Wednesday, March 16, 2005
Wednesday, March 09, 2005
William O. Beeman: George W. Bush - The 13th Shi'a Imam :: from www.uruknet.info :: news from occupied Iraq
William O. Beeman--George W. Bush - The 13th Shi'a Imam :: from www.uruknet.info :: news from occupied Iraq: "George W. Bush - The 13th Shi'a Imam
William O. Beeman, t r u t h o u t
Monday 07 March 2005
Iran's security chief, Hassan Rowhani proclaimed in October, 2004 that it was in Iran's best interest for George W. Bush to be re-elected over John Kerry. His comment left American commentators stunned in disbelief. However, it is now clear that Rowhani was right: the Bush administration has done more than any other American leader to advance the interests of Shi'a Islamic political leadership in Iran and indeed, in the rest of the Middle East. Some groups of religious supporters in Iran are beginning to call President Bush 'the 13th Imam,' an ironic reference to the 12 historical Imams sacred to the branch of Shi'ism dominant in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon.
President Bush's support for Shi'ism may be unintentional, to be sure, but there is no doubt about the effects of his administration's policies in boosting Shi'ite power throughout the region.
The Bush administration has lent massive help to the Iranian economy by allowing U.S. corporations to circumvent the Clinton-era economic sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic. While the Treasury Department cracks down on insignificant infractions of the trade sanctions, such as prohibiting U.S. publishers from providing editorial services to Iranian authors, and restricting scholarly groups from holding meetings in Iran, it overlooks large American corporations operating in Iran through dummy subsidiaries operating out of Canada, Europe and Dubai. Oil service companies, including Halliburton, continue to conduct business in Iran on a pre-revolutionary scale, while the shops and bazaars are awash in American goods.
Additionally, by failing to exercise any control whatever over rising oil prices, the U.S. government has created massive windfall profits for the Iranian government. In the late 1990's Iran's economy was in disastrous shape. With oil selling at well over $50 a barrel, Iran is awash in money again.
However, the greatest benefits have been political. Nothing has done more to increase the popularity of Iran's Shi'ite leaders than the Bush administration's attack on Iran's nuclear development. Tehran's leaders are highly unpopular with the majority of Iran's youthful population because of their social policies, but Iran's right to develop its own nuclear industry is the one point on which virtually all Iranians are agreed. This strong national feeling has boosted the credentials of the mullahs, and will likely rocket former clerical President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani back into the presidency.
In Iraq, of course, the desperation of the Bush administration to demonstrate America's ability to conduct elections in by January 30 was effectively utilized by the majority Shi'ite community-especially its astute leader, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The result is that the Shi'ites are likely to emerge as the dominant power in Iraq.
Pressure on other Middle East regional powers to "democratize" has resulted in the emergence of Shi'ite power in minority communities throughout the region. The United States encouraged Saudi Arabia to liberalize its governmental system to allow the election of local leaders. The chief beneficiaries were the Shi'ites in Saudi Arabia's oil-rich Eastern Province. Long disadvantaged and downtrodden by the conservative Wahhabi-dominated Saudi government, the Shi'ites now will have their own local officials, and real political power for the first time in the history of the State. Qatar has established a separate legal court for the Shi'ites, and the Sunni rulers of Bahrain are on tenterhooks worrying about how U.S. pressure will translate into increased power for their country's Shi'ite majority population.
President Bush's insistence that Syria evacuate its troops from Lebanon is a godsend to the Shi'ites there. Hezbullah, the Shi'ite movement established more than 20 years ago to combat oppression from Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims is now the strongest, most organized political party in Lebanon, with an effective military wing. U.S. actions in that nation will eventually lead to Shi'ite domination of Lebanon, after a likely revival of the civil war that Syrian occupation quelled.
Even the Syrians are benefiting from President Bush's politics. Bashar al-Assad, Syria's current leader from the Alawite branch of Shi'ism, is a weak leader, dominated by shadowy figures left over from his father's heavy-handed rule. American assaults on the Syrian government have accomplished the almost impossible task of increasing Assad's popularity and the credibility of his government.
