Nuclear drive a casualty of Iran's turmoil Experts say Tehran is unlikely to speed up its program (L.A. Times)

latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iran-nukes28-2009aug28,0,4625620.story
latimes.com
Nuclear drive a casualty of Iran's turmoil

Experts say Tehran is unlikely to speed up its program, giving the U.S. and its allies more time to work with.

Commentary by William O. Beeman: Iran's nuclear program has served as an excuse for launching an attack on the Islamic Republic since 2003. It is clear that Iran is far away from mastering the fuel cycle that would allow it to create fuel for generation of energy. Iran's attackers use weasel-words like "nuclear weapons development capacity" to make the program seem vastly more threatening than it is. In fact, there is no evidence whatever that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. This does not stop politicians in the United States, Israel and elsewhere from presenting Iranian nuclear weapons development as a fait accompli. As Borzou Daragahi points out, there would be many bumps in the road before Iran could come close to developing a weapon, if such a program actually existed, and the current political turmoil sets the clock back even farther. In the meantime, Pakistan becomes less and less stable every day, and Pakistan has nuclear bombs ready to launch. No one in Washington or Tel Aviv seems to care.


By Borzou Daragahi

August 28, 2009

Reporting from Beirut

Iran's political crisis could prevent the nation from making any swift move to ratchet up its nuclear program, said analysts and officials, giving President Obama and Western allies more time to grapple with the issue.

The chaos over the disputed reelection of hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad brings into question who calls the shots in Tehran, and what any deal with the Islamic Republic involving its nuclear program would look like.

The Obama administration, concerned that Tehran is seeking to amass the materials needed to manufacture nuclear weapons, set an informal deadline of September for Iran to respond positively to an offer to discuss the matter rather than risk new economic sanctions.

"The infighting in Tehran has sent up a smoke screen that further confuses the picture from the outside, and the picture was plenty opaque to begin with," said a U.S. official in Washington who is involved in formulating nuclear policy and spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.

Tehran has long insisted that its nuclear research program is meant solely to provide electricity for its growing population. Its production of reactor-grade uranium has become a source of national pride, the atomic symbol emblazoned on the back of Iran's 50,000-rial bills.

But most Western arms-control experts believe Iran is trying to achieve the ability to quickly manufacture a nuclear bomb. And Iran continues to defy United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding that it stop producing the enriched uranium, material that, if further refined, could be turned into the fissile material for a bomb.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, is set to take up its latest quarterly status report on Iran's nuclear program in early September.

In recent weeks, Iran granted IAEA inspectors access to a heavy-water reactor and parts of the country's enrichment facility after previously barring them. The move suggests an effort by Tehran to ease pressure on itself and on its most likely supporters at the Security Council -- Russia and China -- before any new talks on sanctions.

Although Iranian scientists have continued to enrich low-grade uranium during the nation's political crisis, news agencies have reported that Tehran has not taken steps to increase its processing capacity during the last quarter. Experts say that may have more to do with technical quirks than political decisions.

For now, most Iran watchers agree that Tehran will not only be unable to respond positively to the Obama administration's offer of talks, but also is in too much political disarray to make the major decisions necessary to build a nuclear weapon. Such steps would include further enriching its uranium supply to weapons grade, or constructing controversial new facilities for speeding up the process.

"The nuclear dossier has been stalled and is in a stagnant position, with no back or forth moves," said Ahmad Shirzad, an Iranian nuclear scientist and political analyst. "The recent events in Iran put all important decision-making in limbo. The postelection events have not completely unfolded, and Mr. Ahmadinejad has not come to a conclusion what to do."

Iran's 20-year foray into nuclear technology has long benefited from a broad consensus among the nation's political elites, or at least acquiescence by foes of the program. Important institutions such as the Expediency Council, led by Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani; the presidency; the Supreme National Security Council and parliament, along with supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have played a role in the program's creation and sustenance.

Conservative Ahmadinejad likes to take credit for Iran's recent nuclear progress. But Tehran actually relaunched its dormant program under the 1980s premiership of his primary rival, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, and the first breakthroughs on enrichment came during the presidency of Ahmadinejad's reformist predecessor, Mohammad Khatami.

"Nuclear policy has not changed regardless of the domestic problems, as the nuclear policy, like any other strategic policy, was predetermined more than two decades ago," said Ali Khorram, a former Iranian diplomat based in Tehran.

Since the disputed June election, Iran's feuding factions have been preoccupied with political infighting. Rafsanjani skipped Ahmadinejad's inauguration and the president skipped a session of the Expediency Council. At a ceremony honoring the new judiciary chief, who is a conservative rival to Ahmadinejad, the president arrived an hour late and left in haste after delivering a blistering speech calling on the jurist to go after those he termed elitists, alluding to Rafsanjani.

Within Iran's treacherous domestic political arena, any sign of weakness, or of bowing to the West, either by slowing Tehran's missile program or suspending the production of reactor-grade uranium, could be used by rivals to pounce, political analysts say. Therefore, it is likely that the current program, in which reactor-grade nuclear material is processed by at least 5,000 spinning centrifuges, will keep moving forward at its current pace.

