Sunday, September 08, 2013

War with Syria Would Fulfill Neoconservative Plan for Middle East Regime Change (Beeman--New America Media)

http://newamericamedia.org/2013/09/war-with-syria-would-fulfill-neoconservative-plan-for-middle-east-regime-change.php#

War with Syria Would Fulfill Neoconservative Plan for Middle East Regime Change

War with Syria Would Fulfill Neoconservative Plan for Middle East Regime Change

New America Media, Commentary, William Beeman, Posted: Sep 08, 2013


There is great division of opinion regarding potential U.S. military action in Syria. However, one group is ecstatic over President Obama’s endorsement of a military attack on Damascus. These are the Neconservatives who dominated the George W. Bush administration, and who still hold tremendous influence in Washington. An attack on Syria would be one step in fulfilling “stage two” of a longstanding neoconservative plan to bring about regime change throughout the Middle East in three stages: Iraq, Syria and finally Iran.

The pattern for this plan has been to wait for an event that can be sold to the world public as justification for military attack, and then to push forward, pressuring the military and government officials to move forward with the next stage of regime change.

President Obama is, perhaps unwittingly, fulfilling this plan, conceived in 1996 by an informal organization, the Study Group on a New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000, headed by Richard Pearle and including well-known neo-conservatives, Douglas Feith, Meyrav Wurmser, David Wurmser, Robert Loewenberg, Charles Fairbanks, Jr. and James Colbert. All are connected with organizations favoring right-wing extremist Israeli policies toward Palestinians and other Middle East nations. The Study Group plan, titled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm” was prepared for Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. The “clean break” refers to their advice that Israel break from the 1993 Oslo peace accords.

The 1996 plan explicitly calls for attacks on Iraq, Syria and eventually Iran. It states: "Israel can shape its strategic environment . . . by weakening, containing, and even rolling back Syria. This effort can focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq — an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right — as a means of foiling Syria’s regional ambitions."

Many of the same figures carried this plan forward two years later under another rubric, The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) founded by William Kristol and Robert Kagan. In a letter to President Clinton and House Speaker Gingrich in 1998, the members of the PNAC, including Kristol, Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Zoellick called for the removal of Saddam Hussein, carrying out the first stage of the agenda of the “Clean Break” plan.

Once George W. Bush was elected president, many of these figures took up prominent positions within his administration. Following the tragic destruction of the Twin Towers in New York and the attack on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the removal of Saddam Hussein became a policy objective for the United States.

The PNAC wrote a letter to President Bush in 2001 stating: “...even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.”

It was at this time that Iran came more clearly into focus for the neoconservatives. The theory they promulgated was that Iran was the prime mover in all anti-Israeli activity in the region through Iran’s purported support for Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas. Syria was seen as complicit in this, and was regularly identified as a “client state” for Iran. However, neither legislators nor the public could be incited by this theory, for which there was, and continues to be, no credible evidence.

In 2003, the neoconservatives, working through right-wing think tanks such as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) were able to convince the Bush administration that Iran’s 40 year old nuclear energy program was really a plot to develop nuclear weapons to be used against Israel. This theory eventually became accepted as gospel in Washington, notwithstanding that American and International intelligence agencies asserted there was no evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. However, based on this baseless assertion, these same players called for military action against Iran.

Following the “Arab Spring” popular revolts against standing regimes in the Middle East the longstanding tension between the Sunni Muslim majority and the Alawite ruling minority in Syria exploded in resistance against Syrian ruler Bashar Al-Assad. This conflict had been festering for two generations. In 1982, armed resistance from the Sunni population resulted in a massacre in the city of Hama under orders from Hafiz al-Assad, Bashar’s father. Bashar retaliated to the more recent revolt with unprecedented cruelty, and has been accused of using chemical weapons against Syrian rebels. Whatever the United States or other nations might do to remove the Assad regime, the civil war there will continue unabated.

However, neoconservatives have seized on this more recent revolt against the Assad government as justification for military action to carry out regime change there, but not just because the Assad regime is objectionable, but rather because in an attack on Syria they see an opportunity to strike a crippling blow against Iran. As conservative New York Times columnist David Brooks stated on the PBS News Hour on September 6, “this isn’t really about Syria. . . . the real issue is the broader credibility of the President, the international credibility of the United States, especially vis-à-vis Iran. This is really about Iran more than Syria.”

Brooks’ widely held view is a miscalculation. Even if the Assad regime is removed from power, Iran will not be significantly damaged in its foreign, nuclear or economic policy.

A quick examination of all of these efforts—the pretext based on the 9/11 tragedy for ousting Saddam Hussein, weak justification for U.S. involvement in a longstanding and ongoing civil war in Syria, and the claim that Iran is not only directing all anti-Israeli action in the Middle East, but is also a nuclear threat show that the neoconservative agenda is a tissue of fantasy designed to convince the world, episode by episode, to completely reshape the region with U.S. military firepower.

Americans should not be listening to these neoconservative voices. They have been responsible for a debilitating and useless conflict in Iraq already. Their “advice” to President Obama and his administration will only drag the United States into another useless and debilitating conflict in the Middle East that will accomplish nothing, and will exacerbate violence rather than bringing the world closer to peaceful resolution of the tensions in the region.

William O. Beeman is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, and Visiting Professor at Stanford University. He has worked in the Middle East for more than 40 years.

Friday, August 09, 2013

"Iran's Plan B for the Bomb" (NY Times--Yadlin and Golov) is erroneous and misleading



Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov of the (non-governmental) Institute for Israeli Security Studies have written an op-ed piece for the New York Times entitled "Iran's Plan B for the Bomb"

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/opinion/irans-plan-b-for-the-bomb.html?ref=opinion

The piece is the usual assembly of claptrap, misleading statements about Iran's nuclear program and deception. Sober researchers would and should be ashamed of producing such nonsense for public consumption. Masking lack of accuracy in analysis with blatant political chicanery.