As the Bush administration must surely know, Shi'ite politicians favor the incorporation of Islamic Shari'a law into the governmental structures of their nations whenever possible. The realization of the Republican vision of "democracy breaking out all over" will give these religious-oriented politicians the best chance to realize this vision in more than a thousand years. This will truly earn President Bush the title of one of the greatest promoters of Islamic rule in all of history - a fitting legacy for America's 43rd President.
--------
William O. Beeman is Professor of Anthropology and Director of Middle East Studies at Brown University. This year he is Visiting Professor of Cultural and Social Anthropology at Stanford University. His forthcoming book is The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs:" How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.
William O. Beeman, t r u t h o u t
Monday 07 March 2005
Iran's security chief, Hassan Rowhani proclaimed in October, 2004 that it was in Iran's best interest for George W. Bush to be re-elected over John Kerry. His comment left American commentators stunned in disbelief. However, it is now clear that Rowhani was right: the Bush administration has done more than any other American leader to advance the interests of Shi'a Islamic political leadership in Iran and indeed, in the rest of the Middle East. Some groups of religious supporters in Iran are beginning to call President Bush 'the 13th Imam,' an ironic reference to the 12 historical Imams sacred to the branch of Shi'ism dominant in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon.
President Bush's support for Shi'ism may be unintentional, to be sure, but there is no doubt about the effects of his administration's policies in boosting Shi'ite power throughout the region.
The Bush administration has lent massive help to the Iranian economy by allowing U.S. corporations to circumvent the Clinton-era economic sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic. While the Treasury Department cracks down on insignificant infractions of the trade sanctions, such as prohibiting U.S. publishers from providing editorial services to Iranian authors, and restricting scholarly groups from holding meetings in Iran, it overlooks large American corporations operating in Iran through dummy subsidiaries operating out of Canada, Europe and Dubai. Oil service companies, including Halliburton, continue to conduct business in Iran on a pre-revolutionary scale, while the shops and bazaars are awash in American goods.
Additionally, by failing to exercise any control whatever over rising oil prices, the U.S. government has created massive windfall profits for the Iranian government. In the late 1990's Iran's economy was in disastrous shape. With oil selling at well over $50 a barrel, Iran is awash in money again.
However, the greatest benefits have been political. Nothing has done more to increase the popularity of Iran's Shi'ite leaders than the Bush administration's attack on Iran's nuclear development. Tehran's leaders are highly unpopular with the majority of Iran's youthful population because of their social policies, but Iran's right to develop its own nuclear industry is the one point on which virtually all Iranians are agreed. This strong national feeling has boosted the credentials of the mullahs, and will likely rocket former clerical President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani back into the presidency.
In Iraq, of course, the desperation of the Bush administration to demonstrate America's ability to conduct elections in by January 30 was effectively utilized by the majority Shi'ite community-especially its astute leader, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The result is that the Shi'ites are likely to emerge as the dominant power in Iraq.
Pressure on other Middle East regional powers to "democratize" has resulted in the emergence of Shi'ite power in minority communities throughout the region. The United States encouraged Saudi Arabia to liberalize its governmental system to allow the election of local leaders. The chief beneficiaries were the Shi'ites in Saudi Arabia's oil-rich Eastern Province. Long disadvantaged and downtrodden by the conservative Wahhabi-dominated Saudi government, the Shi'ites now will have their own local officials, and real political power for the first time in the history of the State. Qatar has established a separate legal court for the Shi'ites, and the Sunni rulers of Bahrain are on tenterhooks worrying about how U.S. pressure will translate into increased power for their country's Shi'ite majority population.
