Thursday, January 30, 2014

Eight Ways You're Wrong About Iran's Nuclear Program--Yousaf Butt [The National Interest]


Eight Ways You're Wrong About Iran's Nuclear Program



Friday, January 17, 2014

Sign Petition opposing additional sanctions against Iran


The United States has opened the first serious talks with Iran in 34 years. Some members of Congress are attempting to sabotage this diplomatic effort by calling for increased sanctions against Iran. This is an unwise action during this negotiating period. Americans should support peaceful diplomacy whenever feasible.

That's why I created a petition to Sen. Amy Klobuchar (MN-1) and Sen. Al Franken (MN-2), which says:

"We the undersigned urge you to support diplomacy with Iran concerning Iran's nuclear program during the six month negotiation period recently agreed upon by the United States and its P5+1 European partners and Iran. We also strongly urge you to oppose legislation directed at the imposition of additional sanctions on Iran during this period--a move that will lead to the likely failure of these talks. "

Will you sign my petition? Click here to add your name:

http://petitions.moveon.org/sign/support-diplomacy-with-4?source=c.fwd&r_by=306515

Thanks! 

The War Bill--Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2013--Gusterson (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)

Commentary from William O. Beeman: 

This excellent article points up the danger of letting ignorant legislators try to micromanage diplomacy. I use the word ignorant in three senses. First, for the most part they know nothing about the actual issues at hand in the Iranian nuclear program--neither the history nor the actual technical details on the ground.

Second, I am convinced that many of the supporters of the bill haven't read it, or considered its implications. The bill goes far, far beyond dealing with Iran's nuclear program, including trying to put restrictions on conventional weapons. Iran's "rocket" program would conceivably be covered by this agreement--rockets that are currently used to launch communications satellites.

Third, the supporters are ignorant of the implications this bill has for all American diplomatic efforts going forward. Pre-configuring the outcomes of diplomatic negotiations effectively renders them moot. Why even  have diplomats if their hands are tied in this way?

The bill is a fantasy desire on the part of Israel and its supporters, such as Senator Kirk, whose ideological biases are quite evident, to cripple Iran's general technology. It is overreach, and if it passes, will backfire in really terrible ways. This is a bad bill in every sense of the word.

William O. Beeman
University of Minnesota


Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

15 January 2014
The war bill
Hugh Gusterson
Just when it seemed we might escape the political tides pushing the United States toward war with Iran, a group of senators has introduced a bill that would put us back on the path to war. We might as well call it the “give war a chance” bill.

Until recently there had been a general consensus in Washington in favor of sanctions against Iran. Although Washington’s two foreign policy factions—arms controllers and regime changers—diverged in their ultimate goals, as long as Tehran kept methodically expanding its uranium enrichment capability (from a few hundred centrifuges in 2005 to 19,000 today and from 5 percent enrichment to 20 percent), the two sides could often agree on a policy of economic strangulation  against Iran, backed up with the threat of military attack.

That coalition between Washington’s arms controllers and regime changers was shattered, though, following the 2013 election victory in Tehran of a moderate, President Hassan Rouhani, who is aggressively pursuing an entente with the West. While the arms controllers, led by President Barack Obama, are trying to avert a war by reaching an accord with Iran, the regime changers are doing everything they can to sabotage such an accord through a Senate bill, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2013, co-authored by Sen. Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, and Sen. Mark Kirk, Republican of Illinois. Of course, being against arms control and for an increased likelihood of war is like being against motherhood and apple pie, so the regime changers are pretending to help the arms control negotiations they seek to undermine.

The geopolitical landscape first shifted in November 2013 after an extraordinary icebreaking phone call in September between Presidents Rouhani and Obama. Iranian and Western negotiators went on to achieve a modest but—given decades of animosity—historic agreement in Geneva. In exchange for an easing of sanctions worth about $7 billion, the Iranians agreed to cease work on their reactor at Arak, freeze the building of new centrifuges, cap uranium enrichment well below bomb-grade at 5 percent, and allow international inspectors greater access. This agreement was the appetizer for the more substantial deal Western and Iranian diplomats are now trying to negotiate—one with the potential to freeze Tehran’s seemingly inexorable progress toward a nuclear weapon indefinitely, while reintegrating the country into the international system and permanently realigning the relationship between Iran, its neighbors, and the United States.