"The nuclear program is a touchstone issue for the entire government," said the U.S. official. "No one on either side of the current controversy is going to risk his credibility by even suggesting a change in posture or a substantive pause."

Iran's political hard-liners have made dramatic moves during previous periods of domestic discord. Such measures as stoning women or questioning the Holocaust provoked an international reaction that unified squabbling domestic factions and silenced critics.

But because of the extent of the current political feuding and the stakes involved, experts say, it is unlikely that Tehran will make a dramatic move toward constructing a nuclear weapon.

"It will be hard to get an approval by all concerned," said Jalil Roshandel, an Iran expert at East Carolina University.

Moreover, he said, continued public support of Ahmadinejad's nuclear policies is no longer a given.

"Public opinion is divided, dispersed or, at best, indifferent," he said.

A "breakout" move on the nuclear issue risks not only public scorn, but also tighter sanctions, an embargo on sales of refined petroleum to Tehran or even armed conflict.

Iran's rulers may not want to risk testing the loyalty of an already volatile and angry populace..

"We must remember that the nuclear program is a means to an end," said Meir Javedanfar, an Iran expert based in Tel Aviv. "Khamenei would not sacrifice his regime over it."

Anger over Ahmadinejad's domestic policies has already emboldened figures close to the opposition to speak out more forcefully against his approach on the nuclear issue.

"The Iranian authorities should know what they should expect if they do not enter the negotiations seriously and do not adhere to the repeated resolutions of the Security Council on the suspension of the uranium enrichment program," warned a commentary in the reformist newspaper Mardom Salari.

Internal paralysis, international isolation and stagnant oil prices, analysts say, could work dramatically in the West's favor, giving Tehran the incentive to make a quick deal with the West in order to concentrate on shoring up domestic stability and its faltering economy.

"So far, since the election, Iran seems to be a bit more flexible than before," said Anoush Ehteshami, a professor of international relations at Durham University in Britain.

"Given the current political climate at home, it makes sense to try to contain the nuclear crisis for as long as possible."

But some warn that any deal with Iran's current government would strengthen its legitimacy, betraying an election protest movement that has captured the world's imagination and challenged decades-old ideas about Iran's political realities.

"The Iranian people will never forget if Western liberalism and the international community abandons the Iranian nation's struggle for freedom," said Reza Kaviani, a Tehran-based analyst and opposition supporter.

daragahi@latimes.com

Special correspondent Ramin Mostaghim in Tehran contributed to this report.

Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times

William O. Beeman--Iran's Current Turmoil Has Deep Roots (New America Media)

Iran’s Current Turmoil Has Deep Roots

New America Media, News Analysis, William O. Beeman, Posted: Jul 17, 2009 Review it on NewsTrust

The turbulent internal politics of Iran following the June 12 election have been most often portrayed as a clash between secularizing reform forces and entrenched religious forces. However, this is a mischaracterization. The controversy is fundamentally between two very old, very entrenched religious philosophies that have been debated for more than 300 years. It’s a debate at the heart of every major political uprising in the nation’s history from that time forward. Even if the present controversy is quelled, this debate will continue for the immediate future, likely resulting in a major governmental shift.

The fundamental debate is over the role of religion in the governance of the state. The Safavid Dynasty, founded in the 17th Century, marks the beginning of modern Iran. The Safavids were an Azerbaijani Turkish Shi’a Muslim religious order with strong ties to Sufi mysticism. They eventually conquered the Caucasus, Central Asia and Northern India.

From the very beginning the question of the role of religion in the state was a great issue. The Safavids established “Twelver” Shi’a Islam as the state religion, and from that time forward most of the institutions of modern Shi’ism were established. This included the doctrine that all Shi’a believers should choose a “person worthy of emulation” to serve as their spiritual guide. Eventually, these “Marjeh-ye Taqlid” were recognized as Grand Ayatollahs, renowned for their scholarship, which was established in a “thesis” that included their views of Islamic laws. They also believed that the Twelfth Imam after the Prophet Mohammad, called the “Mahdi,” had vanished in the Golden Mosque in Samarra and would eventually return at the end of time, with Jesus, to render the final judgment of humankind. The Mahdi remains for modern Shi’a believers the ultimate true authority.

The wisest religious scholars warned the Safavids that Islamic clerics should not get involved with government, lest they become corrupt. They pointed out that Islam says very little about statecraft or the formation of governmental institutions and that the compromises of politics are often incompatible with religious piety.

The Safavids didn’t listen. They became powerful and eventually did become corrupt, until they were weakened and conquered by forces from Afghanistan. Another Turkish Dynasty, the Qajars, arose in the 19th Century, with the same fundamental problems of reconciling religious institutions with the State. The Qajar shahs were often at odds with the clergy—particularly when they began to meet the economic and military challenges of Europe by selling “concessions” to Europeans for the exploitation of Iran’s natural resources and economic institutions. The result was an Islamic backlash with open rebellion against the state that launched the modern Islamic movement and led to Iran’s first constitution in 1905.

