (including Misurata, Zentan, Zawiya, Zouara, Nalut, Jabal Gharbi, Ghat and Kufra), it has promised membership to all Libyans who want to join, and it asserted that the council is the sole representative of the whole of Libya.
The council’s foremost priorities for the past several weeks have been garnering foreign support for airstrikes on Gadhafi’s forces and the establishment of a no-fly zone. Absent that, the rebels have long argued, none of their other military objectives stood a chance of being realized.
It was the lobbying for Western support in the establishment of a no-fly zone that led the transitional council’s “executive team,” also known as the crisis committee, to go on a tour of European capitals in mid-March designed to shore up support from various governments and international institutions. Mahmoud Jebril, an ally of Abdel-Jalil, and de facto Foreign Minister Ali al-Essawi, the former Libyan ambassador to India who quit in February when the uprising began, comprise the executive team. The result of this trip was the first recognition of the transitional council as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people, which was provided by France on March 10. France, as we were to see in the following days, was to become the most vociferous advocate of the international community coming to the aid of the rebel council through the use of airstrikes.
It is important to note that little of the territory that fell into rebel control in the early days of the insurrection was actually occupied through conquest. Many military and security forces in the east either deserted or defected to the opposition, which brought not only men and arms, but also the territory those troops ostensibly controlled. Most fighting that occurred once the situation transitioned into what is effectively a civil war, particularly in the main population centers along the coastal stretch between Benghazi and Sirte, consisted of relatively small, lightly armed formations conducting raids, rather than either side decisively defeating a major formation and pacifying a town.
Just as the executive team represents the National Transitional Council’s foreign affairs unit, the council also has a military division. This was originally headed by Omar El-Hariri, but the overall command of the Libyan rebels has since reportedly been passed to former Interior Minister Gen. Abdel Fattah Younis. Younis’ name arose early on as the man with whom the British government was engaging as it tried to get a grip on the situation unfolding in rebel-held territory. He was not included in the original transitional council membership, however, despite several indications that he did in fact retain widespread support among eastern rebels. This, like the clash between Abdel-Jalil and Ghoga, was another indication of the rivalries that exist in eastern Libya, which paint a picture of disunity among the rebels.
Younis, however, now appears to have been officially incorporated into the command structure and is presiding over a National Transitional Council “army” that, like the council itself, is the sum of its parts. Every population center in eastern Libya has since the uprising began created respective militias, all of which are now, theoretically, to report to Benghazi. Indeed, the most notable of these local militias, created Feb. 28, has been known at times as the Benghazi Military Council, which is linked to the Benghazi city council, the members of which form much of the political core of the new national council. There are other known militias in eastern Libya, however, operating training camps in places like Ajdabiya, Al Bayda and Tobruk, and undoubtedly several other locations as well.
Younis has perhaps the most challenging job of all in eastern Libya: organizing a coherent fighting force that can mount an invasion of the west — something that will be difficult even after an extensive foreign bombing campaign. More defections by the military and security forces in the west, like the earlier defections in Zawiya and Misurata, would perhaps benefit the transitional council even more than the bombing campaign under way. There is no sign of imminent defections from the west, however, which will only reinforce the military and geographic challenges with which the rebel council is faced.
Libyan society is by definition tribal and therefore prone to fractiousness. The Gadhafi era has done nothing to counter this historical legacy, as the Jamahiriya political system promoted local governance more than a truly national system of administration. Ironically, it was this legacy of Gadhafi’s regime that helped the individual eastern cities to rapidly establish local committees that took over administration of their respective areas, but it will create difficulties should they try to truly come together. Rhetoric is far different from tangible displays of unity.
Geography will also continue to be a challenge for the National Transitional Council. The Libyan opposition still does not have the basic military proficiencies or know-how to project and sustain an armored assault on Tripoli; if it tried, it would run a serious risk of being neutralized on arrival by prepared defenses. Even Gadhafi’s hometown of Sirte — almost certainly a necessary intermediate position to control on any drive to Tripoli — looks to be a logistical stretch for the opposition. An inflow of weapons may help but would not be the complete solution. Just as the primary factor in eastern Libya’s breaking free of the government’s control lies in a series of military defections, the occurrence of the same scenario in significant numbers in the west is what would give the National Transitional Council its best chance of overthrowing Gadhafi.
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com
March 20, 2011
Note from William O. Beeman: STRATFOR is a semi-reliable source prone to leaps of conjecture and frequent inaccuracy. However, this is the most detailed account I have seen of the organization of the opposition forces in Libya. Given the dearth of information about the opposition and the uncertainty of the outcome in Libya, the account here is worth paying attention to. I caution readers not to accept this account uncritically.