Articles like this drive me crazy, especially because the authors hide behind "opinion" to mask their erroneous and misleading statements.

There is no evidence anywhere that Iran has a nuclear weapons program, and I defy the authors to produce such evidence. No intelligence agency in the U.S., Israel or the U.N. has ever provided any proof of this. Iran's leaders have regularly denounced nuclear weaponry and stated that it would be a violation of Islamic principles to develop one. Obviously these brute facts do not deter those who have been rooting for a military attack on Iran for decades.

The hostile-to-Iran "authorities" cited in the article have been predicting that Iran would be one or two years away from making a bomb for years. It hasn't happened.

Quite aside from the lack of evidence for any Iranian nuclear weapons program, the practical logistics in making a nuclear weapon are simply not present in Iran. The Arak plant is not on line. The claim that Iran has enough low-enriched uranium to make (the purposely vague) "several" bombs is an outright lie. The facilities for weaponizing the non-existent plutonium produced by the Arak plant do not exist, and a delivery system for a purported nuclear weapon also does not exist.

I urge all Americans who doubt what I am saying here to read the concise and accurate new book: "A Dangerous Delusion: Why the West is Wrong about Nuclear Iran" by award winning journalist Peter Oborne and Ph.D. physicist David Morrison.

Saturday, August 03, 2013

Video Shows Iran’s President-Elect Was Misquoted on Israel


Commentary by William O. Beeman: The fact that the New York Times jumped to print the incorrect information about Mr. Rouhani's comments is testament to the prejudicial reporting that has persisted in writing about Iran. The initial incorrect report appeared on the Times front page. The Lede is a pale correction. Mr. Rouhani's remarks about the state of affairs surrounding the city of Jerusalem, which was the focus of his remarks. There is no mention of Israel, only of "coercion" and "oppression" which are the "sores" (zakhm) that have persisted for the Muslim world. Who could take issue with that? Clearly the New York Times and Prime Minister Netanyahu, who twisted these remarks into some imagined attack on Israel.

Here is what Barak Obama said about Israel:

"But what I think is that this constant wound, that this constant sore, does infect all of our foreign policy. The lack of a resolution to this problem provides an excuse for anti-American militant jihadists to engage in inexcusable actions, and so we have a national-security interest in solving this, and I also believe that Israel has a security interest in solving this because I believe that the status quo is unsustainable." <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2008/05/obama-on-zionism-and-hamas/8318/>

http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/video-shows-irans-president-elect-was-misquoted-on-israel/

Video Shows Iran’s President-Elect Was Misquoted on Israel

A video report from Iran’s state-owned Press TV included subtitled remarks by President-elect Hassan Rouhani that were misreported by other Iranian news agencies on Friday.

Last Updated, 6:46 p.m. | As my colleague Thomas Erdbrink reports from Tehran, Iran’s state media scrambled on Friday to correct comments wrongly attributed to the country’s president-elect, Hassan Rouhani, after he was incorrectly quoted calling Israel “a sore which must be removed.”
Press TV, the English-language arm of Iran’s state broadcaster, subtitled Mr. Rouhani’s actual remarks, made to a reporter during the Islamic republic’s annual march for Quds, the Arabic name for Jerusalem. The video shows that the cleric did not mention Israel by name or call for its elimination, but did compare “the shadow of the occupation of the holy land of Palestine and the dear Quds,” to a “wound” or “sore” that “has been sitting on the body of the Islamic world for many years.”
Those remarks were still disturbing to Israelis, since they hewed to the Iranian government line that the entire state of Israel is occupied Palestinian territory. A longer clip of the state television broadcast showed Mr. Rouhani smiling and waving in the parade as chants of “Death to Israel” echoed in the background.
Video from Iranian state television of senior clerics marching in the annual Quds Day parade in Tehran on Friday.

That report also showed other senior figures marching, including the former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. According to Shiva Balaghi, an Iranian-American cultural historian, Mr. Rafsanjani explained as he marched that the point of the annual Quds Day rally was to encourage Palestinians. “When they see this support,” he said, “they will become hopeful.”
Arash Karami, a journalist who blogs about the Iranian media, noted that two semi-official news agencies that initially misreported Mr. Rouhani’s remarks, subsequently corrected their reports in articles headlined: “The Occupation of Palestine Is a Wound on the Body of the Islamic World.”
International news organizations that had relied on the initial, flawed reports from Iran were forced to explain the error later in the day. Rana Rahimpour of the BBC’s Persian service explained what happened in an appearance on BBC World News.
An on-air correction from BBC News, explaining that Iran’s president had been misquoted.

After the video showed that Iran’s incoming president had been misquoted, a spokesman for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the Israeli leader stood by his initial response, in which he said:
Rouhani’s true face has been revealed earlier than expected. Even if they will now rush to deny his remarks, this is what the man thinks and this is the plan of the Iranian regime. These remarks by President Rouhani must rouse the world from the illusion that part of it has been caught up in since the Iranian elections. The president there has changed but the goal of the regime has not: To achieve nuclear weapons in order to threaten Israel, the Middle East and the peace and security of the entire world. A country that threatens the destruction of the State of Israel must not be allowed to possess weapons of mass destruction.
That comment remains on the prime minister’s Facebook page, still explained as his response to Mr. Rouhani’s “remarks in which he was cited as saying that Israel ‘has been a wound on the body of the Islamic world for years and should be removed.’”
Hours later, the prime minister’s official spokesman to the Arab media, Ofir Gendelman, drew attention on Twitter to an Arabic translation of Mr. Netanyahu’s rejoinder without mentioning that there was no evidence the comment that prompted the response was ever made.
There was evidence of some confusion in the Israeli response, though, since Golnaz Esfandiari, a reporter who blogs on Iran for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, noticed that part of the statement initially posted on Mr. Netanyahu’s personal Twitter feed was deleted shortly after she replied to it.


