Did Robert Gates Manufacture the Iran Crisis?--Huffington Post--Beeman

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Did Robert Gates Manufacture the Iran Crisis?

Posted: 03/24/2014 1:27 pm EDT Updated: 03/24/2014 1:27 pm EDT

Gareth Porter has been the most conscientious follower of the purported danger of Iran's purported "nuclear weapons program." In his new, meticulously documented book, Manufactured Crisis (New York: Just World Books, 2014) he exposes the many lies and half-truths that have been promulgated over more than two decades to try and convince the American public and the world that Iran is the chief danger to international peace through its nuclear program.

One of Porter's surprising implications is that former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates may have been the prime mover in the 20-year-old attack on Iran based on unsubstantiated claims that Iran is manufacturing nuclear weapons.

Before plunging into the details of Porter's book or his information about Mr. Gates, let me state the book's conclusions unequivocally: Iran has never been proven to have a nuclear weapons program. Any claim to the contrary is absolutely false. The attempt to claim that such a weapons program exists was the result of a decades long effort on the part of American neoconservatives allied with right-wing forces in Israel to legitimize hostile actions against Iran designed to effect regime change there.

Porter's overall account of the evolution of consensus about the threat of Iran's nuclear program is fascinating and appalling reading. It is fascinating because he has created a compelling narrative showing how the framework for attacking Iran compounded lies and misinformation over many years. It appears in this account that Robert Gates had a continuing central role.

Robert Gates had been employed by the CIA since college. He was witness to the Iran-Contra affair under President Reagan, and was called to give testimony about his knowledge of the affair. Despite continual questions about the conduct of the CIA during the 1980's and early 1990's in which he had a central role, Gates rose through the ranks of the intelligence community. He served as Deputy National Security Adviser (1989-1991) -- a promotion from his role as Deputy Director of National Intelligence (1986-1989), and finally became Director of Central Intelligence in 1991 after contentious hearings

One of the most telling episodes in Porter's book concerns President George H.W. Bush. In 1989 he was willing to improve relations with Iran eliminating sanctions that had been in place since the Revolution of 1978-79. At that time American hostages were being held by Shi'a forces in Lebanon. Then Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati intervened, and all American prisoners were released. Bush was grateful and was supported by his National Security Advisor, Brent Snowcroft but suddenly his administration reversed course.

This is the point at which Robert Gates becomes a major player in the attacks against Iran. As Porter describes it, though Snowcroft and Bush wanted improved relations, everyone else on the National Security team -- and one assumes that this includes Gates -- insisted that Iran was "deeply engaged in other acts of terrorism that made it very, very difficult to improve the relationship" (p. 87). Porter goes on to demonstrate that these "other acts of terrorism" were unsubstantiated. Essentially the decision not to go forward with improved relations with Iran was a political one and not based on any proven Iranian actions.

After Gates became CIA Director, the disinformaton about Iran continued. Porter documents that in 1992 it was Gates who first declared in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on March 27, with no hard evidence, that "Iran is developing a capability to produce weapons of mass destruction," and was "seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability." The phrase "nuclear weapons capability" likely originated here.

In this way the juggernaut against Iran was launched. Although the National Intelligence estimate for 1992 declared that Iran would not seriously threaten U.S. interests, Gates' estimate became gospel for the balance of the Bush administration, carrying forward into the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations. Gates' influence was indeed extremely telling.

After the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush administration was dominated by neo-conservatives who had been active since the administration of his father and were anxious to see regime change throughout the Middle East. They ignored the fact that the Iranian nuclear energy program had started in earnest during the last years of the regime of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and declared that Iran had been undertaking "secret" nuclear developments. In fact, these were not at all secret, and had been governed by the rules of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to which Iran and the United States (but not Israel, Pakistan, India or North Korea) were signatories, and which guaranteed Iran the "inalienable right" to the peaceful development of nuclear power.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with carrying out inspections of Iran's nuclear program (and indeed, the nuclear programs of all signatories to the Treaty). They never once found the slightest evidence that Iran had a nuclear weapons program or had diverted any nuclear material for military use.

Still Gates' 10-year old assertion that Iran was seeking to acquire a "nuclear weapons capability," though completely unproven, was seized upon by the neoconservatives who wanted to bring down the Iranian regime.