Toward the end of the Qajar period, prominent Islamic scholars Shaykh Fazollah Nuri and Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein Na’ini maintained opposite viewpoints about the role of clerics in government. As Iran scholar Abbas Milani pointed out in a July 15 article in The New Republic, Sheikh Nuri believed that, in the absence of the hidden Mahdi, religious clerics had ultimate authority in the modern state, and could veto legislation if it was not sufficiently Islamic.

Ayatollah Na’ini asserted that no human government could substitute for the true “Islamic government” to be established by the Mahdi at his return. In the interim, humans had to do the best they could. For Na’ini, this was a constitutional democracy in which, according to Milani, “The role of ayatollahs . . . would be to "advise" the rulers and ensure that laws inimical to sharia were not implemented. But it would not be to rule the country themselves.” Na’ini approved the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty, which ruled Iran until the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who lead the Islamic Revolution which deposed the shah, at first seemed to embrace Na’ini’s philosophy of clerical non-involvement. After the revolution succeeded, however, he reversed course, and embraced Nuri’s philosophy, to the consternation of the majority of the Grand Ayatollahs. The Iranian constitution, consequently, rests on the principle of the “Velayat-e Faqih,” or the “Regency of the Chief Jurisprudent,” in which a senior scholar is chosen as Regent for the absent Mahdi. This is Iran’s “Supreme Leader” today.

Clerics who opposed this doctrine at the time were stripped of their credentials, and some were placed under house arrest.

When Ayatollah Khomeini died, it was difficult to find a successor who would take on the role of Supreme Leader. Ali Khamene’i was finally chosen. He was not a cleric of the first rank, but he was quickly elevated to the rank of Ayatollah. His legitimacy was questioned from the moment he took office.

The controversy still rages. Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, one of the most conservative clerics in the holy shrine city of Qom, and spiritual advisor to President Ahmadinejad, is a supporter of the Nuri position. He has declared that elections are unnecessary now that proper Islamic rule is in place. He reportedly told election workers before the June 12 election that it would be permissible for them to fix the election to make sure that Ahmadinejad could continue in office to support religious rule.

Ahmadinejad’s chief rival, Mir Hossein Mousavi, is no less pious, but he espouses the religious philosophy embodied in the writings of Ayatollah Na’ini—that a secular democracy should be the basic form of government for Iran, with religious scholars serving merely as advisors.

This is also the position favored by the most influential Grand Ayatollah in Iraq, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani of Najaf. Some of the most revered clerics in Iran have likewise denounced the election, thus tacitly revealing their opposition to the principle of the Supreme Leader.

The current attacks questioning the election are thus seen by both Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamene’i as attacks against the most fundamental principle of the current constitution of the Islamic Republic. If the reformers prevail, the constitution would likely be rewritten, and the office of Supreme Leader would be eliminated or greatly reduced in influence. This was threatening not only to the two top office holders, but to everyone else whose power depended on them, including the Revolutionary Guard, and the Basij militia forces, both of which were established to “guard the principles of the Revolution.”

Even if the current controversy dies down, and Ahmadinejad assumes a second presidential term, the crisis will continue. Supreme Leader Khamene’i has no obvious successor, and with the majority of Grand Ayatollahs opposing the very existence of the office, it is unclear who will be found to fill it.

William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota. He has conducted research on Iran for more than 30 years and lived through the Revolution of 1978-79. He is the author of The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.

The Iranian Turmoil--latest thinking--William O. Beeman

I recognize a real social movement when I see one, and the Iranian turmoil is likely to have long-term consequences. Eventually, I believe those agitating for governmental change are going to prevail and revise the constitution, but it will take better organization and a long time to come to fruition.

On the other hand, I recognize several things about the current regime:

1. Ahmadinejad's supporters, the Abadgaran, Isargaran, etc. had a large component of Iraq war veterans. They complained bitterly that they didn't get enough power when AN was elected, and he responded by giving many of them very important posts throughout his administration, where he had the authority. They are now dependent on his retaining is office for them to stay in power. I wrote about this in the last chapter of the Great Satan book. These folks are real power-mongers. They want to maintain their status at any cost.

2. As Neil MacFarquhar noted in today's NYT, Ayatollah Khamene'i also has a coterie of folks dependent on him. If he goes, so do they. Same deal, patron-client relations mean that they will fight fiercely to make sure he stays in his post. Thus for both AN and AK, they are shored up by people whose very lives and fortunes depend on their staying in office, and they will go to ruthless measures to see that this is accomplished.

3. The Iranian regime has saddled up to both China and Russia, and has seen how useful their models for government are--placate the people with electronic toys and slightly improved living conditions and crack down ruthlessly on dissent. I think this is what they have decided to do.

4. Russia and China have a very important stake in keeping things as they are. They have good energy and trade deals with Iran, and these relations are a counter to the United States and Europe. I would not be surprised if they have a heavy hand in this. There are confusing reports of soldiers who don't speak Persian breaking heads in Tehran and elsewhere.

William O. Beeman