Attacking Iran will not Stop the Violence in Lebanon
William O. Beeman
Blaming Iran for the horrific violence between Israel and the Arabs of Lebanon and Palestine is a popular stance in the world today. Although it might make many people feel good to give Iran another tongue lashing, such an exercise will do nothing to stop the violence and destruction going on in the region. Paradoxically, however, Iran could play a role in bringing about peace if it were allowed to do so.
Iran makes a convenient scapegoat. It has no defenders. Americans and Europeans are already furious with Tehran over the development of Iran's nuclear program. The Sunni States in the region--principally Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt are worried about growing Iranian power as Shi'a forces throughout the region grow in influence. The Sunnis are uncomfortable defending the Shi'a community in Lebanon, and are quite happy to have Iran bear blame for the war, even if the reasoning is weak. Meanwhile in the United States, neoconservatives are primed with a decade-long program to attack Iran that they have conveniently grafted onto the Hezbollah-Israeli conflict as a suggested response.
However, both of these positions are mistaken in their analysis and in their strategic goals.
The Sunni States' position is short-sighted and pusillanimous. Perhaps they hope that the Shi'a world as a whole will be weakened through Israel's actions. But there is no magic Israeli bullet that will eliminate the need of the nations in the region to come to peaceful terms with Iran, which grows stronger and more prosperous every day with every American misstep and every increase in the price of oil. Nor can the Sunni states avoid accommodating the significant, growing non-Iranian Shi'a population in the region. Standing silent and allowing the Lebanese Shi'a to be attacked is also bringing about the destruction of the Sunni population in Lebanon--including the "Jewel of the Eastern Mediterranean," the Sunni/Christian city of Beirut, long a financial and tourist center for the Sunni Arab community. Standing on the sidelines in the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict also effectively ignores the backlash that is being felt by the Palestinians and their supporters as Israel lashes out at Hamas.
The neoconservative position is far more complex, and potentially more dangerous. The neoconservatives purposely ignore the fact that their basic thesis is wrong. Hamas and Hezbollah are not puppets. They have control of their own actions and destinies. More importantly, the neoconservative proposed action--attacking Iran militarily--is impossible at present; a campaign against Iran is acknowledged by American military strategists to be impractical and potentially ineffective. Finally, even if the United States or Israel could be successful in destroying Iran's government through a military attack, this action would not curtail violence against Israel. More specifically, it would not destroy Hezbollah or Hamas, as the neoconservatives claim.
One can only conclude that the neoconservatives have been calling for Iran's destruction for so long, they can not give up the habit. William Kristol writing in the Weekly Standard and London's Financial Times on July 16 writes: "No Islamic Republic of Iran, no Hezbollah. No Islamic Republic of Iran, no one to prop up the Assad regime in Syria. No Iranian support for Syria . . . little state sponsorship of Hamas and Hezbollah. " The Wall Street Journal Editorial Page has stated flatly: "Keep in mind that Hezbollah is not the indigenous Lebanese "resistance" organization it claims to be, but is a military creature of Tehran." Neoconservative guru Michael Ledeen of the American Enterprise Institute writes: "there is a common prime mover, and that is the Iranian mullahcracy, the revolutionary Islamic fascist state that declared war on us 27 years ago and has yet to be held accountable." Finally, Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, picking up these themes announced on July 19 that Hezbollah timed the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, the event which set off the violence, to deflect world attention away from Iran's nuclear development program.
These representative positions sound reasonable in Washington only because they perpetuate the dominant mythology in American foreign policy that State support is the only thing that sustains groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. The glib neoconservative solution: destroy the State supporters, in this case Iran, and the offending groups will be destroyed in turn, sounds great to sound-byte driven legislators who have no knowledge of the Middle Eastern region.
However, with a little reflection, Washington policy makers should be running away from the neoconservatives on this point, since their spiel should sound ominously familiar. It is the precise formula promulgated by a major group of neoconservative advisors, including Richard Pearle, and Douglas Feith to Israeli Prime-Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996. Their paper, entitled "'A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm," called for the overthrow of the governments of Iraq, Iran and Syria as a way to eliminate threats to Israel, on the theory that this would undercut support for groups opposing Israel.
This call for action was repeated by many of the same neoconservative group members, along with William Kristol, Dick Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, John Bolton and Zalmay Khalilzad under the rubric of the organization, The Project for the New American Century in 1998. This group wrote a recommendation to President Bill Clinton and Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich calling again for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, in part to obtain security for Israel. The basic logic in these position papers drove the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Then as now, the idea that regime change in the region will secure Israel's safety is wrong. It is mistaken both in its reasoning and in its understanding of basic facts about Hezbollah and Hamas, their history and their purpose.
Hamas, as some, including Kristol, actually point out, is an emanation of the Muslim brotherhood, now enjoying resurgence in Egypt. Hamas predates the Iranian Revolution, since the pedigree of its parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood goes back to the 19th Century and the original Islamic Movement led by reformer Jamal ed-Din al-Afghani, designed to counter European powers and the Middle Eastern rulers who collaborated with them to rob the people of the region of their patrimony.
Iran has no control at all over Hamas' actions or its political agenda. The closest Iran comes to actually influencing Hamas is financial support provided based on a general open appeal from Hamas leader Khaled Mesha'al after Hamas came to power in Palestine in a democratic election, and was subsequently isolated by Israel and the United States.
Hezbollah would never have existed if the French had not created a state where the plurality of Shi'a Muslims would be ruled by minority confessional groups in their own nation--groups that had no interest in protecting the Shi'a as they were attacked by Israel throughout the late 20th Century.
Iran was instrumental in the birth of Hezbollah in the early 1980's when it was the only defense available for the Shi'a community. However, today, though Hezbollah uses Iranian arms (Iran in fact sells to many nations), and Iran has communication with Hezbollah, every expert on Hezbollah today agrees that Iran has had no effective control over Hezbollah's actions for several years--especially since Hezbollah has become largely a political and charitable organization. As former CIA analyst and now Georgetown University professor Daniel Byman wrote in Foreign Affairs in 2003, Iran "lacks the means to force a significant change in the [Hezbollah] movement and its goals. It has no real presence on the ground in Lebanon and a call to disarm or cease resistance would likely cause Hezbollah's leadership, or at least its most militant elements simply to sever ties with Tehran's leadership."
In short, both Hamas and Hezbollah have their own history, their own reasons for existing, and their own agendas regarding Israel and the West. The idea that they are empty vessels waiting to be filled with an Iranian agenda is absurd in the extreme. Even if Iran were leveled, like Carthage in Roman times, both Hamas and Hezbollah would continue their struggle against Israel, and the Shi'a world, energized by the outrages perpetrated against it, would continue to grow in strength and defiance.
It is better by far to embrace Iran as part of the solution rather than part of the problem. Many Westerners, noting the hostile rhetoric against Israel emanating from Iran may find it hard to believe that Iran could ever play a positive role in a conflict of this sort. However, this attitude is part of the problem. Iran talks the way it does in great part to retaliate against the United States for its actions against Iran. The fact that the United States has not yet found a way to actually talk to Iran exacerbates this situation, promoting even more Iranian hostility.
Iran craves the respect of the international community more than any other commodity one might offer, though Western observers will find their methods for obtaining that respect counter productive. Nevertheless, Iran models its macho posturing on those who confront it—primarily the United States. Iran relishes the idea that it might be offered a respectful position as a peacemaker.
In practical terms, the Islamic Republic may not directly influence the actions of Hezbollah and Hamas, but they offer a way to talk to the two groups. Iran has been willing to serve as mediator in the past in the region, notably in working with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and has garnered bona fides for its efforts. Moreover, Iran has hinted in the recent past that it would drop its hostile posture toward Israel if relations with the United States were to improve.
Many Middle Eastern problems will be solved once the United States decides to get serious about dealing with Iran, as myriad foreign policy advisors, including former National Security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Council on Foreign Relations have recommended. Vilifying Iran is not doing anyone any good, but asking them for a little help might do a great deal to bring peace to the region.
_____________________
William O. Beeman is Professor of Anthropology and Middle East Studies at Brown University. He has lived and worked in the Middle East for more than thirty years. His most recent book is The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other.
Wednesday, July 19, 2006
Wednesday, July 05, 2006
Pragmtism May Trump Zeal as Iran's Power Grows--Christian Science Monitor
Christian Science Monitor
July 6, 2006
Pragmatism may trump zeal as Iran's power grows
Iran faces a July 12 deadline on the West's incentives intended to defuse nuclear standoff.
By Scott Peterson | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
ISTANBUL, TURKEY – Iranians tearfully remember the moment when a US Navy cruiser shot down an Iranian civilian airliner over the hazy Persian Gulf, killing all 290 on board.
Eighteen years ago this week, Iranian TV flashed images of bodies and debris floating in the water and the Islamic Republic accused the US of a "barbaric massacre." It added the destruction of Iran Air Flight 655 and its "martyrs" to a long list of grievances that continue to stoke US-Iran hostility.
Now, as Iran prepares to respond to a US offer of direct talks over its nuclear program - the first such high-level public offer since Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution - its officials are reexamining their past.
How is the thinking of Iran's arch-conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the more powerful clerics led by Iran's supreme religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, shaped by their difficult and sometimes violent experience with the US?
That history includes US support for Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s - and Western silence about Iraq's flagrant use of chemical weapons at the time - as well as President Bush's inclusion of Iran in his "axis of evil."
But despite the decades of mistrust, disrespect, and anger, analysts say that Iran's leaders feel they are now in a position of power like never before, so revolutionary zeal is giving way to a new pragmatism that could break the taboo over talks.
"You can't deal with the US from a position of weakness. The only way the US will come around to treat you with respect is from a position of power," says Farideh Farhi, an Iran specialist at the University of Hawaii, currently in Tehran.
The US has "historically proven its intent to weaken" Iran, says Ms. Farhi. Iran's leadership shares this view, as do many ordinary Iranians, who otherwise often hold Americans themselves in high regard. "Even among the Iranian population, you can sense a tremendous distrust of US intentions."
Wednesday, Iran postponed talks with the European Union on a bundle of incentives put forward by Russia, China, Britain, France, Germany, and the US to ease tensions over its nuclear program. Talks were rescheduled for Thursday to discuss the offer before a July 12 deadline imposed on Iran to respond to the package.
Iran's current sense of strength comes from a coincidence of factors. Mr. Ahmadinejad's victory a year ago placed every lever of power into conservative hands; last April, during the back-and-forth with Europe and the US over Iran's disputed nuclear program, Tehran achieved low-level uranium enrichment.
Iran is buoyed also by a glut of cash from high global oil prices, and has watched as the US military machine - once seen as a tool of "regime change" that would be aimed at Iran - is bogged down fighting an insurgency in Iraq.
"Thanks to the US government, two of Iran's main threats - Saddam Hussein, and the Taliban and Al Qaeda - have been removed from power," says Abbas Maleki, Iran's former deputy foreign minister, currently at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. "So it's a different situation."
Iran and its leadership have also changed over time, experts say. Dreams of exporting the revolution evaporated long ago. "Twenty years ago, the Iranian public sphere was [still] ideological.... At that time, talk of US-Iran relations was taboo," says Hamid Reza Jalaiepour, a US hostage-taker, former intelligence officer, and provincial governor.
"Now, the Iranian public sphere is pragmatic," says Mr. Jalaiepour, who today teaches political sociology at Tehran University. "The two sides are willing to negotiate. But both sides are bargaining for the price, for their own conditions."
There is new "common ground," because US military control of adjacent Iraq and Afghanistan means "the US is a close neighbor of Iran," says Jalaiepour. Populists like Ahmadinejad "are looking for development [and] need votes"; the US likewise "can't solve its problems through another war, or through sanctions."
There is even a mechanism in Iranian culture that can overcome "all these insults, annoyance, and sabotage" of two estranged parties, says William Beeman, an anthropologist and Iran specialist at Brown University, contacted in Tokyo. "Once reconciliation takes place, it is total, it is absolute sweetness and light from then on."
But sitting down for talks will require some humility. Washington alleges that Iran is the world's "most active state sponsor of terrorism," for supporting Hizbullah in Lebanon, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories.
And in Tehran, true believers of the revolution can't count the number of American flags they have burned over the years, or effigies of Bush they have torched.
"History is important, but for a new relationship we should forget everything in the past, because those bad events do not help solve the problem," says Amir Mohebian, political editor of the conservative Resalat newspaper in Tehran. "It has been a cold war between the two countries, and it could be a hot war any moment, so each [side] should try to bury the history."
"I think it is a good opportunity for the US, because the generation of the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war are showing that they [can] forget all these problems of the past," says Mr. Maleki, whose brother was killed at the Iran-Iraq front. "All of us - we are ready to forget. We have moved on."
The US experience with Iran fixates on the hostage crisis, when radical students seized the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979, and held and humiliated 52 US diplomats for 444 days. US officials also saw an Iranian hand in bomb attacks against US Marines and US Embassy targets in Lebanon, and even the kidnapping of Americans there in the 1980s. They add the Khobar Towers bomb in Saudi Arabia in 1996, and charge that today Iran is meddling in Iraq.
Iranian baggage with the US stretches back to a CIA-engineered coup in 1953, that restored Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi to the Peacock Throne. And to that morning in 1988, when the USS Vincennes mistook the airliner for an attacking Iranian jet. In a result that still galls Iranians, the US never apologized for the incident; the ship's air-warfare chief won the Navy's Commendation Medal for "heroic achievement," and all crew received combat-action ribbons.
"It still resonates [in Iran], because it reaffirms the narrative that is already there: that Americans are hypocrites who talk about justice, but when it comes to wars and other people's interests, they always work to undermine it," says the University of Hawaii's Farhi.
A key case was Iranian help to the US on Afghanistan, after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. Both Iranian and American officials hoped it would be a seed for US-Iran détente. But instead, within weeks Bush had included Iran - under reform-leaning President Mohammad Khatami - in his "axis of evil."
"Axis of evil was a fiasco for the Khatami government," says Farhi. "That was used by the hard-liners, who said: 'If you give in, if you help from a position of weakness, then you get negative results.' "
Similarly, US officials capped a series of modest goodwill gestures in the late 1990s with a March 2000 speech by then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. She apologized for the 1953 coup, lifted import restrictions on foodstuffs and carpets, and called for dialogue.
Within days, Khamenei dismissed the apology as too late and irrelevant, because the US "might be committing similar crimes now," according to Kenneth Pollack, then head of Gulf affairs at the US National Security Council. "The hard-liners were just not interested in a rapprochement," Mr. Pollack writes in his book, "The Persian Puzzle."
The same uncompromising approach may apply to American neo-conservatives today. Both US and Israeli voices have excoriated the Bush administration for even considering talks with Iran.
"In the US, demonizing Iran is such an amazingly potent asset for US politicians, that you just don't have anyone cheering for this kind of improvement," says Beeman, author of "The 'Great Satan' vs. the 'Mad Mullahs.'"
Analysts say Iranians - and especially war veterans like Ahmadinejad - still smart from the support by the US and Europe of Hussein's Iraq. The result is a degree of stubborn conviction, that makes Iran's leadership less susceptible to penalties like economic sanctions.
"For a certain segment of people running the country - like Ahmadinejad - they have a can-do mentality [that] gives confidence,'" says Farhi. "They got through the [Iran-Iraq] war. They willed the defense of Iran."
But radicals in Iran have become "officials and statesmen," and the "state machine ... evolves radicals to a pragmatic way," says Jalaiepour. "Maybe the main obstacle today are hard-liners in the US - they are very dangerous - who don't like to solve the US-Iran problem through negotiation."
"This regime has invested heavily in anti-Americanism [and] they can't easily retreat from that position," says Abbas Amanat, professor of Middle East history at Yale University in New Haven, Conn.
"The fact there was a hostage crisis, or the Iran-contra scandal, or even support for Iraq in the war - I don't think these are substantial barriers" to reconciliation, says Mr. Amanat. "What is a barrier is the rhetoric, and memories, of course."
William O. Beeman
Professor, Anthropology; and Theatre, Speech and Dance
Brown University
Providence, RI 02912
July 6, 2006
Pragmatism may trump zeal as Iran's power grows
Iran faces a July 12 deadline on the West's incentives intended to defuse nuclear standoff.
By Scott Peterson | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
ISTANBUL, TURKEY – Iranians tearfully remember the moment when a US Navy cruiser shot down an Iranian civilian airliner over the hazy Persian Gulf, killing all 290 on board.
Eighteen years ago this week, Iranian TV flashed images of bodies and debris floating in the water and the Islamic Republic accused the US of a "barbaric massacre." It added the destruction of Iran Air Flight 655 and its "martyrs" to a long list of grievances that continue to stoke US-Iran hostility.
Now, as Iran prepares to respond to a US offer of direct talks over its nuclear program - the first such high-level public offer since Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution - its officials are reexamining their past.
How is the thinking of Iran's arch-conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the more powerful clerics led by Iran's supreme religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, shaped by their difficult and sometimes violent experience with the US?
That history includes US support for Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s - and Western silence about Iraq's flagrant use of chemical weapons at the time - as well as President Bush's inclusion of Iran in his "axis of evil."
But despite the decades of mistrust, disrespect, and anger, analysts say that Iran's leaders feel they are now in a position of power like never before, so revolutionary zeal is giving way to a new pragmatism that could break the taboo over talks.
"You can't deal with the US from a position of weakness. The only way the US will come around to treat you with respect is from a position of power," says Farideh Farhi, an Iran specialist at the University of Hawaii, currently in Tehran.
