Thursday, June 27, 2013

Thoughts on the invalidation of DOMA

Thoughts on the invalidation of DOMA

I wish I could be sanguine about the future of marriage equality, but judging from the angry pronouncements from the right it looks like hatred and bigotry, like the last lurch of a dying monster in a B-movie will not die.

The opposition to same-sex marriage purports to be about a lot of things: religious freedom (the freedom to hate and discriminate in name of religion), family values (despite rampant divorce, spousal abuse and child abuse among heterosexual couples) and even economic costs in insuring same sex spouses and losing tax revenue if people file as a married couple (as if Republicans really cared about tax revenue!)

What is really at issue is discrimination. The opponents of same-sex marriage want to do anything they can to avoid having to acknowledge that homosexuals are in any way "like them." They want to exclude gay citizens in any way they can from normal citizenship--even normal humanity.

This is why the issue of same-sex marriage is on a par with racial equality. It is an exercise that forces Americans to stop "othering" gay people, and in their own crude parlance, legalization of same-sex marriage is being "crammed down their throats." They prefer to exclude, hate and discriminate, and this is more important to them than any American ideal of equality, protection under the law or human rights.


http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/opinion/the-long-road-to-marriage-equality.html?comments#permid=27


--
William O. Beeman 
Professor and Chair 
Department of Anthropology 
University of Minnesota 
395 HHH Center 
301 19th Avenue S.  
Minneapolis, MN 55455 
(612) 625-3400 

Wednesday, June 26, 2013

Dennis Ross insults the Iranian people

In the New York Times today (June 26) former Middle East Negotiator Dennis Ross delivers a slap at the Iranian people. He writes

Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, allowed Mr. Rowhani to win the election recognizing that he had run against current Iranian policies that have isolated the country and invited economically disastrous sanctions. But it isn't clear why Mr. Khamenei allowed such an outcome, 


In this statement, Mr. Ross, who urged support of the Green movement in 2009 effectively ignores the reform movement in Iran, a movement that has been ongoing for more than 15 years. He also insults the Iranian people by implying that they have no agency in their own elections. 

Mr. Ross is a neoconservative connected with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) a well known anti-Iran think tank, still influential with conservative legislators and supported by AIPAC.

One uncharacteristic point in Mr. Ross' op-ed was his de-facto call for recognition of Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy development. 

The answer should be that we can accept Iran's having civil nuclear power but with restrictions that would make the steps to producing nuclear weapons difficult, as well as quickly detectable.

Since Mr. Ross has been a hard-liner on this issue, calling for denying Iran any of its rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, this may signal that the extreme right, of which he is a member, is finally beginning to see after 10 years that this position has no currency. 
--
William O. Beeman 
Professor and Chair 
Department of Anthropology 
University of Minnesota 
395 HHH Center 
301 19th Avenue S.  
Minneapolis, MN 55455 
(612) 625-3400 

Tuesday, June 25, 2013

Marsha Cohen--Diamonds for Peanuts and the Double Standard on Iran (Beeman)

http://www.lobelog.com/diamonds-for-peanuts-and-the-double-standard/

"Diamonds for Peanuts" and the Double Standard

by Marsha B. Cohen

The New York Times' op-ed page headlined "Hopes for Iran", which offers half a dozen cautious to negative views on Iran's president-elect Hassan Rouhani, unexpectedly links to a "Related Story" published last year: Should Israel Accept a Nuclear Ban? Linking the online discussion — intentionally or not — to a debate over Israel's own nuclear program and policies may be more remarkable than any of the op-eds' arguments.

One of the most overlooked and under-discussed aspects of the Iranian nuclear program, at least from an Iranian point of view, is the double standard that's applied to it: while Israel has an estimated 100-200 nuclear weapons that it has concealed for decades, Iran is treated like the nuclear threat — and Iran doesn't possess a single nuclear weapon. Adding insult to injury, Israel is usually the first, loudest and shrillest voice condemning Iran and demanding "crippling sanctions" while deflecting attention away from its own record.

"Iran has consistently used the West's willingness to engage as a delaying tactic, a smoke screen behind which Iran's nuclear program has continued undeterred and, in many cases, undetected," complained former Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Dore Gold (also president of the hawkish Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) in a 2009 LA Times op-ed entitled "Iran's Nuclear Aspirations Threaten the World":

Back in 2005, Hassan Rowhani, the former chief nuclear negotiator of Iran during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, made a stunning confession in an internal briefing in Tehran, just as he was leaving his post. He explained that in the period during which he sat across from European negotiators discussing Iran's uranium enrichment ambitions, Tehran quietly managed to complete the critical second stage of uranium fuel production: its uranium conversion plant in Isfahan. He boasted that the day Iran started its negotiations in 2003 "there was no such thing as the Isfahan project." Now, he said, it was complete.

Yet half a century ago, Israel's Deputy Minister of Defense, Shimon Peres — the political architect of Israel's nuclear weapons program — looked President John F. Kennedy in the eye and solemnly intoned what would become Israel's "catechism", according to Avner Cohen: "I can tell you most clearly that we will not introduce nuclear weapons to the region, and certainly we will not be the first." Fifty years and at least 100 nuclear weapons later, Peres is awarded the U.S. Medal of Freedom, with no mention of his misrepresentation of Israel's nuclear progress.