 

Tuesday, July 30, 2013

Ex-Envoy’s Account Clarifies Iran’s 2003 Nuclear Decision--Porter (IPS)

http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/07/ex-envoys-account-clarifies-irans-2003-nuclear-decision/

Ex-Envoy’s Account Clarifies Iran’s 2003 Nuclear Decision

By Gareth PorterReprint |       |  Print | Send by email
WASHINGTON, Jul 30 2013 (IPS) - Newly published recollections by the former French ambassador to Iran suggest that Iran was not running a covert nuclear weapons programme that it then decided to halt in late 2003, as concluded by U.S. intelligence in 2007.
Ambassador Francois Nicoullaud recounted conversations with high-ranking Iranian officials indicating that Tehran’s then nuclear policy chief – and now president-elect – Hassan Rouhani did not know what research projects relating to nuclear weapons had been carried out over the years.
“I guess that most people, [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei included, were surprised by the extent of the activities." -- former French ambassador to Iran Francois Nicoullaud
The conversations described by Nicoullaud in a Jul. 26 New York Times op-ed also portray Rouhani as having difficulty getting individual researchers to comply with an order to halt all research related to nuclear weapons.
The picture of Iranian nuclear policy in 2003 drawn by Nicoullaud is different from the one in the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, which concluded that Iran had halted “its nuclear weapons program”. That conclusion implied that Iranian government leadership had organised a programme of research and development aimed at producing a nuclear weapon.
Nicoullaud recalled that a high-ranking Iranian official confided to him in late October 2003 that Rouhani had just “issued a general circular asking all Iranian departments and agencies, civilian and military, to report in detail about their past and ongoing nuclear activities.”
The conversation came immediately after Rouhani had concluded an agreement with the foreign ministers of the UK, France and Germany on Oct. 21, 2003, Nicoullaud recalled.
The same official explained that “the main difficulty Rouhani and his team were encountering was learning exactly what was happening in a system as secretive as Iran’s,” wrote Nicoullaud.
A few weeks after, the French ambassador learned from a second official, whom he described as “a close friend of Rouhani”, that Rouhani’s nuclear policy team had issued instructions to halt projects relating to nuclear weapons.
The Iranian official said the team was “having a hard time”, because, “[p]eople resist their instructions,” according to Nicoullaud. The official remarked that it was difficult to “convince researchers to abruptly terminate projects they had been conducting for years”.
In an e-mail to IPS, Nicoullaud said he did not believe the Iranian government had ever approved a nuclear weapons programme. “The first challenge for Rouhani when he took hold of the nuclear,” said Nicoullaud, “must have been to get a clear picture of what was going on in Iran in the nuclear field.”
Rouhani had been the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) since 1989 and would not only have known about but would have been involved in any government decision to establish a nuclear weapons programme.
“I guess that most people, [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei included, were surprised by the extent of the activities,” Nicoullaud told IPS.
Nicoullaud’s recollections are consistent with published evidence that nuclear weapons-related research projects had begun without any government authorisation.
Despite an Iranian policy that ruled out nuclear weapons, many Iranian officials believed that a nuclear weapons “capability” would confer benefits on Iran without actually having nuclear weapons.
But the meaning of such a capability was the subject of ongoing debate. Nasser Hadian, a well-connected Tehran University political scientist, wrote in late 2003 about two schools of thought on the option of having a “nuclear weapons capability” but not the weapons themselves. One definition of that option was that Iran should have only the capability to produce fuel for nuclear reactors, Hadian explained, while the other called for Iran to have “all the necessary elements and capabilities for producing weapons”.
That debate had evidently not been officially resolved by a government decision before Rouhani’s appointment. And in the absence of a clear statement of policy, figures associated with research centres with military and defence ministry ties began in the latter of the 1990s to create their own nuclear weapons-related research projects without the knowledge of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).
Such projects were apparently begun during a period when the Supreme National Security Council was not exercising tight control over the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), the Ministry of Defence or the military industrial complex controlled by Defence Industries Organisation related to nuclear weapons.
By the mid-1990s, AEOI was already taking advantage of the lax supervision of its operations to take actions that had significant policy implications without authorisation from the SNSC.
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, then the spokesman for Iran’s nuclear negotiating team, recalls in his memoirs that in January 2004, Rouhani revealed to him that AEOI had not informed the SNSC about a policy-relevant matter as important as the purchase of the P2 centrifuge designs from the A. Q. Khan network in 1995. AEOI officials had misled him, Rohani said, by claiming that “they had found some information about P2 centrifuges on the Internet and are studying it!”
When Rouhani was named to take over as nuclear policy coordinator in early October 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was demanding a full accounting by Iran of all of its nuclear activities. Rouhani’s circular to all civilian and military offices about nuclear work came soon after he had promised the IAEA that Iran would change its policy to one of full cooperation with the IAEA.
At the same time, Rouhani moved to tighten up the policy loophole that had allowed various entities to start weapons-related nuclear research.
Rouhani anticipated resistance from the bureaucratic entities that had nuclear weapons-related research projects from the beginning. He recalled in a later interview that he had told President Mohammad Khatami that he expected that there would be problems in carrying out the new nuclear policy, including “sabotage”.
The sequence of events surrounding Rouhani’s new nuclear policy indicates that he used Khamenei’s public posture that nuclear weapons were forbidden according to Islamic law to ensure compliance with the ban on such research projects.
Around the same time that Rouhani ordered the bureaucracy to report on its nuclear-related activities and to stop any research on military applications of nuclear power in late October, Khamenei gave a speech in which he said, “In contrast to the propaganda of our enemies, fundamentally we are against any production of weapons of mass destruction in any form.”
Three days later, Rouhani told students at Shahrud Industrial University that Khamenei considered nuclear weapons as religiously illegal.
That same week, in an interview with San Francisco Chronicle correspondent Robert Collier, Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor of the conservative newspaper Kayhan and an adviser to Khamenei, alluded to tensions between the Rouhani team and those researchers who were not responding to or resisting the Rouhani circular.
Khamenei was forcing those working on such projects to “admit that it is forbidden under Islam”, Shariatmadari said. He also suggested that the researchers resisting the ban had been working “clandestinely”.
After the U.S. intelligence community concluded in November 2007 estimate that Iran had halted a “nuclear weapons program”, a U.S. intelligence official said key pieces of evidence were intercepted communications from at least one senior military officer and others expressing dismay in 2007 that nuclear weapons-related work had been shut down in 2003.
But U.S. intelligence officials said nothing about what kind of work was being shut down, and revealed no further evidence that it was a “nuclear weapons program” under the control of the government.
Nicoullaud’s recollections suggest that the 2007 estimate glossed over a crucial distinction between an Iranian “nuclear weapons program” and research projects that had not been authorised or coordinated by the Iranian regime.
Nicoullaud told IPS he believes the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which controls Iran’s ballistic missile programme, was also carrying out a clandestine nuclear weapons programme. The IRGC’s own ministry had been merged, however, with the old Ministry of Defence to form a new ministry in 1989, which implies that any such clandestine programme would have necessarily involved a wider military conspiracy.
*Gareth Porter, an investigative historian and journalist specialising in U.S. national security policy, received the UK-based Gellhorn Prize for journalism for 2011 for articles on the U.S. war in Afghanistan