The US has "historically proven its intent to weaken" Iran, says Ms. Farhi. Iran's leadership shares this view, as do many ordinary Iranians, who otherwise often hold Americans themselves in high regard. "Even among the Iranian population, you can sense a tremendous distrust of US intentions."
Wednesday, Iran postponed talks with the European Union on a bundle of incentives put forward by Russia, China, Britain, France, Germany, and the US to ease tensions over its nuclear program. Talks were rescheduled for Thursday to discuss the offer before a July 12 deadline imposed on Iran to respond to the package.
Iran's current sense of strength comes from a coincidence of factors. Mr. Ahmadinejad's victory a year ago placed every lever of power into conservative hands; last April, during the back-and-forth with Europe and the US over Iran's disputed nuclear program, Tehran achieved low-level uranium enrichment.
Iran is buoyed also by a glut of cash from high global oil prices, and has watched as the US military machine - once seen as a tool of "regime change" that would be aimed at Iran - is bogged down fighting an insurgency in Iraq.
"Thanks to the US government, two of Iran's main threats - Saddam Hussein, and the Taliban and Al Qaeda - have been removed from power," says Abbas Maleki, Iran's former deputy foreign minister, currently at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. "So it's a different situation."
Iran and its leadership have also changed over time, experts say. Dreams of exporting the revolution evaporated long ago. "Twenty years ago, the Iranian public sphere was [still] ideological.... At that time, talk of US-Iran relations was taboo," says Hamid Reza Jalaiepour, a US hostage-taker, former intelligence officer, and provincial governor.
"Now, the Iranian public sphere is pragmatic," says Mr. Jalaiepour, who today teaches political sociology at Tehran University. "The two sides are willing to negotiate. But both sides are bargaining for the price, for their own conditions."
There is new "common ground," because US military control of adjacent Iraq and Afghanistan means "the US is a close neighbor of Iran," says Jalaiepour. Populists like Ahmadinejad "are looking for development [and] need votes"; the US likewise "can't solve its problems through another war, or through sanctions."
There is even a mechanism in Iranian culture that can overcome "all these insults, annoyance, and sabotage" of two estranged parties, says William Beeman, an anthropologist and Iran specialist at Brown University, contacted in Tokyo. "Once reconciliation takes place, it is total, it is absolute sweetness and light from then on."
But sitting down for talks will require some humility. Washington alleges that Iran is the world's "most active state sponsor of terrorism," for supporting Hizbullah in Lebanon, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories.
And in Tehran, true believers of the revolution can't count the number of American flags they have burned over the years, or effigies of Bush they have torched.
"History is important, but for a new relationship we should forget everything in the past, because those bad events do not help solve the problem," says Amir Mohebian, political editor of the conservative Resalat newspaper in Tehran. "It has been a cold war between the two countries, and it could be a hot war any moment, so each [side] should try to bury the history."
"I think it is a good opportunity for the US, because the generation of the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war are showing that they [can] forget all these problems of the past," says Mr. Maleki, whose brother was killed at the Iran-Iraq front. "All of us - we are ready to forget. We have moved on."
The US experience with Iran fixates on the hostage crisis, when radical students seized the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979, and held and humiliated 52 US diplomats for 444 days. US officials also saw an Iranian hand in bomb attacks against US Marines and US Embassy targets in Lebanon, and even the kidnapping of Americans there in the 1980s. They add the Khobar Towers bomb in Saudi Arabia in 1996, and charge that today Iran is meddling in Iraq.
Iranian baggage with the US stretches back to a CIA-engineered coup in 1953, that restored Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi to the Peacock Throne. And to that morning in 1988, when the USS Vincennes mistook the airliner for an attacking Iranian jet. In a result that still galls Iranians, the US never apologized for the incident; the ship's air-warfare chief won the Navy's Commendation Medal for "heroic achievement," and all crew received combat-action ribbons.
"It still resonates [in Iran], because it reaffirms the narrative that is already there: that Americans are hypocrites who talk about justice, but when it comes to wars and other people's interests, they always work to undermine it," says the University of Hawaii's Farhi.
A key case was Iranian help to the US on Afghanistan, after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. Both Iranian and American officials hoped it would be a seed for US-Iran détente. But instead, within weeks Bush had included Iran - under reform-leaning President Mohammad Khatami - in his "axis of evil."
"Axis of evil was a fiasco for the Khatami government," says Farhi. "That was used by the hard-liners, who said: 'If you give in, if you help from a position of weakness, then you get negative results.' "
Similarly, US officials capped a series of modest goodwill gestures in the late 1990s with a March 2000 speech by then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. She apologized for the 1953 coup, lifted import restrictions on foodstuffs and carpets, and called for dialogue.
Within days, Khamenei dismissed the apology as too late and irrelevant, because the US "might be committing similar crimes now," according to Kenneth Pollack, then head of Gulf affairs at the US National Security Council. "The hard-liners were just not interested in a rapprochement," Mr. Pollack writes in his book, "The Persian Puzzle."
The same uncompromising approach may apply to American neo-conservatives today. Both US and Israeli voices have excoriated the Bush administration for even considering talks with Iran.
"In the US, demonizing Iran is such an amazingly potent asset for US politicians, that you just don't have anyone cheering for this kind of improvement," says Beeman, author of "The 'Great Satan' vs. the 'Mad Mullahs.'"
Analysts say Iranians - and especially war veterans like Ahmadinejad - still smart from the support by the US and Europe of Hussein's Iraq. The result is a degree of stubborn conviction, that makes Iran's leadership less susceptible to penalties like economic sanctions.
"For a certain segment of people running the country - like Ahmadinejad - they have a can-do mentality [that] gives confidence,'" says Farhi. "They got through the [Iran-Iraq] war. They willed the defense of Iran."
But radicals in Iran have become "officials and statesmen," and the "state machine ... evolves radicals to a pragmatic way," says Jalaiepour. "Maybe the main obstacle today are hard-liners in the US - they are very dangerous - who don't like to solve the US-Iran problem through negotiation."
"This regime has invested heavily in anti-Americanism [and] they can't easily retreat from that position," says Abbas Amanat, professor of Middle East history at Yale University in New Haven, Conn.
"The fact there was a hostage crisis, or the Iran-contra scandal, or even support for Iraq in the war - I don't think these are substantial barriers" to reconciliation, says Mr. Amanat. "What is a barrier is the rhetoric, and memories, of course."
William O. Beeman
Professor, Anthropology; and Theatre, Speech and Dance
Brown University
Providence, RI 02912
Tuesday, June 13, 2006
Beeman Guest Editorial: The Journalism/Think Tank Merry-Go-Round
Beeman Guest Editorial: The Journalism/Think Tank Merry-Go-Round,
Posted on Informed Comment, Blog maintained by Juan Cole
http://www.juancole.com/2006/06/beeman-guest-editorial-journalismthink.html#comments
William O. Beeman
"The Journalism/Think Tank Merry-Go-Round
And the Dilemma of the Academic Public Intellectual"
' [I want to address] the question of the sad, sad state of American academics in policy formation in the United States today. Think tanks, where no one ever has to go through peer review before publishing the most questionable material, are in the ascendancy. Real scholars are derided as the academy is openly attacked by these quasi-intellectual bodies. No wonder! If the think-tankers' shoddy methods and ideological biases were subject to the scrutiny they deserve, 90% of the garbage that is self-published by their house organs and pushed by their publicity machinery would never see the light of day.
It is so sad now that governmental bodies are no longer calling on academic experts for public testimony in even the most crucial matters where they have unique knowledge. On no subject is this more true than in the Middle East area. If you are not in a think tank in Washington, apparently your expertise matters not at all. Never mind that that the think tank denizens were never in the region, don't know the languages, and never did any research in their lives. If their ideology is in line with the White House, that is good enough.
The media bears a great deal of responsibility in this matter. Lazy, news-cycle driven and subject to the pressure of ideology and publicity flackers, it is so much easier to just call the think tank down the street, or a PR firm like Benador Associates where someone is on call and already in suit and tie, or skirted suit to get to the studio within the next 20 minutes, than to spend the extra half-hour trying to locate an ISDN feed in . . . Minneapolis or Austin to get the best possible expertise on a subject at hand. For the print media a quote--any quote--is often good enough to anchor a story. No time to wait for someone to call back after a seminar! If the reporter can't get the quotable phrase on the first phone call, its on to the next, or once again, to the on-call quotables at the think-tank around the corner.
Even when someone with real expertise can be located, the media vitiates the message by making a fetish of "balance"--an odd feature of American public discourse, documented by my colleague Deborah Tannen in her classic book, The Argument Culture. This means that whatever the subject, a pro and con side must be represented--even if one of the positions is absurd, or representative of an extreme fringe opinion. This results in match-ups like Paul Krugman debating Bill O'Reilly on economic matters and other such ludicrous pairings. This situation has created careers for people like Anne Coulter, David Frum and Jonah Goldberg, who otherwise know very little--but they are reliable as "cons" (pun intended) on virtually any topic that requires an expansion of intellect. No wonder the public doesn't know which way is up.
Sadly, the academy has reacted badly to this state of affairs--not by encouraging its members to shine the light on the slime and mold generated by these propaganda machines, but by fomenting retreat into its own dark little corner where it can be safe and "uncontroversial." The better not to run afoul of its more vocal and ideologically driven alumni and trustees, who believe along with Bill O'Reilly that all knowledge is just opinion anyway, so why not just tell the professoriate what they should be teaching, and what positions they should be espousing? Writing for the public is not only unrewarded by the academy, it is absolutely detrimental to academic careers. Thus fine scholars who do decide to speak out are hit both ways--both by the ideological hacks for whom their truths are uncomfortable, and by their own institutions who see their public activities as controversial and undignified.
Contrast this with the situation in Japan, France, Brazil--in fact, anywhere else in the world--where academics are welcomed and respected in the field of public discourse, and move readily in and out of positions of public responsibility. Likewise, scholars of distinction, such as the incomparable Eric Rouleau, are prized and well-compensated members of the fourth estate.
Despite these stringencies, those of us who are tenured at institutions of higher learning have a special responsibility--a sacred duty--to speak out at every turn to defend free inquiry, and solid knowledge. We are privileged to be able to have careers in research, writing and teaching, and are in debt to society for this. We have the obligation as patriotic citizens and seekers of truth to use, as Juan has consistently, the fruits of our research and knowledge to inform not just the dozen or so colleagues who share our academic sub-specialization, but the public who is hungry for this material, and in the current intellectual desert in America, who desperately needs it. '
William O. Beeman
Professor, Anthropology; and Theatre, Speech and Dance
Brown University
Blog and current Op-ed pieces--Culture and International Affairs
(2004-2005 Visiting Professor, Cultural and Social Anthropology,
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305)
Professor Beeman's latest book: The "Great Satan" vs. The "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other. (Praeger/Greenwood). '
Posted on Informed Comment, Blog maintained by Juan Cole
http://www.juancole.com/2006/06/beeman-guest-editorial-journalismthink.html#comments
William O. Beeman
"The Journalism/Think Tank Merry-Go-Round
And the Dilemma of the Academic Public Intellectual"
' [I want to address] the question of the sad, sad state of American academics in policy formation in the United States today. Think tanks, where no one ever has to go through peer review before publishing the most questionable material, are in the ascendancy. Real scholars are derided as the academy is openly attacked by these quasi-intellectual bodies. No wonder! If the think-tankers' shoddy methods and ideological biases were subject to the scrutiny they deserve, 90% of the garbage that is self-published by their house organs and pushed by their publicity machinery would never see the light of day.
It is so sad now that governmental bodies are no longer calling on academic experts for public testimony in even the most crucial matters where they have unique knowledge. On no subject is this more true than in the Middle East area. If you are not in a think tank in Washington, apparently your expertise matters not at all. Never mind that that the think tank denizens were never in the region, don't know the languages, and never did any research in their lives. If their ideology is in line with the White House, that is good enough.
The media bears a great deal of responsibility in this matter. Lazy, news-cycle driven and subject to the pressure of ideology and publicity flackers, it is so much easier to just call the think tank down the street, or a PR firm like Benador Associates where someone is on call and already in suit and tie, or skirted suit to get to the studio within the next 20 minutes, than to spend the extra half-hour trying to locate an ISDN feed in . . . Minneapolis or Austin to get the best possible expertise on a subject at hand. For the print media a quote--any quote--is often good enough to anchor a story. No time to wait for someone to call back after a seminar! If the reporter can't get the quotable phrase on the first phone call, its on to the next, or once again, to the on-call quotables at the think-tank around the corner.
Even when someone with real expertise can be located, the media vitiates the message by making a fetish of "balance"--an odd feature of American public discourse, documented by my colleague Deborah Tannen in her classic book, The Argument Culture. This means that whatever the subject, a pro and con side must be represented--even if one of the positions is absurd, or representative of an extreme fringe opinion. This results in match-ups like Paul Krugman debating Bill O'Reilly on economic matters and other such ludicrous pairings. This situation has created careers for people like Anne Coulter, David Frum and Jonah Goldberg, who otherwise know very little--but they are reliable as "cons" (pun intended) on virtually any topic that requires an expansion of intellect. No wonder the public doesn't know which way is up.
Sadly, the academy has reacted badly to this state of affairs--not by encouraging its members to shine the light on the slime and mold generated by these propaganda machines, but by fomenting retreat into its own dark little corner where it can be safe and "uncontroversial." The better not to run afoul of its more vocal and ideologically driven alumni and trustees, who believe along with Bill O'Reilly that all knowledge is just opinion anyway, so why not just tell the professoriate what they should be teaching, and what positions they should be espousing? Writing for the public is not only unrewarded by the academy, it is absolutely detrimental to academic careers. Thus fine scholars who do decide to speak out are hit both ways--both by the ideological hacks for whom their truths are uncomfortable, and by their own institutions who see their public activities as controversial and undignified.
Contrast this with the situation in Japan, France, Brazil--in fact, anywhere else in the world--where academics are welcomed and respected in the field of public discourse, and move readily in and out of positions of public responsibility. Likewise, scholars of distinction, such as the incomparable Eric Rouleau, are prized and well-compensated members of the fourth estate.
Despite these stringencies, those of us who are tenured at institutions of higher learning have a special responsibility--a sacred duty--to speak out at every turn to defend free inquiry, and solid knowledge. We are privileged to be able to have careers in research, writing and teaching, and are in debt to society for this. We have the obligation as patriotic citizens and seekers of truth to use, as Juan has consistently, the fruits of our research and knowledge to inform not just the dozen or so colleagues who share our academic sub-specialization, but the public who is hungry for this material, and in the current intellectual desert in America, who desperately needs it. '
William O. Beeman
Professor, Anthropology; and Theatre, Speech and Dance
Brown University
Blog and current Op-ed pieces--Culture and International Affairs
(2004-2005 Visiting Professor, Cultural and Social Anthropology,
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305)
Professor Beeman's latest book: The "Great Satan" vs. The "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other. (Praeger/Greenwood). '
Friday, June 02, 2006
Comment on the United States State Department offer to Iran by Gary Sick, Director of Gulf2000, Columbia University. Response from William O. Beeman
Comment on the United States State Department offer to Iran by Gary Sick, Director of Gulf2000, Columbia University
I start from the assumption that Rice's statement was a compromise document that was fought out over a period of weeks, perhaps months, in Washington between the warring tribes (the Washington Post in particular documents this in some detail in their front-page story today). One tribe seems to be centered in the State Department in the persons of Condoleeza Rice and Nick Burns; the other tribe is headed by VP Cheney and operates out of his black-box counter-policy staff in the White House -- a new phenomenon in the history of US foreign policy.
Neither side appears to have won an outright victory, though Rice & Co. were able to win the tactical victory of an offer to Iran of possible diplomatic contact. It is important to remember that every word of this statement was weighed and was subject to arguments and objections. So it is possible to learn a lot just by a careful reading.
The entire first half of the document is devoted to a restatement of the US objections to Iran and its nuclear program. This is to appease the Cheneyites that Bush and Condi have not gone wobbly on Iran. At the same time, the word "diplomacy" shows up over and over, which I take as a signal that Bush and Condi have looked at the likely outcome of a military strike and have decided that it is a losing proposition. But they dare not "take it off the table," both as a negotiating tactic and as a necessary sop to those lusting for more blood sport after Iraq.
The preamble also stresses multilateral approaches, identifying the US with its European allies and "the international community." This is, if nothing else, a measurement of how the Cheney forces have been weakened by the unilateralism of Iraq and its aftermath. They must at least pretend to build international support, even if at heart they don't believe in it.
For those of us who have followed the various proposals in op-eds, study groups, and Track II meetings concerning possible contact between Iran and the US, we will appreciate that the language of this statement, though tough, does not resort to the more extravagant rhetoric of the past. There is no talk here of an Axis of Evil, or rogue state, or outlaw regime, or central banker of terror, that have characterized so many American statements about Iran. Remember, in the negotiations of this text, those words were not just casually omitted; they had to be resisted or excised.
Outsiders may find it hard to understand what an accomplishment that may have been.
About half way down, Rice states, "The Iranian people believe they have the right to civil nuclear energy. We acknowledge that right." Although technically that is not new, it effectively defines the boundaries of the discussion. This is not about depriving Iran of nuclear technology (as we tried to do not so very long ago) or even about nuclear power stations or even, in the final analysis, about enrichment -- all of the "red lines" that the US has adopted at various times.