As Porter documents, the IAEA quickly became politicized. Its head, Mohammad elBaradei was excoriated by the George W. Bush administration who tried to get him fired because he would not assert that Iran was building nuclear weapons. His eventual successor Yukio Amano was more compliant. Though still not able to say that Iran had a demonstrable nuclear weapons program, IAEA reports after he took office used convoluted language to suggest that they "could not eliminate the possibility" that Iran might be building nuclear weapons. Several attempts on Iran's part during the Bush administration to negotiate over misunderstandings of its program were rebuffed by Washington, partially due to those same neoconservatives in his administration, notably John Bolton who served as United Nations Ambassador on a recess appointment during a the crucial period from 2005-2006 and made it his mission to attack Iran with falsehoods at every turn.

Porter presents example after example of the U.S. Press, notably the New York Times, distorting the facts about Iran's nuclear activities. Every action and decision was placed under a microscope, and though Iran had only completed one reactor in development since before the Revolution, and was far from completing any facility for additional generation of nuclear power, the hyperbole in the press made it seem that Iran would have a bomb tomorrow. Lobbying groups such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) influenced these writings and lobbied the U.S. Congress for more stringent sanctions on Iran with the aim of completely dismantling Iran's forty-year old nuclear program. They also supported military action against Iran either by the United States or by Israel. Porter's book features the famous picture of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pointing to a picture of a Warner Brothers cartoon bomb and inveighing against Iran.

In 2006 President George W. Bush nominated Robert Gates to be secretary of defense. Gates had been serving as president of Texas A&M University, and was persuaded to leave that post to return to national service. He was retained by President Obama after the 2008 election. It is notable that although President Obama had pledged to engage Iran diplomatically, in his first term, no serious diplomatic efforts were undertaken. To the contrary, increased rhetoric claiming that Iran had a nuclear weapons program issued from the White House and the Department of Defense. It was only after then Secretary Gates left office that the Obama administration began to engage in serious diplomatic talks with Iran. This process was aided by the election of Hassan Rowhani as president of Iran and the appointment of Javad Zarif, American educated former Iranian U.N. Ambassador, as Minister of Foreign Relations.

Aside from the intriguing clues to Robert Gates' probable role in constructing a false picture of the Iranian nuclear danger, Porter's book is essential reading for all Americans wary of manufactured paths to war that have become a major theme in U.S. foreign relations after World War II. Porter shows how ideology can distort facts, and be used as a weapon to sway public opinion in directions that are inimical to world interests. As talks with Iran in Vienna over its nuclear program proceed, Porter notes that the Obama administration, only after ridding itself of the extended influence of Robert Gates and his ilk, has finally made attempts to wind down the two decades of baseless attacks on Iran to try and forge a rapprochement. The question remains whether war mongers in Washington, Israel and some nations in Europe will come to their senses and let this happen.

Follow William O. Beeman on Twitter: www.twitter.com/wbeeman

A Tale of Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing--Review of Manufactured Crisis by Gareth Porter (Beeman)

http://womenagainstmilitarymadness.org/newsletter/2014/030414/tale.html A Tale of Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing: Iran’s Nukes Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare by Gareth Porter (New York: Just World Books, 2014)

