William O. Beeman--The Afghan Drawdown is Long, Long Overdue

The Afghan Drawdown is Long, Long Overdue

New America Media, Commentary, William O. Beeman, Posted: Jun 22, 2011

President Obama is now doing something politically difficult — drawing down our troops from Afghanistan. However difficult it will be for the president to weather his Washington critics, it is the right decision politically and militarily.

The United States has been fighting in Afghanistan for nearly a decade. It is the longest military conflict in our history, and also the most futile and ineffective. Once Al-Qaeda had been ousted from power and had retreated to Pakistan, there was no longer a reason for an American presence there. When the United States finally killed Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, the lack of need for a continued American military presence became definitive. Our continued presence is overkill; we have long since won our battles there. We know that our erstwhile enemy consists of only a few hundred weakened and leaderless adherents in the region.

The costs of maintaining the American military in Afghanistan are astronomical — a billion dollars a week by some estimates. There would be some justification for this expense if the military were actually accomplishing something of value for the United States or even for the Afghan people, but neither is the case.

Let us be clear. The United States is in a conflict of its own making. It set up this war more than 30 years ago in its support of “freedom fighters” working to oust the Soviet Union from Afghan soil. There was nothing wrong with that support at the time; however the United States lost interest in the Afghans and their external voluntary zealot-supporters from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Morocco the minute the Soviets had withdrawn. These external fighters, who could not return home since they frightened their own governments, were dumped into Pakistan with the United States’ blessing, only to fester in their extreme views, forming the core of Al-Qaeda.

The Taliban ex-Afghan fighters — equally reactionary to Al-Qaeda in their religious philosophy — were first supported by the United States, since they hoped that they would support building a pipeline for Caspian petroleum across Afghan territory. When they were seen to protect Al-Qaeda, they became the U.S. target.

The United States' answer to Taliban rule was to install a corrupt dictator, Hamid Karzai, as president of the nation. Karzai, who had long connections with Washington and U.S. financial interests, stole billions of U.S. dollars and never did anything to counter religious extremism in his country. He certainly never lifted a finger to aid in the containment of Al-Qaeda.

American troops twiddled their thumbs in Afghanistan, half-building useless, flimsy public works that now largely stand empty. They also wasted time trying to eradicate the only cash crop that gave Afghan farmers any income at all — opium poppies — and engaging in random skirmishes with Taliban guerrillas. There was never any concrete goal to the military presence beyond containment of Al-Qaeda. Variously the United States has claimed that it was trying to “stabilize” Afghanistan, to bring democratic government to the nation, to assure human rights, and a hundred other ancillary tasks that were utterly impractical and unsuccessful.

In truth, American military and political leaders never understood Afghan society at all. They called local leaders “warlords” and tried to destroy their power base, when in fact these individuals had formed the core of the traditional political system in the country and were forces for stability. They never appreciated the extraordinary ethnic and cultural diversity of the nation, which made every region virtually a nation within a nation, requiring tailor-made strategies for each, rather than one-size-fits-all broad-brush measures. They failed to understand the system of economic and political patronage that insured some modicum of financial security for peasants. They also were totally puzzled by the religious landscape of the country — sometimes over-the-top in its religious stringency, at other times lax and even agnostic.

The one truly virtuous ideal upheld by Americans was the protection of women and women’s rights. But here too the United States could only pay lip service to this important social dynamic. It couldn’t prevent laws curtailing women’s rights from being passed, nor could it develop a strategy for persuading Afghan leaders to intervene in the most egregious local abuses.

One thing is clear though: The U.S. presence has been an astonishing windfall for U.S. contractors and external advisors who reaped billions of their own with little or no supervision at U.S. taxpayer expense. These war profiteers are first and foremost lobbying to keep the military in place.

What is also clear is that the Afghan people no longer want the United States in their country — just as they have never wanted any foreign presence on their soil. At best, the United States has relieved the Afghan military from its own defense responsibilities. It has enriched its generals and other military personnel, but in no way has it been effective in helping to build an Afghan military.

Critics will say that President Obama has simply given up. But our military leaders gave up long before the president. Virtually everyone in command in Afghanistan, and certainly the preponderance of the rank-and-file military, see absolutely no purpose in maintaining a U.S. presence there any longer. It is time for them to come home and give Afghanistan what it really wants — self determination and a nation free of foreign occupation for the first time in decades.

The traditional leadership systems of Afghanistan should be given time to work and establish political stability once more. This will not be quick or easy. Here, the United States or the United Nations could play a limited role in preventing external influence and curtailing the civil conflict, which will likely ensue. However, the Afghans want to make their own way. It is time to let them.

William O. Beeman--No Evidence of an Iranian Bomb, Yet the Attacks on Iran Continue - New America Media

No Evidence of an Iranian Bomb, Yet the Attacks on Iran Continue - New America Media

New America Media, News Analysis, William O. Beeman, Posted: Jun 03, 2011

Pulitzer Prize–winning reporter Seymour Hersh has once again created controversy by stating in a recent New Yorker article, “Iran and the Bomb,” that there is no evidence that Iran is building a nuclear weapon. Hersh is correct, but his statement still provokes debate.

Politico reporter Jennifer Epstein, in a May 31 article, attempts to refute of Hersh’s assertion. Among other charges, she cites criticism of Hersh for using "anonymous sources" in this and other articles. Irony of ironies, Epstein's entire story is based on an anonymous source attacking Hersh. She quotes "a senior administration official" saying: “[A]ll you need to read to be deeply concerned about Iran’s nuclear program is the substantial body of information already in the public domain, including the most recent IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] report."

Since the most recent IAEA Report itself gives no detail whatsoever about this alleged military information, one can only conclude that the information it is talking about was leaked. Indeed, the website ISIS (Institute for Science and International Security) provided what purports to be the evidence for IAEA concern.

The information also appears to have been leaked to the New York Times. Writers David E. Sanger and William J. Broad reported on a series of unrelated “concerns” in Iranian engineering research that when considered together could lead to “triggering” technology for a nuclear weapon. Broad followed up with details in the Science Times section of the newspaper on May 31. He acknowledged that there is no evidence that such a trigger is known to be in development, and several of the elements are consistent with non-military peaceful applications.