Instead, the US position is now defined very clearly (in the press conference that followed the announcement): "There is a strong international consensus that Iran must not have a nuclear weapon, . . .and that if Iran is to have a civil nuclear program it needs to be one in which the international community can have confidence that they're not trying to build a nuclear weapon under cover of civil nuclear power. We have complete and total agreement on that."
That is altogether sensible, but it is also a position that the US has come to adopt only slowly and, in my view, belatedly. It even leaves room -- perhaps inadvertently -- for an outcome in which Iran would preserve some degree of enrichment (laboratory level centrifuge operation under close IAEA supervision?) as a face-saving measure. But that would have to come later in the negotiating process.
Then it gets to the central point: ". . .to underscore our commitment to a diplomatic solution and to enhance the prospects for success, as soon as Iran fully and verifiably suspends its enrichment and reprocessing activities, the United States will come to the table with our EU-3 colleagues and meet with Iran's representatives."
It is an amusing little irony that the US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, who is one of the hardest of all hardliners on this subject, and who presumably resisted it in the internal debate, was appointed to be the messenger to deliver advance notice of the decision to the Iranian UN ambassador, Javad Zarif, who is widely regarded as a proponent of better US-Iran relations. It would have been interesting to listen to that conversation.
Immediately thereafter, the text slips back to more hardline dogma. President Bush, it notes, "wants a new and positive relationship between the American people and the people of Iran." This relationship is to be between the peoples of the two countries, not their governments; and all talk of more formal relations is dismissed. There is not even a substantive hint about the possible agenda for US-Iran interaction in the nuclear talks. Instead, "We believe the Iranian people want a future of freedom and human rights-. the right to vote, to run for office, to express their views without fear, and to pursue political causes. We would welcome the progress, prosperity, and freedom of the Iranian people."
That is merely a polite way of saying that we want the present Iranian government to go away and be replaced by something else, i.e. regime change. So the US hardliners get the last word, albeit in softer language than they might otherwise prefer. That is why Condi Rice must react in horror to the idea that this might be the beginning of a "grand bargain" with the Iranian regime. That is anathema to neo-Cheney dogma.
However, if you think that this is simply a neo-con package with a bit of new ribbon, just consult the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal today, or the article by Michael Rubin in the National Review Online entitled "Damage Is Done: The Bush administration's bad Iran move" And there will be much more. This was a major battle; it inspired outrage by those whose ideological convictions failed to carry the day; and it's not over.
So what should we make of all this?
First of all, it really is a major shift in US policy. Regardless of spin, the offer to join the talks is a reversal of previous US positions and was achieved only after a good bit of bureaucratic blood was spilled.
Second, it is also a compromise, consequently unsatisfactory to purists of all stripes. However, in comparing this US initiative to Ahmadinejad's crude letter, this comes out looking pretty good.
Third, its outcome is quite uncertain. If Iran's leaders see it as a potential opening to satisfy Iran's national pride and also to pursue its larger goals of integration and respect in the international community, they could construct a tentative but positive response that would challenge the US side to go beyond the bare bones of this statement.
That could be the beginning of a useful process that could address a larger range of issues that divide the two countries. Secretary Rice protests that no such outcome is envisaged, and the neo-con publicists tremble at the thought that Iran just possibly might not reject the offer out of hand, thereby starting an actual negotiating process that would address more than the nuclear issue and might even lead to evolution rather than revolution in Iran.
If, however, Iran follows the dictates of its own neo-conservatives who believe that the US is presently a toothless tiger that can be dismissed with impunity, then the hardliners in Washington will also win and we will have missed still another opportunity to resolve some of the issues between the two countries, which have festered unattended for more than a quarter of a century.
We will also edge closer to the time when Iran gets into the nuclear weapons business. If we had decided ten years ago that our objective was to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and if we had been willing to engage with them then and put a reasonable offer on the table, it is very likely that Iran would not have even a nascent enrichment capability today. But several US administrations deluded themselves into thinking that we could keep the Iranians technologically dumb and deprived, by pure coercion and pressure. Now they have at least a rudimentary enrichment capability, and it is delusional to think that they will give it up entirely.
Both sides have walked away from potentially beneficial arrangements over the years. Later we both look back and realize that the price of a new bargain will be far higher than the one we earlier rejected. This is merely the latest in this sad procession, and it is too early to say which of the warring tribes -- whether in Washington or Tehran -- will ultimately prevail.
Response from William Beeman
I thank Gary Sick for his wise and insightful analysis of the current turning point in U.S.-Iranian affairs. I recognize from Gary's careful reading of the Rice document that genuine change is in the offing, and am persuaded that the situation is indeed conducive to easing tensions, and even to creating eventual rapprochement between the United States and Iran. The question will be whether people of good will in both Iran and the United States will have the courage and the resources to stay the course despite the considerable forces that will be working hard to sabotage the process.
Massive political and economic forces in the United States are deeply invested in preserving enmity between the two countries. Both Democrats and Republicans have shamelessly used attacks on Iran as an all-purpose posture whenever they were empty of any thoughtful opinion on foreign policy. Getting these politicians to recant those positions is going to be hard--since changing a strongly expressed public opinion gives one's political enemies an easy route of political attack. Political advocacy groups such as AIPAC, AEI and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy have built permanent attacks on Iran into their fundamental operating and funding procedures. The editorial pages of major newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times know they have a boost in reader approval every time they deliver a body blow to Iran. Iran and 9/11 are the all-purpose excuses for everything that goes wrong in the world for the Bush administration. Attacking Iran is an industry, in fact, and getting all those people to give it up will be very hard, as Madeline Albright found out in her first brave effort during the Clinton administration.
Iranian officials are no less shameful in using "The Great Satan did it" as the excuse for their failures, or justifying their more questionable actions as defense against American attacks. Remove the putative American threat and all those flaws and failures will have to be addressed.
As fervently as forces in the U.S. political establishment would like to see the Iranian government dry up and blow away, it just will not happen--not with bombing, not with subversion, and not by trying to create dissention among Iran's ethnic and religious groups. Nor will Iran relinquish rights that it shares with other nations just because the United States wants it to happen. From the Iranian side, the United States is not going to remove itself from the Gulf region very soon, nor will it give up supporting Israel; and this will not change whether Democrats or Republicans are in power. These are hard facts that both sides will have to learn to live with.
The simple truth is that these hard facts are not so hard to live with after all when the opportunity to talk them over exists on a regular basis in the context of a community of nations who share a common view of the need to promote the welfare of the world, not just the interests of a narrow spectrum of nations. The present situation is indeed a watershed. Even if the entire effort falls apart, it will be easier to return to this same point now that it has been attained.
I start from the assumption that Rice's statement was a compromise document that was fought out over a period of weeks, perhaps months, in Washington between the warring tribes (the Washington Post in particular documents this in some detail in their front-page story today). One tribe seems to be centered in the State Department in the persons of Condoleeza Rice and Nick Burns; the other tribe is headed by VP Cheney and operates out of his black-box counter-policy staff in the White House -- a new phenomenon in the history of US foreign policy.
Neither side appears to have won an outright victory, though Rice & Co. were able to win the tactical victory of an offer to Iran of possible diplomatic contact. It is important to remember that every word of this statement was weighed and was subject to arguments and objections. So it is possible to learn a lot just by a careful reading.
The entire first half of the document is devoted to a restatement of the US objections to Iran and its nuclear program. This is to appease the Cheneyites that Bush and Condi have not gone wobbly on Iran. At the same time, the word "diplomacy" shows up over and over, which I take as a signal that Bush and Condi have looked at the likely outcome of a military strike and have decided that it is a losing proposition. But they dare not "take it off the table," both as a negotiating tactic and as a necessary sop to those lusting for more blood sport after Iraq.
The preamble also stresses multilateral approaches, identifying the US with its European allies and "the international community." This is, if nothing else, a measurement of how the Cheney forces have been weakened by the unilateralism of Iraq and its aftermath. They must at least pretend to build international support, even if at heart they don't believe in it.
For those of us who have followed the various proposals in op-eds, study groups, and Track II meetings concerning possible contact between Iran and the US, we will appreciate that the language of this statement, though tough, does not resort to the more extravagant rhetoric of the past. There is no talk here of an Axis of Evil, or rogue state, or outlaw regime, or central banker of terror, that have characterized so many American statements about Iran. Remember, in the negotiations of this text, those words were not just casually omitted; they had to be resisted or excised.
Outsiders may find it hard to understand what an accomplishment that may have been.
About half way down, Rice states, "The Iranian people believe they have the right to civil nuclear energy. We acknowledge that right." Although technically that is not new, it effectively defines the boundaries of the discussion. This is not about depriving Iran of nuclear technology (as we tried to do not so very long ago) or even about nuclear power stations or even, in the final analysis, about enrichment -- all of the "red lines" that the US has adopted at various times.
Instead, the US position is now defined very clearly (in the press conference that followed the announcement): "There is a strong international consensus that Iran must not have a nuclear weapon, . . .and that if Iran is to have a civil nuclear program it needs to be one in which the international community can have confidence that they're not trying to build a nuclear weapon under cover of civil nuclear power. We have complete and total agreement on that."
That is altogether sensible, but it is also a position that the US has come to adopt only slowly and, in my view, belatedly. It even leaves room -- perhaps inadvertently -- for an outcome in which Iran would preserve some degree of enrichment (laboratory level centrifuge operation under close IAEA supervision?) as a face-saving measure. But that would have to come later in the negotiating process.
Then it gets to the central point: ". . .to underscore our commitment to a diplomatic solution and to enhance the prospects for success, as soon as Iran fully and verifiably suspends its enrichment and reprocessing activities, the United States will come to the table with our EU-3 colleagues and meet with Iran's representatives."
It is an amusing little irony that the US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, who is one of the hardest of all hardliners on this subject, and who presumably resisted it in the internal debate, was appointed to be the messenger to deliver advance notice of the decision to the Iranian UN ambassador, Javad Zarif, who is widely regarded as a proponent of better US-Iran relations. It would have been interesting to listen to that conversation.
Immediately thereafter, the text slips back to more hardline dogma. President Bush, it notes, "wants a new and positive relationship between the American people and the people of Iran." This relationship is to be between the peoples of the two countries, not their governments; and all talk of more formal relations is dismissed. There is not even a substantive hint about the possible agenda for US-Iran interaction in the nuclear talks. Instead, "We believe the Iranian people want a future of freedom and human rights-. the right to vote, to run for office, to express their views without fear, and to pursue political causes. We would welcome the progress, prosperity, and freedom of the Iranian people."
That is merely a polite way of saying that we want the present Iranian government to go away and be replaced by something else, i.e. regime change. So the US hardliners get the last word, albeit in softer language than they might otherwise prefer. That is why Condi Rice must react in horror to the idea that this might be the beginning of a "grand bargain" with the Iranian regime. That is anathema to neo-Cheney dogma.
However, if you think that this is simply a neo-con package with a bit of new ribbon, just consult the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal today, or the article by Michael Rubin in the National Review Online entitled "Damage Is Done: The Bush administration's bad Iran move"
So what should we make of all this?
First of all, it really is a major shift in US policy. Regardless of spin, the offer to join the talks is a reversal of previous US positions and was achieved only after a good bit of bureaucratic blood was spilled.
Second, it is also a compromise, consequently unsatisfactory to purists of all stripes. However, in comparing this US initiative to Ahmadinejad's crude letter, this comes out looking pretty good.
Third, its outcome is quite uncertain. If Iran's leaders see it as a potential opening to satisfy Iran's national pride and also to pursue its larger goals of integration and respect in the international community, they could construct a tentative but positive response that would challenge the US side to go beyond the bare bones of this statement.
That could be the beginning of a useful process that could address a larger range of issues that divide the two countries. Secretary Rice protests that no such outcome is envisaged, and the neo-con publicists tremble at the thought that Iran just possibly might not reject the offer out of hand, thereby starting an actual negotiating process that would address more than the nuclear issue and might even lead to evolution rather than revolution in Iran.
If, however, Iran follows the dictates of its own neo-conservatives who believe that the US is presently a toothless tiger that can be dismissed with impunity, then the hardliners in Washington will also win and we will have missed still another opportunity to resolve some of the issues between the two countries, which have festered unattended for more than a quarter of a century.
We will also edge closer to the time when Iran gets into the nuclear weapons business. If we had decided ten years ago that our objective was to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and if we had been willing to engage with them then and put a reasonable offer on the table, it is very likely that Iran would not have even a nascent enrichment capability today. But several US administrations deluded themselves into thinking that we could keep the Iranians technologically dumb and deprived, by pure coercion and pressure. Now they have at least a rudimentary enrichment capability, and it is delusional to think that they will give it up entirely.
Both sides have walked away from potentially beneficial arrangements over the years. Later we both look back and realize that the price of a new bargain will be far higher than the one we earlier rejected. This is merely the latest in this sad procession, and it is too early to say which of the warring tribes -- whether in Washington or Tehran -- will ultimately prevail.
Response from William Beeman
I thank Gary Sick for his wise and insightful analysis of the current turning point in U.S.-Iranian affairs. I recognize from Gary's careful reading of the Rice document that genuine change is in the offing, and am persuaded that the situation is indeed conducive to easing tensions, and even to creating eventual rapprochement between the United States and Iran. The question will be whether people of good will in both Iran and the United States will have the courage and the resources to stay the course despite the considerable forces that will be working hard to sabotage the process.
Massive political and economic forces in the United States are deeply invested in preserving enmity between the two countries. Both Democrats and Republicans have shamelessly used attacks on Iran as an all-purpose posture whenever they were empty of any thoughtful opinion on foreign policy. Getting these politicians to recant those positions is going to be hard--since changing a strongly expressed public opinion gives one's political enemies an easy route of political attack. Political advocacy groups such as AIPAC, AEI and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy have built permanent attacks on Iran into their fundamental operating and funding procedures. The editorial pages of major newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times know they have a boost in reader approval every time they deliver a body blow to Iran. Iran and 9/11 are the all-purpose excuses for everything that goes wrong in the world for the Bush administration. Attacking Iran is an industry, in fact, and getting all those people to give it up will be very hard, as Madeline Albright found out in her first brave effort during the Clinton administration.
Iranian officials are no less shameful in using "The Great Satan did it" as the excuse for their failures, or justifying their more questionable actions as defense against American attacks. Remove the putative American threat and all those flaws and failures will have to be addressed.
As fervently as forces in the U.S. political establishment would like to see the Iranian government dry up and blow away, it just will not happen--not with bombing, not with subversion, and not by trying to create dissention among Iran's ethnic and religious groups. Nor will Iran relinquish rights that it shares with other nations just because the United States wants it to happen. From the Iranian side, the United States is not going to remove itself from the Gulf region very soon, nor will it give up supporting Israel; and this will not change whether Democrats or Republicans are in power. These are hard facts that both sides will have to learn to live with.
The simple truth is that these hard facts are not so hard to live with after all when the opportunity to talk them over exists on a regular basis in the context of a community of nations who share a common view of the need to promote the welfare of the world, not just the interests of a narrow spectrum of nations. The present situation is indeed a watershed. Even if the entire effort falls apart, it will be easier to return to this same point now that it has been attained.
Tuesday, April 18, 2006
Online NewsHour: Iran Continues Its Nuclear Program Despite International Warnings -- April 14, 2006
Online NewsHour: Iran Continues Its Nuclear Program Despite International Warnings -- April 14, 2006
FEARS OF A NUCLEAR-ARMED IRAN
April 14, 2006
Now that Iran has claimed its ability to enrich uranium, could the world tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran? And should it? Two experts debate the international response to Iran as a nuclear power.
MARGARET WARNER: The fiery rhetoric continued this week from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Today, he denounced Israel again at the opening of an international conference in Tehran, saying Israel was a threat to the region and would not last long.
MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD, President of Iran (through translator): The Zionist regime of Israel is like a rotten, dried tree that will be annihilated by one storm. Like it or not, the Zionist regime is heading toward annihilation.
MARGARET WARNER: His remarks came on the heels of his announcement three days ago that Iran had successfully enriched uranium, a milestone on the path to producing nuclear weapons, if Iran chooses to do so. Iran insists it is pursuing nuclear energy, not weapons.
But the Bush administration, noting that Iran concealed critical parts of its nuclear program for years, is demanding that Tehran stop all enrichment activities now. The president spoke Monday.
GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States: We do not want the Iranians to have a nuclear weapon, the capacity to make a nuclear weapon, or the knowledges of how to make a nuclear weapon. That's our stated goal. It is also the goal, fortunately, of other friends and allies, starting with Great Britain, Germany and France.
MARGARET WARNER: At the urging of the U.S., Britain and France, the U.N. Security Council last month set an April 28th deadline for Iran to freeze its enrichment program.
The U.N.'s atomic energy agency chief, Mohamed ElBaradei, took that message to Tehran yesterday. But President Ahmadinejad responded with defiance, saying Iran will not retreat "one iota" on its uranium enrichment.
Secretary of State Rice, in Washington yesterday, sounded resolute but also frustrated over the failure thus far to persuade Iran to change course.
CONDOLEEZZA RICE, U.S. Secretary of State: There is no doubt that Iran continues to defy the will of the international community. There is no doubt that Iran has continued its salami-slicing tactics, a little bit here, and then a little bit more, and then a little bit more, despite the fact that the international community has said very clearly, "Stop."
Now, when the Security Council reconvenes, there will have to be some consequence for that action and that defiance, and we will look at the full range of options available to the Security Council.
MARGARET WARNER: But two veto-wielding members of the Security Council, China and Russia, are still resisting any tougher U.N. measures to try to force Iran to comply.