Rolling back Iran’s nuclear program has thus far been the publicly stated rationale for sanctions. But a faction of the US foreign policy community, dominated by the neoconservatives who brought about the disastrous invasion of Iraq, has always had the more ambitious, if less candidly avowed, objective of ousting the regime that came to power in Tehran in 1979. In the run-up to the US invasion of Iraq, neoconservatives liked to quip that “anyone can go to Baghdad. Real men go to Tehran.” Neocons like William Kristol, Doug Feith, Eliot Cohen, Paul Bremer, and Danielle Pletka (all of whom have signed a letter to the Senate endorsing the Menendez-Kirk approach) have never forgiven the Iranian regime for its humiliating seizure of American hostages at the US embassy in Tehran in 1979. And they believe that the removal of Iran’s clerical regime would ameliorate the situation in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq; cripple Hezbollah; dispose of the main threat to Israel in the neighborhood; and re-establish American dominance in the region. Of course, they had similarly utopian dreams for the invasion of Iraq, and look how that turned out.

In a recent opinion piece for The Washington Post, Senator Menendez (or is that Senator Mendacious?) presented his legislation as intended to help negotiations with Iran succeed. “The proposed legislation is a clarifying action. It allows all sides to negotiate in certainties and provides one year of space for the parties to continue talking. It spells out precisely the consequences should the agreement fail. This should motivate Iranians to negotiate honestly and seriously. At the same time, these prospective sanctions play a positive and reinforcing role in negotiations.”

Nothing could be further from the truth. Even by the currently degraded standards of Washington discourse, this is a pretzel-shaped representation of reality. It is for good reason that President Obama has promised to veto the Menendez-Kirk legislation if it passes, and 10 Senate committee chairs have co-signed a letter to Senate majority leader Harry Reid condemning it.

Edward Levine, a former Senate staffer, has posted an excellent analysis of the Senate bill’s dangers on the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation’s website. He foregrounds four poison pills that it contains.
First, for sanctions against Iran to be suspended, the bill requires the President to certify that “Iran has not conducted any tests for ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 500 kilometers.” As Levine points out, this moves the goalposts on Iran since missile tests have not been a part of the negotiations thus far. Furthermore, since the bill specifies no time period during which such missile tests are disallowed, and Iran has conducted such tests in the past, by some interpretations the bill will preemptively exclude lifting sanctions.

Second, the bill would allow sanctions to be lifted only if the US president certified that “Iran has not directly, or through a proxy, supported, financed, planned, or otherwise carried out an act of terrorism against the United States or United States persons or property anywhere in the world.” Again, no time period is specified. As Levine observes, this means that “if, say, Hezbollah were to explode a bomb outside a US firm’s office in Beirut, the sanctions would go into effect (because Iran gives financial and other support to Hezbollah) even if Iran’s nuclear activities and negotiations were completely in good faith.”

Third, the bill would preauthorize sanctions, but waive them every year if the US Congress agreed that Iran was meeting its commitments. From the Iranian point of view, this would weaken any agreement by introducing the possibility that Congress could allow it to lapse. Iran could end up dismantling nuclear infrastructure only to find itself dealing with a new Congress that decided it had not done enough, or one so paralyzed it could not prevent the trap it had devised from snapping shut.

Finally, Levine points out that the bill requires the dismantling of Iran’s “enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and facilities, the heavy water reactor and production plant at Arak, and any nuclear weapon components and technology.” While it might be conceivable that this could happen many years in the future at the end of a multi-stage process, it is unreasonable in the near term to expect Iran to give up the nuclear infrastructure, permitted by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, for which it has paid so dearly, and in which it sees a hedge against possible security threats.

As former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Colin Kahl puts it in The National Interest, “given the significant financial investment—estimated to be at least $100 billion—and political capital the regime has expended to master uranium enrichment, the supreme leader will not agree to completely dismantle Iran’s program as many in Congress demand. Indeed, Khamenei probably fears such a humiliation more than he fears economic collapse or targeted military strikes against his nuclear facilities.” In other words, this provision in the Kirk-Menendez bill, tantamount to a demand for Iranian surrender, is an offer Tehran cannot accept—but can be blamed for refusing.