In short, the IAEA report and the information leaked to ISIS are totally inconclusive regarding any military use of nuclear technology. If Epstein’s "senior official" wants to claim that this is the smoking gun that proves Iran to be manufacturing nuclear weapons, he or she would be laughed out of the room.

In addition, the Government’s own National Intelligence Estimate of 2011, released in March specifically has dropped language stating that Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions are a future option. Tellingly, the report has been buried by the Obama administration

According to Epstein, the "senior official" goes on to say:

“There is a clear, ongoing pattern of deception, and Iran has repeatedly refused to respond to the IAEA’s questions about the military dimensions of [its] nuclear program, including those about the covert site at Qom,”

This shows once again that "they ain't got nuttin'." Iran's "refusal" to respond to the IAEA questions is limited to a mysterious laptop captured by U.S. Intelligence seven years ago containing "bomb plans" that no one has ever seen. The site at Qom is nothing but an empty hole in the ground with no fissile materials ever introduced--in short, a complete dead horse.

One can ask: Why does the administration continues to flog this non-starter of an issue in the face of its own intelligence on the issue?

Many who have questioned the Bush and Obama administration's tenacity in holding on to this nuclear non-issue have often been accused of "supporting the mullahs" or worse. This is absolutely not the issue. The issue is not support or non-support of the Iranian regime, it is concern over America's own ineffective foreign policy.

It is worth asking whether the United States is going to follow a reasoned and productive policy toward Iran or is going to keep obsessing about this non-existent nuclear issue to the exclusion of every other possible dimension of interacting with the Iranian State?

The United States really cannot afford to let this obstacle dominate our every move toward the most important political entity in the Middle East. The sad part is that the issue isn't even one of ignorance or misinformation. It is one of ideology. To accept the reality that Iran is not the most dangerous nation on the planet is obviously a political third-rail in the United States. It triggers an avalanche of other accusations, Anti-Israeli attitudes or worse, Antisemitism, being among the most common and also the most irrelevant.

Anyone in government or the press, such as Hersh, who questions the utterly unproven postulate that Iran has an active, effective nuclear weapons program risks political disaster. Therefore, otherwise responsible people are willing to embrace a foolish lie that was concocted to serve as a selling point to the American people for Iranian "regime change" during the Bush administration.

Today the specter of the Iranian nuclear bogeyman serves no purpose whatever except to obstruct progress in bringing stability to the region. People embrace the “Iranian bomb myth” not so much because they know it to be true based on hard facts, but rather in order to avoid political attack. Where are our principles? Where is our professionalism?

William O. Beeman Review of "Tehran Rising" by America Abroad Media (Truth Out)

Debunking the Top Seven Myths on Iran's Middle East Policies

by: William O. Beeman,

New America Media

This evening, I listened to the radio program Tehran Rising [5] produced by America Abroad—a program distributed by Public Radio International—and I must say that I was deeply disturbed by the way the program was framed. The program centers on "spreading Iranian influence" in the Middle East.


Frankly, it is somewhat fatuous to try to hang a story about change and unrest in the Middle East on the Iranian bogeyman. Haven't we had enough of this?
Since nations such as Lebanon, Bahrain and Iraq (all covered in the reporting for this piece) are hugely different in their internal and external dynamics, to make this a story about Iran really obscures any nuance whatsoever in the politics of the region, and implies that nothing would be happening if it weren't for Iranian machinations.


There are certainly a few people in Iran who would exult in this misperception, however, here are a few of the myths offered in the program which I would like to debunk.


Myth #1: A "cold war" between Iran and Saudi Arabia.


This is a completely fictional construction. Saudi Arabia has long been wary and disturbed by the Shi'a majority in Hasa, its eastern oil territory. This was true even under the Shah and long before. The fear of the uprising in Bahrain has little or nothing to do with confronting Iran--it is driven by fear that the Bahraini uprising will spread over the causeway to its own province.


Myth #2: Iran’s spurring on of the Bahrain uprising.


The implication in the program was that Iran is doing something to spur on the Bahrain uprising. The program’s own interviewee, Kristin Smith Diwan, denied this.
Moreover, I just participated in a seminar for the U.S. Central Command in Tampa. Two military intelligence agents --fluent in Arabic and Persian – and former students of Middle East experts Ray Motaheddeh and Juan Cole – flatly denied that there was any evidence that Iran had any agents on the ground in Bahrain, based on their own extensive investigations in February and March of this year.


Myth #3: The bulk of Lebanon’s Hezbollah funds come from Iran.


My position on Hezbollah and that of virtually every other observer of Hezbollah is that Iran has no effective control over Hezbollah's political actions today (as opposed to 30 years ago).


The program documented clearly the charitable actions carried out by Hezbollah that were supported by Iran. Iran never denied this. At the same time, the program clearly pointed out the correct statement that the bulk of Lebanon's redevelopment funds came from foreign remittances and from the Gulf States.


The program misleadingly implies that Hezbollah is not receiving funds from the same sources. In fact, the bulk of Hezbollah's funds come from those foreign sources, not from Iran.


Of course the Sunnis such as the one interviewed on the program are opposed to Iran, but look at the welcome President Ahmadinejad got from both Shi'as and Sunnis in his recent trip.


Myth #4: Iranian influence is negative or evil.


This implication that Iranian influence is somehow negative or evil as opposed to being just what nations do was prevalent in the program.


Turkey is trying to increase its influence in Central Asia, but no one complains about that. Iran is being squeezed economically and of course is trying to develop economic and political ties. It’s behaving as nations operate normally.


Myth #5: Iran is exploiting weak democracies.


Ash Jain, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and former State Department staff member, and all those at the WINEP are dedicated to propagandizing against Iran. The idea that Iran is "exploiting weak democracies" is rather silly. Iran can't exploit anyone unless they are able to promulgate messages and actions that are welcome to the populations of other nations.


In fact, Iran has made little or no headway in any predominately Sunni nation. Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment is quite right about the "self-limiting" nature of Iran's influence. Case in point: Tajikistan. Persian speaking, culturally Iranian, the Tajiks should be susceptible to Iranian influence. Instead, they are extremely wary of Iran because Iranians are Shi'a and Tajiks are Sunni.