President Bush's insistence that Syria evacuate its troops from Lebanon is a godsend to the Shi'ites there. Hezbullah, the Shi'ite movement established more than 20 years ago to combat oppression from Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims is now the strongest, most organized political party in Lebanon, with an effective military wing. U.S. actions in that nation will eventually lead to Shi'ite domination of Lebanon, after a likely revival of the civil war that Syrian occupation quelled.
Even the Syrians are benefiting from President Bush's politics. Bashar al-Assad, Syria's current leader from the Alawite branch of Shi'ism, is a weak leader, dominated by shadowy figures left over from his father's heavy-handed rule. American assaults on the Syrian government have accomplished the almost impossible task of increasing Assad's popularity and the credibility of his government.
As the Bush administration must surely know, Shi'ite politicians favor the incorporation of Islamic Shari'a law into the governmental structures of their nations whenever possible. The realization of the Republican vision of "democracy breaking out all over" will give these religious-oriented politicians the best chance to realize this vision in more than a thousand years. This will truly earn President Bush the title of one of the greatest promoters of Islamic rule in all of history - a fitting legacy for America's 43rd President.
--------
William O. Beeman is Professor of Anthropology and Director of Middle East Studies at Brown University. This year he is Visiting Professor of Cultural and Social Anthropology at Stanford University. His forthcoming book is The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs:" How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.
Sunday, March 06, 2005
Iran: Support of terrorism is less than it seems | The San Diego Union-Tribune
William O. Beeman--Iran: Support of terrorism is less than it seems | The San Diego Union-Tribune: "
Iran: Support of terrorism is less than it seems
By William O. Beeman
March 4, 2005
Of all the accusations leveled against Iran by the United States, the strongest, and least questioned, is the charge that Iran 'is the (world's) most active state sponsor of terrorism,' to quote the U.S. State Department. This claim is both inaccurate and overblown. If the United States ever hopes to influence Iran in other ways, such as persuading Tehran to modify its plans for the development of nuclear power, it must re-examine this long-held article of faith.
The United States government first began to identify Iran as a supporter of terrorist activities in 1984 under the Reagan administration. The accusations have grown more strident from year to year. On an annual basis, the State Department has repeated accusations that Iran has supported virtually every terrorist attack in the world.
This is an astonishing exaggeration. In fact, Iran cannot be linked to any direct attack on the United States since the 444-day hostage crisis, which ended in 1981. The assertions of Iran's continued support for terrorism are prime examples of truth by repetition, used commonly by many conservative commentators, and myriads of U.S. legislators and officials � including U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during her recent European tour.
Of all of these claims, one alone has some substance. Iranian support for the Lebanese Shiite organization Hezbollah is verifiable. However, the flat statement: 'Iran supports Hezbollah' is simplistic and misleading. It is important to understand the real nature of this support, and the extent to which Iran is actually able to influence the actions of this Shiite Lebanese group. Moreover, it is important to take into consideration the fact that Hezbollah is arguably no longer a terrorist organization, as it could be said to have been 25 years ago.
Iran had an undeniable interest in the fate of the large Shiite community in southern Lebanon following the Revolution of 1978-79. The Lebanese Shiites were under oppression from both Sunnis and Maronite Christians. Moreover, Sunni Palestinian refugees, settled in their midst, both served as a drain on weak local economic resources, and, because of their attacks on Israel, as magnets for violent Israeli retaliation in the region. The Shiites, who were attacked as much as the Palestinians, felt helpless and frustrated, and eventually fought back by forming Hezbollah.
The successful revolution in Iran was enormously inspirational to these Lebanese Shiites, and many Iranians, zealous and excited at their victory over the Pahlavi regime, were looking for ways to spread their revolution. Under these conditions, support for Hezbollah seemed to be virtuous aid for a hapless community of co-religionists under oppression, just as the Iranians had felt themselves to be before the Revolution.
The Iranian central government was weak and scattered after the Revolution. Semi-independent charitable organizations, called bonyads (literally, "foundations") sponsored by individual Shiite clerics began to help the fledgling Hezbollah organization get off the ground. There was little the Khomeini government could do to curtail these operations without endangering public support for the fledgling Republic, since internal power struggles were endemic.