According to declassified documents, Yitzhak Rabin, another future Israeli prime minister (who would be awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1994) also invoked the nuclear catechism to nuclear negotiator Paul Warnke in 1968, arguing that no product could be considered a deployable nuclear weapons-system unless it had been tested (Israel, of course, had not tested a nuclear weapon). Warnke was unswayed by Rabin's talmudic logic but came away convinced that pressuring Israel would be futile since it was already a nuclear weapons state.

In a BBC Radio June 14 debate between Gold and former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw about the prospects for improving relations with Iran after Rouhani's election, Straw pointed out that Israel has a "very extensive nuclear weapons program, and along with India and Pakistan are the three countries in the world, plus North Korea more recently, which have refused any kind of international supervision…":

JOHN HUMPHRYS (Host): Well let me put that to Dr Gold; you can't argue with that, Dr Gold?

DORE GOLD: Well, we can have a whole debate on Israel in a separate program.

JOHN HUMPHRYS: Well, it's entirely relevant isn't it? The fact is you're saying they want nuclear weapons; the fact is you have nuclear weapons.

DORE GOLD: Look, Israel has made statements in the past. Israeli ambassadors to the UN like myself have said that Israel won't be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.

JACK STRAW: You've got nuclear weapons.

JOHN HUMPHRYS: You've got them.

JACK STRAW: You've got them. Everyone knows that.

DORE GOLD: We have a very clear stand, but we're not the issue.

JACK STRAW: No, no, come on, you have nuclear weapons, let's be clear about this.

National security expert Bruce Riedel is among those who have observed Washington's "double standard when it comes to Israel's bomb: the NPT applies to all but Israel. Indeed, every Israeli prime minister since David Ben-Gurion has deliberately taken an evasive posture on the issue because they do not want to admit what everyone knows." Three years ago, Riedel suggested that the era of Israeli ambiguity about its nuclear program "may be coming to an end, raising fundamental questions about Israel's strategic situation in the region." Thus far that hasn't happened. Instead, Israeli leaders and the pro-Israel lobby use every opportunity (including Peres' Medal of Freedom acceptance speech) to deflect attention from Israel's defiant prevarication about its own nuclear status and directing it toward Iran.

This past April, Anthony Cordesman authored a paper for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) arguing that Israel posed more of an existential threat to Iran than the other way around. "It seems likely that Israel can already deliver an 'existential' nuclear strike on Iran, and will have far more capability to damage Iran than Iran is likely to have against Israel for the next decade," Cordesman wrote. (The paper has since been removed from the CSIS website, but references to it persist in numerous articles.)

This double standard, and refusal to recognize Iranian security concerns, is not news to Iranians. Ali Larijani, Speaker of the Iranian Majlis (Parliament), assured the Financial Times last September that talks between the U.S. and Iran "can be successful and help create more security in the region. But if they try to dissuade Iran from its rights to have peaceful nuclear technology, then they will not go anywhere — before or after the US elections." Larijani, who was Iran's nuclear negotiator between 2005-2007, proposed that declarations by U.S. political leaders that Iran has a right to "peaceful nuclear technology" be committed to in writing.

"Many times the US president or secretary of state have said they recognise Iran's right to nuclear energy," Larjani said. "So, if [they] accept this, write it down and then we use it as a basis to push forward the talks…What they say during the talks is different from what they say outside the talks. This is a problem." Larijani also denied that Iranian leaders were discussing withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) even though the benefits of Iran remaining a signatory — in the face of mounting international pressure campaigned for by Israel while Israel itself faced little to no criticism — seemed unclear. "The Israelis did not join the NPT and they do not recognize the IAEA," he said. "They are doing what they want — producing nuclear bombs, and no one questions it."

This past weekend, CNN's Christiane Amanpour bluntly suggested that up until now, the U.S. has offered Iran few incentives to comply with the international community's demands regarding Iran's nuclear program: "Let's just call a spade a spade. I've spoken to Iranian officials, former negotiators, actually people who worked for Dr. Rouhani earlier, and they said that so far the American incentives to Iran in these nuclear negotiations amounts to demanding diamonds for peanuts."

Ben Caspit, writing in al-Monitor last week week, notes that as soon as the Russians hinted Iran would be willing to suspend uranium enrichment and keep it at the 20% level, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blew off the suggestion as merely cosmetic. The Israeli demand will continue to be  uncompromising, Caspit says, insistent that "…nothing short of complete cessation of uranium enrichment, removal of all enriched uranium out of Iran; termination of nuclear facility activities and welcoming the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would provide sufficient guarantee of Iran's willingness to abandon the nuclear program. Needless to say this will never happen."

As Jim Lobe pointed out the other day, Rouhani outlined an 8-point blueprint for resolving the nuclear standoff between the U.S. and Iran in a letter to TIME in 2006. Rouhani stated:

In my personal judgment, a negotiated solution can be found in the context of the following steps, if and when creatively intertwined and negotiated in good faith by concerned officials…Iran is prepared to work with the IAEA and all states concerned about promoting confidence in its fuel cycle program. But Iran cannot be expected to give in to United States' bullying and non-proliferation double standards.