Myth #6: Iran has “won” because Hamas has gained power.


Ash Jain of WINEP claims that Iran has "won" because Hamas has stabilized and become a force in the Middle East. For heaven's sake, one would think that the denizens of Hamas have no interest in their own affairs and future.


Does he think that Hamas lives only to fulfill some fantasy foreign policy influence on Iran's part?


Myth #7: All Shi’a leaders agree with Iran.


Let's be clear. No Shi'a religious leaders outside of Iran agree with Iran's form of government or want to emulate it. Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani of Iraq is flatly opposed to Iran's brand of clerical rule, and disagrees with the idea that the Iranian Revolution should be spread abroad. Not that there’s hope of that anyway.
Therefore, the flat answer to the question of Iranian influence is: Some in Iran would like to see Iran have greater influence in the region, but their "success" is largely a figment of the imagination of overwrought Westerners looking about for another "cold war" enemy, to echo the framework of this program.


Much of what is attributed to Iran in this radio program and elsewhere is actually the result of the natural dynamics of the individual communities of the region playing out their own local interests.


The fact that some in Iran may be cheerleading from the sidelines doesn't mean that Iran is in control. Nor does it mean that what Iran is doing is any different than any other nation in the world trying to create favorable relations for itself.


William O. Beeman is Professor and Chair of Anthropology and specialist in Middle East Studies at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis-St. Paul Minnesota, formerly of Brown University.

William O. Beeman Review of "Tehran Rising" by America Abroad Media

I listened to the radio program Tehran Rising produced by America Abroad--a
program distributed by Public Radio International
<http://www.americaabroadmedia.org/programs/view/id/157>
this evening and I must say that I was deeply disturbed by the way the piece was framed.
The program centers on "spreading Iranian influence" in the Middle East.

Frankly it is somewhat fatuous to try to hang a story about
change and unrest in the Middle East on the Iranian bogeyman. Haven't we
had enough of this? Since nations such as Lebanon, Bahrain and Iraq, all
covered in the reporting for this piece,  are hugely different in their internal
and external dynamics, to make this a story about Iran really obscures any
nuance whatever in the politics of the region, and implies that nothing would
be happening if it weren't for Iranian machinations. There are certainly a few
people in Iran who would exult in this misperception--giving Iran far more.
Interested people should listen to the program or read the transcript themselves.
However, here are some of my objections:

1. The piece posits a "cold war" between Iran and  Saudi Arabia. This is a complete 
fictional construction. Saudi Arabia has long been wary and disturbed by 
the Shi'a majority in the Hasa, its eastern oil territory. This was true 
even under the Shah and long before. The fear of the uprising in Bahrain 
has little or nothing to do with confronting Iran--it is driven by fear 
that the Bahraini uprising will spread over the causeway to its own 
province.

2. The implication that Iran is doing something to spur on the Bahrain 
uprising. Your own interviewee, Kristin Smith Diwan, denied this. 
Moreover, I just participated in a seminar for the U.S. Central Command 
in Tampa. Two Military Intelligence agents--fluent in Arabic and 
Persian--former students of Ray Motaheddeh and Juan Cole--flatly denied 
that there was any evidence that Iran had any agents on the ground in 
Bahrain, based on their own extensive investigations in February and March.

3. Hezbullah--I think you know not only my position on Hezbullah but 
that of virtually every other observer of Hezbullah, and that is that 
iran has no effective control over Hezbullah's political actions today 
(as opposed to 30 years ago). You documented clearly the charitable 
actions carried out by Hezbullah that were  supported by Iran. Iran 
never denied this. At the same time, the program clearly pointed out the 
correct statement that the bulk of Lebanon's redevelopment funds came 
from foreign remittances and from the Gulf States. The program 
misleadingly implies that Hezbullah is not receiving funds from the same 
sources. In fact the bulk of Hezbullah's funds come from those sources, 
not from Iran. Of course the Sunni's such as the one interviewed on the 
program are opposed to Iran, but look at the welcome President 
Ahmadinejad got from BOTH Shi'as and Sunnis in his recent trip.

4. The implication that Iranian influence is negative or evil as opposed 
to being just what nations do. Turkey is trying to increase its 
influence in Central Asia, but no one complains about that. Iran is 
being squeezed economically and of course is trying to develop economic 
and political ties.

5. Ash Jain and all those at WINEP are dedicated to propagandizing 
against Iran. The idea that Iran is "exploiting weak democracies" is 
rather silly. Iran can't exploit anyone unless they are able to 
promulgate messages and actions that are welcome to the populations of 
other nations. In fact, Iran has made little or no headway in any 
predominately Sunni nation. Karim Sajjadpour is quite right about the 
"self-limiting" nature of Iran's influence. Case in point: Tajikistan. 
Persian speaking, culturally Iranian, the Tajiks should be susceptible 
to Iranian influence. They are extremely wary of Iran because Iranians 
are Shi'a and Tajiks are Sunni.

5. Ash Jain claims that Iran has "won" because Hamas has stabilized and 
become a force in the Middle East. For heaven's sake, one would think 
that the denizens of Hamas have no interest in their own affairs and 
future. Does he think that Hamas lives only to fulfill some fantasy 
foreign policy influence on Iran's part?

6. Let's be clear. No Shi'a religious leaders outside of Iran 
agree with Iran's form of government or want 
to emulate it. Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani is flatly opposed to Iran's 
brand of clerical rule, and disagrees with the idea that the Iranian 
Revolution should be spread abroad--a vain hope anyway.

7. Therefore the flat answer to the question of Iranian influence is: 
Some in Iran would like to see Iran have greater influence in the 
region, but their "success" is largely a figment of the imagination of 
overwrought Westerners looking about for another "cold war" enemy, to 
echo the framework of this program." Much of what is attributed to Iran 
here is the result of the natural dynamics of the individual communities 
of the region playing out their own local interests. The fact that some 
in Iran may be cheerleading from the sidelines doesn't mean that Iran is 
in control. Nor does it mean that what Iran is doing is any different 
than any other nation in the world trying to create favorable relations 
for itself.