Libya has descended to a situation tantamount to civil war, with forces loyal to Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi in the west pitted against rebels from the east. One of the biggest problems faced by Western governments has been identifying exactly who the rebels are. Many of them, including former Libyan Justice Minister Mustafa Abdel-Jalil and former Interior Minister Gen. Abdel Fattah Younis, defected early on from the Gadhafi regime and represent part of the leadership of the National Transitional Council, which lobbied Western governments for support soon after its formation. Challenges posed by geography and lack of military capabilities remain, however, meaning that even with the aid of foreign airstrikes against Gadhafi’s forces, the rebel council will struggle to achieve its stated goal of militarily toppling Gadhafi and unifying the country under its leadership.
Editor’s note:This analysis was originally published March 8 but has been significantly updated with current, accurate information.
Analysis
Identifying the Opposition
One of the biggest problems Western governments have faced throughout the Libyan crisis has been identifying who exactly the “eastern rebels” are. Until the uprising began in February, there was thought to be no legitimate opposition to speak of in the country, and thus no contacts between the United States, the United Kingdom, France or others. Many of those who now speak for the rebel movement are headquartered in Benghazi. There have been several defections, however, from the regime of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi to the eastern rebel leadership, and it is men like these with whom the West is now trying to engage as the possible next generation of leadership in Libya, should its unstated goal of regime change come to fruition.The structure through which the Libyan opposition is represented is the National Transitional Council. The first man to announce its creation was former Libyan Justice Minister Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, who defected from the government Feb. 21 and declared the establishment of a “transitional government” Feb. 26. At the time, Abdel-Jalil claimed that it would give way to national elections within three months, though this was clearly never a realistic goal.
One day after Abdel-Jalil’s announcement, a Benghazi-based lawyer named Abdel-Hafidh Ghoga held a news conference to refute his claims. Ghoga pronounced himself to be the spokesman of the new council and denied that it resembled a transitional government, adding that even if it did, Abdel-Jalil would not be in charge. Ghoga derided the former justice minister as being more influential in the eastern Libyan city of Al Bayda than in Benghazi, which is the heart of the rebel movement.
The personality clash between Abdel-Jalil and Ghoga continued on for most of the next week, as each man portended to be running a council that spoke for the eastern rebel movement in its entirety. It was significant only insofar as it provided just a glimpse of the sort of internal rivalries that exist in eastern Libya, known historically as Cyrenaica. Though Cyrenaica has a distinct identity from the western Libyan region historically referred to as Tripolitania, that does not mean that it is completely unified. This will be a problem moving ahead for the coalition carrying out the bombing campaign of Libya, as tribal and personal rivalries in the east will compound with a simple lack of familiarity with who the rebels really are.
The National Transitional Council officially came into being March 6, and — for the moment, at least — has settled the personal and regional rivalry between Abdel-Jalil and Ghoga, with the former named the council’s head and the latter its spokesman. Despite the drama that preceded the formal establishment of the council, all members of the opposition have always been unified on a series of goals: They want to mount an armed offensive against the government-controlled areas in the west; they want to overthrow Gadhafi; they seek to unify the country with Tripoli as its capital; and they do not want foreign boots on Libyan soil. The unity of the rebels, in short, is based upon a common desire to oust the longtime Libyan leader.
The transitional council asserts that it derives its legitimacy from the series of city councils that have been running the affairs of the east since the February uprising that turned all of eastern Libya into rebel-held territory. This council is, in essence, a conglomeration of localized units of makeshift self-governance. And while it may be centered in the east, the rebel council has also gone out of its way to assert that all Libyans who are opposed to Gadhafi’s rule are a part of the movement. This is not a secessionist struggle. A military stalemate with Gadhafi that would lead to the establishment of two Libyas would not represent an outright success for the rebels, even though it would be preferential to outright defeat. Though it has only released the names of nine of its reported 31 members for security reasons, the National Transitional Council has claimed that it has members in several cities that lie beyond the rebel-held territory in the east (including Misurata, Zentan, Zawiya, Zouara, Nalut, Jabal Gharbi, Ghat and Kufra), it has promised membership to all Libyans who want to join, and it asserted that the council is the sole representative of the whole of Libya.
The council’s foremost priorities for the past several weeks have been garnering foreign support for airstrikes on Gadhafi’s forces and the establishment of a no-fly zone. Absent that, the rebels have long argued, none of their other military objectives stood a chance of being realized.
It was the lobbying for Western support in the establishment of a no-fly zone that led the transitional council’s “executive team,” also known as the crisis committee, to go on a tour of European capitals in mid-March designed to shore up support from various governments and international institutions. Mahmoud Jebril, an ally of Abdel-Jalil, and de facto Foreign Minister Ali al-Essawi, the former Libyan ambassador to India who quit in February when the uprising began, comprise the executive team. The result of this trip was the first recognition of the transitional council as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people, which was provided by France on March 10. France, as we were to see in the following days, was to become the most vociferous advocate of the international community coming to the aid of the rebel council through the use of airstrikes.