--
William O. Beeman 
Professor and Chair 
Department of Anthropology 
University of Minnesota 
395 HHH Center 
301 19th Avenue S.  
Minneapolis, MN 55455 
(612) 625-3400 

Wednesday, June 19, 2013

Neoconservative Reuel Marc Gerecht insults Dr. Hassan Rowhani in the New York Times

Self-avowed neoconservative Reuel Marc Gerecht in the New York Times on Sunday chose to insult Dr. Hassan Rowhani's educational credentials by stating that he "supposedly has a Ph.D. in constitutional law from some university in Scotland (exactly where isn't clear)"
<http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/06/17/hopes-for-change-in-iran/rowhani-is-a-tool-of-irans-rulers>

Here are the details from Glasgow Caledonian University where he received his higher degrees

Here are the details from Glasgow Caledonian University, where he received his Ph.D:

"Dr Rouhani, who was a clear winner of the Iranian Presidential election capturing more than 50% of the vote, studied at GCU in the 1990s under his family name of Hassan Feridon. He was awarded an MPhil in 1995. His thesis was entitled The Islamic Legislative Power with reference to the Iranian experience. In 1999, Dr Rouhani gained a PhD with his thesis, The Flexibility of Shariah (Islamic Law), with reference to the Iranian experience.

Dr Rouhani's election campaign videos featured pictures of Glasgow Caledonian University and the former GCU student spoke warmly of his time in the city. On Tuesday, June 18, the Glasgow-based Herald newspaper reported on Dr Rouhani's first news conference in Tehran, quoting him as saying he would "follow the path of moderation and justice, not extremism".

more can be seen at 


--
William O. Beeman 
Professor and Chair 
Department of Anthropology 
University of Minnesota 
395 HHH Center 
301 19th Avenue S.  
Minneapolis, MN 55455 
(612) 625-3400 

Oped-New York Times: How to End the Stalemate With Iran (Mousavian and Shabani)

How to End the Stalemate With Iran

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/opinion/how-to-end-the-stalemate-with-iran.html?_r=0
By SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN and MOHAMMAD ALI SHABANI
Published: June 18, 2013

THE stunning election of a pragmatic former Iranian nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, has offered the Obama administration a once-in-a-lifetime chance to end the atomic stalemate with Iran.

In the West, Mr. Rowhani is widely seen as a turbaned politico from inside the establishment. One of us has worked for him directly, as his deputy in nuclear talks. The other has conducted research at the think tank he runs. We can attest that he is wary of a purely ideological approach to foreign policy and is driven by more than simple expediency in pursuit of the national interest. After seeing the nuclear deal he was attempting to negotiate with the European Union fall apart in 2005, Mr. Rowhani is now seeking to resolve the nuclear issue once and for all, and also to redeem himself politically.

Mr. Rowhani's victory demonstrates that there is now real momentum toward the initiation of direct talks between Iran and the United States. Despite remarks he has made to appease hard-liners since his victory, Mr. Rowhani's campaign rhetoric made clear his desire to change the hostile relationship with America. In recent months, even Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has given permission for direct negotiation — although he has not expressed optimism about its prospects.

 

The single biggest threat to this unique window for dialogue is misguided perceptions of each side's respective strengths and weaknesses. To avoid squandering this opportunity, President Obama and President-elect Rowhani, who takes office in August, must resist and debunk the false impressions that have been promoted by extremists on both sides.

 

In Washington, some have started portraying Mr. Rowhani's election as proof that America's current approach, which relies on tough sanctions, is working. The perception is that the Iranians are willing to budge on their nuclear rights, and that the centrist president-elect — who once agreed to temporarily and voluntarily suspend uranium enrichment — will make unreciprocated concessions. According to this theory, a weakened Iran, hungry for an imminent end to hard-hitting sanctions, will take what it can get. This view implicitly promotes the dangerous idea that the United States should retain or even stiffen its rigid nuclear posture.

 

In Tehran, there is a sense of optimism about the nuclear issue that derives from a tenuous narrative of Iranian resurgence. For years, there has been a systemic reluctance to engage in substantive negotiations, unless Iran is operating from a position of strength. Now a new president has won a clear popular mandate after eight years of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's divisive rule. As a result, there is a growing perception that Iran has the long-sought upper hand.

 

Indeed, many view Mr. Rowhani's background as the supreme leader's longtime personal representative to the Supreme National Security Council as evidence of a new era of national cohesion. This perception of strength could spur Iran to seriously enter nuclear negotiations. But overconfidence could also lead Iran's rulers to avoid making the concessions necessary to break the stalemate.

 

When two rivals walk into a room, each convinced that he has the upper hand, it can end only in disaster. These diametrically opposed perceptions of the meaning of Mr. Rowhani's election have the potential to torpedo this unique opportunity for a deal.

 

Worryingly, the West has a history of squandering chances to strike a deal with Mr. Rowhani. He has publicly suggested that one route out of the nuclear stalemate is the torpedoed 2005 proposal he negotiated with Jacques Chirac, France's president at the time. Under that plan, Western powers would recognize Iran's legitimate rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, including uranium enrichment for civilian purposes like nuclear energy and medical research.

 

In exchange, Iran would accept the International Atomic Energy Agency's definition of "objective guarantees" that the Iranian nuclear program will remain peaceful and not be diverted toward weaponization in the future. That proposal fell apart because of pressure from the George W. Bush administration, which insisted on no enrichment at all.