There is one more troubling clause in the Senate bill. It states that "if the government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States government should stand with Israel,” calling for “diplomatic, military and economic” support in such circumstances. In other words, it effectively outsources to Israel the decision over whether the United States should go to war with Iran. No wonder the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has been pushing so hard for the bill on Capitol Hill. (Incidentally the Jewish lobby groups J Street and Americans for Peace Now oppose the bill.)

The Kirk-Menendez bill has 59 co-sponsors—just eight shy of the number needed to override a presidential veto. It is astonishing that such a disastrous piece of legislation could have so much support in what we used to be able to call, with a more or less straight face, the world’s greatest deliberative body. Kahl, the former deputy assistant secretary of defense, believes the bill would violate the agreement already reached with Iran in November. The Iran expert Trita Parsi warns that “if the Geneva deal falls apart as a result of Congressional foul play, the world will view the United States and not Iran as the main obstacle to a nuclear agreement,” and that the international sanctions regime may fall apart as a result. Representative Raúl Grijalva, Democrat of Arizona, and Kate Gould of the Friends Committee on National Legislation laid out what's at stake, pointing out that "if Congress isn't careful, it will sabotage our country's best opportunity to prevent war and a nuclear-armed Iran.” Meanwhile many commentators have cautioned that the bill will actually strengthen the hardliners in Tehran and, by sabotaging the chance to reach an agreement, make it more likely that the United States will face a stark choice between accepting a nuclear-armed Iran and going to war.

But the bill is above all dangerous because of the reckless way in which it creates two dead man’s switches—protocols that automate escalation and weaken the grip of American decision-makers on decisions about war and peace. One dead man’s switch is the pre-emplacement of sanctions and the insistence that action must be taken every year to prevent them from being implemented. One would have thought that Congress had learned from its experience with the automatic budget cuts of the 2013 sequester not to play this kind of game with itself.

The second, and even more disturbing, dead man’s switch is the clause pressing the United States to follow Israel to war. Reminiscent of the catastrophic alliance obligations that historians now blame for ensnaring Europe in the First World War, this stipulation incites Israeli hardliners by making them think they have a blank check from the United States. It also willfully and deliberately moves the center of gravity of the decision making outside the United States.

Neoconservatives like to use the rhetoric of patriotism to discredit their opponents. But true patriots do not outsource national-security decisions to other countries.
An anthropologist, Gusterson is a professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University. His expertise is in nuclear culture, international security, and the anthropology of science....


Monday, November 25, 2013

Iran Has a Right to Enrich—And America Already Recognized It (Muhammad Sahimi--The National Interest)


Iran Has a Right to Enrich—And America Already Recognized It


The Iran Accord -- Profoundly, and Primarily, Symbolic--(Huffington Post--William O. Beeman)

 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-o-beeman/iran-nuclear-program_b_4332182.html?utm_hp_ref=tw

HUFFINGTON POST


The Iran Accord -- Profoundly, and Primarily, Symbolic


November 24, 2013

William O. Beeman
 Posted: 11/24/2013 7:33 pm

The principal benefit of the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 nations
on November 23 is that Iran and the United States were able to down to talk
and reach an agreement on *something*. Given 33 years of estrangement and
non-communication, this is an extraordinarily important development --
nearly equivalent to the U.S. breakthrough to China -- perhaps the signal
achievement of the Nixon administration.

The profound symbolism of the moment more than outweighs the lighter
substantive elements of the temporary agreement. The United States and its
partners appeared tough and got very little. Iran appeared tough and gave
up very little. Both sides saved face. This is the essence of a successful
agreement. No one "won" and no one "lost."

Iranians have been both sincere and clever in the negotiations. They played
up to the insubstantial straw-man accusations promulgated by the U.S. and
its partners, making them seem weightier than they were in reality. By
yielding to the P5+1 demands, in essence Iran has allowed itself to be
persuaded to stop temporarily doing what it never intended to do -- make a
nuclear weapon. The bottom line is that Iran did not give up very much in
the negotiations, (but it didn't gain very much either).

Reviewing the terms of the agreement in conjunction with the reality on the
ground in Iran, one can see how easy it was for Iran's negotiators to agree
to these terms.

Low Enriched Uranium


Iran's enrichment of uranium was the crux of the matter. The United States
and its allies had fetishized Iran's uranium enrichment program. They had
made the improbable leap that having enriched uranium would immediately
lead to a nuclear weapon. This is an immense mistake -- so large that one
must suspect that it is essentially hyped for public consumption. The
public has certainly been convinced of this.