Monday, July 01, 2013

Re: Fwd: Why is Iran so difficult to get right in Washington?

There is zero evidence of election fraud in 2009, nor woulf there have been any need for fraud, since the losing candidates were all regime-insiders who had been vetted and cleared to run.



Subject: Fwd: Why is Iran so difficult to get right in Washington?

Why is Iran so difficult to get right in Washington?

July 1, 2013
Al Jazeera
Reza Marashi and Trita Parsi
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/2013630111133190971.html


Trying to predict political developments in Iran can be a humbling experience, even for the most seasoned students of Iranian politics. The unexpected electoral victory of centrist Hassan Rouhani serves as a reminder of this stark reality. The Washington Post editorial board boldly proclaimed before the elections that Rouhani "will not be allowed to win".

Some said the elections were irrelevant because whatever the outcome, Khamenei would be the winner. Yet the frequency with which conventional wisdom in Washington gets Iran wrong is striking. Why is that? And how can Washington's ability to read Tehran be improved?

Rouhani's resounding victory sheds light on at least three factors contributing to a systemic misreading of Iran.

Conventional thinking in Washington regularly suffers from three critical flaws. The first, assumption blindness, is the inability to recognise the implicit assumptions underlying one's analysis, which leads to a failure to reassess those assumptions when the analysis is proven wrong.

Washington is seemingly unaware of the deterministic power of its assumptions. This assumption blindness prevents consideration of alternative scenarios, which helps explain why Washington is so often surprised by Tehran. There is a strongly held view, for instance, that Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei wields complete power. Working backward, many Iran analysts argued the candidate perceived to be Khamenei's favourite - Saeed Jalili - would win.

But once the unexpected occurred and Rouhani's victory was a reality (and Jalili came in a distant third), the faulty assumption of Khamenei's power was not questioned. Belief in his omnipotence remained strong. Instead, the following question was asked: Why did Khamenei "permit" Rouhani to win? Assumption blindness prevented the confidence in Khamenei's power to be reviewed and instead led the analysis in an almost conspiratorial direction: Whatever happens, it's because Khamenei wills it.

While there is no doubt that the supreme leader wields the highest individual authority, it is equally clear that he relies on a number of councils as well as formal and informal institutions to advise him on foreign policy and national security.  As a result, most decisions are made in a permanent interaction between diverse and sometimes competing power centres.

Perhaps more importantly, conventional thinking in Washington did not provide room to consider the idea that the Iranian people understood the power dynamics in their own country better than anyone abroad. Few believed that Iranians could outmanoeuvre Khamenei, leaving him with no choice but to succumb to their wishes. Since these outcomes didn't fit the assumption about Iran, they couldn't be envisioned.

Assumption confusion

Whereas assumption blindness prevents the reassessment of assumptions, the second flaw, "assumption confusion", is the treatment of untested assumptions as empirically proven conclusions. In the above case, it stems from the treatment of Khamenei's omnipotence as a foregone conclusion from the outset. His unchallenged power is treated as a fact rather than a supposition.

Finally, the Iran discourse in Washington also suffers from "variable blindness". Valuable information about Tehran's decision-making, internal deliberations and reasoning is scarce. Since the factors shaping Tehran's calculation are unknown "unknowns"- to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld - Washington tends to attribute all developments in Iran to the few variables it can observe.

The "smoking gun"

For instance, Obama administration officials have said that sanctions should be credited for Rouhani's victory. The "smoking gun" is the observable pain inflicted by sanctions, which then is implicitly assumed to have convinced Iranians to cast their votes for a centrist candidate. Of course, nobody in Washington argued before the election that the logic of sanctions was to pressure people to vote for different leadership. After all, that couldn't be possible according to Washington's belief system since Khamenei determines the outcome of the elections, not the people.

With little access to data describing and explaining the play-by-play political developments around the elections, Washington's variable blindness led it to explain the election outcome through the one variable it knew: US sanctions.

Washington's assertions regarding sanctions and the elections have baffled analysts and civil society actors in Iran. To them, the fundamental difference between the elections in 2013 and 2009 is that Khamenei couldn't cheat this time, lest he risk the collapse of his regime. Not because of the sanctions, but because the rifts within the regime from the disputed reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remain deep and unhealed.

Reformist strategists told us of this reality more than two years before the elections - and before the imposition of Obama's "crippling" sanctions. And we pointed it out a few days before the elections as an argument as to why cheating could be suicidal for Khamenei this time around.