Challenges
Before the decision was made to implement a no-fly zone, the Libyan opposition forces collapsed in the face of Gadhafi’s onslaught, and they have shown little sign of coalescing into a meaningful military force. While the loyalist eastward thrust was against a disorganized rebel force, Gadhafi’s forces have demonstrated that they retain considerable strength and loyalty to the regime. That means that even with coalition airstrikes taking out armor and artillery, there will still be forces loyal to Gadhafi inside any urban center the rebels might encounter in a westward advance, meaning that the rebels would be forced to fight a dedicated force dug into built up areas while operating on extended lines, a difficult tactical and operational challenge for even a coherent and proficient military force. So even though the coalition airstrikes have since shifted the military balance, the fundamental challenges for the rebels to organize and orchestrate a coherent military offensive remain unchanged.It is important to note that little of the territory that fell into rebel control in the early days of the insurrection was actually occupied through conquest. Many military and security forces in the east either deserted or defected to the opposition, which brought not only men and arms, but also the territory those troops ostensibly controlled. Most fighting that occurred once the situation transitioned into what is effectively a civil war, particularly in the main population centers along the coastal stretch between Benghazi and Sirte, consisted of relatively small, lightly armed formations conducting raids, rather than either side decisively defeating a major formation and pacifying a town.
Just as the executive team represents the National Transitional Council’s foreign affairs unit, the council also has a military division. This was originally headed by Omar El-Hariri, but the overall command of the Libyan rebels has since reportedly been passed to former Interior Minister Gen. Abdel Fattah Younis. Younis’ name arose early on as the man with whom the British government was engaging as it tried to get a grip on the situation unfolding in rebel-held territory. He was not included in the original transitional council membership, however, despite several indications that he did in fact retain widespread support among eastern rebels. This, like the clash between Abdel-Jalil and Ghoga, was another indication of the rivalries that exist in eastern Libya, which paint a picture of disunity among the rebels.
Younis, however, now appears to have been officially incorporated into the command structure and is presiding over a National Transitional Council “army” that, like the council itself, is the sum of its parts. Every population center in eastern Libya has since the uprising began created respective militias, all of which are now, theoretically, to report to Benghazi. Indeed, the most notable of these local militias, created Feb. 28, has been known at times as the Benghazi Military Council, which is linked to the Benghazi city council, the members of which form much of the political core of the new national council. There are other known militias in eastern Libya, however, operating training camps in places like Ajdabiya, Al Bayda and Tobruk, and undoubtedly several other locations as well.
Younis has perhaps the most challenging job of all in eastern Libya: organizing a coherent fighting force that can mount an invasion of the west — something that will be difficult even after an extensive foreign bombing campaign. More defections by the military and security forces in the west, like the earlier defections in Zawiya and Misurata, would perhaps benefit the transitional council even more than the bombing campaign under way. There is no sign of imminent defections from the west, however, which will only reinforce the military and geographic challenges with which the rebel council is faced.
Libyan society is by definition tribal and therefore prone to fractiousness. The Gadhafi era has done nothing to counter this historical legacy, as the Jamahiriya political system promoted local governance more than a truly national system of administration. Ironically, it was this legacy of Gadhafi’s regime that helped the individual eastern cities to rapidly establish local committees that took over administration of their respective areas, but it will create difficulties should they try to truly come together. Rhetoric is far different from tangible displays of unity.
Geography will also continue to be a challenge for the National Transitional Council. The Libyan opposition still does not have the basic military proficiencies or know-how to project and sustain an armored assault on Tripoli; if it tried, it would run a serious risk of being neutralized on arrival by prepared defenses. Even Gadhafi’s hometown of Sirte — almost certainly a necessary intermediate position to control on any drive to Tripoli — looks to be a logistical stretch for the opposition. An inflow of weapons may help but would not be the complete solution. Just as the primary factor in eastern Libya’s breaking free of the government’s control lies in a series of military defections, the occurrence of the same scenario in significant numbers in the west is what would give the National Transitional Council its best chance of overthrowing Gadhafi.
Monday, March 14, 2011
Thursday, March 10, 2011
Good Question: Are Americans Unfairly Anti-Muslim? « CBS Minnesota--Interview with William O. Beeman
Good Question: Are Americans Unfairly Anti-Muslim? « CBS Minnesota
I am featured in this interview. I am absolutely incensed at the hearings being conducted by Representative Peter King, which incite rank prejudice against a billion Muslims.