The events of the last few months have led many in and out of government to begin contemplating the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. To explore that, we turn to two men who've studied and written widely about Iran.
William Beeman is a professor of anthropology at Brown University and author of the book "The Great Satan versus the Mad Mullahs: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other."
And Patrick Clawson is deputy director for research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and co-author of "Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos."
Welcome to you, both. If the diplomatic track fails -- and, Professor Beeman, let me begin with you -- can the world live with a nuclear-armed Iran?
WILLIAM BEEMAN, Professor of Anthropology, Brown University: Let's first of all get a few facts straight. First of all, Iran's nuclear program is 30 years old, more than 30 years old, and was blessed and started by the United States. Gerald Ford offered Iran a full nuclear cycle in 1976.
Iran is in full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it continues its enrichment process in full compliance with its rights under that treaty.
And so, therefore, Iran is moving toward nuclear energy in a way that also has been demonstrated that there is no evidence whatever that they have a nuclear weapons program. That's been affirmed by U.S. officials, by British officials, and by others.
And so, therefore, the idea that Iran has a nuclear weapons program is based entirely on suspicion and mistrust. However...
MARGARET WARNER: So you don't even think we have to think about it?
WILLIAM BEEMAN: Well, I think that Iran certainly already has the knowledge to build a nuclear weapon if they want to. And so, therefore, perhaps the U.S. government has already set a red line that's been crossed by Iran.
But I will tell you that, if Iran were to develop a nuclear weapon, it's primary use would be defensive, as Iran has continually asserted in its presentation of its conventional weapons program.
MARGARET WARNER: Patrick Clawson, what's your view of this? I mean, would it be so threatening to the rest of the world if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon?
PATRICK CLAWSON, Washington Institute for Near Easy Policy: Well, as Professor Beeman explained, Iran has said that its program is peaceful. And, therefore, if Iran were to actually assemble a weapon and then we'd have to ask, "Why?"
And there's concern that that would show that the most radical elements had, in fact, won out in Tehran and that they were planning to do something about the president's talk about wiping Israel off the face of the Earth or death to America.
Even if that weren't the case, we'd still have to worry that a nuclear-armed Iran could start a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. And that's an unstable enough region, thank you, already. Plus, the Nonproliferation Treaty would start to crumble and lots of countries around the world would consider also going down that route.
So if the program in Iran were to go beyond the peaceful uses that Professor Beeman was talking about, to actually having a nuclear weapon, boy, that'd be a lot to worry about.
MARGARET WARNER: But so you think that Iran, if it acquired a nuclear weapon -- and I know that we're way down the road there -- but you think it would perhaps use it against Israel?
PATRICK CLAWSON: Well, Iran might think about how to use a weapon as a demonstration in order to influence Israel. For instance, if the Iranians were to set off a nuclear bomb in the middle of Israel's Negev Desert in a way that nobody got killed, that would put Israel in a very difficult position, because the Iranians would have used a nuclear weapon, but on the other hand, not that much damage would have been done.
MARGARET WARNER: Professor Beeman, what do you think is the likelihood of that? I mean, President Ahmadinejad has just said over and over again that, you know, Israel should be wiped off the face of the Earth, that today Israel should be annihilated, is going to be. Why shouldn't Israel be concerned that a nuclear-armed Iran might turn those nuclear weapons against Israel?
WILLIAM BEEMAN: It's important to understand that President Ahmadinejad's statements are not necessarily going to result in any kind of an action. President Ahmadinejad has absolutely no control over Iran's military, nor does he have control over Iran's foreign affairs.
And I think that one should understand that, when he makes these extreme statements, it's largely in response to the attacks and extreme statements that have been made against Iran by the United States.
Iran knows very well that, if they make statements that are hostile to Israel, that that will get our attention, and that will certainly result in a reaction from the United States.
MARGARET WARNER: Patrick Clawson, following up on what you said before, the idea that they might send a nuclear weapon into Israel, you know, it might be uninhabited area but still attack Israel with a nuclear weapon, why wouldn't good old-fashioned deterrence work, the kind of thing that worked between the U.S. and Soviet Union for all of those years during the Cold War, I mean, if the United States or, for that matter, Israel made it clear that any use of nuclear weapons, any attack by nuclear weapons would result in a swift and immediate retaliatory attack by the U.S. or by Israel?
PATRICK CLAWSON: Well, deterrence was pretty tough thing to do during the Cold War. It's a very expensive and hard thing to do militarily. It requires having a lot of allies to help you. It requires being right on the alert all the time.
For 40 years, we were constantly on the alert. We came close to having nuclear crises a couple of times. So deterrence, it's a tough policy to do. And we'd have to have help from Iran's neighbors, and this would not be easy.
MARGARET WARNER: But, wait, I'm sorry, I don't understand. Why would you need help from Iran's neighbors? I mean, if Iran knew that any nuclear attack it launched would trigger a retaliatory attack by the U.S., I mean, what else would be needed?
PATRICK CLAWSON: Well, Iran could think that, with nuclear weapons, that it could engage in a lot of conventional threats against U.S. interests, knowing that the U.S. wouldn't retaliate because it has nuclear weapons.
MARGARET WARNER: I see, but it would embolden them.
PATRICK CLAWSON: It would embolden them, the way that Pakistan was emboldened after it got nuclear weapons to provide much more support to these militant groups in Kashmir. So Iran could provide a lot more support to anti-American groups, to groups opposed to the Saudi and other regimes in the area, thinking that it was safe behind its nuclear umbrella.
MARGARET WARNER: What's your view of that, Professor Beeman, that, even if it didn't use the nuclear weapons, it would make Iran so powerful that they could threaten its neighbors or U.S. Interests with just conventional means?
WILLIAM BEEMAN: Actually, it's very interesting that the United States doesn't seem to listen to Iranian officials when they say that they're not interested in nuclear weapons and their religious officials say that they're not religiously sanctioned.
But beyond that, we've created a situation in the region with Pakistan, India and Israel, all not signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, who do have nuclear weapons. And we have the situation where the United States has just made major concessions to India, which does have nuclear weapons.
The Iranians were certainly watching, and they understand that those people who have nuclear weapons get more respect from the United States, so the temptation is increased.
MARGARET WARNER: And then let me ask -- so, and as you've described, one country has gotten them, and then another country. What about Mr. Clawson's point that he made earlier? Do you agree with it, that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would trigger an arms race among other countries in the region, that a country, say, like Saudi Arabia or Egypt may feel, "We'd better get them, too"?
WILLIAM BEEMAN: Well, I think that this is a situation where boys want bigger toys. And if Iran gets a nuclear weapon, I am certain that there are people in Saudi Arabia who feel that they kind of deserve to have one, as well. And it may not come to pass, but it certainly would be an increased temptation for Saudi Arabia.
By the way, I should mention that Iran has excellent relations with Saudi Arabia right now and would probably do nothing to destabilize that regime.
MARGARET WARNER: Let me go back to Professor Beeman's initial point which was: We shouldn't really be worrying about this, that Iran has no reason to want nuclear weapons, and has said constantly it doesn't want nuclear weapons.
PATRICK CLAWSON: Oh, I would agree with him that Iran has no reason to have nuclear weapons, that it doesn't face a security problem which requires it to have nuclear weapons.
But, unfortunately, then we have to look at its activities, and there I would argue that we have to be prepared for the eventuality that, after 18 years of not being accurately reporting what it's doing to the UN's Atomic Energy Agency, that perhaps Iran has got a reason to hide all the activities. And refusing the offers that have been made to it by the Europeans and the Russians, perhaps Iran has got a reason for being so stubborn.
MARGARET WARNER: Let me ask you briefly: Do you think the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is so threatening that the U.S. should use military force, if necessary, to stop it?
PATRICK CLAWSON: If Iran is going to cross that last line to actually assemble a nuclear weapon, not just be close to, but actually assemble a weapon, then the answer is we'd have to be worried enough about this that we should be prepared to use military force to stop it. That's the red line that the U.S. has drawn: Don't assemble an actual weapon.
MARGARET WARNER: Which is a long way down the line.
PATRICK CLAWSON: A long ways down the line.
MARGARET WARNER: But, Professor Beeman, what's your view on that, if this were to come to pass?
WILLIAM BEEMAN: Absolutely, this is five to 10 years down the line. If Iran started today, and worked 24/7, and directed all its of energy toward developing a weapon, the statements that's been made by the Israeli government that it might be two or three years down the line are massively exaggerated.
MARGARET WARNER: Yes, but what I was trying to get to your quick answer to was: Do you think, if it did happen, that the United States should take it out?
WILLIAM BEEMAN: If they actually assembled a weapon, then I think we'd have to rethink the entire issue, but I don't think that's going to happen in the near future.
MARGARET WARNER: All right. Professor William Beeman, Patrick Clawson, thank you, both.
PATRICK CLAWSON: Thank you.
FEARS OF A NUCLEAR-ARMED IRAN
April 14, 2006
Now that Iran has claimed its ability to enrich uranium, could the world tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran? And should it? Two experts debate the international response to Iran as a nuclear power.
MARGARET WARNER: The fiery rhetoric continued this week from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Today, he denounced Israel again at the opening of an international conference in Tehran, saying Israel was a threat to the region and would not last long.
MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD, President of Iran (through translator): The Zionist regime of Israel is like a rotten, dried tree that will be annihilated by one storm. Like it or not, the Zionist regime is heading toward annihilation.
MARGARET WARNER: His remarks came on the heels of his announcement three days ago that Iran had successfully enriched uranium, a milestone on the path to producing nuclear weapons, if Iran chooses to do so. Iran insists it is pursuing nuclear energy, not weapons.
But the Bush administration, noting that Iran concealed critical parts of its nuclear program for years, is demanding that Tehran stop all enrichment activities now. The president spoke Monday.
GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States: We do not want the Iranians to have a nuclear weapon, the capacity to make a nuclear weapon, or the knowledges of how to make a nuclear weapon. That's our stated goal. It is also the goal, fortunately, of other friends and allies, starting with Great Britain, Germany and France.
MARGARET WARNER: At the urging of the U.S., Britain and France, the U.N. Security Council last month set an April 28th deadline for Iran to freeze its enrichment program.
The U.N.'s atomic energy agency chief, Mohamed ElBaradei, took that message to Tehran yesterday. But President Ahmadinejad responded with defiance, saying Iran will not retreat "one iota" on its uranium enrichment.
Secretary of State Rice, in Washington yesterday, sounded resolute but also frustrated over the failure thus far to persuade Iran to change course.
CONDOLEEZZA RICE, U.S. Secretary of State: There is no doubt that Iran continues to defy the will of the international community. There is no doubt that Iran has continued its salami-slicing tactics, a little bit here, and then a little bit more, and then a little bit more, despite the fact that the international community has said very clearly, "Stop."
Now, when the Security Council reconvenes, there will have to be some consequence for that action and that defiance, and we will look at the full range of options available to the Security Council.
MARGARET WARNER: But two veto-wielding members of the Security Council, China and Russia, are still resisting any tougher U.N. measures to try to force Iran to comply.
The events of the last few months have led many in and out of government to begin contemplating the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. To explore that, we turn to two men who've studied and written widely about Iran.
William Beeman is a professor of anthropology at Brown University and author of the book "The Great Satan versus the Mad Mullahs: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other."
And Patrick Clawson is deputy director for research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and co-author of "Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos."
Welcome to you, both. If the diplomatic track fails -- and, Professor Beeman, let me begin with you -- can the world live with a nuclear-armed Iran?
WILLIAM BEEMAN, Professor of Anthropology, Brown University: Let's first of all get a few facts straight. First of all, Iran's nuclear program is 30 years old, more than 30 years old, and was blessed and started by the United States. Gerald Ford offered Iran a full nuclear cycle in 1976.
Iran is in full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it continues its enrichment process in full compliance with its rights under that treaty.
And so, therefore, Iran is moving toward nuclear energy in a way that also has been demonstrated that there is no evidence whatever that they have a nuclear weapons program. That's been affirmed by U.S. officials, by British officials, and by others.
And so, therefore, the idea that Iran has a nuclear weapons program is based entirely on suspicion and mistrust. However...
MARGARET WARNER: So you don't even think we have to think about it?
WILLIAM BEEMAN: Well, I think that Iran certainly already has the knowledge to build a nuclear weapon if they want to. And so, therefore, perhaps the U.S. government has already set a red line that's been crossed by Iran.
But I will tell you that, if Iran were to develop a nuclear weapon, it's primary use would be defensive, as Iran has continually asserted in its presentation of its conventional weapons program.
MARGARET WARNER: Patrick Clawson, what's your view of this? I mean, would it be so threatening to the rest of the world if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon?
PATRICK CLAWSON, Washington Institute for Near Easy Policy: Well, as Professor Beeman explained, Iran has said that its program is peaceful. And, therefore, if Iran were to actually assemble a weapon and then we'd have to ask, "Why?"
And there's concern that that would show that the most radical elements had, in fact, won out in Tehran and that they were planning to do something about the president's talk about wiping Israel off the face of the Earth or death to America.
Even if that weren't the case, we'd still have to worry that a nuclear-armed Iran could start a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. And that's an unstable enough region, thank you, already. Plus, the Nonproliferation Treaty would start to crumble and lots of countries around the world would consider also going down that route.
So if the program in Iran were to go beyond the peaceful uses that Professor Beeman was talking about, to actually having a nuclear weapon, boy, that'd be a lot to worry about.
MARGARET WARNER: But so you think that Iran, if it acquired a nuclear weapon -- and I know that we're way down the road there -- but you think it would perhaps use it against Israel?
PATRICK CLAWSON: Well, Iran might think about how to use a weapon as a demonstration in order to influence Israel. For instance, if the Iranians were to set off a nuclear bomb in the middle of Israel's Negev Desert in a way that nobody got killed, that would put Israel in a very difficult position, because the Iranians would have used a nuclear weapon, but on the other hand, not that much damage would have been done.
MARGARET WARNER: Professor Beeman, what do you think is the likelihood of that? I mean, President Ahmadinejad has just said over and over again that, you know, Israel should be wiped off the face of the Earth, that today Israel should be annihilated, is going to be. Why shouldn't Israel be concerned that a nuclear-armed Iran might turn those nuclear weapons against Israel?
WILLIAM BEEMAN: It's important to understand that President Ahmadinejad's statements are not necessarily going to result in any kind of an action. President Ahmadinejad has absolutely no control over Iran's military, nor does he have control over Iran's foreign affairs.
And I think that one should understand that, when he makes these extreme statements, it's largely in response to the attacks and extreme statements that have been made against Iran by the United States.
Iran knows very well that, if they make statements that are hostile to Israel, that that will get our attention, and that will certainly result in a reaction from the United States.
MARGARET WARNER: Patrick Clawson, following up on what you said before, the idea that they might send a nuclear weapon into Israel, you know, it might be uninhabited area but still attack Israel with a nuclear weapon, why wouldn't good old-fashioned deterrence work, the kind of thing that worked between the U.S. and Soviet Union for all of those years during the Cold War, I mean, if the United States or, for that matter, Israel made it clear that any use of nuclear weapons, any attack by nuclear weapons would result in a swift and immediate retaliatory attack by the U.S. or by Israel?
PATRICK CLAWSON: Well, deterrence was pretty tough thing to do during the Cold War. It's a very expensive and hard thing to do militarily. It requires having a lot of allies to help you. It requires being right on the alert all the time.
For 40 years, we were constantly on the alert. We came close to having nuclear crises a couple of times. So deterrence, it's a tough policy to do. And we'd have to have help from Iran's neighbors, and this would not be easy.
MARGARET WARNER: But, wait, I'm sorry, I don't understand. Why would you need help from Iran's neighbors? I mean, if Iran knew that any nuclear attack it launched would trigger a retaliatory attack by the U.S., I mean, what else would be needed?
PATRICK CLAWSON: Well, Iran could think that, with nuclear weapons, that it could engage in a lot of conventional threats against U.S. interests, knowing that the U.S. wouldn't retaliate because it has nuclear weapons.
MARGARET WARNER: I see, but it would embolden them.
PATRICK CLAWSON: It would embolden them, the way that Pakistan was emboldened after it got nuclear weapons to provide much more support to these militant groups in Kashmir. So Iran could provide a lot more support to anti-American groups, to groups opposed to the Saudi and other regimes in the area, thinking that it was safe behind its nuclear umbrella.
MARGARET WARNER: What's your view of that, Professor Beeman, that, even if it didn't use the nuclear weapons, it would make Iran so powerful that they could threaten its neighbors or U.S. Interests with just conventional means?
WILLIAM BEEMAN: Actually, it's very interesting that the United States doesn't seem to listen to Iranian officials when they say that they're not interested in nuclear weapons and their religious officials say that they're not religiously sanctioned.
But beyond that, we've created a situation in the region with Pakistan, India and Israel, all not signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, who do have nuclear weapons. And we have the situation where the United States has just made major concessions to India, which does have nuclear weapons.
The Iranians were certainly watching, and they understand that those people who have nuclear weapons get more respect from the United States, so the temptation is increased.
MARGARET WARNER: And then let me ask -- so, and as you've described, one country has gotten them, and then another country. What about Mr. Clawson's point that he made earlier? Do you agree with it, that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would trigger an arms race among other countries in the region, that a country, say, like Saudi Arabia or Egypt may feel, "We'd better get them, too"?