However, Iran's low-enriched uranium stockpile cannot be used for any
military purpose, short of the rather improbable construction of a "dirty
bomb" -- a conventional warhead containing radioactive material, not to
explode, but to pollute. Such a primitive weapon has no practical use.
Under the agreement, Iran would cease adding to this stockpile.

Under the agreement, Iran will be allowed to continue to enrich uranium at
less than 5 percent purity -- a concession that preserves Iran's rights
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to peaceful nuclear development
-- its fundamental demand going into the talks.

High Enriched Uranium 


Iran's stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium would be eliminated through
conversion to fuel plates for use in a research reactor or oxidized. It
could then not be further enriched or weaponized in any way. This seems
like a major concession, but when one understands why Iran was enriching to
the 20 percent level to begin with, it is less so.

Iran has a research reactor, the Tehran Research Reactor
(TRR)<http://www.nti.org/facilities/182/>that produced medical
isotopes for the treatment of cancer. The reactor had
been supplied by the United States in 1967. The United States at that time
provided weapons grade fuel for running the reactor. Iran was running out
of 20 percent fuel, and was expected to deplete the supply entirely by
2011. Iran tried to broker a deal for more 20 percent fuel with the United
States. A preliminary agreement was reached on October 1, 2010. The United
States reneged on the agreement. Iran then began enriching its own uranium
to the 19.75% level -- technically below the high-enriched uranium
threshold of 20%. After converting part of this this indigenously produced
fuel into non-weaponizeable reactor plates, it was introduced into the TRR
in February, 2012 <http://www.isisnucleariran.org/static/443/> . The
November 23 agreement will allow Iran to do what it was going to do anyway,
and finish converting the rest of its 19.75 percent fuel into
non-weaponizable reactor plates.

Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor


The agreement requires Iran not to activate its new small heavy water
research reactor in Arak. This small reactor was known to nuclear
inspectors for some time, but because it contained no fissile material, it
was not required to be monitored. The reactor was suddenly seized upon by
Israel and later by French Prime Minister François Hollande as a "path to
plutonium" -- a massive over-reaction. This was quickly echoed and
exaggerated in the press. The Christian Science monitor suggested that this
facility was in truth a "red herring" in the
negotiations<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1118/Iran-s-Arak-nuclear-reactor-Real-dealbreaker-or-red-herring-video>.


The reactor has faced considerable delays in construction and is not
scheduled to open until 2016. It will produce a small amount of
electricity, but it is designed to eventually supplement then replace the
TRR, producing medical isotopes. Plutonium can be extracted from spent fuel
rods, but only if there is a completely new facility constructed to so
this. Iran has no such facility. If Iran were to decide to make a weapon
from this extracted plutonium, it would then need a third facility.
Additionally, as former IAEA nuclear inspector Robert Kelley points
out:"the reactor doesn't do anything without fuel, and so if you don't
have fuel, the reactor doesn't run. If the reactor doesn't run, it doesn't make
plutonium."  <http://therealnews.com/mobile/story.php?id=10995>


All of this time, the International Atomic Energy Agency would be
monitoring the use of the fissile material. Parallels with India, Pakistan
and Israel , who did use heavy-water reactors to extract plutonium and
build bombs are inaccurate, because as non-signatories to the NPT, the
actions of these nations were not monitored.

Building a Bomb? 


There is a strange irony in President Obama's announcement of the temporary
agreement. He mentioned the term "nuclear weapon" multiple times in his
announcement, implying that Iran was on a path to develop such a weapon.
One wonders if he actually believes this or if his repeated implied
accusation was a rhetorical device designed to placate his hard-line
critics.

The president must know by this time that there is no evidence that Iran
has or ever had a nuclear weapons program. Every relevant intelligence
agency in the world has verified this fact for more than a decade. Two U.S.
National Intelligence Estimates that were made public in 2007 and 2011
underscored this. The International Atomic Energy Agency has also
consistently asserted that Iran has not diverted any nuclear material for
any military purpose.