 

Eight years after the collapse of dialogue with the European Union, the dominant discourse in Tehran still portrays Mr. Rowhani's recommendation to suspend enrichment on a voluntary, temporary basis as a failure because it resulted only in humiliating calls for an indefinite suspension of all enrichment.

 

But Iran's relinquishing of its legitimate rights under the N.P.T., including enrichment, isn't, and has never been, on the table. However, Iranian leaders are open to new measures that would permanently allay Western concerns about Iran's nuclear program.

Indeed, the contours of a final nuclear deal are clear. Iran will have to agree to the highest level of transparency and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and assure world powers that its nuclear program will never be diverted toward weaponization.

 

In exchange, the West will have to recognize Iran's right to peaceful nuclear technology, including enrichment, and gradually lift sanctions.

 

Sooner rather than later, Iran and the United States will engage with each other. The main obstacle to a final deal is no longer its terms, but the path to reaching such an accord. Mr. Rowhani and Mr. Obama must stick to pragmatism and fend off extremism. They must combine prudence with courage and take reciprocal, rationally sequenced steps, and then follow through with hard sells at home. And most of all, they must avoid embracing the misperceptions of strength and weakness that have brought us to the brink.

After decades of fruitless confrontation, both the United States and Iran need cooperation.

 

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former spokesman for Iran's nuclear negotiators, is a research scholar at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton and the author of "The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir." Mohammad Ali Shabani, a contributing editor at the Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, is a doctoral candidate at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

 


_________________________________________

Seyed Hossein Mousavian

Associate Research Scholar atWoodrow Wilson School Princeton University

Phone +1 609 258 9873 | Fax +1 6092563661 - smousavi@princeton.edu  

 http://www.princeton.edu/sgs/faculty-staff/seyed-hossein-mousavian/

 

Tuesday, June 18, 2013

How to End the Stalemate With Iran

The New York Times


June 18, 2013

How to End the Stalemate With Iran

By SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN and MOHAMMAD ALI SHABANI-- 

6/18/13 How to End the Stalemate With Iran - NYTimes.com
June 18, 2013
How to End the Stalemate With Iran
By SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN and MOHAMMAD ALI SHABANI
THE stunning election of a pragmatic former Iranian nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, has
offered the Obama administration a once-in-a-lifetime chance to end the atomic stalemate with
Iran.
In the West, Mr. Rowhani is widely seen as a turbaned politico from inside the establishment.
One of us has worked for him directly, as his deputy in nuclear talks. The other has conducted
research at the think tank he runs. We can attest that he is wary of a purely ideological
approach to foreign policy and is driven by more than simple expediency in pursuit of the
national interest. After seeing the nuclear deal he was attempting to negotiate with the
European Union fall apart in 2005, Mr. Rowhani is now seeking to resolve the nuclear issue
once and for all, and also to redeem himself politically.
Mr. Rowhani's victory demonstrates that there is now real momentum toward the initiation of
direct talks between Iran and the United States. Despite remarks he has made to appease
hard-liners since his victory, Mr. Rowhani's campaign rhetoric made clear his desire to change
the hostile relationship with America. In recent months, even Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, has given permission for direct negotiation — although he has not expressed
optimism about its prospects.
The single biggest threat to this unique window for dialogue is misguided perceptions of each
side's respective strengths and weaknesses. To avoid squandering this opportunity, President
Obama and President-elect Rowhani, who takes office in August, must resist and debunk the
false impressions that have been promoted by extremists on both sides.
In Washington, some have started portraying Mr. Rowhani's election as proof that America's
current approach, which relies on tough sanctions, is working. The perception is that the
Iranians are willing to budge on their nuclear rights, and that the centrist president-elect —
who once agreed to temporarily and voluntarily suspend uranium enrichment — will make
unreciprocated concessions. According to this theory, a weakened Iran, hungry for an imminent
end to hard-hitting sanctions, will take what it can get. This view implicitly promotes the
dangerous idea that the United States should retain or even stiffen its rigid nuclear posture.
In Tehran, there is a sense of optimism about the nuclear issue that derives from a tenuous
MORE IN OPINION
Editorial: Details Not More Assurances
Read More »
6/18/13 How to End the Stalemate With Iran - NYTimes.com
narrative of Iranian resurgence. For years, there has been a systemic reluctance to engage in
substantive negotiations, unless Iran is operating from a position of strength. Now a new
president has won a clear popular mandate after eight years of President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad's divisive rule. As a result, there is a growing perception that Iran has the longsought
upper hand.
Indeed, many view Mr. Rowhani's background as the supreme leader's longtime personal
representative to the Supreme National Security Council as evidence of a new era of national
cohesion. This perception of strength could spur Iran to seriously enter nuclear negotiations.
But overconfidence could also lead Iran's rulers to avoid making the concessions necessary to
break the stalemate.
When two rivals walk into a room, each convinced that he has the upper hand, it can end only in
disaster. These diametrically opposed perceptions of the meaning of Mr. Rowhani's election
have the potential to torpedo this unique opportunity for a deal.
Worryingly, the West has a history of squandering chances to strike a deal with Mr. Rowhani.
He has publicly suggested that one route out of the nuclear stalemate is the torpedoed 2005
proposal he negotiated with Jacques Chirac, France's president at the time. Under that plan,
Western powers would recognize Iran's legitimate rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, including uranium enrichment for civilian purposes like nuclear energy and medical
research.
In exchange, Iran would accept the International Atomic Energy Agency's definition of
"objective guarantees" that the Iranian nuclear program will remain peaceful and not be
diverted toward weaponization in the future. That proposal fell apart because of pressure from
the George W. Bush administration, which insisted on no enrichment at all.
Eight years after the collapse of dialogue with the European Union, the dominant discourse in
Tehran still portrays Mr. Rowhani's recommendation to suspend enrichment on a voluntary,
temporary basis as a failure because it resulted only in humiliating calls for an indefinite
suspension of all enrichment.
But Iran's relinquishing of its legitimate rights under the N.P.T., including enrichment, isn't, and
has never been, on the table. However, Iranian leaders are open to new measures that would
permanently allay Western concerns about Iran's nuclear program.
Indeed, the contours of a final nuclear deal are clear. Iran will have to agree to the highest level
of transparency and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and assure
world powers that its nuclear program will never be diverted toward weaponization. In
6/18/13 How to End the Stalemate With Iran - NYTimes.com
exchange, the West will have to recognize Iran's right to peaceful nuclear technology, including
enrichment, and gradually lift sanctions.
Sooner rather than later, Iran and the United States will engage with each other. The main
obstacle to a final deal is no longer its terms, but the path to reaching such an accord. Mr.
Rowhani and Mr. Obama must stick to pragmatism and fend off extremism. They must
combine prudence with courage and take reciprocal, rationally sequenced steps, and then follow
through with hard sells at home. And most of all, they must avoid embracing the
misperceptions of strength and weakness that have brought us to the brink.
After decades of fruitless confrontation, both the United States and Iran need cooperation.
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former spokesman for Iran's nuclear negotiators, is a research scholar
at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton and the author of
"The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir." Mohammad Ali Shabani, a contributing editor at the
Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, is a doctoral candidate at the School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London.