Indeed, the Iranian people had plenty of reasons to vote against the conservatives, and didn't need sanctions to convince them to do so. What was lacking was the push to persuade them that their votes wouldn't be ignored as they were in 2009. That push was provided only a few days before the elections - not by sanctions - but by the campaigning of former Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Variable blindness

The variable blindness leading to over-reliance on sanctions as a catch-all explanation of favourable developments in Iran produces two counter-factual scenarios: First, absent sanctions, the logic reads, Iranians would have happily voted for the conservatives, blissfully unaware of the disaster that eight years of Ahmadinejad had brought unto them. And secondly, had Washington imposed even more sanctions on Iran, an even greater election outcome would have been produced.

Perhaps the Iranians would have elected Mother Teresa rather than Hassan Rouhani.

As a friend in Tehran pointed out, the variable blindness that credits Rouhani's victory to sanctions is ironically the latest installment of the conspiracy theories of Daei Jan Napoleon, one of Iran's most important and beloved works of modern fiction: Everything that happens in Iran and to Iranians is because of the machinations of others.

Perhaps nothing demonstrates the Washington establishment's distance from the realities on the ground in Iran more than its belief that no force could bring about this unexpected result other than the US itself. The actions of the Iranian people appear not to figure into Washington's analysis at all.

The election of Hassan Rouhani has provided both sides an opportunity to pause and rethink their approach to each other. This may prove to be crucial in bringing an end to a looming lose-lose confrontation. But before the US and Iran can change how they behave towards each other, they have to change how they think about and analyse one another.

Reza Marashi is Director of Research at the National Iranian American Council.

Trita Parsi is President of the National Iranian American Council and author of A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran.

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--
William O. Beeman 
Professor, Department of Anthropology 
University of Minnesota 
395 HHH Center 
301 19th Avenue S.  
Minneapolis, MN 55455 
(612) 625-3400 

academic website: http://www.williambeeman.com 

During 2013-2014 I will be Visiting Professor at the Department of Anthropology, Stanford University. 


Fwd: NYTimes.com: London. Tokyo. Athens. Tulsa?



---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: wbeeman <emailthis@ms3.lga2.nytimes.com>
Date: Mon, Jul 1, 2013 at 10:24 AM
Subject: NYTimes.com: London. Tokyo. Athens. Tulsa?
To: wbeeman@umn.edu


Sent by wbeeman@umn.edu:

London. Tokyo. Athens. Tulsa?

By MARY PILON

Tulsa, Okla., saying it can offer plenty of room, wants to host the 2024 Summer Games and join the likes of Athens, Beijing and London in Olympic history.

Or, copy and paste this URL into your browser: http://nyti.ms/1cGfLzM
To ensure delivery to your inbox, please add nytdirect@nytimes.com to your address book.
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--
William O. Beeman 
Professor, Department of Anthropology 
University of Minnesota 
395 HHH Center 
301 19th Avenue S.  
Minneapolis, MN 55455 
(612) 625-3400 

academic website: http://www.williambeeman.com 

During 2013-2014 I will be Visiting Professor at the Department of Anthropology, Stanford University. 

Fwd: Why is Iran so difficult to get right in Washington?



---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Trita Parsi, PhD <Tp@tritaparsi.com>
Date: Mon, Jul 1, 2013 at 9:18 AM
Subject: Why is Iran so difficult to get right in Washington?
To: wbeeman@umn.edu


Good morning,

So the below piece may ruffle some feathers in Washington, but it's written in the spirit of helping fix a systemic problem in the collective Beltway read on Iran whose existence few would or could deny.

It is written by Reza Marashi and myself for Al Jazeera English, published today.

Your comments are most welcome.

Sincerely,
Trita Parsi, PhD



Why is Iran so difficult to get right in Washington?

July 1, 2013
Al Jazeera
Reza Marashi and Trita Parsi
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/2013630111133190971.html


Trying to predict political developments in Iran can be a humbling experience, even for the most seasoned students of Iranian politics. The unexpected electoral victory of centrist Hassan Rouhani serves as a reminder of this stark reality. The Washington Post editorial board boldly proclaimed before the elections that Rouhani "will not be allowed to win".

Some said the elections were irrelevant because whatever the outcome, Khamenei would be the winner. Yet the frequency with which conventional wisdom in Washington gets Iran wrong is striking. Why is that? And how can Washington's ability to read Tehran be improved?

Rouhani's resounding victory sheds light on at least three factors contributing to a systemic misreading of Iran.

Conventional thinking in Washington regularly suffers from three critical flaws. The first, assumption blindness, is the inability to recognise the implicit assumptions underlying one's analysis, which leads to a failure to reassess those assumptions when the analysis is proven wrong.

Washington is seemingly unaware of the deterministic power of its assumptions. This assumption blindness prevents consideration of alternative scenarios, which helps explain why Washington is so often surprised by Tehran. There is a strongly held view, for instance, that Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei wields complete power. Working backward, many Iran analysts argued the candidate perceived to be Khamenei's favourite - Saeed Jalili - would win.

But once the unexpected occurred and Rouhani's victory was a reality (and Jalili came in a distant third), the faulty assumption of Khamenei's power was not questioned. Belief in his omnipotence remained strong. Instead, the following question was asked: Why did Khamenei "permit" Rouhani to win? Assumption blindness prevented the confidence in Khamenei's power to be reviewed and instead led the analysis in an almost conspiratorial direction: Whatever happens, it's because Khamenei wills it.

While there is no doubt that the supreme leader wields the highest individual authority, it is equally clear that he relies on a number of councils as well as formal and informal institutions to advise him on foreign policy and national security.  As a result, most decisions are made in a permanent interaction between diverse and sometimes competing power centres.

Perhaps more importantly, conventional thinking in Washington did not provide room to consider the idea that the Iranian people understood the power dynamics in their own country better than anyone abroad. Few believed that Iranians could outmanoeuvre Khamenei, leaving him with no choice but to succumb to their wishes. Since these outcomes didn't fit the assumption about Iran, they couldn't be envisioned.