Best,

Bill Beeman
University of Minnesota

 

William O. Beeman--We Killed Osama bin Laden, Now Let’s Kill the Myth - New America Media

We Killed Osama bin Laden, Now Let’s Kill the Myth - New America Media

New America Media,

Commentary, William O. Beeman, Posted: May 03, 2011

The United States is jubilant over the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. However, it will be some time before history catches up with the mythology that arose around him and the al-Qaeda organization in the past 10 years. Osama bin Laden at the end was far from the looming powerful figure he was made out to be. He had outlived his usefulness both as a bogeyman for the West, and as an Islamic responder to the neo-colonialist forces his organization purported to confront.

The principal myth surrounding bin Laden was that his brand of religion represented a mainstream streak of something identified variously as “jihadism” or, in more genteel rhetoric, “political Islam.” This was far from the truth. No doubt, bin Laden justified his actions with questionable theology and bogus fatwas, but his organization’s actions represented an extremist view of religiously justified political action that was embraced by only a fraction of the Islamic world.

Second, bin Laden was seen as promulgating the United States as al-Qaeda’s principal target—a mythology that was certainly reinforced by the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Actually, the target of bin Laden and the al-Qaeda forces for which he served as leader was the Saudi Arabian Royal Family. He turned to this mission after the Soviet Union was expelled from Afghanistan. Bin Laden viewed the Saudi Royal Family as having defiled the Arabian Peninsula—the Holy Land where the major religious shrines of Islam are located. Not only were the lives of the Saudi rulers seen as venal, they allowed the United States and other nations to establish military operations on Saudi soil. The United States became the target of al-Qaeda when they set up operations to protect and support the Saudi Royal Family.

Third, bin Laden was promoted by the Bush administration as the mastermind of a gigantic apocalyptic global organization under his control. They built the search for him into the Global War on Terror—for which they actually issued GWOT medals. This was a gigantic exaggeration that was largely accepted by the American public without question.

Fourth, exaggerating bin Laden’s powers also served disparate dissident groups in the Islamic world. After the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, bin Laden’s organization had enormous cachet among political resistance groups—many of whom predated the rise of bin Laden and al-Qaeda by decades. These smaller groups, with their own local grievances against repressive rulers, quickly “branded” themselves with the epithet “al-Qaeda.” It was a franchise operation that gave many small groups from the Philippines to Morocco instant attention and credibility. In fact, bin Laden never had direct control over these groups. They would occasionally come to him directly or indirectly for blessings of their actions, and he would routinely “approve.” This served everyone’s purpose—making bin Laden’s al-Qaeda seem more powerful than it was, and giving the local groups credibility. We now know that over 10 years, bin Laden’s organization had dwindled precipitously. In fact, its numbers were in the low hundreds in the Afghan-Pakistan theater in the end.
Fifth, bin Laden was presented by the United States—particularly the Bush administration—as impossibly clever, wily and able to evade U.S. military operations. This mythology was promulgated by Pakistan as well. In fact, bin Laden was an incredibly useful symbolic bogeyman. His mere existence justified the United States’ presence in Afghanistan, as well as billions of dollars spent supporting the Pakistan military regime without complaint from the American public. It is already apparent that the Pakistanis—and likely some Americans—knew very well where he was. He was not hiding out in a cave somewhere; he was 35 miles from Islamabad in a stable compound in a luxury neighborhood.
Finally, bin Laden has been portrayed with the power to reach beyond the grave. Virtually, the instant that his death was announced, global speculation about “sleeper cells” and attacks by “bin Laden’s followers” filled the airwaves. In fact, no one has ever identified these organizations. This is part of the continued mythology of a unified Islamic global movement organized to confront Western civilization. Such a movement never existed, though there are certainly individuals in both the West and the Islamic world who find it politically useful to promulgate such a fabrication.

As we have seen in the past few months, the dominant focus for political action in the Middle East and elsewhere is not religious-based. Movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain and even Jordan are based in the principle of secular representative government free of Western political and economic control, channeled through repressive rulers. Even in Iran, dissidents seek to lessen the influence of religious doctrinaire control as their political system moves inexorably toward secular rule.

The mythic ideology of Islamic confrontation with the West, inherent in the bin Laden myth, should die with him. Americans, rather than celebrating a triumph over Islam, should instead be looking forward to a new era of cooperation with the progressive peoples throughout the region, who, with bin Laden’s death, have now begun to have the false accusation of Islamic extremism lifted from their shoulders.

William O. Beeman is professor and chair of the department of anthropology, University of Minnesota, Minn. He has lived and worked in the Middle East for more than 30 years, and is past president of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association.

Interview with William O. Beeman--PressTV - 'Yemenis reject any Saudi interference'

Interview with William O. Beeman

PressTV - 'Yemenis reject any Saudi interference'

Press TV has interviewed Professor William Beeman, the chairman of anthropology department of the University of Minnesota, who acknowledges that the people of Yemen are saying "No" to any interference from Saudi Arabia.

Press TV: Regarding the two-week deadline, which has been presented by the Yemeni opposition for President Saleh to leave his post - Do you think he will meet this deadline and step down?

William Beeman: I think that President Saleh has no intention of stepping down voluntarily. He's going to have to be forced out of office. What we find in Sana'a is that we have pro-Saleh demonstrations taking place, but anywhere outside of the centre of Sana'a you have anti-government demonstrations going on. We don't have good information about the northern parts of the country. But I think President Saleh thinks he is going to be able to remain in power.

Press TV: You say that Saleh has no intentions of quitting and he will have to be forced out - Are these protests we are seeing all over Yemen enough to accomplish that? Or are we talking about something bigger that is needed?

William Beeman: It's an interesting question because it's not clear who may be helping the opposition with resources etc. President Saleh has government resources at his beck and call including part of the military that is still supporting him.

As you know, General Ammar has defected to the opposition and we are waiting to get more information about General Ammar and who may have promised him some leadership position perhaps in a newly formed government or what ties he has with resources external to Yemen. The resources for the opposition are not well known right now.