Reviewed by William O. Beeman

Gareth Porter has been the most conscientious follower of the fantasy danger of Iran’s purported “nuclear weapons program.” In this new, meticulously documented book, he exposes the many lies and half-truths that have been promulgated over more than two decades to try and convince the American public and the world that Iran is the chief danger to international peace. Before plunging into the details of the book, let me state its conclusions unequivocally: Iran has never been proven to have a nuclear weapons program. Any claim to the contrary is absolutely false. The attempt to claim that such a weapons program exists was the result of a decades-long effort on the part of American neoconservatives allied with right-wing forces in Israel to legitimize hostile actions against Iran designed to effect regime change there. Porter’s account is fascinating and appalling reading. It is fascinating because he has created a compelling narrative showing how the framework for attacking Iran in this way evolved over decades. One of the most telling episodes in the book concerns President George H.W. Bush. In 1989 he was willing to improve relations with Iran eliminating sanctions that had been in place since the revolution of 1978-79. At that time American hostages were being held by Shi’a forces in Lebanon. Then Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati intervened, and all American prisoners were released. Bush was grateful and was supported by his national security advisor, Brent Snowcroft, but suddenly his administration reversed course. As Porter describes it, though he and Bush wanted improved relations, everyone else on the national security team insisted that Iran was “deeply engaged in other acts of terrorism that made it very, very difficult to improve the relationship” (p. 87). Porter goes on to demonstrate that these “other acts of terrorism” were unsubstantiated. Essentially the decision not to go forward with improved relations was a political one and not based on any proven Iranian actions. After Robert Gates, who had served on the National Security Council, became CIA director, the disinformaton about Iran continued. Porter documents that in 1992 it was Gates who first declared, with no hard evidence at all, that “Iran is developing a capability to produce weapons of mass destruction,” and was “seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.” In this way the juggernaut against Iran was launched. Although the national intelligence estimate for that year declared that Iran would not seriously threaten U.S. interests, Gates’ estimate became gospel for the balance of the Bush administration, carrying forward into the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations. Gates’ influence was indeed extremely telling. After the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush administration was dominated by neoconservatives who had been active since the administration of his father and were anxious to see regime change throughout the Middle East. They ignored the fact that the Iranian nuclear energy program had started in earnest during the last years of the regime of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and declared that Iran had been undertaking “secret” nuclear developments. In fact, these were not at all secret, and had been governed by the rules of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to which Iran and the United States (but not Israel, Pakistan, India, or North Korea) were signatories, and which guaranteed Iran the “inalienable right” to the peaceful development of nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with carrying out inspections of Iran’s nuclear program (and indeed, the nuclear programs of all signatories to the treaty). They never once found the slightest evidence that Iran had a nuclear weapons program or had diverted any nuclear material for military use. Still Gates’ 10-year-old assertion that Iran was seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, though completely unproven, was seized upon by the neoconservatives who wanted to bring down the Iranian regime. As Porter documents, the IAEA quickly became politicized. Its head, Mohamed ElBaradei, was excoriated by the George W. Bush administration, who tried to get him fired because he would not assert that Iran was building nuclear weapons. His eventual successor, Yukio Amano, was more compliant. Though still not able to say that Iran had a demonstrable nuclear weapons program, IAEA reports after he took office used convoluted language to suggest that they “could not eliminate the possibility” that Iran might be building nuclear weapons. Several attempts on Iran’s part during the Bush administration to negotiate over misunderstandings of its program were rebuffed by Washington, partially due to those same neoconservatives in his administration, notably John Bolton, who served as United Nations ambassador on a recess appointment during the crucial period from 2005-2006 and made it his mission to attack Iran with falsehoods at every turn. Porter presents example after example of the U.S. media, most notably The New York Times, distorting the facts about Iran’s nuclear activities. Every action and decision was placed under a microscope, and though Iran had only completed one reactor in development since before the revolution, and was far from completing any facility for additional generation of nuclear power, the hyperbole in the press made it seem that Iran would have a bomb tomorrow. Lobbying groups such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) influenced these writings and lobbied the U.S. Congress for more stringent sanctions on Iran with the aim of completely dismantling Iran’s 40-year-old nuclear program. They also supported military action against Iran either by the United States or by Israel. Porter’s book features the famous picture of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pointing to a picture of a Warner Brothers cartoon bomb and inveighing against Iran. Porter’s book is essential reading for all Americans wary of the manufactured path to war. It shows how ideology can distort facts, and can be used as a weapon to sway public opinion in directions that are inimical to world interests. As talks with Iran in Vienna over its nuclear program proceed, Porter notes that the Obama administration, only after ridding itself of the extended influence of Robert Gates, has finally made attempts to wind down the two decades of baseless attacks on Iran to try and forge a rapprochement. The question remains whether warmongers in Washington, Israel, and some nations in Europe will come to their senses and let this happen. William O. Beeman is professor of anthropology at the University of Minnesota. He has conducted research in Iran for over 40 years, and is author of The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.

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War with Syria Would Fulfill Neoconservative Plan for Middle East Regime Change (Beeman--New America Media)

http://newamericamedia.org/2013/09/war-with-syria-would-fulfill-neoconservative-plan-for-middle-east-regime-change.php#

War with Syria Would Fulfill Neoconservative Plan for Middle East Regime Change

New America Media, Commentary, William Beeman, Posted: Sep 08, 2013

There is great division of opinion regarding potential U.S. military action in Syria. However, one group is ecstatic over President Obama’s endorsement of a military attack on Damascus. These are the Neconservatives who dominated the George W. Bush administration, and who still hold tremendous influence in Washington. An attack on Syria would be one step in fulfilling “stage two” of a longstanding neoconservative plan to bring about regime change throughout the Middle East in three stages: Iraq, Syria and finally Iran.