Assumption confusion

Whereas assumption blindness prevents the reassessment of assumptions, the second flaw, "assumption confusion", is the treatment of untested assumptions as empirically proven conclusions. In the above case, it stems from the treatment of Khamenei's omnipotence as a foregone conclusion from the outset. His unchallenged power is treated as a fact rather than a supposition.

Finally, the Iran discourse in Washington also suffers from "variable blindness". Valuable information about Tehran's decision-making, internal deliberations and reasoning is scarce. Since the factors shaping Tehran's calculation are unknown "unknowns"- to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld - Washington tends to attribute all developments in Iran to the few variables it can observe.

The "smoking gun"

For instance, Obama administration officials have said that sanctions should be credited for Rouhani's victory. The "smoking gun" is the observable pain inflicted by sanctions, which then is implicitly assumed to have convinced Iranians to cast their votes for a centrist candidate. Of course, nobody in Washington argued before the election that the logic of sanctions was to pressure people to vote for different leadership. After all, that couldn't be possible according to Washington's belief system since Khamenei determines the outcome of the elections, not the people.

With little access to data describing and explaining the play-by-play political developments around the elections, Washington's variable blindness led it to explain the election outcome through the one variable it knew: US sanctions.

Washington's assertions regarding sanctions and the elections have baffled analysts and civil society actors in Iran. To them, the fundamental difference between the elections in 2013 and 2009 is that Khamenei couldn't cheat this time, lest he risk the collapse of his regime. Not because of the sanctions, but because the rifts within the regime from the disputed reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remain deep and unhealed.

Reformist strategists told us of this reality more than two years before the elections - and before the imposition of Obama's "crippling" sanctions. And we pointed it out a few days before the elections as an argument as to why cheating could be suicidal for Khamenei this time around.

Indeed, the Iranian people had plenty of reasons to vote against the conservatives, and didn't need sanctions to convince them to do so. What was lacking was the push to persuade them that their votes wouldn't be ignored as they were in 2009. That push was provided only a few days before the elections - not by sanctions - but by the campaigning of former Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Variable blindness

The variable blindness leading to over-reliance on sanctions as a catch-all explanation of favourable developments in Iran produces two counter-factual scenarios: First, absent sanctions, the logic reads, Iranians would have happily voted for the conservatives, blissfully unaware of the disaster that eight years of Ahmadinejad had brought unto them. And secondly, had Washington imposed even more sanctions on Iran, an even greater election outcome would have been produced.

Perhaps the Iranians would have elected Mother Teresa rather than Hassan Rouhani.

As a friend in Tehran pointed out, the variable blindness that credits Rouhani's victory to sanctions is ironically the latest installment of the conspiracy theories of Daei Jan Napoleon, one of Iran's most important and beloved works of modern fiction: Everything that happens in Iran and to Iranians is because of the machinations of others.

Perhaps nothing demonstrates the Washington establishment's distance from the realities on the ground in Iran more than its belief that no force could bring about this unexpected result other than the US itself. The actions of the Iranian people appear not to figure into Washington's analysis at all.

The election of Hassan Rouhani has provided both sides an opportunity to pause and rethink their approach to each other. This may prove to be crucial in bringing an end to a looming lose-lose confrontation. But before the US and Iran can change how they behave towards each other, they have to change how they think about and analyse one another.

Reza Marashi is Director of Research at the National Iranian American Council.

Trita Parsi is President of the National Iranian American Council and author of A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran.

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--
William O. Beeman 
Professor, Department of Anthropology 
University of Minnesota 
395 HHH Center 
301 19th Avenue S.  
Minneapolis, MN 55455 
(612) 625-3400 

academic website: http://www.williambeeman.com 

During 2013-2014 I will be Visiting Professor at the Department of Anthropology, Stanford University. 

Saturday, June 29, 2013

President-Elect of Iran Says He Will Engage With the West--New York Times

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/world/middleeast/president-elect-of-iran-says-he-will-engage-with-the-west.html?hp

President-Elect of Iran Says He Will Engage With the West

By 
Published: June 29, 2013

TEHRAN — Iran's president-elect, Hassan Rouhani, said Saturday that he would engage with the West and fulfill his electoral promises to allow more freedom for the Iranian people

Mr. Rouhani, who calls himself a moderate, won the June 14 presidential election by a large margin, surprising many who expected Iran's governing establishment to block any candidate calling for change. Hinting at the revolutions that have ousted several leaders in the Middle East, Mr. Rouhani emphasized that it was important to listen to the "majority of Iranians."

"In our region, there were some countries who miscalculated their positions, and you have witnessed what happened to them," he said during a live broadcast of a conference organized by Voice and Vision, Iran's state television and radio organization.

"The world is in a transitional mood, and a new order has yet to be established," he said. "If we miscalculate our national situation, it will be detrimental for us."

He also said Iran should not hesitate to criticize the Syrian government for some of its actions in its war against rebels seeking to oust it. While Iranian officials have staunchly defended Iran's support for President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, Mr. Rouhani warned against a double standard in international affairs.

"We should not describe as oppressive brutal actions in an enemy country while refraining from calling the same actions oppressive if they take place in a friendly country," he said. "Brutality must be called brutality."

Mr. Rouhani appealed for more moderation in foreign and domestic policies and praised the police for tolerating recent street celebrations over his election victory and for Iran's soccer team.

He also hinted that he would consider loosening some of the restrictions imposed by the much-loathed morality police, who arrest people for wearing "improper clothing" or not observing Islamic codes strictly. "Happiness is our people's right," he said. "We should not be strict toward the people. People follow the morality codes by themselves and are careful about them."

Mr. Rouhani, who will be sworn in on Aug. 3, reminded those opposing change in Iran that the election was also a referendum on the country's future.