William O. Beeman 
Professor and Chair 
Department of Anthropology 
University of Minnesota 
395 HHH Center 
301 19th Avenue S.  
Minneapolis, MN 55455 
(612) 625-3400 

Sunday, June 16, 2013

Iranian and American Elections Have Similarities--William O. Beeman (New America Media)

http://newamericamedia.org/2013/06/iranian-and-american-elections-have-similarities.php


Iranian and American Elections Have Similarities

Iranian and American Elections Have Similarities

New America Media, News Analysis, William O. Beeman, Posted: Jun 16, 2013

Much of what transpired in Iran during the presidential election on Friday, June 14 (Flag Day in the U.S.), won by Hassan Rowhani should be familiar to American citizens: A candidate replacing a term-limited president contrasting himself with a former conservative government, campaigning on social and human rights issues along with a promise for an improved economy, combined with a split vote for his opposition that assured his victory by less than a one per-cent margin. Echoes of the American election in 2012 and many earlier elections are clearly present in Iran in 2013. Apparently Iranian and American voters are more alike than either group realizes.

And like American elections often are, the Iranian presidential elections did not turn out as expected—happily for many Iranians, and not so happily for Western critics of Iranian society. The victorious Mr. Rowhani, seen as the most moderate of all the six candidates, was not predicted to win by Western pundits, who followed their own superficial ideological bias, predicting that the election would be rigged by ultra-conservative mullahs and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to favor the most conservative contender. As Iranians turned out in huge numbers—more than 80 percent of eligible voters by the most recent estimates—they gave the lie to this superficial Western view.

Mr. Rowhani’s election was engineered with adept politicking worthy of Democratic mastermind David Axelrod. Mr. Rowhani was somewhat of a dark horse at the beginning of Iran’s short campaign period. Sharp, well-articulated political speeches, including criticism of the current government, garnered him immediate attention as a politician differentiated from the pack of conservatives favored by Iran’s leaders. His endorsement by former Presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani, both seen as relatively moderate, gave him a large boost. Finally, the strategic withdrawal of the other moderate candidate, Mohammad Reza Aref in favor of Mr. Rowhani, sealed the victory.

A friend who works for Press TV, a major Iranian news station, confirmed this dynamic: “After the withdrawal of Mr. Aref, the people saw that Mr. Rowhani had a chance of winning. Many who had planned to boycott the election then decided to vote.” The surge occurred in the two days before the election. As a result, the three conservative candidates split the conservative vote, and Mr. Rowhani as the only moderate surged in the polls and in the vote.

Mr. Rowhani’s victory was decisive. He emerged on Saturday garnering three times the votes of his nearest rival for office, and thus avoiding a runoff election. The results have been met with delight in Iran. Speaking to a journalist friend in Tehran, he reported that the people were celebrating Mr. Rowhani’s victory in the streets in huge numbers. “They are very, very happy,” he exclaimed.

Mr. Rowhani‘s social issues agenda was devoured by the voters, hungry for change. He vowed to increase freedom of expression, free political prisoners, establish greater roles for women and encourage support of the arts, as well as the most important issue for Iranians, to support the Iranian economy, which has been hit hard by U.S. and European sanctions. This makes the election similar to those elections everywhere, where social and pocketbook issues are the main concerns of the electorate.