Press TV: Concerning the Saudi-backed initiative that is supposed to take place next week - it has been rejected by the people of Yemen. We were talking to a journalist this week and he said that this proposal is not for the opposition or the people to accept or reject, it's been made directly to Saleh. Considering the influence Saudi Arabia has wielded in the past in Yemen - Do you think Saleh would accept a proposal by them?

William Beeman: The details of such a proposal would be interesting to know. One of the things the Saudi government wants to ensure is that there is stability in Yemen because the Saudis see Yemen and the people in Yemen as potential threats. If Saleh goes they will want assurance that there is going to be a stable pro-Saudi government that takes his place.

And the reason the opposition has expressed a rejection of a plan, whatever it may consist of, is that they don't want the Saudis controlling their government, or their destiny. And that goes for interference from the US as well.

There is a classic mistake that nations make when they are dealing with other nations in the midst of revolution, and we've seen it again and again, is that the people are not interested in outside interference.

Press TV: Can the revolution reach fruition without influence from foreign powers? We see in Egypt where there was a powerful and viable institution, the military, which has a lot of sway politically, but we're not seeing that in Yemen.

William Beeman: That's exactly right; we don't know what military forces they have. Additionally, there are many Yemenis that live outside of Yemen and the possibility of them supplying aid to the opposition is there. The question is - Are they able to transfer funds or supply arms? That's an interesting question, so I would look to the Yemeni community abroad. A number of millions of Yemenis are not in the country at present and they are opposed to the rule of President Saleh. This element needs to be considered by analysts as well as people inside Yemen.

Press TV: With the Saudi mediation efforts - Can we expect Saudi Arabia to be an honest broker considering what it is doing in Bahrain against pro-democracy protesters? And also, would Saudi Arabia take into account its own strategic interests first in ensuring stability over what the people of Yemen want?

William Beeman: Well, Saudi Arabia itself is not in any way a democracy; it doesn't have a constitution and the Saudi royal family rules by decree. So there is no democracy in Saudi Arabia and the idea that they are trying to foster a democratic state in Yemen is strange given that they don't believe in it for their own people.

It is a question of stability. We forget that the family of Osama Bin Laden comes from Yemen. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is based in Yemen - it's not a very big or very important group, but nevertheless it is enough to worry the Saudi royal family because the principal target for al-Qaeda is not the US or Europeans - It's the Saudi royal family. They would like to see the Saudi royal family completely eliminated from Saudi Arabia and the Saudi royal family knows this.

An unstable Yemen is therefore a potential source of real danger for the government of Saudi Arabia and that's why they want to broker a deal that will bring people to power in Yemen that they will have some control over. And they have had through the US control of President Saleh.

SC/GHN

Email response from a University of Wisconsin professor:

Email response from a University of Wisconsin professor:

Date: Tue, Mar 29, 2011 at 9:34 PM
Subject: Information concerning the confidentiality of your e-mail

As you may know, the Republican Party of Wisconsin has submitted an Open Records request for the e-mails of a faculty member after he presented scholarship critical of them.  I do not know if that request will be granted. Because I have recently been at certain protests and have signed certain petitions (on my own time, not university time) that the Republican Party would also object to, I am informing all who e-mail me that I can not guarantee your confidentiality. My private e-mail is [redacted].  However, it is unclear whether I can guarantee confidentiality of my private e-mail if the content is deemed to be official university business, and I may not be able to discuss information protected by the federal educational privacy act.  You can also call me at [redacted], but please note that voice messages are e-mailed to me.  I apologize for the inconvenience and hope this situation resolves itself soon.

Netanyahu's Dangerous Posturing (Israel PM: Must be military option against Iran)

Prime minister Netanyahu's over-the-top call for Iran to be "stopped" like Gadhafi's regime in Libya reflects either his venality in promulgating a doomsday scenario, his active desire to utterly mislead the public through the false equation of the Gadhafi regime with the Iranian government, or his naivete in terms of strategy. Any of my freshman students knows that the two governments are utterly different in their history, their composition and their philosophy. What does the Prime Minister think that this rather ridiculous call to action is going to accomplish? It certainly is not going to persuade the Russians! And every military leader knows that a preemptive attack on Iran invites utter disaster for the region and the world. Additionally, unless one accepts the false assertion that Hamas and Hezbollah operate under the direct orders of Tehran, Iran hasn't actively threatened anyone. Nor is there any indication whatever that Iran  "dreams of world supremacy" as Netanyahu asserts.  This is just another foolish attempt to ratchet Iran up to the status of über-Bogeyman. Isn't it reasonable to expect that world leaders not indulge themselves in this kind of childish, irresponsible rhetoric?

Bill Beeman
University of Minnesota

usatoday.com

Israeli PM: Iran should be 'stopped' like Gadhafi

MARCH 24, 2011

MOSCOW (AP) — Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Thursday that Iran's government should be "stopped" like Gadhafi's regime in Libya.

Netanyahu said that Iran's nuclear and other ambitions pose an immediate threat to global security.

"This is a very belligerent Islamist regime that dreams of world supremacy, and it has to be stopped," he told the Vesti television channel. "If we have to tame Gadhafi, we have to stop the Tehran's regime in the same way."

Netanyahu arrived in Moscow Thursday, a day after Russian President Dmitry Medvedev welcomed his Palestinian counterpart Mahmoud Abbas. Observers believe their visits are aimed at overcoming the obstacles in the Palestinian-Israeli talks.

Russia is part of the so-called Quartet of Mideast peace brokers that also includes the United States, the European Union and the United Nations. The Quartet's principles include recognition of Israel, a renunciation of violence, and adherence to previous Palestinian agreements.

Justin Elliott--A history of Libya and blowback--Interview with William O. Beeman

MONDAY, MAR 21, 2011 13:32 ET

WAR ROOM

A history of Libya and blowback

BY JUSTIN ELLIOTT

AP/Langevin

Moammar Gadhafi and wreckage from Pan Am flight 103

A fact that hasn't gotten much attention since the Obama administration started its bombing campaign in Libya is that we've been here before. President Ronald Reagan launched a bombing raid on Libya in 1986, known as Operation El Dorado Canyon.