Syria also had a strong role in the early establishment and sustenance of Hezbollah, and its role was far more practical and self-serving that Iran's. Indeed, Iranian ideologues could never have had entre to southern Lebanon without Syria's cooperation.
Now, after nearly two decades, the export of Iranian revolutionary ideology in this loose and uncontrolled manner may have succeeded too well. Hezbollah maintains a stronger commitment to the symbolic legacy of the Iranian Revolution than Iranians themselves. According to Hezbollah expert Daniel Byman, writing recently in Foreign Affairs, " ... (Iran) lacks the means to force a significant change in the (Hezbollah) movement and its goals. It has no real presence on the ground in Lebanon and a call to disarm or cease resistance would likely cause Hezbollah's leadership, or at least its most militant elements simply to sever ties with Tehran's leadership."
In short, although Iranian religionists were instrumental in aiding its establishment, Hezbollah has now taken on a life of its own. Even if all Iranian financial and logistic support were cut off, Hezbollah would not only continue, it would thrive. Put simply, Iran's support is not essential for Hezbollah to continue. Byman flatly states that if the United States is really serious about stopping Hezbollah, it would do better to attack Syria than Iran.
Hezbollah has achieved stability and respectability by becoming as much a social welfare and political organization as a militant resistance organization. According to international relations specialist Dwight J. Simpson, in 2004 it had 12 elected parliamentary members. Moreover many Hezbollah members hold elected positions within local governments. The group had by that time built five hospitals and is building more. It operated 25 primarily secular schools, and provided subsidies to shopkeepers. Its support came primarily from zakat – the charitable "tithe" required of all Muslims – not from Iran.
The Shiites, having seen their co-religionists in Iraq succeed in initial elections there in 2005 have hopes that they too will assume the power in Lebanon that accords with their status as the nation's largest community. As this happens, Hezbollah will fully cease to be a terrorist group and will gradually assume the role of a political organization. Its "terrorist" activities will be reframed as national defense, especially as they gain control of conventional military forces and weapons.
It should be clear to Americans that the Bush administration is stymied in its dealings with Tehran. The prospect of a direct attack on the Iran to bring about "regime change" is not a practical possibility. In part because of specious accusations such as "the most active state supporter of terrorism" charge, Tehran's leaders are all but deaf to American politicians. This standoff would begin to change if the United States would abandon this baseless rhetoric.
Beeman is professor of anthropology and director of Middle East Studies at Brown University and visiting professor of cultural and social anthropology at Stanford University. His coming book is "The Great Satan vs. The Mad Mullahs: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other." "
"
Iran: Support of terrorism is less than it seems
By William O. Beeman
March 4, 2005
Of all the accusations leveled against Iran by the United States, the strongest, and least questioned, is the charge that Iran 'is the (world's) most active state sponsor of terrorism,' to quote the U.S. State Department. This claim is both inaccurate and overblown. If the United States ever hopes to influence Iran in other ways, such as persuading Tehran to modify its plans for the development of nuclear power, it must re-examine this long-held article of faith.
The United States government first began to identify Iran as a supporter of terrorist activities in 1984 under the Reagan administration. The accusations have grown more strident from year to year. On an annual basis, the State Department has repeated accusations that Iran has supported virtually every terrorist attack in the world.
This is an astonishing exaggeration. In fact, Iran cannot be linked to any direct attack on the United States since the 444-day hostage crisis, which ended in 1981. The assertions of Iran's continued support for terrorism are prime examples of truth by repetition, used commonly by many conservative commentators, and myriads of U.S. legislators and officials � including U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during her recent European tour.
Of all of these claims, one alone has some substance. Iranian support for the Lebanese Shiite organization Hezbollah is verifiable. However, the flat statement: 'Iran supports Hezbollah' is simplistic and misleading. It is important to understand the real nature of this support, and the extent to which Iran is actually able to influence the actions of this Shiite Lebanese group. Moreover, it is important to take into consideration the fact that Hezbollah is arguably no longer a terrorist organization, as it could be said to have been 25 years ago.