Even Israeli intelligence analysts agree that Iran is "not a danger" to
Israel. Typical is ex-Mossad chief Efraim Halevy who said on March 16 this
year that Iran "will not make it to the bomb," and that Israel's existence
"is not in danger and shouldn't be questioned"<http://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-is-dead-scared-of-israel-says-ex-mossad-chief/>

What Iran Gets in Return


Though Iran is not giving up very much in the November 23 agreement, it is
also not receiving a great deal in return. It will receive 6 to 7 billion
dollars' worth of sanctions relief, more than 4 billion of which is money
already owed to Iran in oil revenues, but frozen. In addition, Iran has
saved face; it did not give up on its inalienable right to enrich uranium
as guaranteed in the NPT. This may be enough to placate hardliners in the
Islamic Republic who have objected to dealings with the United States and
its allies in the past.

There will be some good feelings both in Washington and Tehran that this
astonishingly long impasse has finally been broken. Could either side have
gotten more from these talks? Probably not. In fact the limited gains for
both sides may well be a sign of the success of the negotiations.

The vitriolic nay-sayers trying to torpedo these talks in both capitals and
elsewhere have been thwarted for the moment, but they will certainly begin
condemning this process immediately. However, leaders in both nations
should flatly ignore them. The world can only hope that this small accord
will lead to more substantive rapprochement in the near future.


CORRECTIONS TO THE ABOVE--November 25


I wish to make a few corrections to my comments above, based largely on technical feedback I received after publication. I have no desire to promulgate mistakes.

1. I probably should not have even raised the idea of a "dirty bomb" made from low-enriched uranium. It is a really crazy idea--but one that has been widely used as a rhetorical device in the press attacking Iran's program. The idea that a nation would go to the trouble of building centrifuges and enriching uranium only to pack it into a warhead to spew radioactive material, and not very lethal material at that, defies logic.

2. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2007 asserted that Iran did not have a nuclear weapons program after 2003. Numerous people have questioned whether the NIE had evidence of Iran having such a weapons program before 2003, and the NIE was silent on this issue. I am informed that Iran was in fact contemplating nuclear weapons in the late 1980's. Iran and Iraq fought a debilitating war from 1980-88 and Iraq was suspected of having or being in the process of developing nuclear weapons.

3. There is a typo in the original article, corrected above. Iran HAS (not had) the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) at present. It is aging but still active.

4. The Arak Heavy Water reactor is not accurately described as "small" It will be a large reactor by international standards. It was designed in the 1980's, so it has been in development. Its stated purpose to the IAEA is to serve as a research reactor for generation of medical and scientific isotopes.

Tuesday, November 19, 2013

Understanding the Iranian Perspective in Nuclear Negotiations--Huffington Post by William O. Beeman


It it's amazing that in the current nuclear negotiations taking place in Geneva  between the P5+1 nations and Iran no one in the public media is making the slightest attempt to present the Iranian perspective. That perspective is crystal clear and the US public needs to understand it to keep from going off the rails in paroxysms of irrelevant blather.

Briefly stated in Iran's position everything is based on the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which Iran is a signatory and from which Iran derives its "inalienable right" to peaceful nuclear development.
There are 189 signatories to the Treaty (not including Israel, India, Pakistan or North Korea). The United States and its five allies do not have the power or the authority to deprive Iran of its rights under the treaty, including the right to enrich uranium and build nuclear reactors, a principle accepted for years by the Europeans and only recently called into question ONLY for Iran.

The U.S. and its allies have observed that some non-nuclear weapons states use nuclear technology but don't enrich uranium, and therefore Iran shouldn't claim that as a treaty right. First, that is not how the treaty reads. Besides this, however, the fact that some nuclear nations don't enrich uranium is utterly irrelevant. These nations could start tomorrow and no one would question them. Additionally, there are a number of NPT signatory states that do enrich uranium, such as Japan and Brazil, whose right to do so is unquestioned. Japan has even announced that it will construct nuclear weapons in the future if it has the need.

Some claim that Iran has violated the treaty by not allowing inspections of its facilities. Inspections under the NPT only pertain to sites with fissile material or which will contain fissile material in 180 days. The P5+1 nations negotiating with Iran have demanded unlimited additional inspections of non-fissile material sites without specifying them. Two are, however, widely mentioned: the incomplete Arak heavy-water nuclear electricity plant, which contains no fissile material and the Parchin military base, already inspected some years ago and found to have no fissile material.