William O. Beeman
William O. Beeman
Wednesday, March 09, 2011
Journey | Minnesota performance list | MinnesotaPlaylist.com
Journey | Minnesota performance list | MinnesotaPlaylist.com
Journey
Presented by University of Minnesota/Elemental Ensemble
A lyric drama with original music based on the medieval Islamic text: Hayy bin Yazqan by the Muslim philosopher and author, Ibn Tufayl, a work that inspired Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe. The Journey is one of discovery as the parentless boy Hayy (called Cyrus), raised in the wild, evolves in his understanding of natural principles and spiritual life. Cyrus is portrayed by a lyric male dancer/actor, and his spiritual exploration of nature is narrated by a storyteller.
1 audience reviews
Review this show
Add cast + crew
Genres
* Classical dance
* Contemporary drama
* Kid friendly
* Modern dance
* Music theater
Schedule and venue
Children's Theater Company, Cargill Stage
2400 3rd Ave. S., Minneapolis
* Thursday, February 24, 2011 8:00pm
* Friday, February 25, 2011 8:00pm
* Saturday, February 26, 2011 8:00pm
* Thursday, March 3, 2011 7:30pm
* Friday, March 4, 2011 7:30pm
* Saturday, March 5, 2011 7:30pm
* Sunday, March 6, 2011 2:00pm
* Thursday, March 10, 2011 7:30pm
* Friday, March 11, 2011 7:30pm
* Saturday, March 12, 2011 7:30pm
* Sunday, March 13, 2011 2:00pm
Tickets
Discounts available
* Senior (65+)
* Student (with valid identification)
* Minnesota Fringe button discount
* Minnesota Public Radio membership
$10-20 at CTC March 3-13
Call (800) 838-3006
Reservations/buy tickets
Eddie Oroyan stars in JOURNEY
Cast + crew
Role Artist
Cyrus Eddie Bruno Oroyan Edit
Storyteller Anika Reitman Edit
Roe, Pirooz Patrick Jeffrey Edit
Boy Josiah Laubenstein Edit
Officer Josiah Laubenstein Edit
Officer Levi Morris Edit
Director and Author Mohammad Bagher Ghaffari Edit
Stage Manager Stacy Schultz Edit
Costumer Sonya Berlovitz Edit
Technical Director Ian Knodel Edit
Production Assistant Shanté Zenith Edit
Producer William O. Beeman Edit
Artistic Consultant Lynn Lukkas Edit
Composer, Music Director Yukio Tsuji Edit
Cellist Cory Goldman Edit
Percussionist Tetsuya Takeno
Journey
Presented by University of Minnesota/Elemental Ensemble
A lyric drama with original music based on the medieval Islamic text: Hayy bin Yazqan by the Muslim philosopher and author, Ibn Tufayl, a work that inspired Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe. The Journey is one of discovery as the parentless boy Hayy (called Cyrus), raised in the wild, evolves in his understanding of natural principles and spiritual life. Cyrus is portrayed by a lyric male dancer/actor, and his spiritual exploration of nature is narrated by a storyteller.
1 audience reviews
Review this show
Add cast + crew
Genres
* Classical dance
* Contemporary drama
* Kid friendly
* Modern dance
* Music theater
Schedule and venue
Children's Theater Company, Cargill Stage
2400 3rd Ave. S., Minneapolis
* Thursday, February 24, 2011 8:00pm
* Friday, February 25, 2011 8:00pm
* Saturday, February 26, 2011 8:00pm
* Thursday, March 3, 2011 7:30pm
* Friday, March 4, 2011 7:30pm
* Saturday, March 5, 2011 7:30pm
* Sunday, March 6, 2011 2:00pm
* Thursday, March 10, 2011 7:30pm
* Friday, March 11, 2011 7:30pm
* Saturday, March 12, 2011 7:30pm
* Sunday, March 13, 2011 2:00pm
Tickets
Discounts available
* Senior (65+)
* Student (with valid identification)
* Minnesota Fringe button discount
* Minnesota Public Radio membership
$10-20 at CTC March 3-13
Call (800) 838-3006
Tickets online: https://www.brownpapertickets.com/event/159102
Reservations/buy tickets
Eddie Oroyan stars in JOURNEY
Cast + crew
Role Artist
Cyrus Eddie Bruno Oroyan Edit
Storyteller Anika Reitman Edit
Roe, Pirooz Patrick Jeffrey Edit
Boy Josiah Laubenstein Edit
Officer Josiah Laubenstein Edit
Officer Levi Morris Edit
Director and Author Mohammad Bagher Ghaffari Edit
Stage Manager Stacy Schultz Edit
Costumer Sonya Berlovitz Edit
Technical Director Ian Knodel Edit
Production Assistant Shanté Zenith Edit
Producer William O. Beeman Edit
Artistic Consultant Lynn Lukkas Edit
Composer, Music Director Yukio Tsuji Edit
Cellist Cory Goldman Edit
Percussionist Tetsuya Takeno
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