"The majority of Iranian people voted for moderation, collective wisdom, insight and consultation," he said. "Everybody should accept the people's vote — the government should accept the people's vote. The people have chosen a new path."

Many Iranians are carefully optimistic about Mr. Rouhani. Last week, Iran's currency gained strength against the dollar. Business owners said they were hopeful that he would address domestic economic problems and possibly find a way to ease the international sanctions over Iran's nuclear program.

Mr. Rouhani also appealed for a more open state news media. "The age of monologue media is over; media should be interactive," he said. In Iran, millions of Web sites are blocked, and the state news media has a monopoly, while the authorities use radio waves to block satellite transmissions from abroad. "In a country whose legitimacy is rooted in its people, then there is no fear from free media," he said.


--
William O. Beeman 
Professor and Chair 
Department of Anthropology 
University of Minnesota 
395 HHH Center 
301 19th Avenue S.  
Minneapolis, MN 55455 
(612) 625-3400 

Twin Cities-Best Arts and Culture in the Nation

Rash Report: Twin Cities creative ecology is interdependent, healthy: http://www.startribune.com/opinion/commentaries/213594171.html

Thursday, June 27, 2013

Thoughts on the invalidation of DOMA

Thoughts on the invalidation of DOMA

I wish I could be sanguine about the future of marriage equality, but judging from the angry pronouncements from the right it looks like hatred and bigotry, like the last lurch of a dying monster in a B-movie will not die.

The opposition to same-sex marriage purports to be about a lot of things: religious freedom (the freedom to hate and discriminate in name of religion), family values (despite rampant divorce, spousal abuse and child abuse among heterosexual couples) and even economic costs in insuring same sex spouses and losing tax revenue if people file as a married couple (as if Republicans really cared about tax revenue!)

What is really at issue is discrimination. The opponents of same-sex marriage want to do anything they can to avoid having to acknowledge that homosexuals are in any way "like them." They want to exclude gay citizens in any way they can from normal citizenship--even normal humanity.

This is why the issue of same-sex marriage is on a par with racial equality. It is an exercise that forces Americans to stop "othering" gay people, and in their own crude parlance, legalization of same-sex marriage is being "crammed down their throats." They prefer to exclude, hate and discriminate, and this is more important to them than any American ideal of equality, protection under the law or human rights.


http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/opinion/the-long-road-to-marriage-equality.html?comments#permid=27


--
William O. Beeman 
Professor and Chair 
Department of Anthropology 
University of Minnesota 
395 HHH Center 
301 19th Avenue S.  
Minneapolis, MN 55455 
(612) 625-3400 

Wednesday, June 26, 2013

Dennis Ross insults the Iranian people

In the New York Times today (June 26) former Middle East Negotiator Dennis Ross delivers a slap at the Iranian people. He writes

Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, allowed Mr. Rowhani to win the election recognizing that he had run against current Iranian policies that have isolated the country and invited economically disastrous sanctions. But it isn't clear why Mr. Khamenei allowed such an outcome, 


In this statement, Mr. Ross, who urged support of the Green movement in 2009 effectively ignores the reform movement in Iran, a movement that has been ongoing for more than 15 years. He also insults the Iranian people by implying that they have no agency in their own elections. 

Mr. Ross is a neoconservative connected with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) a well known anti-Iran think tank, still influential with conservative legislators and supported by AIPAC.

One uncharacteristic point in Mr. Ross' op-ed was his de-facto call for recognition of Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy development. 

The answer should be that we can accept Iran's having civil nuclear power but with restrictions that would make the steps to producing nuclear weapons difficult, as well as quickly detectable.

Since Mr. Ross has been a hard-liner on this issue, calling for denying Iran any of its rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, this may signal that the extreme right, of which he is a member, is finally beginning to see after 10 years that this position has no currency. 
--
William O. Beeman 
Professor and Chair 
Department of Anthropology 
University of Minnesota 
395 HHH Center 
301 19th Avenue S.  
Minneapolis, MN 55455 
(612) 625-3400 

Tuesday, June 25, 2013

Marsha Cohen--Diamonds for Peanuts and the Double Standard on Iran (Beeman)

http://www.lobelog.com/diamonds-for-peanuts-and-the-double-standard/

"Diamonds for Peanuts" and the Double Standard

by Marsha B. Cohen

The New York Times' op-ed page headlined "Hopes for Iran", which offers half a dozen cautious to negative views on Iran's president-elect Hassan Rouhani, unexpectedly links to a "Related Story" published last year: Should Israel Accept a Nuclear Ban? Linking the online discussion — intentionally or not — to a debate over Israel's own nuclear program and policies may be more remarkable than any of the op-eds' arguments.

One of the most overlooked and under-discussed aspects of the Iranian nuclear program, at least from an Iranian point of view, is the double standard that's applied to it: while Israel has an estimated 100-200 nuclear weapons that it has concealed for decades, Iran is treated like the nuclear threat — and Iran doesn't possess a single nuclear weapon. Adding insult to injury, Israel is usually the first, loudest and shrillest voice condemning Iran and demanding "crippling sanctions" while deflecting attention away from its own record.

"Iran has consistently used the West's willingness to engage as a delaying tactic, a smoke screen behind which Iran's nuclear program has continued undeterred and, in many cases, undetected," complained former Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Dore Gold (also president of the hawkish Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) in a 2009 LA Times op-ed entitled "Iran's Nuclear Aspirations Threaten the World":

Back in 2005, Hassan Rowhani, the former chief nuclear negotiator of Iran during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, made a stunning confession in an internal briefing in Tehran, just as he was leaving his post. He explained that in the period during which he sat across from European negotiators discussing Iran's uranium enrichment ambitions, Tehran quietly managed to complete the critical second stage of uranium fuel production: its uranium conversion plant in Isfahan. He boasted that the day Iran started its negotiations in 2003 "there was no such thing as the Isfahan project." Now, he said, it was complete.