The pattern for this plan has been to wait for an event that can be sold to the world public as justification for military attack, and then to push forward, pressuring the military and government officials to move forward with the next stage of regime change.

President Obama is, perhaps unwittingly, fulfilling this plan, conceived in 1996 by an informal organization, the Study Group on a New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000, headed by Richard Pearle and including well-known neo-conservatives, Douglas Feith, Meyrav Wurmser, David Wurmser, Robert Loewenberg, Charles Fairbanks, Jr. and James Colbert. All are connected with organizations favoring right-wing extremist Israeli policies toward Palestinians and other Middle East nations. The Study Group plan, titled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm” was prepared for Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. The “clean break” refers to their advice that Israel break from the 1993 Oslo peace accords.

The 1996 plan explicitly calls for attacks on Iraq, Syria and eventually Iran. It states: "Israel can shape its strategic environment . . . by weakening, containing, and even rolling back Syria. This effort can focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq — an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right — as a means of foiling Syria’s regional ambitions."

Many of the same figures carried this plan forward two years later under another rubric, The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) founded by William Kristol and Robert Kagan. In a letter to President Clinton and House Speaker Gingrich in 1998, the members of the PNAC, including Kristol, Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Zoellick called for the removal of Saddam Hussein, carrying out the first stage of the agenda of the “Clean Break” plan.

Once George W. Bush was elected president, many of these figures took up prominent positions within his administration. Following the tragic destruction of the Twin Towers in New York and the attack on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the removal of Saddam Hussein became a policy objective for the United States.

The PNAC wrote a letter to President Bush in 2001 stating: “...even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.”

It was at this time that Iran came more clearly into focus for the neoconservatives. The theory they promulgated was that Iran was the prime mover in all anti-Israeli activity in the region through Iran’s purported support for Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas. Syria was seen as complicit in this, and was regularly identified as a “client state” for Iran. However, neither legislators nor the public could be incited by this theory, for which there was, and continues to be, no credible evidence.

In 2003, the neoconservatives, working through right-wing think tanks such as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) were able to convince the Bush administration that Iran’s 40 year old nuclear energy program was really a plot to develop nuclear weapons to be used against Israel. This theory eventually became accepted as gospel in Washington, notwithstanding that American and International intelligence agencies asserted there was no evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. However, based on this baseless assertion, these same players called for military action against Iran.

Following the “Arab Spring” popular revolts against standing regimes in the Middle East the longstanding tension between the Sunni Muslim majority and the Alawite ruling minority in Syria exploded in resistance against Syrian ruler Bashar Al-Assad. This conflict had been festering for two generations. In 1982, armed resistance from the Sunni population resulted in a massacre in the city of Hama under orders from Hafiz al-Assad, Bashar’s father. Bashar retaliated to the more recent revolt with unprecedented cruelty, and has been accused of using chemical weapons against Syrian rebels. Whatever the United States or other nations might do to remove the Assad regime, the civil war there will continue unabated.

However, neoconservatives have seized on this more recent revolt against the Assad government as justification for military action to carry out regime change there, but not just because the Assad regime is objectionable, but rather because in an attack on Syria they see an opportunity to strike a crippling blow against Iran. As conservative New York Times columnist David Brooks stated on the PBS News Hour on September 6, “this isn’t really about Syria. . . . the real issue is the broader credibility of the President, the international credibility of the United States, especially vis-à-vis Iran. This is really about Iran more than Syria.”

Brooks’ widely held view is a miscalculation. Even if the Assad regime is removed from power, Iran will not be significantly damaged in its foreign, nuclear or economic policy.

A quick examination of all of these efforts—the pretext based on the 9/11 tragedy for ousting Saddam Hussein, weak justification for U.S. involvement in a longstanding and ongoing civil war in Syria, and the claim that Iran is not only directing all anti-Israeli action in the Middle East, but is also a nuclear threat show that the neoconservative agenda is a tissue of fantasy designed to convince the world, episode by episode, to completely reshape the region with U.S. military firepower.

Americans should not be listening to these neoconservative voices. They have been responsible for a debilitating and useless conflict in Iraq already. Their “advice” to President Obama and his administration will only drag the United States into another useless and debilitating conflict in the Middle East that will accomplish nothing, and will exacerbate violence rather than bringing the world closer to peaceful resolution of the tensions in the region.