That was a very different era -- one in which Moammar Gadhafi was an active sponsor of terrorism and had been demonized in the U.S. for years. There are, however, interesting parallels to today. The Obama administration, for example, has warned in recent days that Gadhafi may try to hit back at the U.S. or Europe by sponsoring acts of terrorism. In the 1980s, Gadhafi did just that. Reagan's strike on Libya was one of the key events in the run-up to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.

The Lockerbie bombing killed 270 people. Among the many Americans killed was Matthew Gannon, a Beirut-based CIA officer. Libyan intelligence agent Abdelbaset al-Megrahi was ultimately convicted of masterminding the attack.

To learn more about the history of Operation El Dorado Canyon and Lockerbie, I spoke with William Beeman, a Middle East expert and anthropology professor at University of Minnesota. The text that follows has been edited for length and clarity.

Can you summarize the political context in the 1980s that led up to the American bombing in Libya in 1986?

Well, Col. Gadhafi was a very iconoclastic figure from the time he took power in 1969. He had been involved in supporting any number of terrorist organizations including the Irish Republican Army. In particular, he was very upset about the fact that anti-Gadhafi forces -- Libyan expatriates -- had been operating in Europe. In retaliation, he funded the IRA and he claimed that this was payback for the Europeans that were allegedly fostering opposition to his own government. Gadhafi also claimed to be sponsoring the Red Army Faction [in Germany] and was generally considered to be a terrible gadfly to Europeans and to the United States. He was quite equal opportunity; he also supported Idi Amin in Uganda, and he declared himself the king of kings of all of Africa. So the United States under Reagan declared Libya to be the chief state supporter of terrorism in the 1980s.

What prompted the American bombing in 1986?

The main thing that touched off the incident was the bombing of the La Belle nightclub in West Berlin in April 1986. There were a small number of people killed and a large number injured. The United States had an absolute smoking gun. The Libyan agents involved in the attack were operating out of East Germany. During the dregs of the Cold War, there was kind of a perfect storm -- East Germany and the communists were involved with the Libyans and they were bombing a nightclub in West Berlin. So the story was, "Evil Gadhafi and evil communists plot to bomb Westerners." Later on it turned out to be true that the Stasi had been involved, but we didn't know about this for a long time, until after the reunification of Germany. A week after the bombing, Reagan ordered the strike on Libya.

What happened in that strike?

In mid-April, U.S. jets attacked a number of sites in Libya including the presidential palace. The U.S. had planned a strike of this kind long before it actually took place, but it came as a big surprise for everybody. The Europeans actually resisted it. The U.S. was cooperating with Great Britain but France and Spain and Italy denied the U.S. overflight rights. So the U.S. started from Great Britain and flew down the coast and then through Gibraltar, which is British territory. They had to refuel in the air to make the flight. They dumped tens of tons of munitions on the airfield in Tripoli.

A dozen or so officers were killed in the raid but Gadhafi and his family escaped. The story is -- and we don't know this is true for sure -- that he was warned in advance by either the the prime minister of Malta or Prime Minister Craxi of Italy. After the raid, Gadhafi announced that he had won a military victory over the United States because they hadn't killed him. There were also a couple of Americans whose plane was shot down.

Didn't Gadhafi claim that his "adopted daughter" was killed in that attack?

That's right. She was called Hannah. But no one had ever heard of her. And every time the story was told about her, her age seemed to change -- from 12 months to 6 years, and various numbers in between. The fact that no one knew who she was and they couldn't get the facts straight about her existence really tells me that it may have been a fabricated story. There may have been somebody from the household killed and it may have been expeditious for Gadhafi to say, "This is my adopted daughter." It might have been a metaphorical relationship more than anything else.

So how did you get from the '86 attack to Lockerbie? Are the two events connected?

From the standpoint of the Libyans, the Lockerbie incident was retaliatory for the fact that the British had allowed the U.S. to fly this mission from Great Britain. A bomb was placed on the plane and it blew up in midair. There were 270 people killed. It was en route from Heathrow to the United States, so that was significant because the airstrikes in 1986 had been, in Gadhafi's view, a joint U.S.-British operation. But the Libyans denied for a long, long time that they had anything to do with the Lockerbie incident. A Libyan, Megrahi, was eventually convicted in Scottish court and was in jail for a long time. Now, just last month, the Libyan justice minister, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, claimed that Gadhafi had personally ordered the Lockerbie attack. But Mustafa Abdel-Jalil is now one of the leaders of the opposition, so maybe that claim is not so surprising.

The Obama administration has said it is now on alert for some kind of Gadhafi-sponsored terrorist attempt. Do you see that as plausible?

Well, it's possible. But it's interesting that most of the Libyan delegations outside of Libya have now denounced the Gadhafi government. Clearly any groups that are loyal to Gadhafi outside of Libya cannot operate under the cover of the Communist state anymore. The United States more or less absolved Gadhafi during the Bush administration. We restored diplomatic relations in 2004. And just before the presidential election in 2008, the U.S. had a comprehensive Libyan claim settlement. The Libyans agreed to compensate the Lockerbie victims and the victims of the Germany bombing in 1986. And the U.S. more or less said, "We're going to wipe the slate clean."

• Justin Elliott is a Salon reporter. Reach him by email at jelliott@salon.com and follow him on Twitter @ElliottJustin More:Justin Elliott

The "coalition" has no clothes - Libya - Salon.com

The "coalition" has no clothes - Libya - Salon.com
Sunday, Mar 20, 2011 12:10 ET

Note from William O. Beeman: The idea that the attack on Libya was the result of a coalition, and not a United States unitary action is utterly absurd on the face of it. This article from Salon by Justin Elliott points this up very clearly, with explicit documentation. If Colonel Qaddafi prevails, he will be able to say, as he did in 1986 when a Ronald Reagan-ordered attack on him failed, "Qaddafi has beaten the United States."

The "coalition" has no clothes

By Justin Elliott

• 
  

AP/Remy de la Mauviniere

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is welcomed by French President Nicolas Sarkozy for a crisis summit on Libya, at the Elysee palace in Paris, Saturday, March, 19, 2011.

An emphatic part of the White House messaging about the bombing in Libya is that the operation is truly international in character.