UN Security Council resolutions on Iran have been cited as an "obligation" incumbent on Iran to cease its enrichment of uranium. However, these resolutions, starting with the first one,UNSC 1696 , although using the word "demand" in calling on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, make it clear that this suspension is placed in the context of an earlier International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors resolution that sees such suspension as "necessary" as a confidence building measure. In the language of the resolution:
Outstanding questions can best be resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's program by Iran responding positively to the calls for confidence building measures which the Board has made on Iran (IAEA 2006)
It has now been seven years since these resolutions were approved. In the intervening years there has been no evidence whatever of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. Two publicly released US National Intelligence Estimates in 2007 and 2011 declared that Iran did not have an active nuclear weapons program. Every IAEA Report since 2003 declares that Iran has not diverted nuclear material for military purposes. Here is the relevant passage from the August 28, 2013 report.
Notwithstanding that certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated below, the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared material at these facilities and LOFs [locations outside facilies]. (IAEA 2013a, p. 3, section C.8.)
U.S. officials and media commentators have continually claimed that Iran is not cooperating with the IAEA. However on November 11, the Iranian government and the IAEA reached clear accords on Iran providing additional inspection and information regarding its program. Here is the language of the accord showing that Iran has agreed to:
1. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Gchine mine in Bandar Abbas
2. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Heavy Water Production Plant
3. Providing information on all new research reactors
4. Providing information with regard to the identification of 16 sites designated for the construction of nuclear power plants
5. Clarification of the announcement made by Iran regarding additional enrichment facilities
6. Further clarification of the announcement made by Iran with respect to laser enrichment technology (IAEA 2013b)
Iran's actions clearly do not constitute non-cooperation. The November 11 IAEA accord also includes provisions that have been discussed by the P5+1 negotiators, and have been indicated in press reports to still be controversial. Clearly these have been resolved to the satisfaction of the IAEA at present.

There are hosts of other irrelevant issues that have crept into press reports about Iran and these negotiations, such as concern about the Iranian government threatening to destroy Israel (a total lie -- it never happened) , supporting Hezbollah and Hamas, also claims with little contemporary merit. Iran's human rights record is definitely of great concern, as is its support for the Assad regime in Syria. But these again are irrelevant to the nuclear negotiations. The essence of these claims seem to be that Iran has behaved badly in other areas, and so doesn't deserve to enjoy its treaty rights.

This is not how treaty law operates, however. Many nations, including the United States have behaved badly in international relations in areas that have nothing to do with their rights and obligations under a host of treaties. To compare one with the other is a comparison of apples and oranges.

For the United States, France or the other P5+1 nations to expect Iran to abrogate its rights under pressure is both unrealistic and unreasonable. Iran will only relinquish those rights if it can be persuaded that it is receiving significant benefits for paying such a high price in terms of its sovereignty and honor. Certainly additional pressure in the form of increased sanctions against Iran will not be persuasive.


 Follow William O. Beeman on Twitter: www.twitter.com/wbeeman      

Sunday, November 17, 2013

The Real News Network two-part interview with Robert Kelley on Iran’s Nuclear Program November 12-13, 2013 PART 2

The Real News Network two-part interview with Robert Kelley on Iran’s Nuclear Program
November 12-13, 2013