William O. Beeman is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, and Visiting Professor at Stanford University. He has worked in the Middle East for more than 40 years.

US professor William O. Beeman: Obama transition team has no expertise on Iran [IRNA]

US professor William O. Beeman: Obama transition team has no expertise on Iran

New York, Feb 11, IRNA -- William O. Beeman, Professor and Chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota said that Obama transition team has no expertise on Iran, but, the fact that President Obama called for dialog with Iranians was a huge development.

He said that in a new American administration it takes some time to confirm new officials, and to get the new organization in place. Also, right now the priority of this administration has been on domestic economic matters.

Q. In the past three weeks, the new US Administration has just made a series of statements, threats, judgments …etc on Iran. Do you see a resolve on part of the US to have direct dialogue with Iran?

A. It is too soon to tell what precise actions the Obama administration will be taking with regard to Iran. In a new American administration it takes some time to confirm new officials, and to get the new organization in place. Also, right now the priority of this administration has been on domestic economic matters. Nevertheless, there is reason for caution. The Obama transition team has almost no expertise on Iran. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) is a prominent neoconservative organization supported by AIPAC. Former Ambassador Dennis Ross is an important member of this and several other anti-Iranian groups. The White House has said that he will be “special envoy” to Iran. This is a mistake, in my opinion. Moreover, the influence of WINEP should be severely curtailed if relations with Iran are to be improved. WINEP favors military action against Iran, and has been instrumental in spreading false information about Iran’s nuclear program.

Q. Aside from sugar coating the same nature of rhetoric that we’d heard from previous administration, is there any move or gesture by this administration that proves such tendency?

A. It is important to remember that attacking Iran has been a common political activity for both Democrats and Republicans. The American public now believes that Iran is a danger to the United States thanks to consistent negative publicity on Iran. So, any administration official that expresses any kind of sympathy toward Iran is going to be in a dangerous political position. For this reason we should expect the Obama administration to go VERY SLOWLY in approaching Iran. The mere fact that President Obama called for dialog with Iranians was a huge development, and it created a lot of criticism for him.

Q. In your view how is Obama going to be able to create stability in the Middle East using Iran’s assistance as it is in the view of some analysts.

A. I am not sure that the Obama administration appreciates how much help Iran can be in stabilizing the region. Iran can help in Iraq, Afghanistan and in the Gulf region. Iran has no control over Hezbollah or Hamas, but they can be used as intermediaries for these groups. The sooner the United States sees Iran as a partner and not an enemy, the sooner progress will be made toward peace in the region.

Q. Some share the view that Israel is extremely worried about the improvement in US Iran relationship and by creating obstacles is trying to prevent such improvements. Do you agree with that view?

A. Israel has ALWAYS been worried whenever Iran and the United States seem to become friendly. Whenever talks start, Israelis put out report, directly and through organizations like WINEP and AIPAC, about Iran supporting terrorism, attacking Americans in Iraq or elsewhere, or developing some non-existent weapon. Israel will DEFINITELY try hard to sabotage any rapprochement between Iran and the United States. This is absolutely certain. I only hope that the Obama administration and more sober foreign policy specialists can help expose these tricks. Mostly it is important to get to the American public to tell them that these accusations are not real, that they are designed to torpedo movement toward normal relations.

End News / IRNA / News Code 350244

The Iranian Veto on Mideast Peace (The Terror Journal)

The Iranian Veto on Mideast Peace


Commentary by William O. Beeman: Neoconservatives in the United States from organizations such as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and many supporters of the Israeli incursion in Gaza have tried to claim that Israel is "really" fighting Iran, not Hamas. These groups call Hamas a "proxy" of Iran. In fact, the claims of Iranian support of Gaza are hugely exaggerated, and show the poverty of Israel's argument for its disproportionate response to Hamas' pitiful offensive to Israel's isolation of Gaza, an isolation that has left thousands starving and without medical supplies. The "blame Iran" strategy is a desperate red herring that masks the recalcitrance of Israeli leaders to find a serious negotiated peace with the Palestinian community. It also masks the somewhat venal political posturing by political parties in Israel in advance of an upcoming general election, in which each party tries to show itself to be tougher than the other parties. Targeting Iran is a safe political stance, as it always garners public support, even when this posture is based on lies. Readers should interpret Robert Kaplan and others cited below as reflecting this neoconservative ideology.