But it's quickly becoming clear that the bombing campaign -- at least so far -- is almost entirely an American operation, albeit one that has been packaged to give it an international look. It's a dissonance that brings back memories of George W. Bush's much-mocked "coalition of the willing."

The rhetoric from the administration has consistently referred to the U.S. playing a "support" role in a large coalition. As Hillary Clinton said yesterday in France, referring to the Security Council resolution that authorizes protection of civilians in Libya: "So let me be very clear about the position of the United States: We will support an international coalition as it takes all necessary measures to enforce the terms of Resolution 1973."

President Obama, in what was obviously a carefully choreographed move, did not himself announce the beginning of the bombing. Indeed, when the news was announced by French President Nicholas Sarkozy, Obama was on an uncanceled trip to Brazil.

Obama's brief statement from Brasilia referred to a "broad coalition" that "brings together many of our European and Arab partners." He said he had authorized "military action in Libya in support of an international effort." Obama used the words "international" and "coalition" a total of ten times in a statement that lasted just three minutes.

The grandstanding was left to Sarkozy, who had ordered French planes to make the first flights over Libya -- before U.S. aircraft got involved. "Along with our Arab, European and North American partners, France has decided to play its part before history," he said.

• Continue reading

But strikes by over 100 American cruise missiles quickly followed the French action, and early Sunday morning a slew of American planes -- including B2s, F-15s, F-16s, Navy EA-18G electronic warfare planes and Marine attack jets, according to the AP -- bombed Libya. It's not clear whether any Arab nations -- some of which supported the Security council resolution -- have contributed military support at this point.

None of this to say that the international political support for the Libya intervention is not significant. But NBC Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszewski today knocked down the talk that what is going on militarily is a "huge coalition effort." Here's what he said in a remarkable segment this morning:

"Despite the White House attempts to make this look like it's a huge coalition effort -- obviously it required coalition political support -- but for now the U.S. military is not only in the lead but conducting almost all military operations, with only minor participation from the French, as you mentioned, even British fighters over night. There's a U.S. commander. And even this morning I talked to senior military officials, when I asked them how soon will the U.S. turn over the command to the coalition -- and the indication is the U.S. military is in no hurry to do that."

Watch:

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Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, this morning delivered a very different message than Miklaszewski's reporting suggests. Mullen insisted in a Sunday show interview that while the U.S. is "leading it now, we're looking to hand off that leadership in the next few days." It will be interesting to see if that happens.

• Justin Elliott is a Salon reporter. Reach him by email at jelliott@salon.com and follow him on Twitter @ElliottJustin More: Justin Elliott

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• Libya: Endgame unclear after successful first days

  U.S. officials call initial bombings a success, but says its too early to define the campaign's ultimate objectives
  ROBERT BURNS, Associated PressSunday, Mar 20, 2011

Libya's Opposition Leadership Comes into Focus | STRATFOR

Libya's Opposition Leadership Comes into Focus | STRATFOR
March 20, 2011

Note from William O. Beeman: STRATFOR is a semi-reliable source prone to leaps of conjecture and frequent inaccuracy. However, this is the most detailed account I have seen of the organization of the opposition forces in Libya. Given the dearth of information about the opposition and the uncertainty of the outcome in Libya, the account here is worth paying attention to. I caution readers not to accept this account uncritically.

Libya has descended to a situation tantamount to civil war, with forces loyal to Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi in the west pitted against rebels from the east. One of the biggest problems faced by Western governments has been identifying exactly who the rebels are. Many of them, including former Libyan Justice Minister Mustafa Abdel-Jalil and former Interior Minister Gen. Abdel Fattah Younis, defected early on from the Gadhafi regime and represent part of the leadership of the National Transitional Council, which lobbied Western governments for support soon after its formation. Challenges posed by geography and lack of military capabilities remain, however, meaning that even with the aid of foreign airstrikes against Gadhafi’s forces, the rebel council will struggle to achieve its stated goal of militarily toppling Gadhafi and unifying the country under its leadership.
Editor’s note:This analysis was originally published March 8 but has been significantly updated with current, accurate information.