From the myopic perspective of Washington, London and other Western capitals, however, the only issue worth talking about was Iran’s nuclear program. From the perspective of the Iranian citizenry, this was a minor issue, if it was mentioned at all. At best, the nuclear question was seen as an unfair characterization by the U.S. and its allies of a program in which Iranians take great pride, because of its demonstration of Iranian technological progress and knowledge. Concomitantly, U.S. sanctions designed to force Iran to stop enriching uranium were met with anger and defiance by the everyday voter.

Even with the Iranian public downplaying the nuclear issue, there is active speculation that the election of Mr. Rowhani may open a new chapter in Western-Iranian relations. Mr. Rowhani was the Iranian nuclear negotiator from 2003-2005. In 2004 on his watch Iran voluntarily suspended uranium enrichment as a confidence building measure in hoped-for negotiations with the West. The United States and other Western powers pointedly ignored this gesture, and imposed further sanctions. After the election of President Ahmadinejad in 2005, uranium enrichment was resumed.

It is important to note that despite the obvious delight of Iranian voters at Mr. Rowhani’s victory, his election is somewhat symbolic. His moderate views may be difficult to implement, given the relative weakness of the Iranian presidency compared to the nation’s Spiritual Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i , who occupies the principal seat of power in the Iranian government. Even outgoing President Ahmadinejad, seen as a conservative, frequently ran afoul of Ayatollah Khamene’i, with detrimental effects on his ability to lead.

Even so, this election will go far in mitigating the public feeling that the last election, in 2009, had been stolen by the government to give President Ahmadinejad a second term, rather than electing the more moderate Mir-Hossein Mousavi. This perception led to riots and demonstrations in Tehran that lasted for months.

The current election celebrations in Iran are reminiscent of those greeting President Obama in his victories of 2008 and 2012. As Americans know, a candidate’s promises are often more celebrated than the reality of governance. This may be Mr. Rowhani’s fate, but for the time being his election is a bright spot in a dismal region of the world.

William O. Beeman is Department Chair of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, a veteran commentator on Iran politics, and a longtime editorial contributor for New America Media.

Sunday, June 09, 2013

Iran implicated in "Cyberattacks" with no evidence, and no attribution--New York Times and Vanity Fair


Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger have found a way to implicate Iran in the current discussion on cyber-surveillance. In the New York Times yesterday ("U.S. Helps Allies Trying to Battle Iranian Hacker" June 8, 2013), in the series of Sanger attacks on Iran appearing virtually every Saturday--perhaps to avoid close scrutiny.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/world/middleeast/us-helps-allies-trying-to-battle-iranian-hackers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

Shanker and Sanger attribute an attack on Aramco facilities to Iran using unattributed soures:

"But deterring cyberattacks is a far more complex problem, and American officials concede that this effort, which will include providing computer hardware and software and training to allies, is an experiment. It has been propelled by two high-profile attacks in the past year. One was against Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s largest, state-run oil producer, and according to American officials it was carried out by Iran. That attack crippled 30,000 computers but did not succeed in halting production." [the other was purportedly launched by North Korea--shades of the Axis of Evil]

A more nuanced, but still inaccurate picture arises in Michael Joseph Gross' article "Silent War" in the July 2013 issue of Vanity Fair
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2013/07/new-cyberwar-victims-american-business#livefyre

Gross writes:

"The data on three-quarters of the machines on the main computer network of Saudi Aramco had been destroyed. Hackers who identified themselves as Islamic and called themselves the Cutting Sword of Justice executed a full wipe of the hard drives of 30,000 Aramco personal computers. . . .

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, as forensic analysts began work in Dhahran, U.S. officials half a world away gathered in the White House Situation Room, where heads of agencies speculated about who had attacked Aramco and why, and what the attackers might do next. Cutting Sword claimed that it acted in revenge for the Saudi government’s support of “crimes and atrocities” in countries such as Bahrain and Syria. But officials gathered at the White House could not help wondering if the attack was payback from Iran, using America’s Saudi ally as a proxy, for the ongoing program of cyber-warfare waged by the U.S. and Israel, and probably other Western governments, against the Iranian nuclear program."

So we see from Gross' account that the perpetrators of this attack did not identify themselves as Iranian, but the United States "officials" were ready to be "wondering" if Iran had some kind of "proxy" to carry out the attack.

Both articles continue to imply that Iran has done things for which no one has any evidence or proof. It is Claude Rains in Cassablanca--"round up the usual suspects," and Iran is ALWAYS the usual suspect. 

Tuesday, April 09, 2013

Reliable News Sources on Iran

There are excellent outlets for accurate information on Iran, but one must look for them. It is easy to be lazy and just read David Sanger in the Times, but Sanger is inaccurate, biased and misleading. The Washington Post is not much better. Since the age of mainstream serious journalism is almost dead, one must go to the Internet to get truthful reporting.

I suggest the Inter Press Service <www.ips.org> where Gareth Porter regularly posts; also New America Media <www.newamericamedia.org>; Agence Global <rights@agenceglobal.com>, Khouri's own service is also good; as is Jim Lobe's blog, Lobelog <http://www.lobelog.com/>. The Real News <http://therealnews.com/t2/> carries excellent video interview coverage of Iran,  Consortium News <http://consortiumnews.com/> is an excellent investigative reporting site with occasional excellent pieces on Iran.