In the political calculus driving Israel’s war with Hamas in Gaza, Iranian ambition has emerged as a critical–if not always clearly defined–variable. In Washington, President Bush has supported Israel’s strike as necessary self-defense, though some analysts believe an Israeli defeat by Iran-supported Hamas would embolden Tehran and weaken prospects for U.S. diplomacy in the region. And while Israel publicly stresses the need to tackle Hamas rocket fire, analysts, including CFR’s Steven A. Cook, note Israel’s desire to reassert its dominance following the disastrous 2006 war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Launching its attack in the final hours of the reliably pro-Israeli Bush administration, writes CFR Senior Fellow Michael Gerson in the Washington Post, is no coincidence, either.

Iran’s mullahs, meanwhile, have followed up the rearmament of Hezbollah by demonstrating an interest in influencing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza. Hours after Israel launched “Operation Cast Lead” on Hamas targets, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, blasted the “horrific atrocity of the Zionist regime,” lashed out at the Bush administration for “complicity in the large crime,” brushed aside European governments for “their indifference,” and chastised the “silence” of Arab regimes–Egypt and Jordan chief among them. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has also weighed in (IRNA), and an Iranian general has called for an oil embargo against the West (Straits Times) to protest Israeli action. As the Wall Street Journal observes, attention on Gaza “could become a convenient distraction” for Iranian leaders besieged by worsening economic news at home.

Yet parsing Iran’s broader goals–and discerning its ability to implement them–remain points of departure in foreign policy circles. Some analysts see a clear connection between Israel and Iran in Gaza. As Robert D. Kaplan writes in the Atlantic, Israel’s attack on Iranian-backed Hamas–considered a Foreign Terror Organization (FTO) by the U.S. government with a stated aim of destroying Israel–”is, in effect, an attack on Iran’s empire.” Israeli intelligence sources from 2003 estimate that Iran contributes $3 million to Hamas annually (PDF). But other observers say ties between Iran and Hamas are less substantive than Israel claims. William O. Beeman, a professor of anthropology at the University of Minnesota, argues that isolation of Gaza in recent years has effectively limited Iranian material support, a belief shared by Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in a new interview with CFR.org. According to a November 2008 Congressional Research Service report (PDF), Hamas reportedly received about 10 percent of its funding from Iran in the early 1990s but has since turned to “wealthy Persian Gulf donors and supporters in Europe and elsewhere.”

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Crisis Guide: The Israeli-PalestinianThere is more agreement on how the various outcomes in Gaza will ripple across the region. For Israel, defeat is not an option, though analysts differ on how victory might be defined. Surrounded by forces hostile to the Jewish state, some believe Israel must reassert the military dominance it lost in Lebanon in 2006. Haaretz columnist David Grossman suggests a cease-fire would better suit Israel’s strategic aims. For the United States and the incoming Obama administration, a victory is also seen as essential. As former U.S. ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk suggests, a convincing defeat of Hamas could lead Iran to reevaluate its support (NYT) for terrorists and even prompt a change of course on its nuclear program. An Israeli defeat and a Hamas victory, on the other hand, could bolster Iranian influence and ambitions in the Arab world, some analysts argue.

Outside of those who believe Egypt should be forced to take control of Gaza (FOX), most analysts agree the United States must broaden its regional strategy to help stem the violence. Washington Post columnist Jim Hoagland suggests Washington should reach out to its moderate Arab allies in the region “put on the spot by Israel’s Gaza onslaught.” One possible avenue of cooperation, Hoagland suggests, is to begin selling civilian nuclear technology to the United Arab Emirates as a show of goodwill in the region. Mohammad Yaghi, a Palestinian political expert with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, agrees that the only way out of the impasse is to encourage moderate Arab states to push Hamas into a peace deal. Yet as one Egyptian official tells the International Crisis Group, countering the influence of Iran and other actors will also be key. “The situation in Gaza has more to do with Hamas’s relations with the region than confrontation with Israel,” he said.

Tehran Wanted to Deny Carter any Kind of Victory--Interview with William O. Beeman (Rooz Online)

Tehran Wanted to Deny Carter any Kind of Victory
Interview with William O. Beeman - 2009.01.21
Barack Obama’s views on the Middle East are not very different from the Bush Administration’s, said Professor William Beeman, Chair of Anthropology and specialist in Middle East Studies at the University of Minnesota, in an interview with Rooz.