Analysis

Identifying the Opposition

One of the biggest problems Western governments have faced throughout the Libyan crisis has been identifying who exactly the “eastern rebels” are. Until the uprising began in February, there was thought to be no legitimate opposition to speak of in the country, and thus no contacts between the United States, the United Kingdom, France or others. Many of those who now speak for the rebel movement are headquartered in Benghazi. There have been several defections, however, from the regime of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi to the eastern rebel leadership, and it is men like these with whom the West is now trying to engage as the possible next generation of leadership in Libya, should its unstated goal of regime change come to fruition.
The structure through which the Libyan opposition is represented is the National Transitional Council. The first man to announce its creation was former Libyan Justice Minister Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, who defected from the government Feb. 21 and declared the establishment of a “transitional government” Feb. 26. At the time, Abdel-Jalil claimed that it would give way to national elections within three months, though this was clearly never a realistic goal.
One day after Abdel-Jalil’s announcement, a Benghazi-based lawyer named Abdel-Hafidh Ghoga held a news conference to refute his claims. Ghoga pronounced himself to be the spokesman of the new council and denied that it resembled a transitional government, adding that even if it did, Abdel-Jalil would not be in charge. Ghoga derided the former justice minister as being more influential in the eastern Libyan city of Al Bayda than in Benghazi, which is the heart of the rebel movement.
The personality clash between Abdel-Jalil and Ghoga continued on for most of the next week, as each man portended to be running a council that spoke for the eastern rebel movement in its entirety. It was significant only insofar as it provided just a glimpse of the sort of internal rivalries that exist in eastern Libya, known historically as Cyrenaica. Though Cyrenaica has a distinct identity from the western Libyan region historically referred to as Tripolitania, that does not mean that it is completely unified. This will be a problem moving ahead for the coalition carrying out the bombing campaign of Libya, as tribal and personal rivalries in the east will compound with a simple lack of familiarity with who the rebels really are.
The National Transitional Council officially came into being March 6, and — for the moment, at least — has settled the personal and regional rivalry between Abdel-Jalil and Ghoga, with the former named the council’s head and the latter its spokesman. Despite the drama that preceded the formal establishment of the council, all members of the opposition have always been unified on a series of goals: They want to mount an armed offensive against the government-controlled areas in the west; they want to overthrow Gadhafi; they seek to unify the country with Tripoli as its capital; and they do not want foreign boots on Libyan soil. The unity of the rebels, in short, is based upon a common desire to oust the longtime Libyan leader.
The transitional council asserts that it derives its legitimacy from the series of city councils that have been running the affairs of the east since the February uprising that turned all of eastern Libya into rebel-held territory. This council is, in essence, a conglomeration of localized units of makeshift self-governance. And while it may be centered in the east, the rebel council has also gone out of its way to assert that all Libyans who are opposed to Gadhafi’s rule are a part of the movement. This is not a secessionist struggle. A military stalemate with Gadhafi that would lead to the establishment of two Libyas would not represent an outright success for the rebels, even though it would be preferential to outright defeat. Though it has only released the names of nine of its reported 31 members for security reasons, the National Transitional Council has claimed that it has members in several cities that lie beyond the rebel-held territory in the east (including Misurata, Zentan, Zawiya, Zouara, Nalut, Jabal Gharbi, Ghat and Kufra), it has promised membership to all Libyans who want to join, and it asserted that the council is the sole representative of the whole of Libya.
The council’s foremost priorities for the past several weeks have been garnering foreign support for airstrikes on Gadhafi’s forces and the establishment of a no-fly zone. Absent that, the rebels have long argued, none of their other military objectives stood a chance of being realized.
It was the lobbying for Western support in the establishment of a no-fly zone that led the transitional council’s “executive team,” also known as the crisis committee, to go on a tour of European capitals in mid-March designed to shore up support from various governments and international institutions. Mahmoud Jebril, an ally of Abdel-Jalil, and de facto Foreign Minister Ali al-Essawi, the former Libyan ambassador to India who quit in February when the uprising began, comprise the executive team. The result of this trip was the first recognition of the transitional council as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people, which was provided by France on March 10. France, as we were to see in the following days, was to become the most vociferous advocate of the international community coming to the aid of the rebel council through the use of airstrikes.

Challenges

Before the decision was made to implement a no-fly zone, the Libyan opposition forces collapsed in the face of Gadhafi’s onslaught, and they have shown little sign of coalescing into a meaningful military force. While the loyalist eastward thrust was against a disorganized rebel force, Gadhafi’s forces have demonstrated that they retain considerable strength and loyalty to the regime. That means that even with coalition airstrikes taking out armor and artillery, there will still be forces loyal to Gadhafi inside any urban center the rebels might encounter in a westward advance, meaning that the rebels would be forced to fight a dedicated force dug into built up areas while operating on extended lines, a difficult tactical and operational challenge for even a coherent and proficient military force. So even though the coalition airstrikes have since shifted the military balance, the fundamental challenges for the rebels to organize and orchestrate a coherent military offensive remain unchanged.
It is important to note that little of the territory that fell into rebel control in the early days of the insurrection was actually occupied through conquest. Many military and security forces in the east either deserted or defected to the opposition, which brought not only men and arms, but also the territory those troops ostensibly controlled. Most fighting that occurred once the situation transitioned into what is effectively a civil war, particularly in the main population centers along the coastal stretch between Benghazi and Sirte, consisted of relatively small, lightly armed formations conducting raids, rather than either side decisively defeating a major formation and pacifying a town.
Just as the executive team represents the National Transitional Council’s foreign affairs unit, the council also has a military division. This was originally headed by Omar El-Hariri, but the overall command of the Libyan rebels has since reportedly been passed to former Interior Minister Gen. Abdel Fattah Younis. Younis’ name arose early on as the man with whom the British government was engaging as it tried to get a grip on the situation unfolding in rebel-held territory. He was not included in the original transitional council membership, however, despite several indications that he did in fact retain widespread support among eastern rebels. This, like the clash between Abdel-Jalil and Ghoga, was another indication of the rivalries that exist in eastern Libya, which paint a picture of disunity among the rebels.
Younis, however, now appears to have been officially incorporated into the command structure and is presiding over a National Transitional Council “army” that, like the council itself, is the sum of its parts. Every population center in eastern Libya has since the uprising began created respective militias, all of which are now, theoretically, to report to Benghazi. Indeed, the most notable of these local militias, created Feb. 28, has been known at times as the Benghazi Military Council, which is linked to the Benghazi city council, the members of which form much of the political core of the new national council. There are other known militias in eastern Libya, however, operating training camps in places like Ajdabiya, Al Bayda and Tobruk, and undoubtedly several other locations as well.
Younis has perhaps the most challenging job of all in eastern Libya: organizing a coherent fighting force that can mount an invasion of the west — something that will be difficult even after an extensive foreign bombing campaign. More defections by the military and security forces in the west, like the earlier defections in Zawiya and Misurata, would perhaps benefit the transitional council even more than the bombing campaign under way. There is no sign of imminent defections from the west, however, which will only reinforce the military and geographic challenges with which the rebel council is faced.
Libyan society is by definition tribal and therefore prone to fractiousness. The Gadhafi era has done nothing to counter this historical legacy, as the Jamahiriya political system promoted local governance more than a truly national system of administration. Ironically, it was this legacy of Gadhafi’s regime that helped the individual eastern cities to rapidly establish local committees that took over administration of their respective areas, but it will create difficulties should they try to truly come together. Rhetoric is far different from tangible displays of unity.
Geography will also continue to be a challenge for the National Transitional Council. The Libyan opposition still does not have the basic military proficiencies or know-how to project and sustain an armored assault on Tripoli; if it tried, it would run a serious risk of being neutralized on arrival by prepared defenses. Even Gadhafi’s hometown of Sirte — almost certainly a necessary intermediate position to control on any drive to Tripoli — looks to be a logistical stretch for the opposition. An inflow of weapons may help but would not be the complete solution. Just as the primary factor in eastern Libya’s breaking free of the government’s control lies in a series of military defections, the occurrence of the same scenario in significant numbers in the west is what would give the National Transitional Council its best chance of overthrowing Gadhafi.

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