WILLIAM BEEMAN: Well, I think that this is a situation where boys want bigger toys. And if Iran gets a nuclear weapon, I am certain that there are people in Saudi Arabia who feel that they kind of deserve to have one, as well. And it may not come to pass, but it certainly would be an increased temptation for Saudi Arabia.
By the way, I should mention that Iran has excellent relations with Saudi Arabia right now and would probably do nothing to destabilize that regime.
MARGARET WARNER: Let me go back to Professor Beeman's initial point which was: We shouldn't really be worrying about this, that Iran has no reason to want nuclear weapons, and has said constantly it doesn't want nuclear weapons.
PATRICK CLAWSON: Oh, I would agree with him that Iran has no reason to have nuclear weapons, that it doesn't face a security problem which requires it to have nuclear weapons.
But, unfortunately, then we have to look at its activities, and there I would argue that we have to be prepared for the eventuality that, after 18 years of not being accurately reporting what it's doing to the UN's Atomic Energy Agency, that perhaps Iran has got a reason to hide all the activities. And refusing the offers that have been made to it by the Europeans and the Russians, perhaps Iran has got a reason for being so stubborn.
MARGARET WARNER: Let me ask you briefly: Do you think the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is so threatening that the U.S. should use military force, if necessary, to stop it?
PATRICK CLAWSON: If Iran is going to cross that last line to actually assemble a nuclear weapon, not just be close to, but actually assemble a weapon, then the answer is we'd have to be worried enough about this that we should be prepared to use military force to stop it. That's the red line that the U.S. has drawn: Don't assemble an actual weapon.
MARGARET WARNER: Which is a long way down the line.
PATRICK CLAWSON: A long ways down the line.
MARGARET WARNER: But, Professor Beeman, what's your view on that, if this were to come to pass?
WILLIAM BEEMAN: Absolutely, this is five to 10 years down the line. If Iran started today, and worked 24/7, and directed all its of energy toward developing a weapon, the statements that's been made by the Israeli government that it might be two or three years down the line are massively exaggerated.
MARGARET WARNER: Yes, but what I was trying to get to your quick answer to was: Do you think, if it did happen, that the United States should take it out?
WILLIAM BEEMAN: If they actually assembled a weapon, then I think we'd have to rethink the entire issue, but I don't think that's going to happen in the near future.
MARGARET WARNER: All right. Professor William Beeman, Patrick Clawson, thank you, both.
PATRICK CLAWSON: Thank you.
Thursday, April 13, 2006
Pacific News Service > News > Iran and U.S. Locked Into Spiral Conflict -- Last Refuge of Weak Leaders--William O. Beeman
Pacific News Service > News > Iran and U.S. Locked Into Spiral Conflict -- Last Refuge of Weak Leaders
Iran and U.S. Locked Into Spiral Conflict -- Last Refuge of Weak Leaders
Commentary/Analysis, William O. Beeman,
New America Media, Apr 13, 2006
Editor's Note: The venomous rhetoric between the U.S. and Iran is largely a drama staged by weak leaders looking for a political boost -- which doesn't make it any less dangerous. New America Media contributor William O. Beeman is professor of anthropology and Middle East studies at Brown University. He is author of "The 'Great Satan' vs. the 'Mad Mullahs': How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other."
PROVIDENCE, R.I.--Just when it seemed impossible for relations between the United States and Iran to get any worse, they have deteriorated once again. The rhetoric and counter-rhetoric over Iran's nuclear program sounds serious and substantive. However, a little reflection reveals this situation for what it is: a continuing piece of high-stakes political theatre that principally benefits the leaders of both nations by shoring up their lagging political fortunes.
It would be easy to dismiss this absurd scenario if the consequences were not potentially so ominous.
Both the Bush administration and the Iranian clerical regime are reeling from historic low support figures from their constituent populations. United States politicians know that attacking Iran is a sure-fire political winner with the American public. Iran has become America's all-purpose bogeyman. Foolish declarations, such as the State Department assertion that Iran is America's "greatest security threat" are received uncritically by voters throughout the nation. Similarly in Iran, the United States can be freely demonized without serious question. The leaders of the Islamic republic regularly blame the United States for their own failings in managing economic development, border control and corruption.
The issue the two sides have seized upon for the last three years is Iran's nuclear development program. For U.S. politicians, nothing gets the attention of the American public more reliably than the threat of nuclear weapons being deployed against the United States. This frightening prospect was effective in convincing the nation to support the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Merely suggesting that Iran poses a nuclear danger is enough to convince many Americans that the suggestion is based on fact.
For Iran, the fact that the United States has led an international campaign to halt its 35-year-old nuclear energy development program -- a program started with American blessing -- is an affront to national pride. Indeed, the specter of violent military attacks on Iran from the United States or Israel if Iran does not stop uranium enrichment is met by defiance from Iran, where the enrichment program continues unabated. As Iran's U.N. ambassador, Javad Zarif declared before the United Nations Security Council on March 29, "Pressures and threats do not work for Iran. Iran is allergic to pressure and threats and intimidation." Consistent reports from Iran state that even Iranians who are opposed to their own government support continued nuclear energy development.
The ominous rhetoric from both sides masks the weakness of both nations' positions.
U.S. and British officials when pressed admit there is no hard evidence that an Iranian nuclear weapons development program exists. They also admit that Iran's nuclear energy development program is their right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran (but not Israel, Pakistan or India) is a signatory. Moreover, Seymour Hersh, writing in the New Yorker about U.S. plans for military strikes against Iran, emphasizes that high-raking U.S. military advisors oppose the idea of any kind of military action against Iran's widespread nuclear development laboratories as impractical, ineffective and likely to create a greater problem than it would solve.
Iran's posturing, which included an amusing set of festivities on April 11 with folkloric performers dancing while hoisting vials of enriched uranium against the backdrop of hundreds of flying white doves, conceals the fact that Iran is years away from producing enough nuclear fuel to power a generator, much less in the quantity and purity level that would allow it to construct a nuclear weapon. However, that has not stopped Iran from showing off a new set of conventional weapons designed to counter an American attack.
This makes American and Iranian assertions and counter-assertions appear rather ridiculous. Indeed, the danger in this situation could be dismissed if there were other leaders in power. However, in both nations the leadership needs this conflict. President Bush and the Republican party face defeat in November without an issue to galvanize the voting public behind their assertion that they are best able to protect the United States from attack -- the only point on which they have outscored Democrats in recent polls. President Ahmadinejad also needs public support for his domestic political agenda -- an agenda that is paradoxically opposed by a large number of the ruling clerics in Iran. Every time he makes a defiant assertion against the United States, the public rallies behind him.
This creates what political scientist Richard Cottam termed a "spiral conflict" in which both parties escalate each other's extreme positions to new heights. It is entirely possible that Iran could goad President Bush into a disastrous military action, and that action would result in an equally disastrous Iranian reaction.
The resulting conflagration would likely engulf the region, and then the world.
Iran and U.S. Locked Into Spiral Conflict -- Last Refuge of Weak Leaders
Commentary/Analysis, William O. Beeman,
New America Media, Apr 13, 2006
Editor's Note: The venomous rhetoric between the U.S. and Iran is largely a drama staged by weak leaders looking for a political boost -- which doesn't make it any less dangerous. New America Media contributor William O. Beeman is professor of anthropology and Middle East studies at Brown University. He is author of "The 'Great Satan' vs. the 'Mad Mullahs': How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other."
PROVIDENCE, R.I.--Just when it seemed impossible for relations between the United States and Iran to get any worse, they have deteriorated once again. The rhetoric and counter-rhetoric over Iran's nuclear program sounds serious and substantive. However, a little reflection reveals this situation for what it is: a continuing piece of high-stakes political theatre that principally benefits the leaders of both nations by shoring up their lagging political fortunes.
It would be easy to dismiss this absurd scenario if the consequences were not potentially so ominous.
Both the Bush administration and the Iranian clerical regime are reeling from historic low support figures from their constituent populations. United States politicians know that attacking Iran is a sure-fire political winner with the American public. Iran has become America's all-purpose bogeyman. Foolish declarations, such as the State Department assertion that Iran is America's "greatest security threat" are received uncritically by voters throughout the nation. Similarly in Iran, the United States can be freely demonized without serious question. The leaders of the Islamic republic regularly blame the United States for their own failings in managing economic development, border control and corruption.
The issue the two sides have seized upon for the last three years is Iran's nuclear development program. For U.S. politicians, nothing gets the attention of the American public more reliably than the threat of nuclear weapons being deployed against the United States. This frightening prospect was effective in convincing the nation to support the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Merely suggesting that Iran poses a nuclear danger is enough to convince many Americans that the suggestion is based on fact.
For Iran, the fact that the United States has led an international campaign to halt its 35-year-old nuclear energy development program -- a program started with American blessing -- is an affront to national pride. Indeed, the specter of violent military attacks on Iran from the United States or Israel if Iran does not stop uranium enrichment is met by defiance from Iran, where the enrichment program continues unabated. As Iran's U.N. ambassador, Javad Zarif declared before the United Nations Security Council on March 29, "Pressures and threats do not work for Iran. Iran is allergic to pressure and threats and intimidation." Consistent reports from Iran state that even Iranians who are opposed to their own government support continued nuclear energy development.
The ominous rhetoric from both sides masks the weakness of both nations' positions.
U.S. and British officials when pressed admit there is no hard evidence that an Iranian nuclear weapons development program exists. They also admit that Iran's nuclear energy development program is their right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran (but not Israel, Pakistan or India) is a signatory. Moreover, Seymour Hersh, writing in the New Yorker about U.S. plans for military strikes against Iran, emphasizes that high-raking U.S. military advisors oppose the idea of any kind of military action against Iran's widespread nuclear development laboratories as impractical, ineffective and likely to create a greater problem than it would solve.
Iran's posturing, which included an amusing set of festivities on April 11 with folkloric performers dancing while hoisting vials of enriched uranium against the backdrop of hundreds of flying white doves, conceals the fact that Iran is years away from producing enough nuclear fuel to power a generator, much less in the quantity and purity level that would allow it to construct a nuclear weapon. However, that has not stopped Iran from showing off a new set of conventional weapons designed to counter an American attack.
This makes American and Iranian assertions and counter-assertions appear rather ridiculous. Indeed, the danger in this situation could be dismissed if there were other leaders in power. However, in both nations the leadership needs this conflict. President Bush and the Republican party face defeat in November without an issue to galvanize the voting public behind their assertion that they are best able to protect the United States from attack -- the only point on which they have outscored Democrats in recent polls. President Ahmadinejad also needs public support for his domestic political agenda -- an agenda that is paradoxically opposed by a large number of the ruling clerics in Iran. Every time he makes a defiant assertion against the United States, the public rallies behind him.
This creates what political scientist Richard Cottam termed a "spiral conflict" in which both parties escalate each other's extreme positions to new heights. It is entirely possible that Iran could goad President Bush into a disastrous military action, and that action would result in an equally disastrous Iranian reaction.
The resulting conflagration would likely engulf the region, and then the world.
Monday, March 27, 2006
Lost in translation - Miguel Guanipa
Lost in translation - Miguel Guanipa
Lost in translation
By Miguel Guanipa (03/27/2006)
On a statement issued recently by the Democratic National Committee Communications Director Karen Finney, she described the president's press conference on the war on Iraq as an effort to offer "the same divisiveness and distortions" and the same "rosy rhetoric and continued commitment to a failed strategy". She also assured the American public of the Democrat's "commitment to aggressively (fight) the war on terror and ensure America’s security".
On another front, a group called “Progressive Democrats of America” sponsored a protest in Market Square a few days ago which called for an end of the Iraq occupation. Cyndi Sheehan brought cheers from the audience of about 200 of the faithful after she recommended that the day be devoted to the “brave and wonderful young people who have had their lives stolen by George W. Bush”.
At the same rally U.S. Rep. Jim Moran (D-8) quoted Tacitus analogically referring to the war when he said “They gave us a desert and called it peace”
Critics of the war continue to contend that Bush initiated a war by using lies and misinformation. Others prominent democrats have called it a “debauched crusade against terror” and questioned whether anyone can be called a democrat who does not oppose the occupation of Iraq. This relentless criticism has continued unabated since the day George W. Bush notified Saddam Hussein that he had 48 hours to vacate his country. One of the crucial justifications under attack by opponents of the war has been the alleged terrorist connection between Iraq and the terrorist group headed by Osama Bin Laden named al Qaeda.
On 2003 former senator Max Cleland, D-GA told the United Press International that “the administration sold the connection (between Iraq and al-Qaeda) to scare the pants off the American people and justify the war”. In a March 21, 2004 interview, former counterterrorism official Richard Clarke declared that there was “no evidence that Iraq was supporting Al Qaeda, ever”. On August 7, 2003 Former Vice President Al Gore claimed that “The evidence now shows clearly that Saddam did not want to work with Osama Bin Laden at all, much less give him weapons of mass destruction”. He has also stated that the president used a “mixture of documents that turned out to be forged and blatantly false assertions that Saddam was in league with al Qaeda” to convince the country that Iraq was a threat to the United States. Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee said that the claims of an Iraq-al Qaeda links showed some “evidence of exaggeration”. Jane Hartman, a Democrat in the House select committee on Intelligence concluded that the evidence on the al Qaeda links with Iraq was “sketchy”. Senator Dianne Feinstein believed that “..The al Qaeda connection was hyped and exaggerated”.
Space does not permit the quoting of more recent untoward characterizations of the Bush administration’s alleged Iraq-al Qaeda connection by many other high ranking democrats, but suffice it to say they are legion. And they have been willingly joined in their assessments by an all too compliant media.
The links between Iraq and Al Qaeda were labeled a “myth” by the editor of the Los Angeles Times”. New York Times columnist Paul Krugman declared that there was no smoking gun when it came to the alleged evidence of an Al Qaeda-Iraq connection. Jason Zengerly, a senior editor at the New Republic called the alleged connection “quackery”. Not to be outdone, William O. Beeman of the Pacific News Service called the Al Qaeda-Iraq connection “tenuous at best” and argued that Secretary Colin Powell’s testimony before the United Nations was based on a “specious argument” and “deceptive rhetoric”. He also called the Iraqi violation of U.N. resolutions “so petty…it is hard to imagine sending 200,000 troops into Iraq to correct them”. Even funny anchor man John Steward parodied once that the link the president claimed existed between Iraq and Al Qaeda was supported by the fact that both words contained the letter Q.
Sited claims of a link between Iraq and Osama bin Laden have been called from totally ridiculous to ideologically incompatible. Saddam himself once cried that he would not be ashamed to admit a relationship with al Qaeda, but there was simply no reason to develop such a relationship. Recent Iraqi intelligence documents released by the U.S. government prove this is only one of the many lies he asked the world community to believe.
Here are some of the facts.
On February 18, 1998, ten months before operation Desert Fox in which the Clinton administration launched missile strikes against Iraq, an intelligence memo detailing upcoming meetings with a bin Laden representative traveling to Baghdad was found in a building that had been bombed during that conflict. Four days later a fatwa was issued by bin Laden in which he accused the United States of “occupying the lands of Islam…plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors and turning its bases into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples” Therefore he urged his followers to “ …kill all Americans and their allies--civilians and military--(which) is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it”. Soon afterwards, Saddam Hussein paid $300,000 to Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of bin Laden’s top deputies who also serves as his physician and is presently wanted by the F.B.I. for his alleged role in the August 7, 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi,Kenya.
In a speech that month, Clinton declared that “We have to defend our future from these predators on the 21st century…..They will be all the more lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them”, and that “There (was) no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein”. Seldom has he been more accurate in his assessment of the threat posed by the unholy alliance between al Qaeda and Iraq which democrats have tried so hard to belittle in their desire to score political points.
Given the recent release of declassified intelligence briefs documenting the clear connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, it is shocking to think that the media and democrats privy to most of this information chose to put partisan politics above the security of this country.
Yet past liaisons between the executive branch of power and the media have not always been this hostile.
Newsweek magazine ran an article In January 11, 1999, which stated that “Saddam Hussein….. (was) reaching out to Islamic terrorists, including some who may be linked to Osama Bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi exile accused of masterminding the bombing of two embassies in Africa last summer” ABC reported On January 15, 1999 that “Intelligence sources say Bin Laden’s long relationship with the Iraqis began as he helped Sudan’s fundamentalist government in their efforts to acquire WMD’s”. This information was corroborated by three separate intelligence agencies.
The Washington Post ran an Associated Press dispatch in February 1999, that declared unambiguously that “The Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (had) offered asylum to Bin Laden, who openly supports Iraq against Western powers”.
On the same year the Congressional Research Service published a report in which is stated that “If Iraq’s Saddam Hussein decide(s) to use terrorists to attack the continental United States (he) would likely turn to bin Laden’s al Qaeda” and that “Al Qaeda poses the most serious terrorist threat to U.S. security interests, for al Qaeda’s well trained terrorists are engaged in a terrorist jihad against U.S. interests world wide”.
Bear in mind, most of this “unbiased “reporting was conducted during Bill Clinton’s term. It was also the Clinton Administration that indicted Osama Bin Laden in the spring of 1998, prior to the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa, citing Al Qaeda’s agreement to collaborate with Iraq on weapons of mass destruction. The indictment read as follows: “Al Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that (regarding) particular projects, specifically including weapons developments, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the government of Iraq“.