Yet half a century ago, Israel's Deputy Minister of Defense, Shimon Peres — the political architect of Israel's nuclear weapons program — looked President John F. Kennedy in the eye and solemnly intoned what would become Israel's "catechism", according to Avner Cohen: "I can tell you most clearly that we will not introduce nuclear weapons to the region, and certainly we will not be the first." Fifty years and at least 100 nuclear weapons later, Peres is awarded the U.S. Medal of Freedom, with no mention of his misrepresentation of Israel's nuclear progress.

According to declassified documents, Yitzhak Rabin, another future Israeli prime minister (who would be awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1994) also invoked the nuclear catechism to nuclear negotiator Paul Warnke in 1968, arguing that no product could be considered a deployable nuclear weapons-system unless it had been tested (Israel, of course, had not tested a nuclear weapon). Warnke was unswayed by Rabin's talmudic logic but came away convinced that pressuring Israel would be futile since it was already a nuclear weapons state.

In a BBC Radio June 14 debate between Gold and former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw about the prospects for improving relations with Iran after Rouhani's election, Straw pointed out that Israel has a "very extensive nuclear weapons program, and along with India and Pakistan are the three countries in the world, plus North Korea more recently, which have refused any kind of international supervision…":

JOHN HUMPHRYS (Host): Well let me put that to Dr Gold; you can't argue with that, Dr Gold?

DORE GOLD: Well, we can have a whole debate on Israel in a separate program.

JOHN HUMPHRYS: Well, it's entirely relevant isn't it? The fact is you're saying they want nuclear weapons; the fact is you have nuclear weapons.

DORE GOLD: Look, Israel has made statements in the past. Israeli ambassadors to the UN like myself have said that Israel won't be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.

JACK STRAW: You've got nuclear weapons.

JOHN HUMPHRYS: You've got them.

JACK STRAW: You've got them. Everyone knows that.

DORE GOLD: We have a very clear stand, but we're not the issue.

JACK STRAW: No, no, come on, you have nuclear weapons, let's be clear about this.

National security expert Bruce Riedel is among those who have observed Washington's "double standard when it comes to Israel's bomb: the NPT applies to all but Israel. Indeed, every Israeli prime minister since David Ben-Gurion has deliberately taken an evasive posture on the issue because they do not want to admit what everyone knows." Three years ago, Riedel suggested that the era of Israeli ambiguity about its nuclear program "may be coming to an end, raising fundamental questions about Israel's strategic situation in the region." Thus far that hasn't happened. Instead, Israeli leaders and the pro-Israel lobby use every opportunity (including Peres' Medal of Freedom acceptance speech) to deflect attention from Israel's defiant prevarication about its own nuclear status and directing it toward Iran.

This past April, Anthony Cordesman authored a paper for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) arguing that Israel posed more of an existential threat to Iran than the other way around. "It seems likely that Israel can already deliver an 'existential' nuclear strike on Iran, and will have far more capability to damage Iran than Iran is likely to have against Israel for the next decade," Cordesman wrote. (The paper has since been removed from the CSIS website, but references to it persist in numerous articles.)

This double standard, and refusal to recognize Iranian security concerns, is not news to Iranians. Ali Larijani, Speaker of the Iranian Majlis (Parliament), assured the Financial Times last September that talks between the U.S. and Iran "can be successful and help create more security in the region. But if they try to dissuade Iran from its rights to have peaceful nuclear technology, then they will not go anywhere — before or after the US elections." Larijani, who was Iran's nuclear negotiator between 2005-2007, proposed that declarations by U.S. political leaders that Iran has a right to "peaceful nuclear technology" be committed to in writing.

"Many times the US president or secretary of state have said they recognise Iran's right to nuclear energy," Larjani said. "So, if [they] accept this, write it down and then we use it as a basis to push forward the talks…What they say during the talks is different from what they say outside the talks. This is a problem." Larijani also denied that Iranian leaders were discussing withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) even though the benefits of Iran remaining a signatory — in the face of mounting international pressure campaigned for by Israel while Israel itself faced little to no criticism — seemed unclear. "The Israelis did not join the NPT and they do not recognize the IAEA," he said. "They are doing what they want — producing nuclear bombs, and no one questions it."

This past weekend, CNN's Christiane Amanpour bluntly suggested that up until now, the U.S. has offered Iran few incentives to comply with the international community's demands regarding Iran's nuclear program: "Let's just call a spade a spade. I've spoken to Iranian officials, former negotiators, actually people who worked for Dr. Rouhani earlier, and they said that so far the American incentives to Iran in these nuclear negotiations amounts to demanding diamonds for peanuts."

Ben Caspit, writing in al-Monitor last week week, notes that as soon as the Russians hinted Iran would be willing to suspend uranium enrichment and keep it at the 20% level, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blew off the suggestion as merely cosmetic. The Israeli demand will continue to be  uncompromising, Caspit says, insistent that "…nothing short of complete cessation of uranium enrichment, removal of all enriched uranium out of Iran; termination of nuclear facility activities and welcoming the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would provide sufficient guarantee of Iran's willingness to abandon the nuclear program. Needless to say this will never happen."

As Jim Lobe pointed out the other day, Rouhani outlined an 8-point blueprint for resolving the nuclear standoff between the U.S. and Iran in a letter to TIME in 2006. Rouhani stated:

In my personal judgment, a negotiated solution can be found in the context of the following steps, if and when creatively intertwined and negotiated in good faith by concerned officials…Iran is prepared to work with the IAEA and all states concerned about promoting confidence in its fuel cycle program. But Iran cannot be expected to give in to United States' bullying and non-proliferation double standards.


--
William O. Beeman 
Professor and Chair 
Department of Anthropology 
University of Minnesota 
395 HHH Center 
301 19th Avenue S.  
Minneapolis, MN 55455 
(612) 625-3400