Among bloggers, the best remain Thomas E. Wark (former NY Times) http://bordellopianist.blogspot.com/ ; Juan Cole "Informed Comment" <www.juancole.com>, Soraya Sepahpour Ulrich, now writing for the Huffington Post
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/soraya-sepahpourulrich/> and myself, William Beeman "Culture and International Affairs" <www.wbeeman.com>. Nima Shirazi's "Wide Asleep in America" is up to date and critical of the mainstream press <http://www.wideasleepinamerica.com/>

Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett are now posting at <GoingtoTehran.com>. Their older blog postings are at <http://www.raceforiran.com/the-race-for-iran-a-manifesto>,

It is impossible to use standard media outlets to get reasonable coverage on Iran. One must go to these smaller web-based outlets, all of which are, in my opinion, reliable. I am sure I have missed a few good outlets, but perhaps others will contribute.

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Former Insiders Criticise Iran Policy as U.S. Hegemony--Review of Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett "Going to Tehran" by Gareth Porter

http://ipsnorthamerica.net/news.php?idnews=4555

Former Insiders Criticise Iran Policy as U.S. Hegemony
Gareth Porter

WASHINGTON, 25 Feb (IPS) - "Going to Tehran" arguably represents the most important work on the subject of U.S.-Iran relations to be published thus far. 

Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett tackle not only U.S. policy toward Iran but the broader context of Middle East policy with a systematic analytical perspective informed by personal experience, as well as very extensive documentation.

More importantly, however, their exposé required a degree of courage that may be unparalleled in the writing of former U.S. national security officials about issues on which they worked. They have chosen not just to criticise U.S. policy toward Iran but to analyse that policy as a problem of U.S. hegemony.

Their national security state credentials are impeccable. They both served at different times as senior coordinators dealing with Iran on the National Security Council Staff, and Hillary Mann Leverett was one of the few U.S. officials who have been authorised to negotiate with Iranian officials.

Both wrote memoranda in 2003 urging the George W. Bush administration to take the Iranian “roadmap” proposal for bilateral negotiations seriously but found policymakers either uninterested or powerless to influence the decision. Hillary Mann Leverett even has a connection with the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), having interned with that lobby group as a youth.

After leaving the U.S. government in disagreement with U.S. policy toward Iran, the Leveretts did not follow the normal pattern of settling into the jobs where they would support the broad outlines of the U.S. role in world politics in return for comfortable incomes and continued access to power.

Instead, they have chosen to take a firm stand in opposition to U.S. policy toward Iran, criticising the policy of the Barack Obama administration as far more aggressive than is generally recognised. They went even farther, however, contesting the consensus view in Washington among policy wonks, news media and Iran human rights activists that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election in June 2009 was fraudulent.

The Leveretts’ uncompromising posture toward the policymaking system and those outside the government who support U.S. policy has made them extremely unpopular in Washington foreign policy elite circles. After talking to some of their antagonists, The New Republic even passed on the rumor that the Leveretts had become shills for oil companies and others who wanted to do business with Iran.

The problem for the establishment, however, is that they turned out to be immune to the blandishments that normally keep former officials either safely supportive or quiet on national security issues that call for heated debate.

In "Going to Tehran", the Leveretts elaborate on the contrarian analysis they have been making on their blog (formerly “The Race for Iran” and now “Going to Tehran”) They take to task those supporting U.S. systematic pressures on Iran for substituting wishful thinking that most Iranians long for secular democracy, and offer a hard analysis of the history of the Iranian revolution.

In an analysis of the roots of the legitimacy of the Islamic regime, they point to evidence that the single most important factor that swept the Khomeini movement into power in 1979 was “the Shah’s indifference to the religious sensibilities of Iranians". That point, which conflicts with just about everything that has appeared in the mass media on Iran for decades, certainly has far-reaching analytical significance.

The Leveretts’ 56-page review of the evidence regarding the legitimacy of the 2009 election emphasises polls done by U.S.-based Terror Free Tomorrow and World Public Opinon and Canadian-based Globe Scan and 10 surveys by the University of Tehran. All of the polls were consistent with one another and with official election data on both a wide margin of victory by Ahmadinejad and turnout rates.

The Leveretts also point out that the leading opposition candidate, Hossein Mir Mousavi, did not produce “a single one of his 40,676 observers to claim that the count at his or her station had been incorrect, and none came forward independently".

"Going to Tehran" has chapters analysing Iran’s “Grand Strategy” and on the role of negotiating with the United States that debunk much of which passes for expert opinion in Washington's think tank world. They view Iran’s nuclear programme as aimed at achieving the same status as Japan, Canada and other “threshold nuclear states” which have the capability to become nuclear powers but forego that option.

The Leveretts also point out that it is a status that is not forbidden by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty – much to the chagrin of the United States and its anti-Iran allies.

In a later chapter, they allude briefly to what is surely the best-kept secret about the Iranian nuclear programme and Iranian foreign policy: the Iranian leadership’s calculation that the enrichment programme is the only incentive the United States has to reach a strategic accommodation with Tehran. That one fact helps to explain most of the twists and turns in Iran’s nuclear programme and its nuclear diplomacy over the past decade.

One of the propaganda themes most popular inside the Washington beltway is that the Islamic regime in Iran cannot negotiate seriously with the United States because the survival of the regime depends on hostility toward the United States.

The Leveretts debunk that notion by detailing a series of episodes beginning with President Hashemi Rafsanjani’s effort to improve relations in 1991 and again in 1995 and Iran’s offer to cooperate against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and, more generally after 9/11, about which Hillary Mann Leverett had personal experience.