Pre-war Iraqi documents released by U.S. intelligence services indicate that on February 19, 1995 after direct official approval by Saddam Hussein one of his government representatives met with Osama bin Laden in Sudan. The purpose of this meeting as stated in the documents was to foster “development of the relationship and cooperation between the two parties to be left according to what is open based on dialogue and agreement on other ways of cooperation”. Other meetings personally approved by Saddam Hussein between Bin Laden and a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995 are also made mention of in the 9/11 commission report.
According to Iraqi Intelligence documents obtained by the Iraq Survey Group after the war began, Osama bin Laden met with Intelligence officials in Syria in the spring of 1992. An undated internal memo in the same group of documents also discussed strategy for an upcoming meeting between Iraqi Intelligence, Bin Laden and a representative of the Taliban. The posted agenda for the meeting was “attacking American targets”.
On October 7, 2002, CIA director George J. Tenet wrote a letter to Senate intelligence chairman Bob Graham in which he detailed the CIA’s reporting on weapons of mass destruction and Iraq’s link to al Qaeda. In it he described “solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda going back a decade” and that credible information indicated that Iraq and al Qaeda had discussed “safe heaven an reciprocal non-aggression”. The letter also offered reports of al Qaeda members seeking contacts with Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities.
This type of information has been repeatedly corroborated by Iraqi defectors who have claimed that Saddam’s regime trained “non-Iraqi Arab terrorists” for years at a camp in Salman Pak, located in the southern region of Baghdad. The existence of this camp was confirmed by U.N inspectors. In it they found training facilities for terrorists which included a Boeing 707 in which defectors claimed terrorists were trained to assassinate, kidnap or hijack their enemies. It was also confirmed by these defectors that this type of training was mostly directed towards American targets and interests.
It is not that journalists and politicians have not been exposed to these facts in the past, but that they have chosen, in their juvenile animosity against the current administration, to not only distort them, but to ignore certain critical parts of this reality because full disclosure would support the president’s decision of going to war with Iraq; a decision they have furiously opposed from the very beginning.
While the truth often carries with it very uncomfortable realities, it is supposed to be the job of the media to report these realities in an objective and impartial manner. But the principle that the enemy of my enemy is my friend did not only appeal to people like Saddam when he planned an alliance with Bin Laden, who bore an equal animosity towards a common nemesis, but also to the Democrats and the liberal media here at home, who saw the potential of using what they though to be a tenuous link at best as a political weapon against the one they deride as an illegitimate president.
Sadly the media assumed the dignified role of whistle-blower and fancied itself forced to embellish stories and concoct far fetched conspiracies, not unlike they did with Cheney’s hunting accident. These constructs naturally tended to reflect their ideological leaning. In the end this proved detrimental to us as information consumers.
There are many Iraqi Intelligence documents that are yet to be fully translated by the U.S. government. Thus far the ones that have been translated yield a picture of a link between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden that appears to extend far beyond what the 9/11 Commission Report euphemistically dubbed a “collaborative relationship”. One may say this presents a golden opportunity for the media to reclaim its role as the impartial messenger it should be and for democrats to rally around a common cause and work together with their republican peers in making the safety of our country a primary concern.
But it is unlikely that democrats and the left leaning media, who are more interested in engaging in adolescent snipping at the president, will be convinced that such a relationship between the sinister duo ever existed unless nothing short of a picture of Osama and Saddam French kissing on a park bench in Fallujah square is produced. And even then it’s hard to say that they will be persuaded.
Lost in translation
By Miguel Guanipa (03/27/2006)
On a statement issued recently by the Democratic National Committee Communications Director Karen Finney, she described the president's press conference on the war on Iraq as an effort to offer "the same divisiveness and distortions" and the same "rosy rhetoric and continued commitment to a failed strategy". She also assured the American public of the Democrat's "commitment to aggressively (fight) the war on terror and ensure America’s security".
On another front, a group called “Progressive Democrats of America” sponsored a protest in Market Square a few days ago which called for an end of the Iraq occupation. Cyndi Sheehan brought cheers from the audience of about 200 of the faithful after she recommended that the day be devoted to the “brave and wonderful young people who have had their lives stolen by George W. Bush”.
At the same rally U.S. Rep. Jim Moran (D-8) quoted Tacitus analogically referring to the war when he said “They gave us a desert and called it peace”
Critics of the war continue to contend that Bush initiated a war by using lies and misinformation. Others prominent democrats have called it a “debauched crusade against terror” and questioned whether anyone can be called a democrat who does not oppose the occupation of Iraq. This relentless criticism has continued unabated since the day George W. Bush notified Saddam Hussein that he had 48 hours to vacate his country. One of the crucial justifications under attack by opponents of the war has been the alleged terrorist connection between Iraq and the terrorist group headed by Osama Bin Laden named al Qaeda.
On 2003 former senator Max Cleland, D-GA told the United Press International that “the administration sold the connection (between Iraq and al-Qaeda) to scare the pants off the American people and justify the war”. In a March 21, 2004 interview, former counterterrorism official Richard Clarke declared that there was “no evidence that Iraq was supporting Al Qaeda, ever”. On August 7, 2003 Former Vice President Al Gore claimed that “The evidence now shows clearly that Saddam did not want to work with Osama Bin Laden at all, much less give him weapons of mass destruction”. He has also stated that the president used a “mixture of documents that turned out to be forged and blatantly false assertions that Saddam was in league with al Qaeda” to convince the country that Iraq was a threat to the United States. Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee said that the claims of an Iraq-al Qaeda links showed some “evidence of exaggeration”. Jane Hartman, a Democrat in the House select committee on Intelligence concluded that the evidence on the al Qaeda links with Iraq was “sketchy”. Senator Dianne Feinstein believed that “..The al Qaeda connection was hyped and exaggerated”.
Space does not permit the quoting of more recent untoward characterizations of the Bush administration’s alleged Iraq-al Qaeda connection by many other high ranking democrats, but suffice it to say they are legion. And they have been willingly joined in their assessments by an all too compliant media.
The links between Iraq and Al Qaeda were labeled a “myth” by the editor of the Los Angeles Times”. New York Times columnist Paul Krugman declared that there was no smoking gun when it came to the alleged evidence of an Al Qaeda-Iraq connection. Jason Zengerly, a senior editor at the New Republic called the alleged connection “quackery”. Not to be outdone, William O. Beeman of the Pacific News Service called the Al Qaeda-Iraq connection “tenuous at best” and argued that Secretary Colin Powell’s testimony before the United Nations was based on a “specious argument” and “deceptive rhetoric”. He also called the Iraqi violation of U.N. resolutions “so petty…it is hard to imagine sending 200,000 troops into Iraq to correct them”. Even funny anchor man John Steward parodied once that the link the president claimed existed between Iraq and Al Qaeda was supported by the fact that both words contained the letter Q.
Sited claims of a link between Iraq and Osama bin Laden have been called from totally ridiculous to ideologically incompatible. Saddam himself once cried that he would not be ashamed to admit a relationship with al Qaeda, but there was simply no reason to develop such a relationship. Recent Iraqi intelligence documents released by the U.S. government prove this is only one of the many lies he asked the world community to believe.
Here are some of the facts.
On February 18, 1998, ten months before operation Desert Fox in which the Clinton administration launched missile strikes against Iraq, an intelligence memo detailing upcoming meetings with a bin Laden representative traveling to Baghdad was found in a building that had been bombed during that conflict. Four days later a fatwa was issued by bin Laden in which he accused the United States of “occupying the lands of Islam…plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors and turning its bases into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples” Therefore he urged his followers to “ …kill all Americans and their allies--civilians and military--(which) is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it”. Soon afterwards, Saddam Hussein paid $300,000 to Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of bin Laden’s top deputies who also serves as his physician and is presently wanted by the F.B.I. for his alleged role in the August 7, 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi,Kenya.
In a speech that month, Clinton declared that “We have to defend our future from these predators on the 21st century…..They will be all the more lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them”, and that “There (was) no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein”. Seldom has he been more accurate in his assessment of the threat posed by the unholy alliance between al Qaeda and Iraq which democrats have tried so hard to belittle in their desire to score political points.
Given the recent release of declassified intelligence briefs documenting the clear connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, it is shocking to think that the media and democrats privy to most of this information chose to put partisan politics above the security of this country.
Yet past liaisons between the executive branch of power and the media have not always been this hostile.
Newsweek magazine ran an article In January 11, 1999, which stated that “Saddam Hussein….. (was) reaching out to Islamic terrorists, including some who may be linked to Osama Bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi exile accused of masterminding the bombing of two embassies in Africa last summer” ABC reported On January 15, 1999 that “Intelligence sources say Bin Laden’s long relationship with the Iraqis began as he helped Sudan’s fundamentalist government in their efforts to acquire WMD’s”. This information was corroborated by three separate intelligence agencies.
The Washington Post ran an Associated Press dispatch in February 1999, that declared unambiguously that “The Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (had) offered asylum to Bin Laden, who openly supports Iraq against Western powers”.
On the same year the Congressional Research Service published a report in which is stated that “If Iraq’s Saddam Hussein decide(s) to use terrorists to attack the continental United States (he) would likely turn to bin Laden’s al Qaeda” and that “Al Qaeda poses the most serious terrorist threat to U.S. security interests, for al Qaeda’s well trained terrorists are engaged in a terrorist jihad against U.S. interests world wide”.
Bear in mind, most of this “unbiased “reporting was conducted during Bill Clinton’s term. It was also the Clinton Administration that indicted Osama Bin Laden in the spring of 1998, prior to the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa, citing Al Qaeda’s agreement to collaborate with Iraq on weapons of mass destruction. The indictment read as follows: “Al Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that (regarding) particular projects, specifically including weapons developments, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the government of Iraq“.
Pre-war Iraqi documents released by U.S. intelligence services indicate that on February 19, 1995 after direct official approval by Saddam Hussein one of his government representatives met with Osama bin Laden in Sudan. The purpose of this meeting as stated in the documents was to foster “development of the relationship and cooperation between the two parties to be left according to what is open based on dialogue and agreement on other ways of cooperation”. Other meetings personally approved by Saddam Hussein between Bin Laden and a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995 are also made mention of in the 9/11 commission report.
According to Iraqi Intelligence documents obtained by the Iraq Survey Group after the war began, Osama bin Laden met with Intelligence officials in Syria in the spring of 1992. An undated internal memo in the same group of documents also discussed strategy for an upcoming meeting between Iraqi Intelligence, Bin Laden and a representative of the Taliban. The posted agenda for the meeting was “attacking American targets”.
On October 7, 2002, CIA director George J. Tenet wrote a letter to Senate intelligence chairman Bob Graham in which he detailed the CIA’s reporting on weapons of mass destruction and Iraq’s link to al Qaeda. In it he described “solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda going back a decade” and that credible information indicated that Iraq and al Qaeda had discussed “safe heaven an reciprocal non-aggression”. The letter also offered reports of al Qaeda members seeking contacts with Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities.
This type of information has been repeatedly corroborated by Iraqi defectors who have claimed that Saddam’s regime trained “non-Iraqi Arab terrorists” for years at a camp in Salman Pak, located in the southern region of Baghdad. The existence of this camp was confirmed by U.N inspectors. In it they found training facilities for terrorists which included a Boeing 707 in which defectors claimed terrorists were trained to assassinate, kidnap or hijack their enemies. It was also confirmed by these defectors that this type of training was mostly directed towards American targets and interests.
It is not that journalists and politicians have not been exposed to these facts in the past, but that they have chosen, in their juvenile animosity against the current administration, to not only distort them, but to ignore certain critical parts of this reality because full disclosure would support the president’s decision of going to war with Iraq; a decision they have furiously opposed from the very beginning.
While the truth often carries with it very uncomfortable realities, it is supposed to be the job of the media to report these realities in an objective and impartial manner. But the principle that the enemy of my enemy is my friend did not only appeal to people like Saddam when he planned an alliance with Bin Laden, who bore an equal animosity towards a common nemesis, but also to the Democrats and the liberal media here at home, who saw the potential of using what they though to be a tenuous link at best as a political weapon against the one they deride as an illegitimate president.
Sadly the media assumed the dignified role of whistle-blower and fancied itself forced to embellish stories and concoct far fetched conspiracies, not unlike they did with Cheney’s hunting accident. These constructs naturally tended to reflect their ideological leaning. In the end this proved detrimental to us as information consumers.
There are many Iraqi Intelligence documents that are yet to be fully translated by the U.S. government. Thus far the ones that have been translated yield a picture of a link between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden that appears to extend far beyond what the 9/11 Commission Report euphemistically dubbed a “collaborative relationship”. One may say this presents a golden opportunity for the media to reclaim its role as the impartial messenger it should be and for democrats to rally around a common cause and work together with their republican peers in making the safety of our country a primary concern.
But it is unlikely that democrats and the left leaning media, who are more interested in engaging in adolescent snipping at the president, will be convinced that such a relationship between the sinister duo ever existed unless nothing short of a picture of Osama and Saddam French kissing on a park bench in Fallujah square is produced. And even then it’s hard to say that they will be persuaded.
Sunday, March 19, 2006
William O. Beeman--U.S. And Iran Agree to Historic Talks Thanks to an Iraqi Mediator--New American Media
William O. Beeman--U.S. and Iran Agree to Historic Talks Thanks to an Iraqi Mediator--New America Media
U.S. and Iran Agree to Historic Talks Thanks to an Iraqi Mediator
New America Media, News Analysis, William O. Beeman, Mar 17, 2006
Editor’s Note: On Mar. 16 Iran and the United States agreed to break the almost three decade-long silence between the two countries. The breakthrough, ironically, has come from the violence in Iraq says William O. Beeman, Professor of Anthropology and Middle East Studies at Brown University. Beeman has conducted research on Iran for more than 30 years. He is the author of “The ‘Great Satan’ vs. the ‘Mad Mullahs’: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other”; and the forthcoming “Iraq: State in Search of a Nation.”
The United States and Iran will be holding direct talks for the first time in 27 years. The talks are about a matter of intense importance to both parties: stabilization of the volatile situation in Iraq. This breakthrough has a good chance of success because for the first time it has been structured in a culturally appropriate way.
Iran and the United States’ unprecedented estrangement has a cultural complement in Iran that can be described as “qahr.” Qahr, a cultural institution in Iran, is not a permanent disagreement but cannot be resolved by the estranged parties without irreparable loss of honor. The resolution, or “aashti,” must be mediated by a party whom both sides respect. During this period -- which can last for years -- the parties remain emotionally connected to each other, though their relationship is cold and hostile. This perfectly describes the U.S.-Iranian relationship.
In this current situation, the "trigger" for the breakthrough was a request to Iran that they enter into talks with the United States from Shi'a cleric Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).
Mr. Al-Hakim is a near-perfect mediator, respected by both the United States and Iran. He was a member of the U.S.-appointed Iraq Interim Governing Council and served as its president in December 2003. He replaced his brother, the revered Shi’a leader Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, as leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq when the latter was assassinated in August 2003 in Najaf. He was also the first candidate listed for the United Iraqi Coalition during the first Iraqi legislative election of January 2005. Perhaps most importantly, he is a close ally of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who has arguably become the most influential Shi'a leader in the world, revered both in Iran and Iraq.
The talks were facilitated by the authorization given by the U.S. government to its Iraqi ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad some months ago to enter into conversation with Iran specifically on the Iraqi situation -- a prospect that the Iranians rejected at the time.
In fact, Iranians have been looking for a mediator in their dispute with the United States for years. Their hopes that Europeans could serve in that role were dashed as France, Germany and Great Britain capitulated to U.S. pressure by actively lobbying for Iran to limit its nuclear energy program.
The long estrangement between Iran and the United States has a solid basis. Each nation has done things that are seen as insulting and damaging to the other. The United States' support of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, including the CIA supported coup in 1953 that restored him to power after he was ousted in a popular movement, lies at the core of Iranian discontent with the United States. American support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, economic sanctions and rhetorical excesses such as President Bush’s inclusion of Iran in the “Axis of Evil,” and the U.S. position on Iran's nuclear energy program only fueled Iranian anger.
From the U.S. standpoint, the hostage crisis of 1979-80, when U.S. diplomatic personnel were held by Iranian revolutionaries for 444 days is Iran's principal transgression. Iran’s hostility toward the "Zionist regime" in Israel, its support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon and its frequent identification of the United States as the "Great Satan" keep American hostility toward Iran alive.
But Iran and the United States both need to see violence and disorder in Iraq come to an end. A stable, functioning Iraq will alleviate the major political liability for the Bush administration. Iran does not want to inherit responsibility for a perpetual civil war on its borders.
The primary obstacle to this salutary potential cooperation is Iran’s nuclear energy program. President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have in the past week both identified Iran as the United States' "most serious security threat" based on the fear that Iran may be developing nuclear weapons. Iran feels that it is being unfairly targeted for what it claims is a peaceful energy program that has conformed to all the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to which Iran (unlike India, Pakistan and Israel) is a signatory.
No timeline has been set for the talks yet. But if both the United States and Iran can reach agreement on a common cooperative strategy for Iraq, the chances are hopeful that other differences between the two nations can eventually also be mediated. To make this work, both sides must show respect for the other, avoiding the invective of the past 27 years.
Iranians, like Americans, are always relieved at a resolution of tension. A successful resolution of a qahr situation frequently results in the estranged parties being better friends than ever from that point onward. Let us hope both that a productive strategy for dealing with Iraq can be reached, and that this will create further good will and greater trust.
User Comments
Maureen Stapler Crowell on Mar 18, 2006 at 09:53:21 said:
A major step toward peace. May it succeed.
It also might be helpful for countries to work together to develop healthy peaceful energy programs -- solar, wind, hydro, geo.