However Barack Obama’s promise of change during the presidential election has led many to expect his Middle East foreign policy approach to differ from that of President Bush.

Almost thirty years ago Iran’s revolution, and the hostage taking tragedy, was tied to U.S. presidential elections and now, once again, Iran seems to be one of the major foreign policy issues that the new President will face in the White House. Iran’s increasing influence throughout the Middle East, from Afghanistan to Lebanon and Palestine, and Tehran’s nuclear program has been the major concerns of the U.S. towards Iran over the past years.

Beeman's most recent work, The “Great Satan vs. the Mad Mullahs: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other”, deals with the highly negative rhetoric and discourse between Iran and the United States over the three decades since the Iranian revolution, and its effects on national attitudes toward the Bush administration's policy towards Iran, as well as the possibility of military confrontation between the two nations.

In an interview with Rooz, Beeman explained how the delay in releasing American hostages in 1980, contributed to the fall of President Jimmy Carter. “I believe the Iranian government wanted to deny Carter any kind of victory, so yes, I believe the delay from the Iranian side was enacted on purpose,” said Beeman adding that, “The characterizations of Carter in Iran were very bitter, likening him to all kinds of mythological villains.”

At this time many Iranians are hoping that Obama’s election will bring a new approach by the new administration to start talking to the Iranian government, and an end to three decades of punishment of the Iranian people because of Iranian government’s international defiance, Beeman believes that picking Denis Ross, as the key person at the State Department to deal with Iran will be a mistake. “The neoconservatives do not want a different policy,” said Beeman adding that, “They want to continue to attack Iran, or have Israel do it, and the Obama administration is not able to do anything about it.”


Rooz: Do you believe that in 1980 there existed politicians in the United States who were interested in using the hostage issue in order to influence the results of the presidential elections?

William Beeman (WB): We will probably never know whether there was a real "October Surprise," though there has been much evidence in support of it. There is no question that ANY issue coming before an election is used by both parties to affect the outcome of the election--even the silliest and most trivial matters become important, largely because voters are very shallow in their opinions and in their research of candidates.


Rooz: Do you believe in the October Surprise Conspiracy theory in the 1980 elections? And that Ronald Reagan’s elections campaign had attempted to convince Iranian officials in its talks with them to postpone the release of the American hostages until after the elections in the US in return for providing American weapons to Iran?

WB: Personally, I don't believe in the conspiracy. Moreover, the hostage crisis had been settled by the time of the elections. It was only the actual release of the hostages that was delayed. I think that Carter's overall incompetence, particularly the abortive rescue mission, was the more important factor affecting the election.


R: Why did the congressional and the Senate investigations about the possibility of an October Surprise lead to no proof in this regard?

WB: I am assuming that there was no proof because there was no proof. As I said above, it almost doesn't matter. The hostage crisis had already doomed the Carter administration. I suppose that if the hostages had been released before the election, things might have been different, but Carter was already far down in the polls. Also, the U.S. economy was in terrible shape, and that usually is more important than any foreign policy issue in determining the election.


R: Was there a pre-determined desire to disprove the October Surprise possibility?

WB: Certainly, the Republicans wanted to disprove this. They wanted their candidate to be elected on his merits, not by default.


R: In the last meeting of the Iranian Parliament on the subject in October 1980, in which it had to decide on the release of the hostages, representatives who were opposed to the release of the hostages who constituted a minority prevented Parliament from reaching a decision through an obstruction thus postponing the release of the Americans to after the elections (specifically, 20 minutes after President Reagan was sworn in). Do you believe that this was an accidental event?

WB: Quite aside from whether Reagan made a "deal" with the Iranians, I believe the Iranian government wanted to deny Carter any kind of victory, so yes, I believe the delay from the Iranian side was enacted on purpose. The characterizations of Carter in Iran were very bitter--likening him to all kinds of mythological villains, like Zohak, the White Div, and Yazid.


R: To what extent did the hostage taking of American diplomats in Iran impact the outcome of US presidential election in 1980?

WB: It was important, because it showed Carter to be ineffective.