Finally, they provide the most detailed analysis available on the 2003 Iranian proposal for a “roadmap” for negotiations with the United States, which the Bush administration gave the back of its hand.

The central message of "Going to Tehran" is that the United States has been unwilling to let go of the demand for Iran’s subordination to dominant U.S. power in the region. The Leveretts identify the decisive turning point in the U.S. “quest for dominance in the Middle East” as the collapse of the Soviet Union, which they say “liberated the United States from balance of power constraints”.

They cite the recollection of senior advisers to Secretary of State James Baker that the George H. W. Bush administration considered engagement with Iran as part of a post-Gulf War strategy but decided in the aftermath of the Soviet adversary’s disappearance that “it didn’t need to”.

Subsequent U.S. policy in the region, including what former national security adviser Bent Scowcroft called “the nutty idea” of “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran, they argue, has flowed from the new incentive for Washington to maintain and enhance its dominance in the Middle East.

The authors offer a succinct analysis of the Clinton administration’s regional and Iran policies as precursors to Bush’s Iraq War and Iran regime change policy. Their account suggests that the role of Republican neoconservatives in those policies should not be exaggerated, and that more fundamental political-institutional interests were already pushing the U.S. national security state in that direction before 2001.

They analyse the Bush administration’s flirtation with regime change and the Obama administration’s less-than-half-hearted diplomatic engagement with Iran as both motivated by a refusal to budge from a stance of maintaining the status quo of U.S.-Israeli hegemony.

Consistent with but going beyond the Leveretts’ analysis is the Bush conviction that the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq had shaken the Iranians, and that there was no need to make the slightest concession to the regime. The Obama administration has apparently fallen into the same conceptual trap, believing that the United States and its allies have Iran by the throat because of its “crippling sanctions”.

Thanks to the Leveretts, opponents of U.S. policies of domination and intervention in the Middle East have a new and rich source of analysis to argue against those policies more effectively.

*Gareth Porter, an investigative historian and journalist specialising in U.S. national security policy, received the UK-based Gellhorn Prize for journalism for 2011 for articles on the U.S. war in Afghanistan.(END/2013) 

Tuesday, January 22, 2013

University of Minnesota Faculty Protest TCF Bank's Closure of Iranian Student Accounts

January 22, 2013


Dear Jay Kosmicki (Vice President and Region Manager) and TCF executives,

We hope that you will take the time to read this letter, as our intention is not to generate ill will, but rather to urge better practices that befit an institution that works with and benefits from a diverse university community.

First, we must express our deep disappointment in TCF-Minneapolis Bank’s unilateral closing of the bank accounts of at least 22 UMN Iranian students citing possible violations of U.S. trade sanctions. As the students have not engaged in any illegal banking transactions, this appeared to be a case of discrimination based on national origin and unfounded “preemptive” stereotypes. As university faculty who research social practices and ideas, we recognized that TCF’s actions, whether intentional or not, fit precisely within the definition of xenophobia.  In other words, allowing a person’s social and group category as the determining factor in assessing an individual without regard to his or her actual actions is textbook prejudice.

Second, we are perhaps even more dismayed by how TCF has handled the process and the aftermath of its actions - the holiday timing of the letters, the lack of empathy and compassion, the misplaced justifications, the dearth of case-by-case review, to name a few. Beyond being “tone-deaf,” we are struck by how distant and anti-social its response has been. If we only imagine how a cursory frown or an misspoken phrase can easily ruin a person’s day, it takes little imagination to understand that the imposed closing of an important facet of one’s life can generate feelings of immense anxiety, betrayal, anger, injustice, dislocation, insult, and injury. 

In this light, we – part of a growing group of faculty and staff members at the University of Minnesota – will switch our direct deposit from TCF Bank into a different institution and/or will close our accounts. We no longer feel comfortable having TCF be the responsible institution for our deposits. This will occur the first week of Spring semester 2013. Some of us also have multiple accounts and mortgages with TCF, and we will begin to move and close these relationships should TCF continue with such anti-social tactics without apology and with impunity. We are in the process of establishing a network of concerned faculty who are gravely concerned about this matter. 

Having stated the above, we also believe that institutions can change; and that all individuals who work within institutions do not necessary agree with a particular course of action. We hope that you will share this letter with other decision-makers at TCF and attempt to reform some of the culture that led to these unfortunate acts.  Many members of the University of Minnesota, for example, are beginning to think that because of TCF’s market strength (some might say monopoly with the Ucard) at the U, they are taking advantage of its power, instead of realizing that the beauty and creativity of a university lies in its embracing of differences and its recognition of an ample humanity. 


Sincerely,

Concerned Faculty and Staff at the University of Minnesota

(which include but are not limited by the undersigned)

William Beeman, Anthropology
David Chang, History
Vichet Chhuon, College of Education and Human Development
Siobhan Craig, English
Tracey Deutsch, History
Michael Goldman, Sociology and Global Studies
Karen Ho, Anthropology
Beth Mercer-Taylor, Institute on the Environment
Peter Mercer-Taylor, Music
Leslie Morris, German, Scandinavian, and Dutch
Paula Rabinowitz, English
Rachel Schurman, Sociology and Global Studies
Hoon Song, Anthropology
Dara Strolovitch, Political Science