Abdnour on Mar 17, 2006 at 19:11:12 said:
This a great news.It is a breakthrough.I become very emotional after reading this article.I am amazed to read it.This Iraki official seem to me that he is an angelsent by God to bring peace on this Earth that is so needed.I do beleive strongly in this.The world
prayers of all faiths are started tobe answered.I have and I had faith that this world can live in peace and harmony.God has been watching and listening for a long time.Because of his eternal love and compassion,he wouldn't let further damages to happen to the mankind.He wanted to put an end to unproductive differences.Saint Augustine said once:"The Divine Word."lightens every Man on this world.Let hope follow its course and the bells of peace ring allover the world.Thank you GOD!This world will regain then love,trust,and espect that have been lost for a long long time.
Bo Campbell on Mar 17, 2006 at 18:28:59 said:
Excellent analysis. The irony of this (if Bush escapes the Iraq debacle) is just too rich.
Rick stanich on Mar 17, 2006 at 18:25:23 said:
If the U.S. enters into this "emotional realationship,which can last for years", it would offer the Iranian leadership more courage to continue it's clandestine nuclear program.America would be decieved into a false sense of hope, and would allow the Iranian regime , as predicated in the koran "a time to sharpen your swords"Resolve the nuclear issue first.Then talk about Iraq.
Time is not on the side of the Iranian regime,but the smoke and mirror "talks" about Iraq would certainly ease the pressure,and quite possibly give them time to sharpen their nukes
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The United States and Iran will be holding direct talks for the first time in 27 years. The talks are about a matter of intense importance to both parties: stabilization of the volatile situation in Iraq. This breakthrough has a good chance of success because for the first time it has been structured in a culturally appropriate way.
Iran and the United States’ unprecedented estrangement has a cultural complement in Iran that can be described as “qahr.” Qahr, a cultural institution in Iran, is not a permanent disagreement but cannot be resolved by the estranged parties without irreparable loss of honor. The resolution, or “aashti,” must be mediated by a party whom both sides respect. During this period -- which can last for years -- the parties remain emotionally connected to each other, though their relationship is cold and hostile. This perfectly describes the U.S.-Iranian relationship.
In this current situation, the "trigger" for the breakthrough was a request to Iran that they enter into talks with the United States from Shi'a cleric Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).
Mr. Al-Hakim is a near-perfect mediator, respected by both the United States and Iran. He was a member of the U.S.-appointed Iraq Interim Governing Council and served as its president in December 2003. He replaced his brother, the revered Shi’a leader Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, as leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq when the latter was assassinated in August 2003 in Najaf. He was also the first candidate listed for the United Iraqi Coalition during the first Iraqi legislative election of January 2005. Perhaps most importantly, he is a close ally of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who has arguably become the most influential Shi'a leader in the world, revered both in Iran and Iraq.
The talks were facilitated by the authorization given by the U.S. government to its Iraqi ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad some months ago to enter into conversation with Iran specifically on the Iraqi situation -- a prospect that the Iranians rejected at the time.
In fact, Iranians have been looking for a mediator in their dispute with the United States for years. Their hopes that Europeans could serve in that role were dashed as France, Germany and Great Britain capitulated to U.S. pressure by actively lobbying for Iran to limit its nuclear energy program.
The long estrangement between Iran and the United States has a solid basis. Each nation has done things that are seen as insulting and damaging to the other. The United States' support of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, including the CIA supported coup in 1953 that restored him to power after he was ousted in a popular movement, lies at the core of Iranian discontent with the United States. American support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, economic sanctions and rhetorical excesses such as President Bush’s inclusion of Iran in the “Axis of Evil,” and the U.S. position on Iran's nuclear energy program only fueled Iranian anger.
From the U.S. standpoint, the hostage crisis of 1979-80, when U.S. diplomatic personnel were held by Iranian revolutionaries for 444 days is Iran's principal transgression. Iran’s hostility toward the "Zionist regime" in Israel, its support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon and its frequent identification of the United States as the "Great Satan" keep American hostility toward Iran alive.
But Iran and the United States both need to see violence and disorder in Iraq come to an end. A stable, functioning Iraq will alleviate the major political liability for the Bush administration. Iran does not want to inherit responsibility for a perpetual civil war on its borders.
The primary obstacle to this salutary potential cooperation is Iran’s nuclear energy program. President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have in the past week both identified Iran as the United States' "most serious security threat" based on the fear that Iran may be developing nuclear weapons. Iran feels that it is being unfairly targeted for what it claims is a peaceful energy program that has conformed to all the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to which Iran (unlike India, Pakistan and Israel) is a signatory.
No timeline has been set for the talks yet. But if both the United States and Iran can reach agreement on a common cooperative strategy for Iraq, the chances are hopeful that other differences between the two nations can eventually also be mediated. To make this work, both sides must show respect for the other, avoiding the invective of the past 27 years.
Iranians, like Americans, are always relieved at a resolution of tension. A successful resolution of a qahr situation frequently results in the estranged parties being better friends than ever from that point onward. Let us hope both that a productive strategy for dealing with Iraq can be reached, and that this will create further good will and greater trust.
User Comments
Maureen Stapler Crowell on Mar 18, 2006 at 09:53:21 said:
A major step toward peace. May it succeed.
It also might be helpful for countries to work together to develop healthy peaceful energy programs -- solar, wind, hydro, geo.
Abdnour on Mar 17, 2006 at 19:11:12 said:
This a great news.It is a breakthrough.I become very emotional after reading this article.I am amazed to read it.This Iraki official seem to me that he is an angelsent by God to bring peace on this Earth that is so needed.I do beleive strongly in this.The world
prayers of all faiths are started tobe answered.I have and I had faith that this world can live in peace and harmony.God has been watching and listening for a long time.Because of his eternal love and compassion,he wouldn't let further damages to happen to the mankind.He wanted to put an end to unproductive differences.Saint Augustine said once:"The Divine Word."lightens every Man on this world.Let hope follow its course and the bells of peace ring allover the world.Thank you GOD!This world will regain then love,trust,and espect that have been lost for a long long time.
Bo Campbell on Mar 17, 2006 at 18:28:59 said:
Excellent analysis. The irony of this (if Bush escapes the Iraq debacle) is just too rich.
Rick stanich on Mar 17, 2006 at 18:25:23 said:
If the U.S. enters into this "emotional realationship,which can last for years", it would offer the Iranian leadership more courage to continue it's clandestine nuclear program.America would be decieved into a false sense of hope, and would allow the Iranian regime , as predicated in the koran "a time to sharpen your swords"Resolve the nuclear issue first.Then talk about Iraq.
Time is not on the side of the Iranian regime,but the smoke and mirror "talks" about Iraq would certainly ease the pressure,and quite possibly give them time to sharpen their nukes
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U.S. and Iran Agree to Historic Talks Thanks to an Iraqi Mediator
New America Media, News Analysis, William O. Beeman, Mar 17, 2006
Editor’s Note: On Mar. 16 Iran and the United States agreed to break the almost three decade-long silence between the two countries. The breakthrough, ironically, has come from the violence in Iraq says William O. Beeman, Professor of Anthropology and Middle East Studies at Brown University. Beeman has conducted research on Iran for more than 30 years. He is the author of “The ‘Great Satan’ vs. the ‘Mad Mullahs’: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other”; and the forthcoming “Iraq: State in Search of a Nation.”
The United States and Iran will be holding direct talks for the first time in 27 years. The talks are about a matter of intense importance to both parties: stabilization of the volatile situation in Iraq. This breakthrough has a good chance of success because for the first time it has been structured in a culturally appropriate way.
Iran and the United States’ unprecedented estrangement has a cultural complement in Iran that can be described as “qahr.” Qahr, a cultural institution in Iran, is not a permanent disagreement but cannot be resolved by the estranged parties without irreparable loss of honor. The resolution, or “aashti,” must be mediated by a party whom both sides respect. During this period -- which can last for years -- the parties remain emotionally connected to each other, though their relationship is cold and hostile. This perfectly describes the U.S.-Iranian relationship.
In this current situation, the "trigger" for the breakthrough was a request to Iran that they enter into talks with the United States from Shi'a cleric Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).
Mr. Al-Hakim is a near-perfect mediator, respected by both the United States and Iran. He was a member of the U.S.-appointed Iraq Interim Governing Council and served as its president in December 2003. He replaced his brother, the revered Shi’a leader Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, as leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq when the latter was assassinated in August 2003 in Najaf. He was also the first candidate listed for the United Iraqi Coalition during the first Iraqi legislative election of January 2005. Perhaps most importantly, he is a close ally of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who has arguably become the most influential Shi'a leader in the world, revered both in Iran and Iraq.
The talks were facilitated by the authorization given by the U.S. government to its Iraqi ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad some months ago to enter into conversation with Iran specifically on the Iraqi situation -- a prospect that the Iranians rejected at the time.
In fact, Iranians have been looking for a mediator in their dispute with the United States for years. Their hopes that Europeans could serve in that role were dashed as France, Germany and Great Britain capitulated to U.S. pressure by actively lobbying for Iran to limit its nuclear energy program.
The long estrangement between Iran and the United States has a solid basis. Each nation has done things that are seen as insulting and damaging to the other. The United States' support of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, including the CIA supported coup in 1953 that restored him to power after he was ousted in a popular movement, lies at the core of Iranian discontent with the United States. American support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, economic sanctions and rhetorical excesses such as President Bush’s inclusion of Iran in the “Axis of Evil,” and the U.S. position on Iran's nuclear energy program only fueled Iranian anger.
From the U.S. standpoint, the hostage crisis of 1979-80, when U.S. diplomatic personnel were held by Iranian revolutionaries for 444 days is Iran's principal transgression. Iran’s hostility toward the "Zionist regime" in Israel, its support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon and its frequent identification of the United States as the "Great Satan" keep American hostility toward Iran alive.
But Iran and the United States both need to see violence and disorder in Iraq come to an end. A stable, functioning Iraq will alleviate the major political liability for the Bush administration. Iran does not want to inherit responsibility for a perpetual civil war on its borders.
The primary obstacle to this salutary potential cooperation is Iran’s nuclear energy program. President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have in the past week both identified Iran as the United States' "most serious security threat" based on the fear that Iran may be developing nuclear weapons. Iran feels that it is being unfairly targeted for what it claims is a peaceful energy program that has conformed to all the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to which Iran (unlike India, Pakistan and Israel) is a signatory.
No timeline has been set for the talks yet. But if both the United States and Iran can reach agreement on a common cooperative strategy for Iraq, the chances are hopeful that other differences between the two nations can eventually also be mediated. To make this work, both sides must show respect for the other, avoiding the invective of the past 27 years.
Iranians, like Americans, are always relieved at a resolution of tension. A successful resolution of a qahr situation frequently results in the estranged parties being better friends than ever from that point onward. Let us hope both that a productive strategy for dealing with Iraq can be reached, and that this will create further good will and greater trust.
User Comments
Maureen Stapler Crowell on Mar 18, 2006 at 09:53:21 said:
A major step toward peace. May it succeed.
It also might be helpful for countries to work together to develop healthy peaceful energy programs -- solar, wind, hydro, geo.
Abdnour on Mar 17, 2006 at 19:11:12 said:
This a great news.It is a breakthrough.I become very emotional after reading this article.I am amazed to read it.This Iraki official seem to me that he is an angelsent by God to bring peace on this Earth that is so needed.I do beleive strongly in this.The world
prayers of all faiths are started tobe answered.I have and I had faith that this world can live in peace and harmony.God has been watching and listening for a long time.Because of his eternal love and compassion,he wouldn't let further damages to happen to the mankind.He wanted to put an end to unproductive differences.Saint Augustine said once:"The Divine Word."lightens every Man on this world.Let hope follow its course and the bells of peace ring allover the world.Thank you GOD!This world will regain then love,trust,and espect that have been lost for a long long time.
Bo Campbell on Mar 17, 2006 at 18:28:59 said:
Excellent analysis. The irony of this (if Bush escapes the Iraq debacle) is just too rich.
Rick stanich on Mar 17, 2006 at 18:25:23 said:
If the U.S. enters into this "emotional realationship,which can last for years", it would offer the Iranian leadership more courage to continue it's clandestine nuclear program.America would be decieved into a false sense of hope, and would allow the Iranian regime , as predicated in the koran "a time to sharpen your swords"Resolve the nuclear issue first.Then talk about Iraq.
Time is not on the side of the Iranian regime,but the smoke and mirror "talks" about Iraq would certainly ease the pressure,and quite possibly give them time to sharpen their nukes
Post Your Comments
First/Last Name
Your Email Address
Your Comments
Disclaimer: New America Media will put up as many of your comments as possible but we cannot guarantee that all e-mails will be published. NAM reserves the right to edit comments that are published.
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The United States and Iran will be holding direct talks for the first time in 27 years. The talks are about a matter of intense importance to both parties: stabilization of the volatile situation in Iraq. This breakthrough has a good chance of success because for the first time it has been structured in a culturally appropriate way.
Iran and the United States’ unprecedented estrangement has a cultural complement in Iran that can be described as “qahr.” Qahr, a cultural institution in Iran, is not a permanent disagreement but cannot be resolved by the estranged parties without irreparable loss of honor. The resolution, or “aashti,” must be mediated by a party whom both sides respect. During this period -- which can last for years -- the parties remain emotionally connected to each other, though their relationship is cold and hostile. This perfectly describes the U.S.-Iranian relationship.
In this current situation, the "trigger" for the breakthrough was a request to Iran that they enter into talks with the United States from Shi'a cleric Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).
Mr. Al-Hakim is a near-perfect mediator, respected by both the United States and Iran. He was a member of the U.S.-appointed Iraq Interim Governing Council and served as its president in December 2003. He replaced his brother, the revered Shi’a leader Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, as leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq when the latter was assassinated in August 2003 in Najaf. He was also the first candidate listed for the United Iraqi Coalition during the first Iraqi legislative election of January 2005. Perhaps most importantly, he is a close ally of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who has arguably become the most influential Shi'a leader in the world, revered both in Iran and Iraq.
The talks were facilitated by the authorization given by the U.S. government to its Iraqi ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad some months ago to enter into conversation with Iran specifically on the Iraqi situation -- a prospect that the Iranians rejected at the time.
In fact, Iranians have been looking for a mediator in their dispute with the United States for years. Their hopes that Europeans could serve in that role were dashed as France, Germany and Great Britain capitulated to U.S. pressure by actively lobbying for Iran to limit its nuclear energy program.
The long estrangement between Iran and the United States has a solid basis. Each nation has done things that are seen as insulting and damaging to the other. The United States' support of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, including the CIA supported coup in 1953 that restored him to power after he was ousted in a popular movement, lies at the core of Iranian discontent with the United States. American support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, economic sanctions and rhetorical excesses such as President Bush’s inclusion of Iran in the “Axis of Evil,” and the U.S. position on Iran's nuclear energy program only fueled Iranian anger.
From the U.S. standpoint, the hostage crisis of 1979-80, when U.S. diplomatic personnel were held by Iranian revolutionaries for 444 days is Iran's principal transgression. Iran’s hostility toward the "Zionist regime" in Israel, its support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon and its frequent identification of the United States as the "Great Satan" keep American hostility toward Iran alive.
But Iran and the United States both need to see violence and disorder in Iraq come to an end. A stable, functioning Iraq will alleviate the major political liability for the Bush administration. Iran does not want to inherit responsibility for a perpetual civil war on its borders.
The primary obstacle to this salutary potential cooperation is Iran’s nuclear energy program. President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have in the past week both identified Iran as the United States' "most serious security threat" based on the fear that Iran may be developing nuclear weapons. Iran feels that it is being unfairly targeted for what it claims is a peaceful energy program that has conformed to all the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to which Iran (unlike India, Pakistan and Israel) is a signatory.
No timeline has been set for the talks yet. But if both the United States and Iran can reach agreement on a common cooperative strategy for Iraq, the chances are hopeful that other differences between the two nations can eventually also be mediated. To make this work, both sides must show respect for the other, avoiding the invective of the past 27 years.
Iranians, like Americans, are always relieved at a resolution of tension. A successful resolution of a qahr situation frequently results in the estranged parties being better friends than ever from that point onward. Let us hope both that a productive strategy for dealing with Iraq can be reached, and that this will create further good will and greater trust.
User Comments
Maureen Stapler Crowell on Mar 18, 2006 at 09:53:21 said:
A major step toward peace. May it succeed.
It also might be helpful for countries to work together to develop healthy peaceful energy programs -- solar, wind, hydro, geo.
Abdnour on Mar 17, 2006 at 19:11:12 said:
This a great news.It is a breakthrough.I become very emotional after reading this article.I am amazed to read it.This Iraki official seem to me that he is an angelsent by God to bring peace on this Earth that is so needed.I do beleive strongly in this.The world
prayers of all faiths are started tobe answered.I have and I had faith that this world can live in peace and harmony.God has been watching and listening for a long time.Because of his eternal love and compassion,he wouldn't let further damages to happen to the mankind.He wanted to put an end to unproductive differences.Saint Augustine said once:"The Divine Word."lightens every Man on this world.Let hope follow its course and the bells of peace ring allover the world.Thank you GOD!This world will regain then love,trust,and espect that have been lost for a long long time.
Bo Campbell on Mar 17, 2006 at 18:28:59 said:
Excellent analysis. The irony of this (if Bush escapes the Iraq debacle) is just too rich.