R: In addition to some American analysts supporting the October Surprise theory, the then-President of Iran and the Foreign Minister at the time (who was subsequently executed by the regime) have both stressed how Iranian officials from the ruling party met with officials from the US Republican party and agreed to postpone releasing the hostages to after the 1980 elections so that Carter would not use the opportunity for his re-election bid. The Russian intelligence apparatus in 1993 in response to a Congressional inquiry about the October Surprise, also confirmed the views of the Iranian officials. Were the above-mentioned Russians and Iranians points either wrong or they have been untruthful?

WB: There was definitely a confluence of interests between the Republicans and Iranian officials, all of whom wanted to deny Carter a victory. There is some indication that Iran and the U.S. were on somewhat better footing in the Reagan administration than, say, today. The Iran-Contra affair could not have taken place if there was not some kind of communication between the two parties. Also, accusations of support of terrorists, despite Iran's support of Hezbollah, did not occur during the Reagan administration. The U.S. was blaming Libya during this time for support of terrorism (under AIPAC guidance). Also, Iran was engaging in arms trafficking with Israel, so things were somewhat friendlier between Iran and the U.S. It certainly could stem from this communality of interest. It is also interesting that initially, Iranian officials expressed a preference for George W. Bush, saying that Iran had generally fared better under Republicans than Democrats. Of course the Bush administration broke that pattern.


R: Tuesday, the 20th, is the swearing in day of Barack Obama as the next President of the U.S. In your view, what role did issues in the Middle East, and particularly Iran, play in electing Obama to the presidency?

WB: Not very much. Obama's views on the Middle East are not very different from the current administration. He has called for negotiations in preference to force as a way of dealing with the problems of the region, and he called for American withdrawal from Iraq. The Republicans tried to use these two positions against him without success. Most Americans seem to agree with Obama on these points.


R: What has been the impact of issues regarding Iran on the US presidential election until now?

WB: Only Obama's opinion that talks should be undertaken with Iran was even used in debate. Obama has officially called for Iran to suspend nuclear enrichment and "stop supporting terrorism." The neo-cons are very cynical. They think that they can agree to let talks take place on the assumption that they will fail, and then the U.S. can go ahead with its former hostile posturing.


R: Do you have a personal anecdote that may be of interest to Iranian readers about the U.S. presidential election in 1980 and the impact of the timing of the release of the American hostages after the election?

WB: Yes, Professor Marvin Zonis and I were consulting with Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance. As soon as we left his office, he resigned his position. He showed us that he was disgusted with the ineffectiveness of the Carter administration and was furious at the rescue mission, which was undertaken without his knowledge while he was on vacation. The mission (which failed) was a total surprise to him. I later cited this incident in calling for Colin Powell to resign after his fatal speech to the United Nations, because he had been equally badly used by the Bush administration.

You should know that I was in Iran until February 1979, and witnessed the entire revolution, but not the hostage crisis. A number of my friends were hostages.


R: You mentioned that Obama's foreign policy would not be much different than George W. Bush. With Denis Ross, as the key person to deal with Iran at the State Department, and given his background in this field, how will Obama's premise of change be accomplished?

WB: Clearly, it won't. Ross is being pushed by the neocons (WINEP, AEI), and the Obama transition team is in the pocket of AIPAC. They want to plant their operatives in the Obama administration.


R: President Bush changed the Republican's pattern toward Iran. Is there any potential that Democrats break their pattern as well and initiate a more friendly relation with Iran?

WB: Obviously, I hope so, but both Democrats and Republicans have had more or less the same policy toward Iran since the Revolution. No politician ever lost a vote by attacking Iran.


R: Thomas Friedman once said, Iran and the United States are natural allies. How does the possible designation of Denis Ross contribute to this?

It won't. Picking Ross is a mistake, if the idea is to have a different policy toward Iran. The neocons do not want a different policy. They want to continue to attack Iran, or have Israel do it, and the Obama administration not able to do anything about it.


R: The United States is facing with a variety of difficulties in the Middle East and the possibility of going to war with Iran seems pretty slim. Can the Obama administration live with a nuclear Iran, in case both countries compromise on some of their positions and policies?

WB: Do you believe Iran has an active nuclear weapons program? I don't. We can definitely live with Iran having nuclear power. The US is selling nuclear power to the UAE for heaven's sake.


Regarding the wall of mistrust between the two countries, in what sort of scenario would negotiations with Iran succeed?

It all starts with opening formal relations. Right now the U.S. and Iran have no relations whatever. Until they do, nothing can proceed.