JESSICA DESVARIEUX, TRNN PRODUCER: Welcome to The Real News Network. I'm Jessica Desvarieux in Baltimore.
Talks between Iran and six global powers over its nuclear program fizzled out over the weekend. But plans are still in place for another meeting on November 20 in Geneva.
Now joining us to discuss this imminent meeting is Robert Kelley. He's a nuclear engineer who has worked in the U.S. nuclear complex for more than 30 years. He assisted the IAEA as the director in the Iraq Action Team.
Thank you so much for joining us, Robert.
ROBERT KELLEY, FORMER NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANALYST, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY: [incompr.] Jessica.
DESVARIEUX: So if there needs to be absolute transparency--we're talking on the Iranian side--do you feel like Iran has been transparent? And could they be more transparent?
KELLEY: Iran has behaved in two different ways. With respect to their legal obligation to allow IAEA access to nuclear materials handling facilities--that's places like inversion plants, reactors, enrichment plants--they've been extremely transparent. They've been very cooperative. Something like 12 percent of the IAEA's total budget goes to inspecting one country, namely, Iran. And they get to go to every place they want to go in the nuclear business. But IAEA asks to go to places that are military facilities, factories for the military programs. And Iran has offered some opportunities for that in the past. They didn't feel that they were rewarded for it, and so they said no.
Personally, I'd like to see them go a little further and allow some access to some contentious military facilities that are not nuclear facilities, because it would tend to clear the books. But so far they haven't been willing to do that, because, as I say, they did it before.
DESVARIEUX: And, Robert, you often hear from the right and Israel and other factions here in the United States that at the end of the day, Iran does want a weapon. But if Iran were to weaponize, would they have to get the inspectors out of the country?
KELLEY: No, they wouldn't need to get the inspectors out. The inspectors are going to nuclear facilities, as I said earlier, and they don't have access to places where weaponization would go on.
Weaponization is largely conducted in laboratories, in computers, and is kind of lacking in signatures. It's very hard for intelligence people to see weaponization. The one place where it really shows up in something like satellite imagery is the high-explosive testing that goes along with it. So that's one place where people would look.
But all you have to do is go back and look at Iraq in 1980s. They were heavily involved in weaponization, in many cases in building next door to places where inspectors were, and the inspectors didn't know it.
The inspectors [inaud.] anyway. It's not in their job description. They are there to monitor nuclear materials. And most inspectors, frankly, just wouldn't recognize the indications of weapons, weaponization if they saw them.
DESVARIEUX: So do you feel like that adds to the legitimacy, you know, of--it's debatable, but legitimacy of the argument that if Iran would want to weaponize? And I only ask that because the negotiations are recommencing next week, and they're happening on November , 20 as I mentioned in the introduction. If you were in the negotiation room, what deal with you like to see come out of these talks?
KELLEY: Well, the weaponization issues are not going to be in the talks on the 20th. That's the really important thing that came out of the last few days. IAEA has retreated from that issue [inaud.] will be primarily devoted to the reactor at Arak and to the uranium enrichment. So that's very good news.
What would I like to see? I would like to see Iran come to where a lot of other countries are that have investigated weapons in the past. I think it's pretty clear to everybody that when the Iran-Iraq War was going on in the late '80s, that both countries were looking at nuclear weapons. And I suspect that some activities continued after that in Iran.
But if you go back and look up--I don't want to name all the countries that have done this, but take for example the Swiss, who published a document about their nuclear weapons program and what they did, and several other European countries that investigated the possibility and then backed off. Iran should really consider the possibility of doing the same. And that is saying, look, here's what we did do some years ago, here's where it led, and here are some of the political decisions that were made. The U.S. intelligence community believes that this program probably stopped in around 1973. And it today Iran is trying to remain a threshold state, if you will, a state that could make that decision today. But there are lots of other countries in that position.
You've also asked about transparency. I would like to add that Iran has just opened a new website. Their website is slick. It's Madison Avenue. It addresses all the issues we're talking about in plain, modern, colloquial English. And so they are trying very hard to come out now to the table and say, here we are, look it, here's what we have today, and here are the issues that we have today with the IAEA and the P5+1. So I think Iran is turning a corner in that regard in terms of trying to speak to the Western world language that the Western world understands and uses.
KELLEY: But, Robert, what about the IAEA? Could they be more transparent?
KELLEY: Oh, I definitely think they could. IAEA is accusing Iran of all kinds of things in the weaponization area. But they are not presenting their evidence. And so the material they're putting on the table is of questionable sourcing. And, frankly, the analysis of it is extremely poor. So when IAEA says to Iran, you're doing such and such at this building, the Iranians can see how bad the analysis is, and they want to know where the information is coming from. I think everyone knows who's feeding the IAEA the information, but IAEA really needs to be just more open with Iran and say, this is what we know, and this is why we're confronting you, and this is what we need to do to finish it.
DESVARIEUX: When you say everyone knows where the information's coming from, who are you talking about specifically?
KELLEY: Oh, I think it's very clear, if you've read Mohamed ElBaradei’s book, that this laptop information on which the military dimensions are based came from the U.S. and Israel. He names Israel as being willing to say, we provided information that we want you to follow up on [incompr.] So you certainly know those two countries at least are providing information. And there's at least a supposition that the information the U.S. is confronting with came through a third party.
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