Rick stanich on Mar 17, 2006 at 18:25:23 said:
If the U.S. enters into this "emotional realationship,which can last for years", it would offer the Iranian leadership more courage to continue it's clandestine nuclear program.America would be decieved into a false sense of hope, and would allow the Iranian regime , as predicated in the koran "a time to sharpen your swords"Resolve the nuclear issue first.Then talk about Iraq.
Time is not on the side of the Iranian regime,but the smoke and mirror "talks" about Iraq would certainly ease the pressure,and quite possibly give them time to sharpen their nukes
Post Your Comments
First/Last Name
Your Email Address
Your Comments
Disclaimer: New America Media will put up as many of your comments as possible but we cannot guarantee that all e-mails will be published. NAM reserves the right to edit comments that are published.
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U.S. and Iran Agree to Historic Talks Thanks to an Iraqi Mediator
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TheStar.com - Fallout from Tehran's nuclear program
TheStar.com - Fallout from Tehran's nuclear program
Fallout from Tehran's nuclear program
analysis | Experts weigh the chances of a pre-emptive U.S. attack and consider the ramifications of an `Islamic bomb.' By Olivia Ward
Mar. 19, 2006. 01:00 AM
OLIVIA WARD
FEATURE WRITER
Remember "Shock and awe"?
As the standoff over Iran's nuclear ambitions continues, the rhetoric between Tehran and Washington is ratcheting up.
Iran's insistence on its right to pursue a nuclear program it calls peaceful, and the U.S. demand that it cease and desist, have brought the world closer to a confrontation that some fear could be a replay of the invasion of Iraq.
On Thursday, U.S. President George W. Bush reaffirmed his pre-emptive war doctrine, accusing Iran of supporting terrorism. The strategy paper said: "We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran."
Iranian nuclear sites are reportedly marked off as targets in a Pentagon war room. John Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, has warned that the United States would use "all the tools at our disposal" to block Iran's nuclear program. He said the U.S. is "beefing up defensive measures" for retaliation — a hint that Washington may not rule out a pre-emptive strike using nuclear weapons.
But how likely is an attack on Iran? And in a worst-case scenario, if Tehran were able to secretly develop a bomb, would it open the way to atomic Armageddon?
"Our military is spread very thin in Iraq and Afghanistan," says Philip Coyle, a senior adviser to the Washington-based Center for Defense Information and former U.S. assistant secretary of defence. "That's the kind of situation in which defence planners will turn to nuclear weapons."
But others take a much different view.
Pre-emptive strikes have been Bush's national security strategy since 2002, notes American military expert and author William Arkin. Two years later, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld approved a top-secret "interim global strike alert order," putting the military on alert to attack countries that are developing weapons of mass destruction.
The order is especially aimed at Iran and North Korea, but the kind of planning that would go into a full-scale bombing campaign to end the threat of an Iranian attack — by wiping out dozens of Iranian command-and-control centres, nuclear sites and missile-launching areas — takes years rather than months.
"I reject the media swirl that says an attack is imminent," says Arkin.
"Getting to the point where the military would have an order from the president to hit Iran next week requires enormous amounts of preparation, organization and a worked-out plan for what fighting a nuclear war would mean. The military knows it is not ready for that."
He adds, though, that "this administration is committed to a course of action that it will use force to prevent others from gaining weapons of mass destruction. It has made it very clear they aren't waiting for the mushroom cloud."
But is Iran bent on developing nuclear weapons — putting hard-line clerics in control of what some fear could be an "Islamic bomb?"
In the West, opinion is divided. For some, Washington's misleading allegations about Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons program have discredited more recent ones that Tehran is moving its nuclear program along a military path.
For others, Iran's refusal to answer key questions posed by the International Atomic Energy Agency is proof that the claims are correct.
Former IAEA weapons inspector David Albright says Iran has "crossed a well-established red line" by breaking the watchdog agency's seals on some of its nuclear sites and announcing plans to resume uranium enrichment-related activities that would provide the quality of fuel needed for power reactors or nuclear weapons.
But Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, says even if Iran decided to develop deadly weapons, "it won't happen tomorrow. If they began right away with an enrichment plant operating, it would be at least three years away. And there could be problems we don't even know about."
Experts point out that bomb-building on a national scale requires good luck as well as good engineering. Centrifuges used to spin energy-producing uranium 235 away from its heavier and more common variety, U-238, are notoriously breakdown-prone. The IAEA recorded that, in 2004, fewer than half of Iran's 1,140 centrifuges were functional. Iran plans to install some 50,000 in its main enrichment plant at Natanz.
The political motivation for Iran to build a nuclear bomb is powerful, however painstaking the process.
"As long as the U.S. makes it clear they're interested in regime change, it's in the interest of Iran to pursue its own deterrent," says Trita Parsi, a Middle East expert at Johns Hopkins University.
"They may be trying to get the technology and master the fuel cycle because they want the option of weaponizing if the situation deteriorates."
The IAEA continues to call for monitoring of Iran's nuclear program and inspections of its sites and scientific documents, while the U.S. and other Western countries urge putting it on the agenda of the UN Security Council. That could result in sanctions or military action if monitoring were not vetoed by historically reluctant China and Russia.
But, says Houchang Hassan-Yari of the Royal Military College in Kingston, "first we have to establish that Iran is really looking for a nuclear bomb. Many times in the past, the IAEA has said they couldn't find anything incriminating. The whole issue isn't a legal or technical one, it's become political."
Iran has repeatedly denied it is interested in developing nuclear weapons. And, Hassan-Yari points out, it has signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty — unlike India, which was recently rewarded by a nuclear deal with Washington
But fear of an "Islamic bomb" has been fuelled by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's bellicose rhetoric, his denial of the Holocaust and his rabid statements against Israel, urging that it be "wiped off the map."
"The question of the nuclear issue wouldn't be an issue at all if the U.S. hadn't decided to pursue it," argues William Beeman, a professor of anthropology and Middle Eastern Studies at Brown University in Rhode Island, and author of The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs:" How the U.S. and Iran Demonize Each Other.
"The U.S. was the instigator of the nuclear program in the 1970s when it sold Iran its technology. The program has continued since then, so it's disingenuous to suddenly declare it a danger."
Alarm bells have been sounded in the past, but less loudly. In the mid-1990s former secretary of state Warren Christopher declared that "based on a wide variety of data, we know that since the mid-1980s, Iran has had an organized structure dedicated to acquiring and developing nuclear weapons."
But, says Beeman, who has studied Iran for three decades, "there is no weapons program. There is nothing that could threaten the U.S. The main fear is that Iran would want to drop a nuclear bomb on Tel Aviv. That is so far beyond possibility as to make the whole scenario ludicrous."
Arguments against allowing Iran to develop an atomic bomb are legion, and all of them frightening: it would destabilize the Middle East; tip the balance against Muslim moderates and toward extremists; provide "dirty bombs" for Hezbollah and anti-Western militants; entrench Iranian hardliners in power; and pose enormous danger if the country fell into political unrest and revolution.
But some observers point out that Iran may see some justification for developing a bomb.
"The American presence surrounding Iran has not improved security, but rather has put a dagger to Iran's front and back," writes non-proliferation expert George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "If ever a country needs nuclear weapons to deter a stronger adversary it is Iran."
Leon Hadar, author of Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East and a research fellow at the Washington-based Cato Institute, says the fear of an Iranian bomb is overblown.
And, he adds, looking at the question historically, there may be points in its favour.
"If you go back to when China exploded its first bomb, the reactions in the American press looked like the end of the world had come.
"China was ruled at that time by ideological fanatics who were every day reiterating their plans to destroy the West. But in the end it created a triangle of relationships that contained the Soviet Union, which was already armed with nuclear weapons."
When Pakistan set off five nuclear tests in 1998, it was also greeted with horror.
However, Pakistan's relations with its nuclear rival, India, thawed in the aftermath of the blast, and there was new agreement over the territorial issue of Kashmir. The two countries pulled back from the brink of war.
That, says Hadar, is the stabilizing effect of nuclear parity.
"I don't advocate nuclear weapons. But in the case of Iran one can see that if there were an Iranian bomb, Israel and Iran would be forced to communicate, to avoid what used to be called `mutual assured destruction.'"
And, he adds, "if Iran had a bomb, there would be a new balance of power in the Middle East, and the U.S. would be marginalized. Iran would be suicidal to think of dropping a bomb on Israel, and Israel would rethink its policy of not admitting it has nuclear weapons. It would also mean that Iran would not risk giving Hezbollah the green light to attack Israel (from Lebanon) because it would know there could be a nuclear response."
Non-proliferation advocates argue that the only solution to the escalation dilemma, ultimately, is world disarmament and a nuclear-free Middle East. Disarmament has been rejected by the U.S., which has reduced its deadly weapons but continues to advocate the development of new nuclear arms. A nuclear-free region was rejected by Israel, which like India and Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty but is widely understood to possess nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Russia and China are showing no sign of eliminating their nuclear arsenals.
While most observers look at the possibility of an Iranian bomb with dismay, a few are beginning to argue that it could be the "shock therapy" that would jolt the Middle East toward eventual nuclear disarmament, and to peace.
"Can we live with a nuclear Iran?" asks Hadar. "Probably. Whether you are a hawk or a dove, you must prepare for a worst-case scenario. Thinking the unthinkable doesn't mean you want it to happen."
Fallout from Tehran's nuclear program
analysis | Experts weigh the chances of a pre-emptive U.S. attack and consider the ramifications of an `Islamic bomb.' By Olivia Ward
Mar. 19, 2006. 01:00 AM
OLIVIA WARD
FEATURE WRITER
Remember "Shock and awe"?
As the standoff over Iran's nuclear ambitions continues, the rhetoric between Tehran and Washington is ratcheting up.
Iran's insistence on its right to pursue a nuclear program it calls peaceful, and the U.S. demand that it cease and desist, have brought the world closer to a confrontation that some fear could be a replay of the invasion of Iraq.
On Thursday, U.S. President George W. Bush reaffirmed his pre-emptive war doctrine, accusing Iran of supporting terrorism. The strategy paper said: "We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran."
Iranian nuclear sites are reportedly marked off as targets in a Pentagon war room. John Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, has warned that the United States would use "all the tools at our disposal" to block Iran's nuclear program. He said the U.S. is "beefing up defensive measures" for retaliation — a hint that Washington may not rule out a pre-emptive strike using nuclear weapons.
But how likely is an attack on Iran? And in a worst-case scenario, if Tehran were able to secretly develop a bomb, would it open the way to atomic Armageddon?
"Our military is spread very thin in Iraq and Afghanistan," says Philip Coyle, a senior adviser to the Washington-based Center for Defense Information and former U.S. assistant secretary of defence. "That's the kind of situation in which defence planners will turn to nuclear weapons."
But others take a much different view.
Pre-emptive strikes have been Bush's national security strategy since 2002, notes American military expert and author William Arkin. Two years later, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld approved a top-secret "interim global strike alert order," putting the military on alert to attack countries that are developing weapons of mass destruction.
The order is especially aimed at Iran and North Korea, but the kind of planning that would go into a full-scale bombing campaign to end the threat of an Iranian attack — by wiping out dozens of Iranian command-and-control centres, nuclear sites and missile-launching areas — takes years rather than months.
"I reject the media swirl that says an attack is imminent," says Arkin.
"Getting to the point where the military would have an order from the president to hit Iran next week requires enormous amounts of preparation, organization and a worked-out plan for what fighting a nuclear war would mean. The military knows it is not ready for that."
He adds, though, that "this administration is committed to a course of action that it will use force to prevent others from gaining weapons of mass destruction. It has made it very clear they aren't waiting for the mushroom cloud."
But is Iran bent on developing nuclear weapons — putting hard-line clerics in control of what some fear could be an "Islamic bomb?"
In the West, opinion is divided. For some, Washington's misleading allegations about Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons program have discredited more recent ones that Tehran is moving its nuclear program along a military path.
For others, Iran's refusal to answer key questions posed by the International Atomic Energy Agency is proof that the claims are correct.
Former IAEA weapons inspector David Albright says Iran has "crossed a well-established red line" by breaking the watchdog agency's seals on some of its nuclear sites and announcing plans to resume uranium enrichment-related activities that would provide the quality of fuel needed for power reactors or nuclear weapons.
But Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, says even if Iran decided to develop deadly weapons, "it won't happen tomorrow. If they began right away with an enrichment plant operating, it would be at least three years away. And there could be problems we don't even know about."
Experts point out that bomb-building on a national scale requires good luck as well as good engineering. Centrifuges used to spin energy-producing uranium 235 away from its heavier and more common variety, U-238, are notoriously breakdown-prone. The IAEA recorded that, in 2004, fewer than half of Iran's 1,140 centrifuges were functional. Iran plans to install some 50,000 in its main enrichment plant at Natanz.
The political motivation for Iran to build a nuclear bomb is powerful, however painstaking the process.
"As long as the U.S. makes it clear they're interested in regime change, it's in the interest of Iran to pursue its own deterrent," says Trita Parsi, a Middle East expert at Johns Hopkins University.
"They may be trying to get the technology and master the fuel cycle because they want the option of weaponizing if the situation deteriorates."
The IAEA continues to call for monitoring of Iran's nuclear program and inspections of its sites and scientific documents, while the U.S. and other Western countries urge putting it on the agenda of the UN Security Council. That could result in sanctions or military action if monitoring were not vetoed by historically reluctant China and Russia.
But, says Houchang Hassan-Yari of the Royal Military College in Kingston, "first we have to establish that Iran is really looking for a nuclear bomb. Many times in the past, the IAEA has said they couldn't find anything incriminating. The whole issue isn't a legal or technical one, it's become political."
Iran has repeatedly denied it is interested in developing nuclear weapons. And, Hassan-Yari points out, it has signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty — unlike India, which was recently rewarded by a nuclear deal with Washington
But fear of an "Islamic bomb" has been fuelled by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's bellicose rhetoric, his denial of the Holocaust and his rabid statements against Israel, urging that it be "wiped off the map."
"The question of the nuclear issue wouldn't be an issue at all if the U.S. hadn't decided to pursue it," argues William Beeman, a professor of anthropology and Middle Eastern Studies at Brown University in Rhode Island, and author of The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs:" How the U.S. and Iran Demonize Each Other.
"The U.S. was the instigator of the nuclear program in the 1970s when it sold Iran its technology. The program has continued since then, so it's disingenuous to suddenly declare it a danger."
Alarm bells have been sounded in the past, but less loudly. In the mid-1990s former secretary of state Warren Christopher declared that "based on a wide variety of data, we know that since the mid-1980s, Iran has had an organized structure dedicated to acquiring and developing nuclear weapons."
But, says Beeman, who has studied Iran for three decades, "there is no weapons program. There is nothing that could threaten the U.S. The main fear is that Iran would want to drop a nuclear bomb on Tel Aviv. That is so far beyond possibility as to make the whole scenario ludicrous."
Arguments against allowing Iran to develop an atomic bomb are legion, and all of them frightening: it would destabilize the Middle East; tip the balance against Muslim moderates and toward extremists; provide "dirty bombs" for Hezbollah and anti-Western militants; entrench Iranian hardliners in power; and pose enormous danger if the country fell into political unrest and revolution.
But some observers point out that Iran may see some justification for developing a bomb.
"The American presence surrounding Iran has not improved security, but rather has put a dagger to Iran's front and back," writes non-proliferation expert George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "If ever a country needs nuclear weapons to deter a stronger adversary it is Iran."
Leon Hadar, author of Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East and a research fellow at the Washington-based Cato Institute, says the fear of an Iranian bomb is overblown.
And, he adds, looking at the question historically, there may be points in its favour.
"If you go back to when China exploded its first bomb, the reactions in the American press looked like the end of the world had come.
"China was ruled at that time by ideological fanatics who were every day reiterating their plans to destroy the West. But in the end it created a triangle of relationships that contained the Soviet Union, which was already armed with nuclear weapons."
When Pakistan set off five nuclear tests in 1998, it was also greeted with horror.
However, Pakistan's relations with its nuclear rival, India, thawed in the aftermath of the blast, and there was new agreement over the territorial issue of Kashmir. The two countries pulled back from the brink of war.
That, says Hadar, is the stabilizing effect of nuclear parity.
"I don't advocate nuclear weapons. But in the case of Iran one can see that if there were an Iranian bomb, Israel and Iran would be forced to communicate, to avoid what used to be called `mutual assured destruction.'"
And, he adds, "if Iran had a bomb, there would be a new balance of power in the Middle East, and the U.S. would be marginalized. Iran would be suicidal to think of dropping a bomb on Israel, and Israel would rethink its policy of not admitting it has nuclear weapons. It would also mean that Iran would not risk giving Hezbollah the green light to attack Israel (from Lebanon) because it would know there could be a nuclear response."
Non-proliferation advocates argue that the only solution to the escalation dilemma, ultimately, is world disarmament and a nuclear-free Middle East. Disarmament has been rejected by the U.S., which has reduced its deadly weapons but continues to advocate the development of new nuclear arms. A nuclear-free region was rejected by Israel, which like India and Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty but is widely understood to possess nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Russia and China are showing no sign of eliminating their nuclear arsenals.
While most observers look at the possibility of an Iranian bomb with dismay, a few are beginning to argue that it could be the "shock therapy" that would jolt the Middle East toward eventual nuclear disarmament, and to peace.
"Can we live with a nuclear Iran?" asks Hadar. "Probably. Whether you are a hawk or a dove, you must prepare for a worst-case scenario. Thinking the unthinkable doesn't mean you want it to happen."
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