Iran had an undeniable interest in the fate of the large Shiite community in southern Lebanon following the Revolution of 1978-79. The Lebanese Shiites were under oppression from both Sunnis and Maronite Christians. Moreover, Sunni Palestinian refugees, settled in their midst, both served as a drain on weak local economic resources, and, because of their attacks on Israel, as magnets for violent Israeli retaliation in the region. The Shiites, who were attacked as much as the Palestinians, felt helpless and frustrated, and eventually fought back by forming Hezbollah.
The successful revolution in Iran was enormously inspirational to these Lebanese Shiites, and many Iranians, zealous and excited at their victory over the Pahlavi regime, were looking for ways to spread their revolution. Under these conditions, support for Hezbollah seemed to be virtuous aid for a hapless community of co-religionists under oppression, just as the Iranians had felt themselves to be before the Revolution.
The Iranian central government was weak and scattered after the Revolution. Semi-independent charitable organizations, called bonyads (literally, "foundations") sponsored by individual Shiite clerics began to help the fledgling Hezbollah organization get off the ground. There was little the Khomeini government could do to curtail these operations without endangering public support for the fledgling Republic, since internal power struggles were endemic.
Syria also had a strong role in the early establishment and sustenance of Hezbollah, and its role was far more practical and self-serving that Iran's. Indeed, Iranian ideologues could never have had entre to southern Lebanon without Syria's cooperation.
Now, after nearly two decades, the export of Iranian revolutionary ideology in this loose and uncontrolled manner may have succeeded too well. Hezbollah maintains a stronger commitment to the symbolic legacy of the Iranian Revolution than Iranians themselves. According to Hezbollah expert Daniel Byman, writing recently in Foreign Affairs, " ... (Iran) lacks the means to force a significant change in the (Hezbollah) movement and its goals. It has no real presence on the ground in Lebanon and a call to disarm or cease resistance would likely cause Hezbollah's leadership, or at least its most militant elements simply to sever ties with Tehran's leadership."
In short, although Iranian religionists were instrumental in aiding its establishment, Hezbollah has now taken on a life of its own. Even if all Iranian financial and logistic support were cut off, Hezbollah would not only continue, it would thrive. Put simply, Iran's support is not essential for Hezbollah to continue. Byman flatly states that if the United States is really serious about stopping Hezbollah, it would do better to attack Syria than Iran.
Hezbollah has achieved stability and respectability by becoming as much a social welfare and political organization as a militant resistance organization. According to international relations specialist Dwight J. Simpson, in 2004 it had 12 elected parliamentary members. Moreover many Hezbollah members hold elected positions within local governments. The group had by that time built five hospitals and is building more. It operated 25 primarily secular schools, and provided subsidies to shopkeepers. Its support came primarily from zakat – the charitable "tithe" required of all Muslims – not from Iran.
The Shiites, having seen their co-religionists in Iraq succeed in initial elections there in 2005 have hopes that they too will assume the power in Lebanon that accords with their status as the nation's largest community. As this happens, Hezbollah will fully cease to be a terrorist group and will gradually assume the role of a political organization. Its "terrorist" activities will be reframed as national defense, especially as they gain control of conventional military forces and weapons.
It should be clear to Americans that the Bush administration is stymied in its dealings with Tehran. The prospect of a direct attack on the Iran to bring about "regime change" is not a practical possibility. In part because of specious accusations such as "the most active state supporter of terrorism" charge, Tehran's leaders are all but deaf to American politicians. This standoff would begin to change if the United States would abandon this baseless rhetoric.
Beeman is professor of anthropology and director of Middle East Studies at Brown University and visiting professor of cultural and social anthropology at Stanford University. His coming book is "The Great Satan vs. The Mad Mullahs: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other." "
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